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SUMMARY 
This philosophical, anthropological study within a fundamental agogic perspective, 
employed an existential phenomenological approach to find out what adulthood is, 
fundamentally. Adulthood as being-ethical, is a more adequate description than 
chronological, biological, psychological and sociological descriptions of adulthood. 
Finding out what being-ethical is, required investigating what it means to be human. Only 
humans exist, and must participate effectively in agogic-dialogic relationships to alleviate 
existential yearning and experience dignifiedness. A code of effective agogy is presented. 
This code is the basis for a universal, fundamental code of ethics which transcends 
particular moral codes and professional codes of ethics. The words "ethicals", 
"ethicalness" and "ethicality" are employed to name, respectively, individual 
requirements in the code; acting according to the code; and the inescapable interrelatedness 
of experiencing dignifiedness and adhering to ethicals. Detailed explanations are given of 
what it means to respond fundamentally ethically. 
Adultness, humanness and ethicalness are different perceptions of the same continuum. 
All humans, whether aware of it or not, have an unattainable ideal of perfect humanness, 
to which they must perennially progress in order to experience dignifiedness, and 
humanness entails perennially becoming more human. Since no human can become 
perfectly human, the ideal of perfect humanness can be called "God". This means that the 
code of humanness is also the code of Godliness and the word "spiritual" is used to 
distinguish fundamental God from religious Gods. 
Spiritual responsibility is the interrelatedness of being-questioning and being-questioned. 
Ultimately, a person's humanness is assessed against the ideal of perfect humanness, by 
his or her own spiritual conscience. Humanity is the interrelatedness of the realities of 
existentiality, agogicality, ethicality, and spirituality and humanness is the inseparability 
of the continua of existentialness, ethicalness, agogicalness and spiritualness. A detailed 
existential-ethical description of education is given. The thesis ends with a post-scientific 
view of what essentially agogic orientated (educative) teaching is, and four 
recommendations are offered to enhance the effectiveness of agogy in teaching and 
learning institutions. Despite an extensive and radical study, it is acknowledged that the 
mystery that is humanity, can never be totally revealed. 
Key terms: 
Adulthood; adult education; andragogic perspective; agogy; education; dignity; ethics; 
existence; existential-ethical; existential phenomenology; fundamental ethics; fundamental 
radical reflection; Godliness; humanness; meaningfulness; philosophical anthropology; 
responsibleness; spirituality. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THEMATOLOGICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ORIENTATION 
"Philosophy is bedevilled with technical jargon whose use embodies confusion - as 
often as not, several different sorts of confusion. Such words have no clear sense, but 
they are liable to have several unclear senses." 
Williams (457:172) 
1.0 INTRODUCTION: MOTIVATION FOR, AND TOPICALITY OF, THE 
RESEARCH I 
As a career educationist2 researching in the discipline of adult education, the 
researcher3 encountered numerous definitional and conceptual difficulties in the literature. 
Harrington (156:xii), for example, experienced similar difficulties: "There are definition 
difficulties, too. Some day a wise individual4 - not a committee - will solve the semantic 
problems. Until then, we must stumble on as best we can." Difficulties in defining 
concepts in the discipline of adult education hindered the researcher's understanding of 
what the education of adults is, and hindered fulfilling the role of educator of adults 
especially in teaching of philosophy of adult education to postgraduate students. 
Some of the difficulties just mentioned included uncertainty about: the aims of the 
education of adults; whether the education of adults is different from the education of 
children and, if so, how; the role of the adult educator; whether authority has any place in 
the education of adults, and the distinction between education of adults, lifelong 
education, permanent education, recurrent education and continuing education. 
1 In this thesis, the phrases "the research" and "this research" are shorthand for the research 
undertaken by the researcher to find answers to the research questions which will be made explicit later 
in this chapter. The word "thesis" refers to this document recording the results of the research. 
2 Almost all bold type, even in quotations from fellow-researchers, is the researcher's: it is used to 
emphasise important phrases of special relevance. Where bold type is a fellow-researcher's emphasis, 
this is mentioned in a footnote. The word "educationist" indicates one who researches, and for the 
purposes of this introductory chapter, "educator" indicates a person who teaches. There is some debate 
as to whether disciplines such as adult education should be spelled with capital letters: in this 
thesis, lower case has been adopted. 
3 The researcher was: tutor and junior lecturer in the School of Economics in the University of Cape 
Town from 1976 to 1980; lecturer in the Department of Adult and Continuing Education, University of 
Glasgow, Scotland, from 1985 to 1990 and is currently an independent management and education 
consultant in Aberdeen, Scotland. 
4 It is highly unlikely that any one person will be able to make major contributions to answering the 
complex questions about humankind. All a scientist can do is make a small contribution to scientific 
dialogue in the hope of finding seeking answers. Scientific research is regarded as all research 
conducted in a systematic and methodical way and not just research in natural science. 
Consequently, since educationists undertake scientific research in the discipline of education, an 
instance of social science, they are referred to as "scientists" in this thesis. Further explanation of 
this approach is provided in Paragraph 3.1 in the current chapter. 
l 
In addition, the researcher found that some educationists who study the education of 
children describe education in a way which leads one to question the very possibility of 
the education of adults and consequently, the possibility of a discipline of adult education. 
For example, Viljoen and Pienaar (439:74) founds that adulthood is" ... a life sphere into 
which the child enters after completion of education ... " and that consequently, 
education is the accompaniment of children to adulthood. Similarly, Coleman (63:vii) 
found that schooling is a way for youth to come into, or (63: 146) be brought into, 
adulthood. Beyers Nel (27:6) found that the ultimate purpose of education is adulthood. 
If these descriptions of what education is, are adequate, it would be inadequate to refer to 
adults continuing their education, the activity of educating adults and the 
discipline of adult education. Wiltshire (464:16) reported similarly: "Against this 
background [education as initial and preparatory ]6, adult education does look very odd 
indeed - almost a contradiction in terms to those who think of adult status as putting 
them beyond the reach of education ... ". 
In summary, the researcher gained the impression that much of the debate in the literature 
of philosophy of adult education arises because "adulthood" or "adult" are not 
defined adequately"7. Consequently, what appears to be debate about a specific problem 
is, when analysed carefully, a non-explicit argument about the nature of 
adulthood. The researcher found in the relevant literature, very few educationists 
attempting to define "adult" or "adulthood", other than by giving a chronological or 
legal age. It was also founds that when definitions are attempted, many of them are 
ambiguous, contradictory or unhelpful in explaining what adulthood is. Le Guillou 
(239:67) for example, first admitted to the definitional problem, but then accepted a 
"definition" of adult education which is inadequate: "In an attempt to avoid the pitfalls of 
semantics, this paper adopts the definition of adult education as ... 'the extension of 
general education into adult life' ". The researcher considered this "definition" inadequate 
because it does not go on to explain what is meant by "adult life". 
5 The researcher is reporting his and others' findings which are there before the task of writing them down 
is attempted. Consequently, it is more accurate to use the past tense "found" rather than the present 
tense "finds". The use of "finding", "findings" and "found" is further explained in Paragraph 3.2 
of the current chapter. 
6 Unless otherwise stated, square brackets [ ] are the researcher's, and round brackets ( ) used in the 
quotations of fellow-researchers indicate brackets in the original. 
7 The use of "adequate" and "adequately" as opposed to "accurate" and "accurately", is explained 
in Paragraph 3.2.1 of the current chapter. To avoid repetition in this thesis, of the phrases "The term" 
or "The word", words (terms) that name concepts are indicated by using quotation marks," ... " as is 
standard practice in philosophical writing. See Hospers (172: 10). · 
8 Unless otherwise stated, "It was found" is used to mean the researcher found. This approach avoids 
the repetition of "The researcher found". 
2 
In addition, when definitions (whatever their degree of adequacy) are provided, they are 
frequently used inconsistently. For example, Harrington (156:xii) accepted a definition of 
adulthood based on chronological age but then found that: "With voting and other 
rights now granted at age eighteen, nearly everyone in higher education can be called an 
adult; and most professional and graduate students are over twenty-one. But in this 
volume adult education refers to those who have completed or interrupted 
their schooling and are entering a college or university or are coming into 
contact with a higher education program9 after an interval away from the 
classroom." 
Part of the researcher's motivation for wanting to study adulthood, was to find out if a 
more adequate definition of adulthood could contribute to overcoming the conceptual 
difficulties in adult education as just described. Another part motivation was the 
researcher's preliminary finding (344:63-66) that adulthood as an existential-ethical 
continuum might provide a more adequate description of what adulthood is than 
chronological, biological, psychological and sociological descriptions alone. 
The researcher was first alerted to the term "existential-ethical continuum", by 
Oberholzer and Grey ling who frequently employed "existential-ethical" (311 :25, 40, 45). 
It might be considered that by presenting findings from previous research, the researcher 
had already concluded what adulthood is. This is not the case. Adhering to the demands 
of scientific research, the researcher used previously arrived at and preliminary 
observations of his own and fellow-researcherslO as points of departure. On initially 
presenting the preliminary observation of adulthood as an existential-ethical 
continuum in the previous research, it was stated that extensive further research would 
be required. This thesis documents the results of that further research. 
~he concerns just explained about the adequacy of descriptions of adulthood, could in 
themselves, be sufficient grounds for undertaking the research. However, it is possible 
that many natural scientists and some social scientists 11 may consider that research into the 
9 Unless otherwise stated, italic type is used only to reflect original researchers' use of italics and to 
highlight foreign terms, and titles of books. Americanised spelling is retained in quotations of fellow-
researchers. The reader may notice that Harrington used "adult education" to name the education of 
adults and not the discipline of adult education. 
10 "Fellow-researchers" is used in place of "other researchers". The researcher regards himself as not 
alone in the search for answers about adulthood and knows he can contribute in only a very small way 
to enhancing understanding in this regard. Research colleagues are regarded not as "the opposition" to 
be attacked and criticised, but as fellow-humans seeking answers. Where "many researchers" or "some 
researchers" are used, the researcher's attitude of genuine dialogue is also present. 
11 "Natural" is used instead of "physical scientists" because it more adequately indicates the 
distinction between natural and social science. Similarly, "social" is used instead of "human 
3 
nature of adulthood is unnecessary. Some educationists may assume that most people 
will have an idea, opinion, view or notion as to what is meant by "adult" and 
"adulthood" and that even children have their own ideas of the meaning of being a 
grown-up. Jordan (195:1) found it arresting that we [contemporary Americans] should 
be asking the question "what does adulthood mean?" - a question that would have made 
little sense to our forebears. 
Some educationists may indicate that extensive research has already been conducted into 
adulthood and that the researcher's investigation into whether adulthood is an 
existential-ethical continuum, is yet another attempt to build a theory, model or 
view of adulthood. To ground even more thoroughly the need for, and topicality of the 
research, it is necessary to present additional evidence. Scientists (including educationists) 
who have studied, or who are still studying adulthood, have themselves indicated, and 
still indicate, the need for further information and research on adulthood. Graubard 
(135:v) expressed the need "to develop analytic procedures that will make the study of 
'adulthood' as common as the study of 'childhood' ", and Jordan (195:10) found that, 
adulthood as a condition used to be simply assumed, but now demands explanation. 
Kakar (198:ix) found it surprisingly difficult to obtain a precise meaning of adulthood, 
and Erikson found that there was a need for a better definition of adulthood (96:33). 
Viljoen and Pienaar (439:131) found that the concept of adulthood is being used" ... 
most inaccurately ... " and that the concept of adulthood needs a new perspective: "If, in 
future, being-an-adult is still to be typified as educational aim, we must definitely 
arrive at new perspectives ... " (439:139). Fiske (104:4) found that: " ... we have not yet 
had time to progress much beyond some sketchy mapping of this [adulthood] vast new 
multidisciplinary field." Similarly, Erikson stated: "But we have only recently come to 
discuss in earnest ... what an adult really is. It will take many seminars, interdisciplinary 
and multidisciplinary, to clarify the question." In addition, Kleiber and Maehr (215:ix) 
found that the study of maturation and adulthood is in its infancy. 
Kimmel (210:vii), referring to adulthood, found that: " ... these important years of the life 
span have only recently begun to receive the detailed attention they deserve." He also 
found (210:viii) that adulthood and ageing12 will continue to emerge as a significant 
field of study; until recently research into the adult years has been uncharted territory; 
there is still much we do not know, even though the knowledge about adulthood 
science" because only humans undertake science, and in this sense, all science including natural 
science, is human science. 
12 
"Ageing" is preferred to "aging". Spelling as used in the United States of America (for example 
"aging", and "program") is retained in the original quotations of other scientists. Kimmel is being 
paraphrased, so "aging" becomes "ageing". 
4 
and ageing has been growing rapidly during the last several years and there are many 
unanswered questions regarding adulthood. Another reason given by Kimmel (210:2) 
for the topicality of adulthood as a research topic is that: "It [adulthood] is also relevant 
to personal or practical questions about growing older because it provides a greater 
understanding and appreciation of our own unfolding lives, the lives of the people we 
live with, and those we see from day to day." 
The researcher considered that some of the terminology used by the researchers just 
referred to requires qualification. Kimmel's use of "growing older" and "unfolding 
lives" indicates that humankind13 is frequently regarded as a plant (flower) or any other 
animal. It was anticipated that the appropriateness of using plantistic, animalistic and 
mechanistic terminology to refer to human adulthood would have to be investigated during 
the research. In addition, Kimmel's findings could equally be true of childhood and, 
consequently, do not really assist with understanding adulthood. For example, one could 
still ask why humankind wants to gain a greater understanding and appreciation 
of life and the lives of others, and what the relationship is between adulthood and 
understanding life. The researcher recognised these questions as part-questions to 
which answers would have to be sought during the research. 
The topicality of adulthood as a topic of research can also be illustrated by relying on the 
findings of commentators on the state of the contemporary world and the problems 
facing educators in preparing people to live with the blessings and distortions arising from 
a teletechtronocracy14. The researcher has previously (344:89-116) presented evidence 
as to the nature of the blessings and distortions of the contemporary world characterised 
by teletechtronocracy. Evans (101:34) confirmed these findings and related them to 
adulthood: if educators are to assist adults to live in a post-industrial society they must 
" ... take clear account of what it is to be an adult in a post-industrial society." Evans 
(101:35) expressed his disapproval of the assumption that the circumstances of adults 
do not need as much special attention as adolescence, and found that: " ... adulthood is 
as full of uncertainties, ambiguities and problems as are adolescence and childhood." 
The researcher considered that Evans found similarly to Kimmel regarding the 
inseparability of adulthood and living: " ... the implications of what it means to be an 
adult in the 1980s reach every dimension of life in our societies - at home, at work, at 
leisure - and is beginning to change the very meaning of work, home and leisure." Again 
13 
"Man" and "mankind" are generally unacceptable in the United Kingdom to name humankind. 
Consequently, in this thesis "humankind" is used except in original quotes of fellow-researchers. 
14 Teletechtronocracy: an advanced form of bureaucracy arising from the combined effects of 
telecommunications, technology, electronics and bureaucracy (344:117). 
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the question arises as to the nature of the relationship between living and adulthood. 
Findings from many fellow-researchers could have been presented to justify an 
investigation into what adulthood is, but these have been omitted to keep this chapter to a 
manageable lengthl5. However, from the evidence already presented it cannot be denied 
that scientific research of adulthood requires an adequate description of what 
adulthood actually is - not just views, opinions or theories. The researcher's aim for 
the research was not to build another model or view, but to attempt to describe as 
adequately as possible, what adulthood is. In particular, the researcher wanted to test 
how adequately, if at all, adulthood as an existential-ethical continuum could 
describe what adulthood is. 
In summary, the question "what is adulthood?" is an initial expression of the broad 
research question to which a seeking answer was sought during the research. The 
critical reader might not have encountered the term "seeking answer" before and might be 
aware that questions of the type, "what is?", are not as straightforward as they appear. 
The implications for the research, of seeking answers and "what is ... ?" type questions, 
are explained later in this chapter16• In providing a thorough explanation of the motivation 
for, and topicality of, the research, the researcher has had to use several terms summarily. 
In order to lessen misunderstanding it is necessary to indicate, even if in an initial way, 
how these terms, as well as those terms in the title of this thesis, will be applied. 
2.0 RESULTS OF EXPLICATION OF TERMS IN THE TITLE 
It is safe to state17 that responsible scientific practice cannot proceed without definition; 
without clarification of the meanings of terms to be used in scientific dialogue. Explication 
of terms is more than just a series of working definitions: it is the beginning of a 
cumulative explication which continues throughout a research programme. 
Consequently, explication is an attempt to clarify the research question, a task which 
Hospers (172: 13) found essential in philosophical research: "In very general questions ... 
the difficulty often lies with the unclarity of the question and not with the impossibility of 
an answer ... to have a clear answer we must first have a clear question." Heidegger 
(163:24-25) gave an even more detailed explanation of the requirement for any research 
question to be explicitly formulated. 
15 See, for example, Turner and Helms (424:2), Kennedy (205:207) and Coleman (63:vii). 
16 
"Seeking answers" is explained in Paragraph 3.2 of the current chapter and "What is?" type questions 
in Paragraph 2.7. 
17 To keep the length of this thesis to manageable proportions "it is safe to state" is used as the 
shortened version of "the researcher considered it safe to state". 
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Even in the preliminary scientific activity of explicating terms, the researcher attempted to 
obtain an insight into the nature and range of the concepts, and the problems likely to arise 
in the research. Consequently, while the results of an initial explication of terms are now 
presented, it was anticipated that further explication would be necessary as the research 
proceeded. In addition, the researcher chose not to explicate the term "defining" in the 
current paragraph because it has implications for methodology and it is explicatt:d later in 
this chapter18. The necessity for further explication will be indicated by appropriate 
footnotes and the results of such explication presented in appropriate chapters in this 
thesis. Since the main phenomenon for investigation in the research was adulthood, the 
researcher began the explication of terms with an explication of "adulthood". 
2.1 "ADULTHOOD" 
Adulthood according to Murray (294: 130) is adultness - the state of being adult. 
According to Sinclair (395:20), adulthood is the state or condition of being an adult, or 
the time of life during which someone is an adult. Gove (133:30) found similarly, but 
added that adulthood is the quality of being an adult - especially intellectual 
maturity. The researcher considered it relevant that adulthood is regarded as 
synonymous with adultness because adultness implies criteria by which people may be 
assessed as to their degree of adultness and, consequently, points to the possibility of 
adulthood as a continuum. Since adulthood is expressed in terms of being adult, in 
order to continue the explication of "adulthood", "adult" must explicated. 
There is considerable agreement among etymologists such as Onions (317: 14-15), 
Partridge (319:450) and Klein (216:28) that "adult" is derived from Latin adultus 
meaning grown up and from adolescere meaning to grow up. Other Latin roots of 
"adult" include alere meaning to nourish and alescere meaning to begin to grow. 
Some lexicographers 19, as will now be shown, regarded the concept of adult as being 
grown up and describe being adult in terms of maturity and development. For 
example, Murray (294: 129) defined adult as having reached the age of maturity or 
complete development (294:130); Kirkpatrick (213:15) as mature; Sinclair (395:20) 
as fully mature and fully developed and Gove (133:30) as fully developed, fully 
mature and fully grown up. Similarly, Kakar (200:118) found that: "To be an adult is 
to be mature." Considering the findings just stated, adulthood could be described as the 
l8 See the findings reported in Paragraph 3.2.l in the current chapter. To avoid clumsy expression, "See 
the findings reported in" have been omitted when the reader is directed to other chapters or 
paragraphs in this thesis. 
l9 It is assumed that editors of reputable dictionaries, if they are not discipline specialists themselves, 
compile their dictionaries in consultation with specialists. Dictionary definitions are therefore taken to 
be preliminary scientific definitions of terms to be explicated. 
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quality of being, or the time during which a person20 is, mature, grown up 
and fully developed. 
Since adulthood can be regarded as a time period or quality of being, to continue the 
explication one must ask what criteria are used to identify this being quality and 
when the time period begins and ends. The reader may notice that the results of the 
explication at this stage, rather than supplying an explanation of what adulthood or an 
adult is, merely re-defined adulthood in terms of quality of being and more specifically, 
maturity and development. To continue explication of the term "adulthood" it was 
necessary to understand what maturity and development are. 
On attempting to find out what maturity and development are, the researcher 
encountered difficulty: maturity is defined in circular fashion in terms of adultness or 
development. For example, Sinclair regarded maturity as becoming an adult, 
reaching a state of complete development and becoming more fully 
developed, while Gove (133:1394) in finding "mature" to be derived from Latin 
maturus meaning ripe or seasonable, regarded maturity to be having attained the 
normal peak of natural growth and development: fully grown and 
developed. Gove also offered "age", "develop" and "ripen" as synonyms for 
"mature" and like Murray (294:Vol VI:246) and Gove (133:1395), used "matureness" 
to imply that maturity is a quality or a state. 
The reader may again notice that attempting to find out what maturity is, was unsuccessful 
because another part-question arose: what is matureness or developedness? In 
addition, the explication of "maturity" revealed a contradiction: on the one hand 
"adultness", "matureness" and "becoming more fully developed", for example, indicate 
that adulthood may be a continuum, but on the other, "complete development", "fully 
developed", "ripe" and '_'fully grown" indicate that adulthood is a state after achieving 
which, no further development, maturing or growth, takes place. 
Descriptions of adulthood such as being fully developed, fully grown, completely 
developed and fully mature, highlight the problem which encouraged the researcher to 
study adulthood, as outlined in this chapter so far. Experience indicated that these 
descriptions of adulthood cannot be adequate because most people have the capability to 
develop, grow or mature, in some sense, all through life. If adulthood is a final 
achievement, what follows? If the aim of child education is adulthood, what is the aim of 
20 In this thesis, "person" is used synonymously with "human being" or "human". The researcher is 
aware of the considerable debate about what a person is, as explained by Thatcher (416:248-259), for 
example, but consideration of this was outside the scope of the research. 
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adult education? If adults could not become better in some way, why is education 
frequently qualified as continuing education, life-long education and recurrent education? 
The researcher gained the strong impression that many researchers regarded adulthood as 
predominantly a biological phenomenon. For example, some lexicographers made no 
distinction between the adulthood of humankind and the adulthood of other living and 
non-living things: Gove (133:30), as does Murray (294:129), used the term maturity to 
refer to men [people], animals and plants; Sinclair (395:20) wrote of a fully developed 
person, animal or insect and Murray (294: 129) regarded an inanimate phenomenon - a 
language - as maturing. The researcher expected that regarding human adulthood as 
similar to the adult stages of other animals would lead to inadequate description. 
At this stage in the research the researcher was still faced with having to further explicate 
"maturity" to obtain even a preliminary insight into what adultness is, and consequently, 
what adulthood is. After further analysis of the findings of some etymologists and 
lexicographers it was found that adults (mature or developed people) are those who: 
• have reached the age when they become legally responsible for their own 
decisions and actions, are no longer the responsibility of their parents (395:20) 
and have the capability to take responsibility (133:1394) for their actions; 
• are fully developed in their personality and emotional behaviour (395:879) and 
in the sense of size, strength or intellectual capacity (133:30); 
• have developed the mental and emotional qualities " ... considered normal to an 
adult, socially adjusted, human being ... " (133:1394) and have achieved " .... 
social development appropriate to an adult ... " (213:777); 
• have the powers of body and mind fully developed and are perfected mentally 
and physically (294: Vol VI:245). 
Again, the adequacy of the definite and common sense statements about adulthood just 
presented, were questioned. For example: 
• What is that age when a person becomes legally responsible? 
• What is a fully developed personality; fully developed emotional behaviour; 
fully developed size and what are fully developed physical, mental and emotional 
abilities? 
• What is a socially adjusted adult and similarly, what social development is 
appropriate to an adult? 
• What does it mean to take responsibility for one's actions? 
The researcher considered that the questions just asked penetrate to the essentials of what 
it means to be an adult, that is, what adulthood is. It was realised that these 
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questions, and similar ones, would have to be answered if an more adequate description 
of adulthood was to be found. In order to prepare for answering these and other questions 
in more detail later in the research, a summary of the main concepts of adulthood, implicit 
or explicitly stated in the evidence just given, was formulated, and is now presented. 
Four main concepts of adulthood had been identified: adulthood as biological 
maturity (size and strength), adulthood as psychological maturity (mental, 
intellectual and emotional maturity) adulthood as sociological maturity (appropriate 
social development) and adulthood as being responsible. Results of assessing what 
each of these concepts entails; and whether one or any of them adequately describes 
adulthood, are reported later in this thesis21. 
The researcher has already explained that part of his motivation for researching adulthood 
is the hope of obtaining guidelines for overcoming conceptual difficulties in the discipline 
of adult education. It was anticipated that just what the relationship between adulthood 
and the education of adults is, and whether or not adulthood as an existential-
ethical continuum can contribute to solving definitional problems in adult education 
would have to be investigated during the research. However, at this preliminary stage in 
the research, it was observed that alere, a Latin root of "adult" and educere a Latin 
root of "education" both mean to nourish (435:257). The researcher considered that 
this similarity was an initial indication of the interrelatedness of adulthood and 
education. 
The reader might wonder why the researcher did not attempt to give even an initial 
description of adulthood as an existential-ethical continuum, since it was partly 
this preliminary concept that led to undertaking the research. There were two main reasons 
for this. Firstly, during the previous research already mentioned, an extensive literature 
search22, showed that there is a very limited literature on adulthood as an existential-
ethical continuum. Consequently, there was a lack of grounding on which to base even 
initial explication so early in the research. 
Secondly, as expected in doctoral research, a contribution to advancement of knowledge 
requires considerable assessment of the adequacy, and then possible reformulation and/or 
synthesis, of existing knowledge. Since the researcher's major part-task in the research 
was to test the adequacy of adulthood as an existential-ethical continuum it was 
anticipated that considerable synthesis of knowledge about existence and ethics would 
21 Chapters Two, Three, Four and Five, respectively. 
22 As far as the researcher is aware, Oberholzer and Grey ling (311) are pioneers in this field. 
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be necessary. Obtaining such a synthesis was beyond the scope of an introductory chapter 
and would have to await considerable investigation later in the research. However, it was 
possible at this early stage in the research to explicate "existential" and "ethical" in a 
preliminary way. In addition, since, in the orientation so far, the possibility of 
adulthood as a continuum has been illustrated several times, particularly by the use of 
"adultness" and "matureness", a preliminary understanding of "continuum" is 
necessary. 
2.2 "CONTINUUM" 
According to Klein (216:344), Partridge (319: 118) and Onions (317:209), "continuum" 
is derived from Latin contunuus meaning a continuous series; a whole, and Partridge 
indicated that the Latin root continere means to hold together. Gove (133:494) and 
Kirkpatrick (213:271) both found that a continuum is something that is continuous and 
selfsame (the same), and continuous is defined (213:271) (216:344) as without 
interruption and uninterrupted. Sinclair (395:306) indicated that a continuum is a 
long series of things in a particular order: "Each thing is closely related to the thing that is 
next to it in the order, but the things at the beginning and the end of the order are very 
different from each other." 
In attempting to express the uninterruptedness of a continuum, Murray et al (294:910) 
found that the series of elements (or "things" as Sinclair calls them) pass into each other, 
and Gove (133:494) found that a continuum is something in which a fundamental 
common character is discernible amid a series of insensible and indefinite 
variations. It was possible even from an initial survey of some of the literature on 
adulthood, to find that some scientists already think of adulthood as a continuum. 
For example, Oberholzer and Grey ling (311 :37) referred to mature adulthood, to three 
modes of adulthood, namely early, prime and late and (311 :53) illustrated the 
possibility of degrees of adulthood; Troll (423) and Kimmel (210:79) referred to 
early and middle adulthood and Erikson23 to young adulthood, maturity and old 
age. In addition, some scientists regarded the whole of human life as a continuum 
referring to stages or phases in the human life cycle. Erikson24 identified eight stages of 
which three are adult stages, Rapoport and Rapoport (332:11-12) identified five stages of 
which three are adult stages and Buhler25 identified five, of which four are adult stages. 
23 Paraphrased in Kimmel (210:14). 
24 Paraphrased in Troll (423:6-7) and in Kimmel (210:13-16). 
25 Paraphrased in Kimmel (210:9). 
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However, despite the evidence just presented and further evidence provided by 
terminology such as "adultness", "degrees of adulthood", "fully human 
adulthood" (144:109), "more mature adulthood" (311:34), "true adult" (311:55), 
and "more complete adulthood" (311:143), the researcher, following the demands of 
science, required further evidence that adulthood is a continuum. For example, the 
researcher wondered how findings already stated that adulthood is a state which is 
fully attainable and that adulthood is a state of perfection (294: Vol Vl:245), would 
be compatible with adulthood as a continuum. In addition, terminology such as "fully 
human adulthood" and "true adulthood" may indicate that adulthood is a finally or 
absolutely achievable state. The researcher wondered how, if adulthood can be perfectly 
attained, it could be a continuum. 
Furthermore, if adulthood occurs in stages, the researcher wondered which, if any of the 
stages, best describe what adulthood is. Some scientists already quoted in this paragraph 
stressed that modes, stages or phases of adulthood are not separate, distinct and 
hermenutically sealed off from one another. However, the researcher wondered how the 
beginning and end of a mode or stage is identified, and also, what is entailed in transition 
from one mode to the other, that is, how one moves along a continuum. It was 
anticipated that answers would be sought to the many part-questions just raised during the 
research. As the title of this thesis indicates, the researcher was concerned with an 
existential-ethical continuum, and consequently, "existential" as part of 
"existential-ethical" was explicated. 
2.3 "EXISTENTIAL-(ETHI CAL)" 
English grammar indicates that the term existential pertains to existence and this is 
borne out by dictionary definitions such as: of or pertaining to existence (294:414), 
and pertaining to existence (133:560). Gove (133:796) gave a more precise definition 
of "existential" as relating to, or dealing with, existence: grounded in 
existence, based on experience of existence. It became evident that to explicate 
"existential", "existence" had to be explicated. Since, as already explained, adulthood 
is regarded by many, as the ultimate aim of education, the researcher anticipated some 
relationship between existence, education and adulthood. Anticipation in this regard was 
supported by, for example, Barnes (20:281-317), Kneller (218), Morris (287), Lesnoff-
Caravaglia (243) and Denton (83). 
Explication of "existence" presented a methodological dilemma for the researcher. On the 
one hand, explication of "existential" was necessa.)' to progress the research, but on the 
other hand, an initial reading of some of the relevant literature on existence, including 
dictionary definitions, indicated the impossibility of even beginning to present an adequate 
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explanation of existence in an introductory chapter. 
Firstly, as Williams ( 457 :viii) for example found, at every stage in the history of 
philosophy great thinkers have had something to say about existence. Consequently, the 
literature resulting from philosophers' attempts to explain what existence is, is 
extensive. In addition to extensive encyclopedia entries, the researcher identified entire 
textbooks on existence. For example, books by Williams ( 457), Munitz (290), Sprigge 
( 402) and Blackham (38) are entitled What is existence?, Existence and Logic, 
Theories of Existence, and Six Existentialist Thinkers, respectively. In addition, 
the extensive literature on existentialism is another indication of the problem facing 
researchers in this field who, in their quest for seeking answers to what existence is, 
must assess the voluminous findings of fellow-researchers. 
Secondly, although some writers on existentialism provide extensive insights into what 
existence is, the researcher was concerned by attempts to absolutize these insights, 
consequently, making existentialism a doctrine (as illustrated by the suffix "-ism"). 
As is well known in scientific work, caution is necessary in interpreting findings based on 
ideology. In addition, in reviewing the appropriate literature, the researcher observed 
references to existenz-philosophy and wondered if this approach was different from 
that of existentialism and existential philosophy. 
Thirdly, the researcher found considerable disagreement among the findings of scientists 
who claim to study existence, a finding Russell26 also made: " ... an almost unbelievable 
amount of false philosophy has arisen through not realizing what 'existence' means". 
Macquarrie (262:62) noted that: " ... the very notion of existence is far from being as 
simple as it seems at first sight and has been understood in many different ways." In 
addition to finding considerable disagreement, the researcher experienced great difficulty 
in understanding some of the literature, because many of the terms used were not 
explained, new ideas were raised without explanation as to how they related to previous 
ideas and "being" and "existence" were used interchangeably without explanation. 
In light of the difficulties just explained, it was decided in this introductory chapter to: 
• merely indicate what the "existence" means for the purposes of the research and to 
delineate as precisely as possible what questions, if any, were beyond the scope of the 
research; 
• leave investigation of what existence actually is and the nature of the relationship 
between existence and humankind, existence and human adulthood and 
26 In Williams (457:v). 
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subsequently existence and adult education, till later in the research27; 
• avoid highly complex discussion of numerous conflicting findings on existence by 
beginning explication with what is already known from everyday experience about 
existence. It was anticipated that dictionary definitions would help in this regard, and 
it was also anticipated that conceptual differences between scientists in this field would 
have to be, in an initial way, critically assessed and reconciled. However, the critical 
assessment and reconciliation just mentioned was undertaken not for itself sake, but 
only for the purpose of assisting the researcher to arrive at his own findings on a 
scientifically derived description of existence for use in the research; and 
• separately explicate existentialism and existenz-philosophy together with an 
assessment of their possible contribution to describing existence28• 
With the methodological background and qualifications just provided, the results of the 
explication of existence are now presented. 
2.3.1 EXISTENCE 
Most dictionary definitions as will now be shown, express existence in terms of 
existing or to exist. Murray et al (294:413-414) defined existence as the fact or 
state of existing and the state of being existent: existent is defined as having 
existence. From everyday experience, the researcher anticipated and found, that other 
definitions of to exist or existing might include that which is real and that which 
is living. For example, Sinclair (395:492) defined existence as to be present in the 
world or universe as a real, living or actual thing and not, for example, to be 
something that people have imagined or made up, and Murray et al (294:413) found 
that existence means to have life or animation: to live; actuality or reality, and to 
have a place in the domain of reality (294:413). However Fabro29 identified material 
existence and ideal existence which the researcher regarded as the same as real 
existence and imagined, thought or made-up existence, respectively. 
The researcher found the explication at this stage unhelpful, giving rise only to further 
questions. For example, it is necessary to ask about the meanings of actuality, reality, 
that which is real, to have existence and to be in a state of being existent. 
The relevant literature and dictionaries were further interrogated to seek answers to the 
questions just asked, and the researcher was directed to "being". 
27 Results in this regard are given in Chapter Six. 
28 The reader will be aware that a subject or a discipline cannot contribute or do anything: it is 
researchers working within these disciplines that contribute. 
29 In (27S:Vol 5:720). 
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For example, existence is defined as actual possession of being (294:413) and as the 
state or fact of having being and the manner of being that is common to every 
mode of being (133:796). Flew (105) simply explained existence with: "See being." 
In addition, "to exist" and "existing", from which "existence" is derived, are also 
defined in terms of being. Consequently, it is not surprising to find "to exist" defined 
as: to have objective being, to continue in being (294:413), to have actual or real 
being: to have contingent but free and responsible being and to live as one that 
has such being (133:796) and to have being (317:336). 
The researcher considered the explication of "existence" inadequate, even for a 
preliminary orientation. All that had been explained is that existence is regarded as 
synonymous with being, a generality expressed by several fellow-researchers. For 
example, Williams (457:vii) wrote of " ... the idea of being or existence ... ", 
"Philosophies of Being or Existence ... " (457:ix) and "The topic of these pages is 
existence, or being ... " ( 457: 172). Munitz (290:xi) asked: "What to make of 
existence (or, as some would prefer to say, of Being30) ... ",and Fabro31 found that 
existence points to being. In the light of existence being treated as synonymous 
with being the researcher attempted to explicate "being". 
As expected, attempts to explicate "being" ended in a circular reference to 
existence. For example, being is defined as: to maintain an existence (294:413), 
the same as existence; " ... if something comes into being or is called into being 
it has been formed or brought into existence ... "; something that is in being already 
exists (395:118), existence; any person or thing existing (213:112), existence; 
existence in some relation of place or condition; existence viewed as a 
property possessed by anything; that which exists or is conceived as existing 
(294:Vol 1:777), the quality or state of existing; conscious or mortal existence 
(133:Vol 1:199), that which exists or may exist; existence in time and space as 
opposed to idea or representation (17:Vol 1:109) and "Usually equivalent in the verbal 
sense to 'existence'" (105:40). The findings just presented again indicated that 
"existence" and "being" are generally regarded as synonyms. If existence is not the 
same as being, then the distinction is not made adequately in the literature studied. 
The unhelpful circular nature of the explanation of existence as being and being as 
existence, provided the researcher with a major methodological dilemma. On the 
one hand, scientific responsibility demanded perseverance with the explication of 
30 The results of further consideration of "Being" with a capital "B" and its implications for human 
being are recorded in Chapter Six, Paragraph One. 
31 In (275:Vol 5:720). 
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"existential" (in its forms of existence, existing and to exist), and this would entail 
explicating being and associated terms such as "real", "reality", "actual" and 
"actuality". On the other hand, explication of "being" would require attempts, 
however preliminary, to answer the questions: "what is being?", "what does it mean 
to be?", "what does it mean to have being?, "what is a mode of being? and 
"what is, for example, real being, objective being, contingent being, 
responsible being and free being? The relevance of being to adult education is shown 
in books with titles such as Education as Existential Possibility (243). 
It was realised that explicating "Being" in detail would have required a detailed study of 
the literature of ontology, that discipline within which knowledge about Being is 
collected and systematised (129:Vol 8:958). This would have been an impossible and 
scientifically inappropriate task in the preliminary stage of the research. This preliminary 
finding was arrived at after reading only a small but appropriate selection of the literature 
on the nature of being such as Heidegger32 (162), (163) Sartre (370) (371) and some 
relevant encyclopedic literature (275:Vol 2:230-232) (275:Vol 3:241-244). 
In the light of the dilemma just explained, the researcher considered it necessary, to: 
• remind the reader that the research was concerned with human existence and human 
being, only as far as they can give insight into what adulthood is; and 
• leave further explication of "existential" till later in the research33 when extensive 
effort could be applied to answering complex questions about existence and being. 
Since there is some uncertainty about what being and Being are, and since terms such as 
"to be human" and "being human" are already in use in this thesis, it was decided to use 
"human" instead of "human being". While this usage is grammatically incorrect, the 
intention was to diminish possible misunderstandings. 
. 
It has been explained why the researcher was cautious about the findings expressed by 
followers of a school of thought currently known as, existentialism. The reader may 
wonder how it is possible to study human existence without detailed examination of the 
literature of existentialism, and may think that the researcher was influenced by 
existentialists' findings without making this explicit. To dispel these notions and to 
preserve the scientific integrity of the research, a brief explanation of the relationship 
between existentialism and the explication of existence as being was necessary. 
32 In Kaufmann (204:242) and (204:233). 
33 Chapter Six, Paragraph 2.0. 
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2.3.2 EXISTENTIALISM, AND EXISTENCE AS BEING 
As already indicated, the suffix "·ism" indicates a doctrine (52:296) (53:994) belief, 
school of thought (435:272), philosophical system (216:560), a theory of humankind 
(133:796); a modem philosophical belief (395:492), a label for several widely different 
revolts against traditional philosophy (204: 11), and a number of related doctrines 
(213:442), for example. As Barnes34 found, Sartre, to whom many people attribute the 
beginnings of existentialism, regarded existentialism to be an ideology. The researcher 
still considered it valid to refer to existentialism as a doctrine, even though some fellow-
researchers such as Copleston (66:125), Solomon (400:173) and Macquarrie (262:14) 
regarded existentialism as a modern movement, a position, and a style of 
philosophising, respectively. The three fellow-researchers just mentioned indicated that 
they are aware of the underlying existentialist thought which some scientists still 
absolutise as existentialism. 
It is safe to state that existentialist thought (existentialist thinking and existentialist 
philosophy) is different (435:273) from existentialism. Existentialist or existential 
philosophy is scientific activity orientated towards investigating phenomena from the 
perspective of existence. The distinction between existentialism and existential 
philosophy can be illustrated more precisely by using examples from the German 
language. As Schacht reported (375:235), existentialisten is used to refer to 
existentialists (followers of existentialism) and existenzphilosophen is used to refer 
to those philosophers who take human existence for their theme. Similarly, 
existenzphilosophie is the term which designates the study of human existence and which 
Schacht (375:235) translated as existenz-philosophy. The researcher uses 
"existential philosophy" instead of "existenz-philosophy" because the former is 
already used in the English language. The researcher also considered that "existential 
philosophy" is a more adequate name for the philosophical (scientific) approach to 
existence than "philosophical existentialism" as devised by Warnock (443:3). In 
addition, because "existentialist" and "existentialist philosopher" (442: 1) (443:1) 
indicate researchers whose activity is already decided by the doctrine of existentialism and 
whose results must be treated with caution, the researcher preferred the term "existential 
philosopher" to "existentialist philosopher". 
In summary, the researcher is not an adherent of existentialism and did not intend to 
promote existentialism or contribute to its doctrine, or any other doctrine. Consequently, it 
is not appropriate to investigate the way in which existentialism came about or to 
analyse different approaches in existentialism35. The researcher was not concerned in the 
34 In Sartre (371:viii). 
35 Warnock (443:1), Macquarrie (262:13-20), Kaufmann (204:11-12) and Schacht (375:232-235) showed 
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research with doctrines, beliefs or theories about what existence could or might be, but 
what it actually is. However, this approach does not exclude investigating any major 
principles included within existentialism for their contribution, if any, to understanding 
adulthood. It has already been explained how the apparent interrelatedness of existence 
and ethics encouraged the researcher to use the hyphenated term "existential-ethical". 
Having now repo~ted the results of a very preliminary explication of "existential" the 
results of explicating "ethical" in "existential-ethical" are reported. 
2.4 "(EXISTENTIAL)-ETHICAL" 
Dictionary and etymological definitions indicated that being ethical has something to do 
with being moral. For example, Klein (216:546) defined "ethical" as relating to 
morality and moral, and Murray et al (294:312) as, pertaining to morality, or the 
science of ethics (294:312). "Ethics", is derived from Latin ethicus (317:329) or 
ethica (319:188) (216:546) and from Greek ethikos meaning moral science or art 
(319:188), and good or right (334:156), and from Greek ethos meaning custom or 
usage (334: 156). 
In addition, the titles of some text books such as Morality. An Introduction to Ethics (455) 
and The Nature of Morality. An Introduction to Ethics (211) indicated that being moral 
and being ethical are the same phenomenon. Fellow-researchers corroborated this. For 
example, Oberholzer and Greyling (311:60) employed "existential-ethical" (311:25, 40, 
45) but also found adulthood to be an on-going moral dynamic. The study of morality, 
that is ethics, is referred to variously as moral philosophy (455:9) and philosophical ethics 
(211:vii). Baelz (15:2) corroborated the finding, that "moral" and "ethical" are 
sometimes regarded as having much the same meaning, and Ulich (425: 144) corroborated 
this. In the light of these results, the researcher felt obliged to explicate "moral". 
A moral (from Latin moralis meaning customs (334:156) and (425:145) from the Latin 
mos or mores which connotes custom, social habit or social agreement), refers to a 
the uncertainty surrounding what existentialism is and how some scientists have been called 
existentialists while themselves rejecting the classification. Warnock, in her introduction to Sartre's 
Being and Nothingness (370:xviii) and in other writing (442:3) indicated that Sartre himself 
eventually disclaimed the label of existentialist. The origins of existentialism are for Warnock 
(443), Macquarrie (262) and Blackham (38), for example, with Kierkegaard; for Schacht (375:232) 
with Sartre. However, Warnock (442:1) found that the existentialist trend in philosophy 
started with Socrates and it is claimed (275:Vol 5:730) that foreshadowings of existentialism can be 
found in the works of St Augustine, Descartes and Pascal. Although much of the literature on 
existentialism, including Foulauie (106:9), Macquarrie (262:61), Van Rensburg et al (435:272) 
and Schacht (375:230), for example, summarises the main principle of this doctrine as existence 
precedes essence, Kaufmann (204: 1) claimed that it cannot be reduced to any set of tenets. 
However, Macquarrie (262:16) wrote of recurring themes. Both Kaufmann (204:1) and Macquarrie 
(262: 18-21) mentioned the diversity among findings (views) of so-called existentialists, and Warnock 
(442:1) stressed the" ... grave difficulties in the way of reaching a satisfactory account of the matter." 
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concrete norm, standard or criterion which may or may not have become a rule or custom 
in any given community, which is applied in everyday life to assess the goodness or 
badness (rightness or wrongness) (52:285) of human conduct (behaviour). Those 
people who adhere to their community's morals (moral code) are said to be moral 
(good or right) and those who do not, are said to be immoral (bad or wrong). It is 
frequently the case that many of a community's morals are taken from its survival 
traditions and religious beliefs and many morals are formalised in laws. Glover (127:86) 
corroborated that morality is widely held to be based on religious commands. 
Consequently, being ethical has something to do with being good. In light of the apparent 
synonymity of "ethical" and "moral", the researcher wondered why he had not used 
"existential-moral", instead of "existential-ethical", in the title to this thesis. On 
reflection, an assumption was uncovered. For the researcher being ethical and being moral 
are not synonymous: being ethical goes beyond being moral in some way. At this 
stage, the researcher was unsure why he was distinguishing between being ethical and 
being moral. However, since the researcher was seeking an adequate fundamental 
description of adulthood, morals which changed from time-to-time or place-to-place 
would not be part of any such description. Consequently, the word "ethical" was 
intuitively used in "existential-ethical" to indicate morals which do not change. It was 
anticipated that the research would reveal whether or not such a distinction is justified and 
consequently whether or not "existential-moral" and "existential-ethical" are synonyms. 
The researcher considered it necessary to test another assumption. As already explained, 
the hyphenated term "existential-ethical" was used because the impression was gained 
that existence can only be ethical existence (344:58-63). The researcher wondered if there 
is an interrelationship between existence and being ethical. An indication of such an 
interrelationship is already given in the use of the terms "being ethical" and "to be 
ethical", but there is additional preliminary evidence. For example, in a very general way, 
Baelz (15:5) found that it may not be possible to isolate ethics from other studies. 
Similarly, Warnock (442:2) writing of Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Sartre, found that they 
make no " ... clear distinction between ethics and the rest of philosophy." More 
specifically, Socrates36, in referring to philosophical ethics, found that what we are 
talking about is how one should live; Baelz (15:5) mentioned "a truly human life"; 
Flew (105:113-114) referred to "human condition", "human nature" and" how we 
must live", and Murdoch (291:78) found that moral philosophy is the examination of the 
most important of all human activities. For the researcher, references to "human 
life", "nature" and "human condition", are references to human existence. 
36 Reported by Williams (456:1). 
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Additional evidence of the interrelatedness of existence and ethics is provided by 
references to existential ethics (275:Vol 5:724-726) (442) (262:268-270), and by 
research entitled, for example, Kierkegaard's Existential Ethics (403). Further evidence is 
given by Murdoch (291:47) who referred to moral philosophy of an existentialist 
type; and Wamock37 who found that Sartre's book Being and Nothingness was 
about ethics; that existentialism in general has been frequently treated as a branch of 
moral philosophy (ethics); and that existentialism arose from a two-part ancestry: 
an ethical tradition and a phenomenological tradition (443:3). It was realised that 
despite the preliminary evidence presented, whether or not there is an interrelationship 
between existence and being ethical, required investigation. If such an interrelationship is 
found the researcher's task would be to find out how it might contribute to the possibility 
of adulthood as an existential-ethical continuum. 
As already indicated, the major part of the research entailed an assessment of whether an 
existential-ethical continuum could better describe adulthood than other descriptions do. 
However, the research was undertaken in the context of adult education, and with the 
part-aim of offering recommendations for the practice of education of adults and for 
research in adult education. To this end, "adult education" was explicated. 
2.5 "ADULT EDUCATION" 
As a practising adult educationist and adult educator, the researcher identified five main 
concepts named by "adult education": 
a) a relationship between an adult educator and adult educand; 
b) a system a society establishes to facilitate the relationship between adult educator 
and adult educand; 
c) a perceived product as expressed in statements such as "In the past only the 
wealthy could buy a good education"; 
d) a social movement or ideology regarding the rights of adults to have access to 
the relationship and system; and 
e) a discipline within which educationists study and systematise knowledge about the 
relationship, system, product and movement. 38 
For the researcher, the fundamental concept named by "adult education" is the 
relationship, because it is from the relationship that the other concepts arise. For 
37 In Sartre (370:viii). 
38 The scope of the research did not permit illustrations of how, in much of the Anglo-American 
literature, misunderstanding arises from using "adult education" (and more generally "education") 
to name five different phenomena 
20 
example, without the relationship (whatever its nature and quality) there would be no 
system, product, movement or discipline - it is because of the relationship that the other 
phenomena arise. Consequently, it is important to remember that in the research, "adult 
education" named the relationship of adult educator and adult educand. 
It would have been appropriate to continue the explication of "adult education" as a 
relationship by first explicating "adult" and then "education". However, attempting an 
extensive explication at this stage would have been inappropriate and indeed, impossible, 
because the whole of the research would involve providing the grounding for a more 
adequate definition of adult education. However, because a preliminary explication of 
adult was reported previously in this chapter when "adulthood" was explicated, the 
researcher attempted to explicate education as a relationship. 
The relevance of education for adulthood has already been partly explained in this chapter. 
Many researchers found education to be the leading and guiding to adulthood: 
adulthood is the ultimate purpose (aim) of education. For example: Roelofse et 
al (359: 19) found that: "Attaining adulthood is the aim of education." and (359:23) that 
the " ... aim of education is to attain responsible adulthood."; Knowles (222:30) found 
that anything which interrupts a person's growth towards the adult dimension is anti-
educational; Viljoen and Pienaar (439:131) found that adulthood is generally formulated 
as the aim of education; and Perquin39 found that education is the help provided to the 
growing child by responsible persons so that the child can become an adult. Although 
many other findings could have been quoted, the researcher considered the evidence just 
given as sufficient to state that the aim of educators and educands is adulthood. 
However, it is necessary to recognise that schooling (the educational system of primary, 
secondary and tertiary) is not synonymous with education. For example, Coleman (63:vii) 
found that: " ... schooling, as we know it, is not a complete environment giving all the 
necessary opportunities for becoming adult". This means that assisting others to 
become adults can take place in family homes, churches and other institutions. The 
researcher expected that if the research was successful in describing what adulthood is, he 
would be able to provide a description of the opportunities referred to by Coleman. 
Despite many years of reading about, and studying fellow-researchers' findings on, 
education40, and even after extensive investigation during this research, the researcher 
found considerable misunderstanding regarding what education is. However, using a 
39 Quoted and translated by Du Plooy and Kilian (90: 10). 
40 As documented in Robb (344) and Robb (345:11-21), for example. 
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phenomenological approach, as will be explained later in this chapter41, it is possible to 
present findings about what education is, and to corroborate these against findings of 
fellow-educationists. The explication of "education" now given can only be a working 
description. It was realised that since adulthood is the ultimate goal of education, the 
findings from investigating what adulthood is, would in all likelihood provide a more 
detailed description of what education is. 
Like many other educationists such as Peters (324:144), Moore (285:70), Verduin 
(437:20), Garforth (119:21) and Frankena42, the researcher found that education entails 
the teacher and learner pursuing, or aiming for, something worthwhile using 
worthwhile means. It is to distinguish those teachers and learners who pursue that 
which is worthwhile, from those that pursue that which is non-worthwhile, that the terms 
"educator" and "educand" are employed. Consequently, education involves not just 
teaching and learning but educative teaching and educative learning. To continue the 
explication of education, just what "worthwhile" means in the context of education had to 
be investigated. The researcher found as Jarvis (184:7) did, that there is much uncertainty 
as to what is meant by "worthwhile", but it cannot be denied that humankind has ideas of 
what educators and educands should be trying to achieve. 
Several educationists offered variations on the theme just presented. For example, 
Bergevin (26:4) found his task as an educator is" ... to discover and present to the adult 
the opportunity to advance as a maturing individual, and to help him learn how to 
contribute his share to the civilizing process .. . the development of free, 
creative, and responsible persons ... ", and (26:5) " ... successfully exploiting our 
learning potential so that we become the mature persons it is possible for us to 
become." Since adulthood is the ultimate aim of education, the criteria of worthwhileness 
just listed are in some way a description of what adulthood is. However, many questions 
arose to confront the researcher. For example: 
• What do complete living, the highest intellectual and moral development, greatness of 
vision, and liberation of the human spirit, entail? 
• What is the civilizing process, a mature person, a responsible person, and even 
an educated person? 
• Why are these aims regarded as desirable, that is, why should, and why do, educators 
and educands work towards complete living or liberation of the human spirit? 
• What is the human spirit and how can it be liberated? 
41 Paragraph 3.1. 
42 As paraphrased in Jarvis (184:6-7). 
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The explication of adulthood previously presented in this chapter43, indicated that finding 
answers to questions such as, What does it mean to be mature, civilised, responsible, and 
an educated person? will be important part-tasks during the research. Additionally, the 
researcher was eager to find out if his attempts to describe adulthood as adequately as 
possible, would reveal why most humans regard being mature, civilised and responsible, 
for example, as desirable. 
The reader may recognise the major interrelationship just revealed. By seeking an 
adequate definition of adulthood, the researcher would simultaneously be seeking an 
adequate definition of what an educated person is. In addition, since educators and 
educands are working towards achieving adulthood, an investigation into what adulthood 
is, is also an investigation of the aims of education44. It is safe to state that the 
researcher had uncovered the synonymity: adult = educated person = aims of 
education. 
This was the first time the researcher had encountered this synonymity so clearly 
expressed. If the researcher's impression that adulthood can best be described as being 
existential-ethical, then this synonymity could be extended to: adult = educated 
person = aims of education = existential-ethical person. It was realised that 
this synonymity would have to be tested, because a child could be an educated person. It 
was suspected that if adulthood is a continuum, then the phenomenon of an educated 
person would also be a continuum. The research was expected to reveal answers to this 
problem. 
Since, during the research, the researcher would be assessing whether adulthood as an 
existential-ethical continuum is an adequate description of adulthood, one must ask 
whether there is an interrelationship between existence and education, and between 
being ethical and education. Indication of these interrelationships is given in books 
entitled: Being and Education (430), Education as Existential Possibility (243), 
Ethics and Education (324), Education and Values (18), Values, Education and 
the Adult (321) and Education and Human Values (339)45 . 
43 Paragraph 2.1. 
44 The "aims of education" is an inadequate expression. Which one of the five phenomena already 
identified does "education" name? More significantly, only people have aims, and the aims of 
educators, of educands and of those who administer an education system may be different. 
45 As might be expected, not all scientific works with "values" and "education" in the title refer to 
ethics and education. For example, Values, Inquiry, and Education (124) is a collection of 
essays on evaluation in educational research. 
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In addition, the reader has probably read numerous findings of many educationists and 
other fellow-researchers which indicate the interrelationships education and morality, 
and education and Being. For example, Kilian and Viljoen (209:3) found that 
education is one of humankind's activities and that activities can be regarded as modes 
or manifestations of existence. Du Plooy and Kilian (90:24) found that education is 
moral advancement and Moore (285:90) found that there is a close connection between 
education and morals and that some people regard moral teaching as essential to 
education, because education is not possible without it. 
From experience, the researcher was aware that some educators regard any attempts to 
advance their pupils (especially adult students)46 morally (ethically), as immoral - a 
devious attempt to force one's philosophy of life on others. The researcher was aware that 
if the research did find that adulthood is an existential-ethical phenomenon, it would pose 
considerable difficulty for some educators. Since the ultimate aim of education is 
adulthood and since (if proven) adulthood is being ethical, then educators would be 
obliged to advance their pupils ethically. If they did not, they could not claim the title of 
"educator". It was realised that this would be a very controversial finding and that 
considerable care would be required in testing whether or not education is possible 
without assisting adults to be ethical (whatever being ethical means). 
However, while awaiting the benefit of these results of the research, adult education is 
regarded initially as an educative relationship between educator and educand. As will 
now be explained, because the relationship known as adult education is one between two 
adults, it is not a pedagogical but an andragogical relationship. It was for this reason 
that the research was conducted from an andragogic perspective and it must be 
explained, in a preliminary way, what an andragogic perspective is. 
2.6 "(FUNDAMENTAL) ANDRAGOGIC PERSPECTIVE" 
Explicating an "andragogic perspective" proved a difficult task for four main reasons. 
• Many Anglo-American adult educationists will be unfamiliar with the meaning of an' 
andragogic perspective because it is used mainly in Germany, France, The 
Netherlands and more recently in some universities in the Republic of South Africa. 
• "Andragogic" names a complex phenomenon, and considerable and detailed 
background explanation would be required to make even preliminary progress. The 
danger was that this necessary detail would have detracted from the main purpose of 
the introduction and make it inordinately long. 
• "Andragogic" is derived from "andragogy", and as will be shown, considerable 
46 Some people object to adults being called "pupils". 
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explanation would have been required to overcome the many misleading uses of 
"andragogy" and to explain its several and subtly different meanings. 
• The term "andragogic" is not yet listed in some major English language dictionaries47. 
To overcome these difficulties it was decided to present many of the preliminary findings 
about an andragogic perspective summarily, and to provide more detailed explanation 
later in this thesis48. The reader might wonder why the researcher would want to study 
adulthood from a perspective so difficult to explicate and which is relatively unknown to 
philosophy of education in the United Kingdom. Since being introduced to an andragogic 
perspective in 198249 the researcher found that it could better describe the reality of adult 
education, than any other approach. The reader may or may not find similarly, as the 
andragogic perspective is explicated in this chapter and also later in this thesis50. 
Many adult educationists will be familiar with the term "andragogy" as introduced in the 
United States of America by Linderman and then Knowles51, and in the United Kingdom 
by Simpson and then Aldred et ai52. To explicate "andragogic perspective" the researcher 
decided to begin with the more familiar term, "andragogy". For the researcher, the 
phenomenon named by "andragogy" is the practice or activity of accompanying adults. 
"Andragogy" is derived from Greek aner, andra or andreia meaning humankind 
(439:199) (11:1), grown up human (414:4) or adult (311:23) (435:397) (82:54) and 
agogos meaning leader (89:19) (435:219) (394:417) (213:938), guide (311:23) 
(414:1), attendant (55:220) or accompanist (439:198). Just as andragogy is the 
accompaniment of adults (414:6) (147:3) (435:220) (439:199) (89:14), so pedagogy 
(from Greek pais meaning youth (311 :23) boy or child (311: 1) (89: 19) (82:9) (209:3) and 
agogos meaning leading or accompaniment) is the practice of accompanying children. 
Similarly, gerontagogy (from Greek geron meaning old man (311 :5), aged person 
(311:23) grey beard, or grey-haired man (435:219) and agogos53) is the practice of 
accompanying older adults (414:8) (439:199) (89:14). As Viljoen and Pienaar (439:195) 
47 Gove (133), Sinclair (395), Simpson and Weiner (394) and Kirkpatrick (213) were consulted. Van 
Enckevort (433:37-41) and Ten Have (414:2-5) provided a thorough description of the origins of 
"andragogy" in Continental Europe. 
48 Chapter Six, Paragraph 2.6. 
49 While studying the Principles of Education at the Tertiary Level (based on Oberholzer and Grey ling) 
(311) for the Diploma in Tertiary Education, and during research for a Master of Education degree (see 
Robb) (344), both at the University of South Africa. 
50 Chapter Six, Paragraph 2.5. 
51 Lindeman published a paper on andragogik in 1926 (250:38) and a book with Anderson in 1927 (10). 
Knowles published two papers in 1968 (219) (220) and his well-known book Modem Practice of 
Adult Education: andragogy versus pedagogy, in 1970 (221). This chronology is also reported by 
Davenport and Davenport (78:4-5) and Jarvis (186:169). 
52 Simpson (393) published his paper in 1964 and Aldred et al published their booklet in 1983 (6). 
53 Viljoen and Pienaar ( 439: 199) referred to geroon rather than geron. It is likely that Yeo ( 469:4-5) and 
Lebel (238:16-18) were not aware of the term "gerontagogy" when they coined "eldergogy" and 
"gerogogy", respectively. 
25 
found. agoge means accompaniment ( 439: 195). 
It is safe to generalise and state that agogy is the practice of accompaniment. 
"Accompaniment" is used to name the complex support offered by one human to 
another in need. In this thesis, the human doing the accompanying is called an agogue 
and the one being accompanied the agogee. Where one person calls on the accompanying 
assistance of another and that requested assistance is offered, it can be said that the agein 
is being actualised and that an agogic relationship is established. Agein is a complex 
phenomenon, meaning, for example, guiding, escorting and accompanying. To be 
involved in an agogic relationship (the actualisation of agein54) is to be involved in the 
agogic mode of being or, for short, the agogic (311:5). "Agogic" is derived from 
the Greek agogike meaning that which is concerned with accompaniment (439:198). 
When one adult calls for assistance from another adult and the fellow-adult responds by 
accompanying, they are involved in the andragogic (mode of being). When a child 
or an older adult calls for assistance from an adult and the adult responds by 
accompanying, they are involved in the pedagogic and the gerontagogic (modes of 
being) respectively. The research was undertaken from an andragogic perspective. 
These preliminary findings are likely to be new and unusual for some readers and Table 
One below is presented to lessen misunderstanding with regard to terminology. 
TABLE ONE 
TABLE TO SUMMARISE THE TERMINOLOGY TO DO WITH THE 
AGOGIC MODE OF BEING 
THE ONE BEING ACCOMPANIED 
Child Adult Older Adult 
The practice pedagogy andragogy gerontagogy 
The mode of being pedagogic andragogic gerontagogic 
The person accompanied pedagogee andragogee gerontagogee 
The person accompanying pedagogue andragogue gerontagogue 
The science pedagogics andragogics gerontagogics55 
The scientist pedagogician andragogician56 gerontagogician 
54 Since "agein" is frequently used as an English word, from now on in this thesis, it will not take 
italics - an emphasis reserved for foreign terms. 
55 See Du Plooy et al (89:14) for further details. 
56 Ten Have (413:3), perhaps following Simpson and Weiner (394:1058), referred to "pedagologists" and 
"andragologists". 
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Since most agogicians study education (the relationship), most of the research on agogy 
has taken place in an education setting. However, as is common knowledge, 
accompaniment of one person by another is not limited to educational situations. 
For example, Ten Have (413:3) (414:6) found that there is nothing in the word "andr-
agogy" that justifies the restriction to adult-educational work, and that (414:6) the Dutch 
concept named by "andragogy" covers all agogical work with adults, including adult 
education. By illustrating the distinction between the Dutch onderwijs and opvoeding, 
Ten Have (414:1-3) explained why agogy is not only education. He pointed out that 
whereas the Anglo-Saxon idea of upbringing facilitated by education includes systematic 
instruction for the unfolding of mental powers and intellectual training, the equivalent in 
Dutch, opvoeding, does not. 
The term onderwijs is used to denote instruction in schools and other institutions, and 
opvoeding emphasises the formation of a harmonious character or personality formation, 
training for social competence, guided development of emotional and moral life, 
building inner-directedness and life orientation. This life orientation does not primarily 
take place in educational institutions, but in the family home, on the play ground, in peer 
groups, and in the life-space of the neighbourhood. 
Yonge (471:166) found that: " ... andragogy should not be used as a synonym for 'adult 
education' ", and Viljoen and Pienaar (439:199) found that a human is accompanied 
throughout life, and all people are accompanied in one way or another. Consequently, 
agogy can take place in medicine, nursing, social work, psychiatric work, and 
psychological services (311:24) (312) (227:108); and in probation work (414:3), 
personnel management, industrial relations (414:4) and (414:14) social work. Van 
Enckevort (433:49-50) provided a similar list. 
Since the researcher was particularly interested in definitional problems in adult education, 
the research was concerned with andragogy in its adult educational setting, or 
similarly, adult education from an andragogical perspective. However, it was 
anticipated that the research might also yield results applicable to the pedagogic and 
gerontagogic. In addition, the researcher hoped that further investigation of the andragogic 
would uncover additional details of what adulthood is and what if any, the relationship is 
between education, accompaniment and adulthood. 
The researcher considered that some readers, on first reading about agogy and the 
andragogic, might assume that he was devising or promoting some theory or philosophy. 
However, as will become even more evident when the method for conducting the research 
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is explained in detail later in this chapter, this is not the case. The researcher's task during 
the research was to describe phenomena as adequately as is humanly possible. 
Consequently, andragogy in the research is not a philosophy, ideology, approach or 
model. The explication of andragogy already given, has arisen from the researcher's 
reflection on his own experiences as an adult-being-accompanied, and critical examination 
of fellow-researchers' findings compared to his own. The scientific nature of this 
reflection is explained later in this chapter57. 
So far in this paragraph the terms "accompany", "accompanying" and "accompaniment" 
have been frequently used. However, one could ask: Towards what is the andragogee 
accompanied (escorted, guided or led) by the andragogue? This question could be asked 
another way. Since, as De Jager et al (82:21) indicated, agein means assistance in 
becoming, the researcher asked: Becoming what? Since most agogicians study 
education (the relationship), it is not surprising to find that the purpose (desired outcome 
or destination) of agogy is generally regarded as adulthood (414:2) (128:107) (439:15) 
(144:12) (90:17). Gluckman (128:113-117) reported the findings of at least six other 
agogicians which record adulthood as being the desired outcome of pedagogy. Again, 
the researcher was returned to the main theme of the research: What is adulthood? 
As was expected, many agogicians found adulthood to be what educationists found it to 
be, as already reported in this chapter, namely, being: mature (144:13), well adjusted, 
socially competent ( 414: 11 ), able to constitute relationships with other people, 
able to construct partnerships in social life, of harmonious character or 
personality, developed emotionally (414:2), independent, self-realising, 
discrimination, encultured (89:198), grown-up (439:16), responsible (89:51) 
(311:4), and accountable. However, what are maturity, self-realisation, social 
competence, accountability, responsibleness, and being developed emotionally? If these 
terms are descriptors of adulthood, their meaning would have to be explicated. Just how 
this was to be done was not evident at this stage in the research. 
An apparent contradiction mentioned earlier in this chapter with regard to education and 
adulthood, arose again. If agogy is accompaniment to adulthood, how can 
there be accompaniment of adults and older adults when they have already 
achieved adulthood? Agogicians, including the researcher, have an answer to that 
question. Most of them found that adulthood is not a final state. Adulthood cannot be 
complete (311:60), final (439:16), terminal (439:201), a final destination 
(439:138), perfected or finished (144:16), full (311:37), a winning line (89:136), 
57 Paragraph 3.2. 
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or an end phase (89: 160). Oberholzer and Grey ling (311 :34) found that an adult can 
become a more mature adult or reach more complete adulthood (311:143). The 
researcher (344:63) previously found that more responsible adulthood is possible. 
Gunter (144:16) found that after attainment of adulthood, greater adulthood is possible 
and that once one has attained adulthood, one is no longer becoming an adult but is an 
adult in a state of becoming. Just as some pedagogicians regarded guiding a child to 
adulthood as improving (414:8) (89:135) (144:13), raising (414:9), elevating 
(311:25), and enhancing and advancing (90:24) the agogee, so it is implied that 
andragogy strives to enhance, advance or elevate an adult to even greater adulthood. 
However, adulthood as not completable, finishable or perfectable does not help to 
describe what adulthood is. In addition, one needs to establish what adulthood is, to know 
what "more", "greater", "enhanced" and "elevated" adulthood mean. Without 
knowing what it means to be mature or responsible, how can one know what more 
responsible and more mature are? The results of the research so far enabled the researcher 
to pose three further questions. 
• Are there certain minimum levels of responsibility, maturity, completeness, 
advancedness which enable one to say someone is an adult, and then higher levels of 
these which enable one to say another is a greater adult or a more mature adult? 
• How does one become a more mature, more responsible and elevated adult? 
• How do humans know that adulthood can never be completed, perfected or finished: 
that a human can never be fully responsible, fully mature or fully enhanced? How do 
humans know what a fully mature or fully responsible adult would be like? 
It was realised that attempts to answer the questions just stated would make up a 
substantial part of the research. 
Despite the fact that the researcher's preliminary findings were that adulthood is not a final 
achievement or a completable task, scientific responsibility required that account be taken 
of fellow-researchers' findings and common knowledge that adulthood is final. For 
example, on reaching the age of eighteen or twenty one, a person becomes adult. In some 
societies having a first child, getting married or starting a first full-time job, gains 
recognition of adult status. Consequently, the researcher was obliged to seek answers to 
the question: Are chronological, biological, psychological and social 
descriptions of what it means to be an adult, adequate? It was realised that 
further examination of current descriptions of adulthood for their adequacy, would be an 
integral part of the research58. 
58 The results of examinations of current descriptions of adulthood for theit.adequacy, are presented in 
Chapters Two, Three and Four. 
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At this point in the researcher, the researcher was again confronted by his motives for 
seeking a fundamentally adequate description of adulthood. The aim was to provide a 
definition of adulthood which could then provide the basis (fundimentum) for a definition 
of adult education. In tum, the reason for seeking a fundamental definition of adult 
education (apart from the wonderment of the research itself) was to try to offer 
suggestions for enhancing the quality of the relationship between andragogue and 
andragogee. 
Again, in tum, the reason for wanting to enhance the relationship, was to assist the 
andragogue to better meet the agogee's needs. But what are these needs? If, as 
described earlier in this chapter, adult education is accompanying the adult to further or 
greater adulthood, what needs is the accompanying supposed to meet? If humankind has 
designed an adult education milieu to accompany the adult to further or greater adulthood, 
why do people undertake adult education? The researcher realised that the questions just 
listed would require answering during the research. 
To avoid over-complexity in this introductory chapter, a wide range of information has 
been presented in a simplified way. The researcher was concerned that this simplification 
might have caused misunderstandings in two respects, namely that: 
• using "improving", "enhancing" and "elevating", may be interpreted as derogatory and 
demeaning of children and of adults who may not be considered elevated, enhanced or 
improved (whatever these mean); and 
• seeking a description of adulthood is misguided. Adulthood in one culture is unlikely 
to be the same as adulthood in another: As Viljoen59 found, differences of opinion 
arise the moment one tries to interpret adulthood because of differing views on life. 
Should the reader hold these criticisms of the explication so far, the following explanation 
should dispel them to some extent. 
Since any belittling of other humans is against the principles of agogy (supportive 
accompaniment), the researcher strived not to be belittling. Several agogicians (439:199) 
(89:161) stated that being-a-child is not a deficient or defective way of being human, 
nor a sickness (439:138). Although childhood is not adulthood and adulthood is the 
expected goal, terms such as adult-in-the-making (439:202) (209:7) (144:38), 
becoming-adult (439:202); not-yet-adult (209:7) and adult-to-be (90:5), should 
not be interpreted, as Gluckman (128:11) did, as regarding the child in a negative way. It 
is unfortunate that "better", "improve" and "enhance" are frequently interpreted as implied 
59 Quoted by Gluckman (128: 113). 
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criticism: the researcher hoped to reveal other more acceptable tenns during the research. 
Rather than finding that adulthood varies from culture to culture, it is the researcher's 
initial impression that expressions of adulthood vary from culture to culture. For the 
researcher, there are some underlying common principles (fundamentals) which define 
adulthood. Viljoen corroborated60 this, finding certain criteria for adulthood that :lave no 
connection with any philosophy of life and which may therefore be regarded as 
universally valid requirements. Similarly, Gunter (144:109) found that adulthood is 
universal and unchangeable. When Kriekmans61 indicated that adulthood is a good 
disposition - one that complies with the demands of humankind's true nature, the 
researcher considered that he was alluding to this universality of adulthood. Of course, to 
find out whether there is such a universally valid description of adulthood, was the 
researcher's main purpose in the research. 
It stands to reason that if adulthood varies from culture to culture, the only research 
possible about adult education, would be comparisons of systems, theories, views and 
beliefs. In addition, if adulthood is a relative phenomenon, how can one rationally select 
more effective methods for educating adults? Consequently, the research was undertaken 
from a fundamental perspective. As will now be explained, a fundamental perspective 
is the only way known to the researcher for uncovering those principles, universals or 
fundamentals (if they are there) which apply to adulthood in all its expressions. 
2.7 "FUNDAMENTAL (ANDRAGOGIC) PERSPECTIVE" 
"Fundamental" is derived from Latin fundamentum meaning ground, basis or 
foundation and fundare meaning to base, to ground; to probe into the basic, the 
essential, the perennial, the continually recurring and ever-repeating; that which 
is constantly and universally present, inner-most nature and ever-constant 
foundation (435:279). Dictionary definitions give similar meanings: Sinclair (395:590) 
found that "fundamental" refers to an essential feature, part or basic nature of 
something and Kirkpatrick (213:507), that it means serving as a foundation or 
groundwork. Oberholzer and Greyling (311:12) found that "fundamental" can be likened 
to "principle" which refers to a primary basis of reality by which all humankind live 
without having to ascribe any particular content to it. It is the universal as the first and 
deepest basis of reality. 
60 Quoted by Gluckman (128:114). 
61 Quoted in Du Plooy and Kilian (90:98-101). 
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Consequently, a fundamental perspective seeks to find the invariant (209:13), ontic, 
universal (311: 12) undeniable, primordial, unchanging, ultimate, and ever-present facts, 
or truths (439:80) about a phenomenon. A fundamental perspective seeks to penetrate 
beyond culture, race, religion and time, for example, to find that which is universal. This 
means that the researcher was not permitted to offer theories, views or beliefs about 
adulthood but had to investigate them for their adequacy of describing the ontic, universal, 
unchanging reality. The researcher's intention was to reflect penetratingly (439:80) on and 
describe as adequately as is humanly possible what, in essence, adulthood in an 
andragogic and education perspective is. 
A fundamental perspective is appropriate for investigating existential phenomena as 
"ontic" and "essence" show. "Ontic" is derived from Greek ontos meaning that which 
is (435:319), and "Essence" from Latin essentia meaning being. The prefix esse means 
to be (435:268) (213:430). Consequently, a fundamental investigation is an essential 
investigation, a penetration to the inner most nature (439:201) (from Greek eidos). It 
entails uncovering and describing essences or essentials, that is, that which makes a 
phenomenon what it is (88:8) (213:430) and without which, it would not be what it 
is. Essences (essentials) make a phenomenon what it is no matter what expression the 
phenomenon takes. It is for this reason that the researcher employed "What is ... ?" type 
questions in the research. An essential (fundamental) is indispensable (213:430) to the 
phenomenon because without it, it would cease to be the phenomenon (395:478). 
In summary, the phenomenon being fundamentally (essentially and ontically) studied by 
the researcher in the research was adulthood as a manifestation of supportive 
accompaniment of adults in an education situation. The researcher considered 
that Ten Have's (414:12) philosophical agology is equivalent to a fundamental agogic 
perspective, and that Kakar (200: 126) was thinking fundamentally when he referred to 
"the final goals62 of adulthood". The researcher's experience is that many fellow-
educationists in the United Kingdom are not familiar with a fundamental approach63• In 
addition, when a fundamental perspective is explained, some consider it an impossible and 
unnecessary task, and one that is methodologically unsound. 
However, the researcher considered that the careful and extensive explication given so far 
in this chapter has indicated that a fundamental perspective is possible, necessary and 
indeed, is the only way to seek answers to very complex questions which give rise to 
62 This does not mean of course, that final or ultimate goals can be achieved. 
63 Perhaps this is so because of the lack of influence of Continental philosophy in the United Kingdom. 
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apparent contradictions. The approach employed in the research to achieve a fundamental 
perspective was an phenomenological one. 
3.0 POINT OF DEPARTURE AND METHOD OF RESEARCH 
As the explanation so far in this chapter has illustrated, the point of departure for the 
research was the phenomenon known as adulthood. However, the researcher intended 
investigating adulthood, fundamentally (radically) and andragogically with 
regard to four main part questions. 
• Do existing concepts of what adulthood is, adequately describe it? 
• Does adulthood as an existential-ethical continuum better describe adulthood than 
other current descriptions? 
• How, if at all, is the phenomenon of the agein in its andragogic mode as the 
perennial, ever-present uniquely human activity of accompaniment, related to 
adulthood as an existential-ethical continuum? 
• Can adulthood as an existential-ethical continuum in andragogic perspective assist in 
describing what the education of adults is? 
It has already been stated that a fundamental perspective is the only way known to the 
researcher for uncovering the essentials, principles, or fundamentals (if they are there) of 
the phenomenon of adulthood. The researcher employed the phenomenological 
radical reflection method and this is now described. 
3.1 A PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH 
The researcher has already frequently stated in this chapter that a phenomenological 
approach was employed in the research. Since a detailed explanation of the 
phenomenological approach has previously (344:28-33) been given, and since the 
topic of the research is not methodology, the current explication of phenomenology 
will concentrate on showing the relevance of the approach to researching adulthood. 
Phenomenology from Greek phainestai, to appear, to come into light, reveal 
itself) and phainomenon, appearance (262:24) is currently generally understood to 
have been designed by Husser164 in an attempt (176:71-73) to make philosophy the 
rigourous science it had always claimed to be and which he felt it should be. 
Phenomenology has also become known as a movement and a method, but discussion 
of the movement and the dispute about phenomenology as an approach rather than a 
method were outwith the scope of the research. For reasons which will become apparent 
64 However, Kant and Hegel used the term in different ways, before Husserl (262:22). Merleau-Ponty 
(279:viii) found that Marx, Nietzsche and Freud used the approach, but that the term is now applied in 
a wide variety of ways in psychology and sociology (52:645), as well as philosophy. 
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in this paragraph, phenomenology in the research was regarded as an approach. An 
overview of the demands of the phenomenological approach as a scientific approach is 
now given. 
It can be safely stated in summary65, that Husserl found three main shortcomings of 
philosophy, namely: the lack of definition of, and clarity in, philosophical problems and 
methods (176:73); the extent to which every question in philosophy becomes a matter of 
personal conviction and of interpretation given by a school of thought or a point of 
view (176:74-75); and the serious error of attempting to use naturalistic, 
empirical methods in philosophy in an attempt to gain scientific rigour ( 176:78). This 
does not mean to say that phenomenological philosophy is not empirical. May (272:8) 
reported how the existential movement in psychiatry and psychology arose precisely out 
of a passion to be more empirical. 11Binswanger and others were convinced that the 
traditional scientific methods not only did not do justice to the data but actually tended to 
hide rather than reveal ... 11 • Husser166 referred to a fundamental investigation of 
phenomena being a radically empirical investigation. Ellenberger (92:992-97) provided an 
extensive description of how phenomenology has been used by psychologists to improve 
the quality of psychological research. As will be explained later in this chapter, a radically 
empirical investigation is conducted employing a method referred to as fundamental 
radical reflection. 
Again in summary, Husserl (176:79-118), using experimental psychology as an example, 
gave extensive reasons why he found the naturalistic empirical sciences67 to be an 
inappropriate way to investigate human phenomena: he found that if applied to the study 
of humankind, naturalistic empirical sciences can only yield inaccurate results. He 
(176:118) also found that: 11 ••• all psychological knowledge, too, even where it is related 
primarily to human individualities, characters and dispositions, finds itself referred back to 
those unities of consciousness, and thereby to the study of the phenomena themselves 
and of their implications. 11 The relevance of phenomenology to the study of education is 
shown in the literature with titles such as: Phenomenology and Education (72) and 
Existentialism and Phenomenology in Education (83). In addition, Vandenberg (431:1-
11) provided an extensive history of the phenomenological and existential 
phenomenological approach in researching education. 
65 It would be scientifically irresponsible (and in any case impossible) to attempt a fuller summary of 
Husserl's voluminous works in this chapter. 
66 Paraphrased in Van Rensburg et al (435:264). 
6? When natural or physical sciences are regarded as the only ways to gain reliable knowledge of 
humankind, this is known as the doctrine of scientism (258: 10). 
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Several of Husserl's (176: 144) findings indicated that the phenomenological approach 
requires the scientist to have theoretical talent, to contribute eternal validities, 
present findings completely clearly, in lucid order and with conceptual 
distinctness, be guided by rigorous theory and use an approach to science 
comprising thought steps, each of which is immediately understood. Husserl 
(177:151) translated the requirements just stated into definite aims: systematic 
approximations on the basis of laws that are unconditionally universal, to 
explain all intuitively pre-given entities by an appeal to what is ultimate and to 
induce from appearances (which are the data in any factual case), future possibilities. 
Since, the research was conducted using a phenomenological approach, the aims just 
stated were those of the researcher68. 
From the summaries just given, it can be stated that phenomenologists are concerned with 
finding the truth about a phenomenon in the form of eternal validities and laws that are 
unconditionally universal. The fact just mentioned is expressed in the relevant 
literature as, for example, phenomenology being a search for, or study of, essences 
(176:147) (279:vii) (439:32) (175:5); an attempt to get to the root nature of character - its 
eidos (90:38); the fundamental or real essences (90:39), the eidos - what was really 
hidden of the phenomenon (89:207), and a detailed description of the essence of the 
phenomenon as it is given to consciousness (89:22). As Landman (234:36) found: 
"Phenomenology is the method that discloses essentials." 
Phenomenology then, is an eidetical approach in search of pure eidetic knowledge, by 
attempting to uncover the eidos, the essence, the "whatness" of the phenomenon which is 
almost always hidden or disguised by the phenomenon's appearance (expression). 
Ellenberger (92:96) corroborated: "With this method, observation is greatly enhanced: the 
less apparent elements of phenomena manifest themselves with increasing richness and 
variety, with finer gradations of clarity and obscurity, and eventually previously unnoticed 
structures of phenomena may become apparent." The finding just stated should not be 
interpreted as indicating two separate parts - essence and appearance: rather, the 
phenomenon is both in one. As Sartre (370:xxii) found, phenomenologists attempt to 
describe something as it is absolutely, as it reveals itself. 
The phenomenologist then, attempts to reveal universal ontological essences not 
contingent essences, or as Heidegger (163:38) said, accidental structures. The fact that 
Sartre (370) subtitled his study into Being and Nothingness, An Essay on 
6S Notice how human activities, including the activity of scientifically researching, cannot be neatly 
boxed-off. The researcher is simultaneously, and in varying degrees, fundamental andragogician, 
philosophical anthropologist, ontologist and ethician, for example. 
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Phenomenological Ontology also indicated that phenomenology is 
phenomenological ontology. Heidegger (163:196) corroborated this: "The phenomenon of 
truth is so thoroughly coupled with the problem of Being ... ". The researcher found, as 
did Heidegger (163:487) and several other scientists69, that philosophy is universal 
phenomenological ontology, and that a fundamental (ontological) study of 
humankind can only be conducted phenomenologically. Conseft uently, 
phenomenology is the practice of ontology, and ontology can only be studied 
phenomenologically. Since the research was to investigate what it means to be an adult or, 
in other words, what being in the mode of adulthood is, and since ontology is sometimes 
referred to as the study of Being, ontology is relevant to the research. 
Throughout this chapter so far, the researcher has stated that the research is a scientific 
study, that educationists, andragogicians, philosophers, ontologists and ethicians, are 
scientists. In addition, it is evident from Husserl's findings (176) (177) (178), that 
phenomenologists want to ensure that phenomenology contributes to philosophy being a 
rigorous science or scientific philosophy (175:5). Husserl (177: 159) regarded 
philosophy as science, using the term philosophy-science. Some readers may 
disapprove of using "science" and "scientist" in this way, and although it is not possible to 
present the "Is-philosophy-a-science?" debate in full in this thesis, the researcher felt duty-
bound to provide some detail on how some phenomenologists attempt to make the results 
of philosophical research scientifically adequate. 
Phenomenologists seek for truth about humankind in the most appropriate way, and in a 
way that offers outcomes (knowledge) with a degree of certainty that has not been 
witnessed before. As Lauer found70, phenomenology: " ... will refuse to accept any 
conclusion that has not been verified as absolutely valid for all men and for all times 
.... "Lauer found71 that solutions to philosophical problems arising from phenomenology 
may not be different from those advanced in former ages, " ... but it must mean that the 
solutions have been validated to an extent that they never had been previously." 
Phenomenologists (philosophers as scientists) consider that the phenomenological 
approach enables the scientist to find scientifically adequate answers to the essences of 
humankind. They consider such a finding safe for at least ten reasons. 
a) Philosophy, as all science, begins with what is already there and that scientists 
begin with philosophical intuition (176: 147). As Merleau-Ponty (279:vii) found, 
69 Including Viljoen and Pienaar (439:33), and CK Oberholzer and Greyling (311:131), for example. 
70 In Husserl (175:5). 
71 In Husserl (175:39). 
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phenomenology is an approach for which the world is already there before 
reflection begins. As Heidegger (163:75) found, ontological foundations can 
never be disclosed by subsequent hypotheses derived from empirical material, but 
are always there already, even when that empirical material simply gets collected. 
b) The only method capable of verifying philosophical truth at all is cooperative 
scientific endeavour which requires time, and the combined efforts of many 
investigators, all imbued with the same ideal but not belonging to the same school 
(175:5). As Lauer found72, one human or one generation cannot deal with all the 
problems of philosophy: " ... philosophy will demand the contributions of a large 
number of scholars, all animated by the same purpose and all employing the same 
phenomenological method." 
c) Philosophy-science is systematic in its procedures but is not a system. 
d) What is now called "phenomenology" was practised before Husserl, and scientists 
who are unaware of the term "phenomenology" do undertake phenomenological 
analysis. For example, Alexander (7:9) an ethician, found that: "It is the business of 
philosophy to investigate the pre-suppositions of common life ... ", and as 
Plato 73 found, the aim of all philosophy is just to correct the assumptions of 
the ordinary mind, and to grasp in their unity and cohesion the ultimate 
principles which the mind feels must be at the root of all reality. As Olafson 
(316:4) indicated, Heidegger found that humankind already. has an implicit 
understanding of the matters that philosophy seeks to raise to the level of explicit 
conceptual formulation. "Indeed one could say that it is just this implicit 
understanding that philosophy attempts to bring to explicit understanding. 
e) Phenomenology is not a method of proof. It describes what is observed (262:25) 
and the phenomenologist does not attempt to persuade, except in the post-scientific 
stance when recommendations (suggestions) for better practice based on the results 
of research, may be offered. 
t) Phenomenology involves not only unveiling the phenomenon, but a continual re-
working of the method as Husserl is reported74 as doing. In addition, because 
phenomenology involves accurate description, it means the continual re-assessment 
72 In Husserl (175:40). 
73 Paraphrased by Alexander (7: 18). 
74 Lauer, in Husserl (175:35-36) explained how in the works of Husserl, one can observe the coverage of 
the same ground over and over again, and the constant questioning of methodological adequacy. 
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of the accuracy of terms and phrases employed. 
g) Phenomenological philosophy is a personal matter - a fact explained by Husserl 
(176: 146): "The impulse to research must proceed not from philosophies but from 
things and from problems connected with them." Luijpen and Koren (258: 11) gave a 
detailed explanation of Husserl's finding: "Authentic philosophy is an attempt to 
give a personal answer to a personal question through a personal struggle 
to remove the obstacles preventing understanding ... if the questions and answers of 
a system do not become my questions and my answers, I never become myself as 
a philosopher." 
h) Because philosophy is a personal experience, every philosopher, by necessity, has 
to cover the same ground: " ... to begin from the beginning and to realize a radical 
reflection on his own subjectivity, a reflection in which is again accomplished the 
fundamental constitution of absolute being" ( 175:36). The researcher considered that 
Macquarrie (262:26) translated "covering the same ground" into a practical 
procedure: "The test is to compare our own first-hand understanding of existence, 
i.e., to confront the phenomenological account [one's own or another scientist's] 
with the phenomena themselves as we have access to them." 
i) The scientist must attempt as far as is humanly possible to free himself of prejudice 
and presuppositions. Heidegger (162:142) indicated why the philosopher cannot 
work from any " - ism" or doctrine: "To be sure, there are books today entitled: 
'What is man?' but the title merely stands in letters on the cover. There is no 
questioning." Heidegger found that people do not question mainly because they 
consider that they already have the answer. Husserl (176: 147) gave a different 
perspective to the same finding: "What is needed is not the insistence that one 
sees with one's own eyes; rather it is that he not explain away under the 
pressure of prejudice what has been seen." 
j) All science is imperfect because humankind is imperfect, and final answers about the 
mystery that humankind is, will never be attained. Consequently, phenomenologists 
do not claim that the knowledge uncovered is final or complete. As Husserl (176:74) 
found: "All sciences are imperfect, even the much admired exact sciences." 
The researcher considered that the explication just presented made it safe to state that the 
phenomenological approach, is the only adequate way (or the proper attitude as Lauer put 
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it75) to study essences of adulthood. The explanation just given highlights the difficulties 
facing any researcher in conducting a phenomenological analysis. Husserl (177:150-151) 
indicated the great difficulty in achieving scientific adequacy in the "humanistic sciences" 
as he called them, and as Macquarrie (262:22) pointed out: " ... pure phenomenology is a 
very difficult undertaking and demands a very strict mental discipline. How can one 
ever be sure that one has screened out all one's presuppositions on any subject?" The 
researcher would add the questions: How is the phenomenologist to attempt the 
uncovering (describing) of essences? How does one uncover and describe or 
reveal that which shows itself (262:25)? How is one to reduce the effect of 
personal preferences and idiosyncrasies? How does one keep to a systematic 
approach without allowing false subject divisions to hide essences? 
While it cannot be denied that scientists, including phenomenologists, can never be 
absolutely certain, it is possible to take precautions which increase the possibility of 
adhering to the demands of a phenomenological approach. The fundamental radical 
reflection method was employed in the research because it contains these precautions 
within it. Although a phenomenological approach demands a systematic approach, it itself 
cannot consist of a system of steps because the phenomenologist must deal with several 
interrelated essences simultaneously. Consequently, the researcher did not employ step-
like procedures offered by some other phenomenologists (90:38-47), and instead used 
fundamental radical reflection, as will now be described. 
3.2 FUNDAMENTAL RADICAL REFLECTION: AN APPROPRIATE 
METHOD FOR A PHENOMENOLOGICAL STUDY OF ADULTHOOD 
As Viljoen and Pienaar ( 439:29) found: " ... the essence of the appearance can only be dis-
covered or brought to light by a human act, viz. by means of radical reflection ... ". 
Because the researcher took a phenomenological approach in the research for this chapter 
and in the style of writing for this chapter, the reader will have already observed instances 
of fundamental radical reflection. When researchers employ fundamental radical 
reflection, it is implied that they are seeking the roots (radix), the essence of the 
phenomenon, in order to identify that which is universal for all phenomena of the type 
under investigation. It is understandable then, that fundamental reflection is an 
appropriate method for a fundamental study of adulthood in andragogic perspective. 
Rather than merely provide a list of the requirements of the fundamental radical 
reflection method, the researcher has also explained how he applied them in the 
research. The list of practical procedures now presented, cannot be regarded 
hierarchically, and the point-form summary approach is adopted only to keep this chapter 
75 In Husserl (175:37). 
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to a manageable length. 
• The major research question has been made explicit and has been divided into 
numerous part-questions. This indicates that the researcher has a scientific hypothesis 
requiring testing, and that any research question to do with humankind cannot be 
asked in a hierarchical, piece-meal way. The question: What is adulthood? for 
example, may be asked in several different ways, which are all part-questions of one 
question. 
• "Seeking-answer" has been used to indicate that no science can result in absolute 
knowledge and that findings about humankind presented in the research are not, and 
never will be, final. The researcher considered it safe to state that this is the way of all 
science - the scientist is always in search for truth and an answer only provides the 
stepping stone for yet another question. 
• Common sense phenomena are referred to as everyday experience and, in 
keeping with the demands of phenomenology and acknowledging the fact that it is a 
personal activity, the researcher has attempted to begin by going back to the things 
in themselves. Common sense phenomena which are frequently taken for granted, 
are explained in as much detail as scientifically necessary to avoid misunderstanding. 
• Numerous footnotes have been employed in this thesis to alert the reader to even 
minor assumptions and reasons for choices of words and editorial style. 
Fundamental radical reflection has to ensure that the reader will not be mislead 
or confused by any unexplained expression - even minor ones. While a large number 
of footnotes could be inconvenient to the reader, these have been kept to the absolute 
minimum within the bounds of scientific responsibility. 
• Detailed and, to some extent, repetitive expression is purposefully employed 
in this thesis. So complex and interrelated are the essences of humankind that finding 
the best terminology to describe them accurately is a major difficulty. This technique 
might be called "pedantic" by non-phenomenologists, but fundamental radical 
reflection requires that the researcher express the same fact in several different ways 
in order to illustrate complex interrelationships. Phenomenologists are required to 
reflect and re-reflect on their expression to provide the best possible description. 
• "Findings", "find(s)" and "found" are used in place of "view", "opinion", 
"says" and "claims", for example, to refer to the results of the researcher and other 
scientists' reflections. This technique is employed as part of fundamental radical 
reflection because science is not concerned with mere views, opinions or schools 
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of thought, for example, excepting to test their adequacy. Many traditional 
philosophers have come to their views or opinions after careful and thorough 
reflection over many years. It is self-evident that these scientifically arrived at 
facts are not the same as the views and opinions of those scientists and lay-people 
who without thorough, or even very little, reflection, form a view on some issue. The 
researcher considered that the "views" and "opinions" of philosophers which are 
formally recorded in books, dissertations and academic papers, for example, are 
usually carefully arrived at results or findings on the topic being researched76. 
Consequently, when philosophers comment on the "philosophies" of other 
philosophers and make statements such as "Sartre follows, borrows from or 
agrees with Heidegger", what they mean is that Sartre, after scientific 
reflection obtains the same results as Heidegger does. In addition, the term 
"findings" is used to refer to the researcher's results of reflection and indicates a 
testing of his own personal understanding of the phenomenon as it presents itself to 
him. The statement just offered explains why in phenomenological philosophy it is the 
scientist's expressions of consciousness of the phenomenon which is the 
part-data and why the findings of other scientists are not data but evidence either 
corroborating or denying what the scientist finds in his own investigation. 
• Every attempt has been made to bracket out the researcher's opinions and 
beliefs, and to record only findings revealed by reflection, and tested and re-
formulated to give as accurate expression as is humanly possible. To avoid presenting 
opinions rather than findings, the researcher had to temporarily suspend 
prejudices and presuppositions arising from his philosophy of life. This was 
attempted by returning to the etymological roots of certain terms to discern their 
original meanings, and by continual re-reflection on the results of the research. The 
extent to which the researcher has succeeded in suspending prejudices will ultimately 
be tested by the critical reflection of fellow-scientists with whom, by the very act of 
committing results to paper in this thesis, he indicates his desire for scientific dialogue. 
• Other scientists' findings (results) will not be merely accepted, but 
continually assessed for whether or not they corroborate the researcher's findings. If 
findings do not coincide then the researcher is obliged to re-reflect on his findings or 
explain why his findings do not coincide with findings of others. Popper, paraphrased 
in Goetz (129:Vol 24:17), corroborated the requirement for re-reflection: to content 
76 One might find differently or be dissatisfied with the quality of the method used to obtain the findings, 
but they are, none the less, findings. This perspective emphasises even more, the scientific 
responsibility of the scientist. 
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oneself with favourable evidence is not enough; one must be searching all the time for 
unfavourable evidence. In this thesis, the researcher has avoided terms such as 
"attacking", "criticising" or "destroying" with regard to the scientific work of 
fellow-researchers. The researcher, like other scientists, is involved in scientific 
practice and an attacking approach is inappropriate. 
• No attempt is made to persuade in the research and the researcher attempted to 
describe and not prescribe. If scientists, including phenomenologists, attempt to 
convince or convert other scientists as Warnock77 claimed Sartre did, and as she 
(443:2) claimed other existentialist philosophers do, then scientific integrity is 
infringed and the results are likely to be unreliable. Consequently, the researcher 
takes responsibility for the findings presented in the research, and avoided terms 
such as "philosophy has claimed" and "this study finds". Personifying a 
discipline or a study removes responsibility for any results which are not reliable: only 
humankind as philosopher/scientist can find. This does not mean however that the 
researcher as researcher is not entitled to his own views on the results of the research 
when they become available. The fundamental radical reflection method 
enables the researcher to express recommendations for practice (views) in what is 
called a post-scientific stance and this will be done in the conclusion to this 
thesis78. 
Fundamental radical reflection as just described, was the researcher's main 
technique for overcoming several difficulties involved in the complex, wide-ranging, 
interdisciplinary research. Macquarrie (262:26) corroborated the necessity of 
phenomenologically scientific rules: "The more strictly its canons are applied, the less are 
the possibilities for distortion and one-sidedness." The critical reader will now be aware 
that describing adulthood and seeking a more adequate description of adulthood 
entailed phenomenological description and phenomenological seeking. Since the 
researcher's main task in the research was to investigate descriptions of adulthood and to 
seek a more adequate description, it was considered necessary to make explicit what was 
meant by "description". 
3.2.1 DESCRIPTION 
For the researcher, a scientific study is not properly undertaken if the results are not 
described. Fellow-researchers ( 166: 1) ( 470:18-19) found similarly. Consequently, the 
description in this thesis is an integral part of the research. Everyday experience of 
77 In Sartre (370:x) and (370:xiii ), respectively. 
78 Chapter Nine, Paragraph 5.0. 
42 
"definition" indicates that it is a clear and concise summary of what something is. 
However, as the reader will now be aware, when one uses the term "what something 
is", one is referring to fundamental or essential description. Hospers (172:40) found 
similarly: when someone asks for the definition of a thing, he is asking for the essence 
of the thing, and ( 172:28) a definition does not include accompanying characteristics, (or 
phenomenologically speaking, contingent characteristics). Hospers (172:31) continued: 
"Many characteristics of a thing can change or disappear and be replaced by others, and 
the thing in question will still be that kind of thing as long as the defining characteristics 
continue to be present." From the explication already given, it is safe to state that the 
researcher is seeking the description of adulthood which will apply to the education 
of adults at all times and in all cultures. 
However, description entails not only finding essences, but attempting to name the 
phenomenon or thing with a word which signifies those essences. Hospers (172:23-24) 
found similarly: "A defining characteristic of a thing (not only a physical thing but a 
quality, an activity, a relation, etc.) is a characteristic in the absence of which the word 
would not be applicable to the thing." Consequently, for the researcher, a definition is 
included in description - definition is shorthand description. Other scientists such as 
Hospers (172:39) found similarly with Yildirim (470:57): " ... a characterising 
definition is a description of an object in terms of its essential properties"79. 
Throughout this chapter "more adequate" has been used to imply a better description of 
adulthood than current descriptions provide, and the reader may wonder why "adequate" 
is used instead of "accurate". An adequate description is one that cannot be questioned or 
reasoned away. If exceptions are found to a given description then it is not as adequate as 
it could be. For the researcher "adequate" better describes the end result of any episode of 
fundamental reflection on a human phenomenon, than does "accurate". "Accurate" implies 
some final answer; some object that can be physically measured, whereas a phenomenon 
such as adulthood can never be known in its completeness. As Katchadourin (202:50) 
found: "We are surely not going to arrive at a definition to end all definition for all time". 
In addition, an inaccurate description would imply a wrong, incorrect or erroneous 
description. "Adequate" on the otherhand implies that even if fellow-researchers uncover 
insights to make a description more adequate, the previous description, as long as the 
researcher was scientifically responsible, was adequate at that time for that researcher. 
In summary, during the research, the researcher sought the most adequate description of 
adulthood, humanly and scientifically possible, and employed fundamental radical 
79 The scope of the research did not allow a more detailed examination of "description" and "definition". 
The reader is referred to Ogden and Richards (314:109-138) who gave considerable detail in this regard. 
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reflection within a phenomenological approach. As evident in this chapter, the research 
involved a wide-ranging multidisciplinary approach. The requirement for a 
multidisciplinary approach in studying adulthood is noted by fellow-researchers such as 
Kimmel (210:vii), and Oberholzer and Greyling (311:131) who found that: "There is a 
dire need for interdisciplinary dialogue ... ". 
In addition, Adler (3:296) provided evidence to show that any investigation of education 
requires a wide-ranging, interdisciplinary study: "Education ... is a problem which carries 
discussion into and across a great many subject matters - the liberal arts of grammar, 
rhetoric, and logic, psychology, medicine, metaphysics, and theology; ethics; politics; and 
economics. It is a problem which draws into focus many of the great ideas - virtue and 
truth, knowledge and opinion, art and science; desire, will, sense, memory, mind, habit; 
change and progress, family and state; man, nature and God." 
At this stage of the research, the researcher wondered which, if any, of the "subject 
matters" and "great ideas" just listed, would have to be investigated during the research. 
Since as already explained80, the research was concerned with adult education as 
relationship, it was anticipated that insights from politics and economics, would not be 
employed. However, some researchers may claim that a wide-ranging interdisciplinary 
approach cannot allow researchers to come to an adequate understanding of the insights 
offered from within individual disciplines. It may also be claimed that taking a "pick-and-
mix" approach leads to superficial selection of "bits-and-pieces" to suit any theory. 
Consequently, to lessen misunderstanding, the researcher had to make explicit from which 
disciplines, insights would most likely be taken, and how these insights were to be used. 
3. 3 A PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL, INTERDISCIPLINARY 
STUDY WITHIN A FUNDAMENTAL ANDRAGOGIC PERSPECTIVE 
The interdisciplinary nature of the research has already been alluded to in this chapter in 
three main ways. 
• It was working in the discipline of adult education that gave rise to questions about 
the adequacy of current descriptions of adulthood. In addition, it has been explained 
that the research would hopefully provide a more adequate description of adulthood 
and in so doing contribute to the discipline of adult education81. 
• It was realised that biological, psychological and sociological descriptions of 
adulthood would have to be tested for their adequacy in describing adulthood. 
80 Paragraph 2.5 in the current chapter. 
81 The reason for wanting to contribute to the discipline was to contribute to enhancing the quality of 
adult education practice. Notice how contributing to theory and contributing to practice cannot be 
separated. 
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Consequently, although the research was not conducted under the auspices of 
biology, psychology and sociology, it was anticipated that insights from these 
disciplines would be employed. 
• The researcher wanted to test during the research, whether an existential-ethical 
description of adulthood in andragogic perspective, could provide a more adequate 
description than current descriptions. Consequently, it was anticipated that insights 
from ontology, ethics and andragogics would be employed. The reader will 
know that ontology and ethics are sub-disciplines or branches of the discipline of 
philosophy. 
In summary, the multidisciplinary research was conducted under the auspices of the 
discipline of philosophy (in particular its sub-disciplines of ontology, ethics and 
andragogics) using a phenomenological approach. The scope of the research did not 
permit investigation of what a discipline is and the interrelationships between, and the 
hierarchy of, disciplines. It was accepted that a discipline is a branch of learning: a 
scientifically collected and recorded body of knowledge. 
One of the dangers in multidisciplinary research is that the scope of a research project 
could become unmanageable. To limit the possibility of this danger, the researcher 
employed only those insights from several disciplines which directly assisted in 
uncovering information about adulthood. So far in this chapter, explanations have been 
given on what the disciplines of ethics, adult education and andragogics entai182. 
However, although an explication of existence has been provided83 and its relationship to 
Being shown, it is necessary to explain briefly why the researcher considered insights 
from researchers working in ontology, would be helpful in finding a more adequate 
description of adulthood. 
3.3.1 ONTOLOGY 
There is some debate in the relevant literature on what exactly ontology is. Munitz (290:9) 
found that: "How ontology is to be characterized, what its scope is, its method, is 
something on which not all philosophers agree." However, after considerable reading and 
reflection, the researcher found ontology (from Greek ontos meaning that which is and 
logos meaning word) (435:320) to be the science of what is; of Being in general 
(151:37); the theory (52:605) or study (105:255) of existence and the theory of Being and 
of the kinds of beings ( 453:xi), and the study of Being; of the characteristics of all reality 
(275:Vol 8:958). 
82 Paragraphs 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 respectively. 
83 Paragraph 2.3.1 in the current chapter. 
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The researcher was not concerned with an ontology, that is, an underlying set of 
assumptions about a conceptual scheme, a theory, and a system (105:256), or in 
assertions (52:605), but with fundamental findings about (essences ot) adulthood that are 
at the root of appearances. Ontologists' insights can assist because they attempt to 
differentiate between real existence and appearance (105:255): to find necessary 
truths about the essences of beings (129:Vol 8:958). The researcher was not concerned 
with all beings but only with the Being of humans - the only human manifestation 
of Being, and in particular that mode of human Being called adult human Being or 
adulthood. 
The circular definition of Being and existence reported earlier in this thesis was again 
observed when ontology was explicated. For example, Goetz (129:Vol 25:721) found that 
existence is an ontological problem and that ontological problems concern existence 
and existential assumptions; McDonald (275:Vol 5:727) referred to "existential 
ontology", and Heidegger (163:488) referred to the "existential-ontological". The 
researcher found that the insights of ontology would be relevant for explication of an 
ethical continuum because, for example, Sartre (370:626) found that ontology reveals the 
origin and the nature of value, and Warnock84 found that Being and Nothingness - an 
essay on phenomenological ontology, is concerned with ethics. The researcher realised 
that investigating what an existential-continuum entails would simultaneously explicate the 
relationship between ontology and ethics. 
Since ontologists seek fundamentals or essences, and since phenomenology is an 
approach for uncovering fundamentals or essentials, the reader will not be surprised to 
find a relationship between ontology and phenomenology. For example, Levin 
(245: 12) found: the objective of the investigation and description is " ... to make explicit 
the unacknowledged logos of the phenomenon: our pre-reflective, pre-conceptual 
relatedness-to-Being, an attunement which we find that we have always already 
enjoyed, long before our capacity to reflect on this pre-given relatedness ... ". 
Consequently an ontological investigation is a fundamental approach and 
"fundamental ontology" is tautologous. 
For the researcher, Heidegger (163:62) adequately described the relationship between 
ontology and phenomenology. They are not two distinct philosophical disciplines 
among others - philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology. This 
means that an ontological investigation can only be a phenomenological investigation and 
84 In Sartre (370:viii). 
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phenomenology is the practise of ontology. In other words, searching for the essences 
(that which is the Being) of adulthood can only be sought using the phenomenological 
approach. Consequently, when Du Plooy et al (89:201) referred to the ontological 
method they can only mean phenomenology. Several researchers (311:131) (439:33) 
(209:81) (90:36) found similarly to Heidegger, that phenomenology is only possible in an 
ontological sense, while ontology is only meaningful as phenomenokgy. This 
inseparability is recognised by fellow-researchers in the terms they use. For example, 
Sartre (370) subtitled his book An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology and Du Plooy 
et al (89:221) and Griessel and Bodenstein (141:28-29) used "existential 
phenomenology". 
During the explication of ontology, the researcher observed that metaphysics was being 
treated by many researchers as synonymous with ontology. Indeed, it was found that 
metaphysics and ontology study the same phenomena. For example, metaphysicians seek 
answers to questions such as being-qua-being (151:1), what really exists (52:524), 
Being as such (129:Vol 24:4), being in general (151:37), the theory (52:605) or 
study (105:255) of existence, the theory of being, of the kinds of beings (453:xi), the 
study of being (275:Vol 8:958), the distinction between appearance and reality 
(151:6), what reality consists of (151:8), the world; what really exists 
(52:524), general principles which are true of everything which exists 
(453:xi), the most real of all things, first principles, ultimate or irrefutable 
truths (129:Vol 24:4), existence or reality as a whole, first principles as a 
foundation for all other knowledge, and what sorts of things ultimately, 
there are (105:229-230). 
Just as the researcher did, the reader may experience frustration at yet another apparent 
synonymity85 - ontology and metaphysics, which is not made explicit in much of the 
literature. The danger of misunderstanding is increased because "metaphysics" has been 
used to name many different concepts, and ( 105 :230) because of the obscurity of language 
used by some metaphysicians. Flew (105:229) and Hamlyn (151:1), just like the 
researcher, found that describing what metaphysics is, is a very difficult task. It was not 
the researcher's task to solve methodological difficulties in various disciplines. However, 
it was necessary to find out if metaphysicians could offer any further insights into 
adulthood, in addition to those insights of ontologists. 
85 The synonymities of ethics and morals, and existence and being have already been raised. It 
was to highlight the possible misunderstanding arising from using the same word to name different 
phenomena, that the quotation was used at the top of Page One in this chapter. 
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On further investigation, it was found that metaphysicians, in addition to those questions 
raised by ontologists, also seek answers to questions such as: the universe as a whole 
(453:xi); the realm of the suprasensible, what is beyond the world of 
experience (105:229-230), the nature of matter, mind, God, freedom of the 
human will, immortality of the soul (453:7), and the nature and existence of 
God (275:Vol 2:230). Although everyday experience indicates that there may be a 
relationship between the existence of God and ethics, the research did not involve 
speculative metaphysics (151:4), that is, speculation on the realm of the 
suprasensible, on the immortality of the soul, and any mystical approaches sometimes 
employed by metaphysicians (13:4). 
The researcher found as did Bullock and Trombley (52:524), that the primary component 
of metaphysics is ontology, and found similarly to Goetz (129:Vol 8:958), that although 
ontology is synonymous with metaphysics, because metaphysics came to include other 
studies such as philosophical cosmology, ontology became the preferred term for the 
study of Being. Consequently, part of the research was under the auspices of ontology 
and not metaphysics, and existential metaphysics (275:Vol 5:726) was taken as 
tautologous. The researcher was not concerned with a metaphysic or several 
metaphysics (105:229) in the sense of theories or personal views of reality. 
So far in this explanation of the rationale for the particular multidisciplinary approach 
taken during the research, the disciplines of biology, psychology, sociology, adult 
education, andragogics, philosophy, ethics and ontology (metaphysics) have been 
mentioned. However, it has been implicit throughout this chapter that the research would 
investigate human adulthood, and that the practice of adult education, agogy, philosophy 
and being ethical, are uniquely human phenomena. In addition, the researcher 
realised that he would not be concerned in the research with all of Being but only with 
being human. This insight reminded the researcher that ultimately, the research would be 
about adulthood as a mode of humanhood - of being human. The researcher found that 
the discipline of philosophical anthropology is regarded by many researchers as the 
scientific investigation of uniquely human phenomena. Consequently, it was considered 
necessary to investigate how insights of philosophical anthropologists could assist in 
finding a more adequate definition of adulthood. 
3.3.2 PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 
"Anthropology" is derived from Greek anthropos meaning human being (319:20) 
(435:223) or humankind (216:83) (317:40), and logos meaning word, evaluation, 
thinking about, distinguishing and discussion (435:223). Many etymologists, 
including Klein (216:83), Partridge (319:20) and Onions (317:40), for example, found 
48 
anthropology to name the science of humankind. Murray (294:361) and 
Kirkpatrick (213:50) found anthropology to name the science of humankind in the 
widest sense. 
However, the researcher found that many anthropologists do not study humankind in 
its widest sense, but only as a biological and psychological (animal) entity. 
For example: 
• Murray (294:361) found that anthropology is concerned mainly with humankind as 
an animal and with the physiological, psychological, zoological, and 
evolutionary nature of humankind; 
• Gove (133:93) found that anthropology is concerned mainly with humankind as 
body and mind and their interrelationships and as anatomy and physiology 
combined; 
• forty five of fifty anthropologists reporting their results at an anthropology conference 
in 195386 researched humankind from the perspectives of archeology, 
paleopathology, biological basis of human behaviour, prehistory, race, 
historical linguistics, evolution of humankind, genetics, human ecology 
and anthropometry, for example; 
• Seymour-Smith listed terms such as "anthropometry" (the measurement of physical 
types in different human populations) (387: 13), "biological anthropology" 
(387:25), "cognitive anthropology" (387:236) and "ethology" (the idea that 
evolution can serve as a paradigm for the analysis of all life, including human life) 
(387: 101); and 
• Fox (107) used terms such as "biosocial anthropology", "evolutionary 
genetics" and "primate kin", and Burton-Jones (55:82) investigated childhood 
from the perspective of ethology (the comparative study of animal behaviour) and 
used the term "mammalian child rearing". 
It is safe to state that many anthropologists (scientists who study humankind), 
concentrate on the study of humankind's physical characteristics - physiology, anatomy 
and behaviour. In addition, it is everyday experience that cultural anthropologists 
study given groups of people or sets of human qualities ( 435:223). The reader will realise 
that it is very unlikely that studying humankind as an animal or as one cultural group will 
uncover a fundamental description of what adulthood, as a mode of humanhood, is. Many 
anthropologists have recognised that biologistic-animalistic descriptions of 
humankind are inadequate. 
86 See Kroeber (228) whose work is regarded as an adequate description of the discipline of anthropology 
in 1953. Note that Burton-Jones (55) recorded one hundred contributions to the conference, whereas 
Kroeber's edition gives the work of only fifty contributors. 
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For example, Van Rensburg (435:223) et al found that: "No single aspect of human 
being can be raised as the sole field of study for anthropology ... ". Bidney (29:682) found 
that: "As natural scientists, anthropologists were supposed to deal with facts and laws and 
to leave values to the philosophers and humanists ... " and that this attitude " ... was 
not at all characteristic of the founders of anthropological science." Similarly, Goetz 
(129:559) found that anthropology was first used in the philosophical faculties of the 
German universities to refer to " ... the systematic study of humankind as a physical and 
moral being." Redfield (333:738) found that anthropologists' concerns with values 
links them with philosophers. Northrop (307:680) recognised that sociological 
jurisprudence must become philosophical and (307:668) that norms express the 
ethos of a culture. In addition, Bidney (29:682) found that until recently, 
anthropologists have overlooked the problem of values. 
With these recognitions it is not surprising that another branch of anthropology -
philosophical anthropology - was created87. Macquarrie and Robinson88 pointed 
out, that by philosophical anthropology, Heidegger meant a study of humankind in 
the widest sense and not in the sense of the empirical sciences of physical 
or cultural anthropology. In summary, philosophical anthropologists seek: 
universal categories of culture (217 :509), universal principles of cultural 
dynamics (29:698), concrete rational norms capable of universal realisation 
(29:698); and the need for " ... understanding humankind as a human being rather than 
as an animal (333:730). 
The researcher came to realise that philosophical anthropology was the overarching (all-
encompassing) discipline within which the research would be conducted. This is so 
because many philosophical anthropologists: 
• while not ignoring the biological, psychological and sociological, go beyond these 
perspectives to the philosophical; 
• are aware of the practice of agogy and the agein, although they may not use the same 
terminology as agogicians. Ten Have (414:5) called agogics a second floor science 
meaning that it requires other more basic sciences such as philosophical 
anthropology. His (414:12) philosophical agology deals with an ontological or 
87 Despite the fact that "philosophical anthropology" was used by Kant ( 1724-1804 ), the modem 
discipline of philosophical anthropology was first recognised only in the 1920s (129:560). Wein 
(448:54) and Dallmayr (73:50) found that Scheler and Plessner were the founders of philosophical 
anthropology with Wein also recognising Hartmann as a founder. The reader is referred to Buber 
(50:148-247), Goetz (129:Vol 25:559-570) and Dallmayr (73:49-77), who provided thorough 
historical accounts of how the discipline came about. 
88 Heidegger's (163) translators. 
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philosophical-anthropological approach to human situations; 
• are aware of the ethical in human Being. The researcher considered that philosophical 
anthroplogists might be able to assist in uncovering what an existential-ethical 
continuum is because some recognise the role of values in human Being (29:682), 
(333:738), human being as moral Being (129:559), and the need to examine the 
problem of values (29:682); 
• employ a phenomenological approach as a scientific approach (265:7): as a more 
appropriate method (246:49-50). Wein (448:56) regarded it to be the" ... duty of 
philosophical anthropology to permeate it [anthropology] with empiric 
science89 ... ". Dallmayr (73 :50) found that: ". .. Philosophical anthropology 
owes its inspiration not only to the development of the empirical science but also to 
the rise of phenomenology and interpretive philosophy." Further evidence of the 
applicability of the phenomenological approach within philosophical anthropology is 
given by Wein (448:56) who claimed that Plessner's intellectual origin includes 
phenomenology. Dallmayr (73:50-51) found that both Scheler and Plessner " ... 
were both equally indebted to the phenomenological perspective". 
The examples just given illustrate why "philosophical anthropology" is the most adequate 
name to describe both the researcher's activity of researching, and the discipline to which 
the research results would hopefully contribute. The researcher found, as did Goetz 
(129:559), that philosophical anthropologists attempt to achieve a better 
understanding of humankind, by: regrouping the specialised disciplines of anthropology 
within a common purpose; giving a sense of order to the investigation of humankind; 
redressing the neglect of the essence or humanity of .humankind by the 
physical and human sciences; and safeguarding humankind from losing the sense 
of respect for what is basically and uniquely human through being treated as a 
means to an end. Similarly, Habermas90 found that philosophical anthropology 
integrates the findings of all those sciences which deal with humankind and its works, and 
that the discipline's task is to interpret scientific findings philosophically. 
Having conducted a detailed explanation of the methodology to be employed in the 
research, including an explanation and justification of the multidisciplinary approach, it is 
possible to summarise the research problem and give an indication of the research 
programme. 
S9 Empiric science is not to be interpreted as a scientistic or only a natural science approach, but a 
systematic scientific approach actualised in this research by fundamental radical reflection. 
90 Quoted by Dallmayr (73:73). 
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4.0 CONCLUSION: RE-STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND THE 
RESEARCH PROGRAMME 
From the detailed recording in this chapter of the results of reflection on the most 
scientifically responsible way to study adulthood, the reader will realise that what appears 
to be a straightforward phenomenon - adulthood - is in fact a complex one. It was also 
realised that seeking an adequate description of what adulthood is, would not bt easy, a 
fact Katchadourin (202:50) also recognised. Bischof (37:x) recognised the same difficulty 
from another perspective. Writing in 1969, he found that no one person will be able 
to assimilate or collate even a portion of the knowledge about adulthood 
and that teams of scholars will be required to winnow down the vast amount of 
information. The researcher hoped that the research would make a small contribution in 
this regard. 
The researcher considered that the extensive explication and explanation recorded in this 
orientation chapter was necessary. This was partly so because it was suspected that the 
traditional way of investigating adulthood - selecting a time-span and calling it "adulthood" 
- was largely responsible for inadequate current descriptions. A concrete illustration of this 
can be given. Turner and Helms ( 424:iii) described their methodology of investigating 
adulthood as attempting to "... assemble ideas, theories, experimental data and even 
folklore ... into a meaningful body of knowledge." However, one can ask what a 
meaningful body of knowledge is. The researcher as philosophical anthropologist 
working from a phenomenological and andragogical perspective9 I, rather 
than merely assembling data, would be fundamentally examining them to find out which, 
if any, can contribute to a more adequate description of what adulthood is. 
The researcher realised that he would be undertaking the research as philosophical 
anthropologist which at different stages of the research would entail being 
ontologist (phenomenologist), ethicist, andragogician and ad ult 
educationist. It was anticipated that as the research progressed, refinements in the 
explanation of methodology would be possible. Indeed, in this paragraph alone, with 
mention of values and ethics, it was anticipated that the research would draw on insights 
of moral philosophers and axiologists92. Malinowski (265:3) writing in 1944, 
found that moral philosophy is one of the many disciplines that have contributed to 
anthropology. Ten Have (414:5) found that agogics, a second floor science, requires 
other more basic sciences such as axiology and epistemology. 
9l The phrase "researcher as philosophical anthropologist working from a 
phenomenological and andragogical perspective", is not an attempt at self-aggrandisement, 
but an example of the complex role that many researchers undertake. 
92 Axiology is the study of values, standards, rules, ethics, social ethics and meta-ethics (414:7). 
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Having explained why a philosophical anthropological approach is the most adequate for 
the research, the reader might think that the researcher ignored a principle of fundamental 
radical reflection: to temporary suspend prejudices and presuppositions. The 
reader might interpret the results in this paragraph as the researcher taking a fixed view or 
"-ism", borrowed, compiled or copied from the views, theories or philosophies of 
life of other philornphers. Why this is not the case can be explained as follows. 
Firstly, the researcher did not have a fixed view of what adulthood is. As already 
explained, it was suspected from everyday experience, from preliminary study in other 
research, and from considerable findings of fellow-researchers, that chronological, 
biological, psychological and sociological descriptions of adulthood were not adequate. 
However, one part-reason for conducting the research was to find out if this suspicion 
was justified. Consequently, the researcher felt duty-bound to test whether or not 
chronological, biological, sociologistical and psychological descriptions of adulthood are 
adequate descriptions of human adulthood93. 
Secondly, the researcher, just as any responsible scientist would, has explained the 
methodologies that would be employed in undertaking the research, and has justified the 
selection of methods and approaches. It may be that fellow-researchers will replicate the 
research and in so doing find errors in method. If so, it is their scientific duty to explain 
these in the spirit of scientific dialogue. 
Thirdly, the researcher does not claim that philosophical anthropology is the only way of 
understanding humankind, since this would be to resort to philosophical 
anthropologism, that is, an absolutisation of philosophical anthropology, which then 
would become a doctrine and scientifically unacceptable. However, the explication in this 
chapter so far has revealed that the only way to uncover the fundamental onticities 
(essences of being human) is through ontological-phenomenological anthropology. 
After the considerable initial research conducted for this chapter, the research question can 
be best re-stated as follows: Does adulthood as an existential-ethical continuum, 
provide a more adequate description of adulthood than current descriptions 
do? It has already been explained that chronological, biological, psychological and 
sociological descriptions of adulthood would have to be reviewed during the research. 
Consequently, it was decided to continue the research by examining chronological and 
biological descriptions of adulthood. 
93 The results of research in these regards are presented in Chapters Two, Three and Four, respectively. 
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political adulthood changed when the voting age was lowered to eighteen. They 
reported that in the 1980s the right to drink alcohol was rescheduled to the older age of 
twenty one. Currently in the United Kingdom (UK) (101:38), a person is considered adult 
at age eighteen for voting purposes: it was previously twenty one. In the eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries children as young as seven undertook strenuous twelve-hour 
working days and were required to contribute to the family income (63:11). 
In one sense, children were regarded as adults and were expected to and could do 
most adult tasks. However, many of them were not awarded full adult economic 
status (63:15). Consequently, a hundred years ago, a child as young as nine may have 
been treated as an adult in the workplace, and yet someone of twenty five would not 
have been regarded as adult. Jordan (195:3) and Goldstein (130:71) provided extensive 
corroboration of this variability over time. Das (200:100) illustrated how within certain 
Hindu cultures in India, a nine-year-old whose father has died may be treated as a jural 
adult, but a forty-year-old man whose father is alive may be treated like ajural child. 
"Political adulthood" and "voting purposes" are emphasised in the previous 
paragraph because they imply a sociological definition of adulthood. A sociological 
definition of adulthood is also alluded to by terms such as "regarded as" and "expected 
to". The researcher anticipated that if there is such a sociological definition, that it would 
be uncovered during the research3. "Adult tasks" and "adult status" have also been 
emphasised because they indicate that adulthood might be described in terms of certain 
tasks and certain roles one fulfils. In addition, the researcher regarded the word "full" in 
"full adult status" as significant because it points to the possibility of a continuum 
where status can be awarded in degrees. More importantly, the reader may notice that in 
using "adult tasks" and "adult status", Coleman has some implicit concept of what 
being an adult is. 
Secondly, the age at which a person is deemed an adult varies from country to country. In 
the UK, a person is deemed adult at different ages for marriage without parent's 
consent, leaving school, entering commercial contracts, alcohol 
consumption, driving a motor vehicle, viewing sexually explicit films and 
publications, and voting, to take only a few. In the Republic of South Africa (RSA) 
the respective ages for these activities are, in some instances again different, and in some 
states of the USA, different again. 
3 Results in this regard are presented in Chapter Four. To avoid repetition, "Results in this regard" 
is omitted from footnotes from now on in this thesis. 
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Thirdly, even within the same time-frame and same country, the chronological age of 
adulthood varies. Jensen et al (193:28) showed how the legal ages for marriage, driving a 
vehicle, voting, executing legal instruments and drinking alcohol are different. In the UK 
(101:38), a person is considered adult at age fourteen for the purposes of full-time 
employment, at age seventeen for judicial purposes and at age sixteen for marriage without 
parents' consent. However, adult status is conferred only at age eighteen for voting 
purposes and the sale of alcoholic drink. In the USA, men are considered adult at eighteen 
for the purposes of military service, but the adult age for marriage, alcoholic drinking and 
driving, varies widely from state to state (101:38). Kimmel (210:6) and Allport (9:125) 
found similarly: in the USA eighteen-year-olds can be drafted, but in most states cannot 
vote. Allport found, as did Kimmel (210:6-7), that certain rites marking the end of 
childhood such as Confirmation and Bar Mitzvah are at age thirteen or twelve and the 
adolescent may be permitted to drive a car at fourteen, sixteen or eighteen depending on 
place of residence. 
In the USA, sixteen is the permitted age for full-time employment, eighteen for marriage 
and twenty one for full citizenship (63:98). Jordan (195:3) gave tabulated examples of 
the variation in the minimum age for marriage within selected states in the USA. 
Oberholzer and Greyling (311:35) found a similar situation in the RSA regarding the 
variety in using chronological age to denote adulthood. For example, although one can 
vote, drive a motor vehicle (only recently) and handle firearms at age eighteen, one must 
be twenty one before marriage and other contractual obligations can be undertaken without 
parents' consent. The researcher considered the examples of variation in the chronological 
age at which adulthood is assumed to begin, to be typical of most cultures. 
For the three main reasons just outlined, the researcher found that adulthood as 
chronological age is inadequate to describe what fundamental4 adulthood is. This finding 
is corroborated by Hareven (154: 16) and Rodeheaver and Data (357: 169), for example. In 
addition, some researchers such as Jensen et al (193:28) found that the nature of 
adulthood as defined by chronological age is arbitrary and that the use of a specific age as 
an indication of the achievement of adult status is subject to such variation as to be 
meaningless. For example, Bischof (37: 1) listed the age range of being an adult as 
twenty five to sixty five. However, one can ask why he chose these limits? Kimmel 
(210:30) found that age is merely a convenient index of the passage of time and (210:31) 
that differences between people with regard to greater occupational achievement, greater 
family responsibility, and greater past experience are not caused by age; instead, they are 
the result of social, biological and psychological changes. He suggested looking 
behind age to see the processes that cause development. 
4 Erikson (98:19) also referred to fundamentals related to adulthood. 
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Similarly, Baer (16:244) found that age has no relevance to developmental sequence, and 
Turner and Helms (424:23) found that because of differences in life expectancies in 
different cultures, developmental psychologists cannot devise a universal age classification 
system. They also found (424:287) that to label someone "old" on the basis of relative age 
differences or absolute number of years accumulated since birth, has often proved to be 
unsatisfactory. Evans ( 101 :38) found chronological age unsatisfactory for explaining what 
it means to be an adult because: " ... becoming an adult legally tells us nothing of what 
it means to be an adult person as opposed to being a child, save for essentially limited 
definitions of personal responsibility, legal liabilities, status and rights ... ". Graubard 
(135:v) corroborated this: "If adult status represented nothing but a chronological fact - the 
achieving of maturity in the eyes of the law - there would be no reason to explore its 
character further." 
Another example of the inadequacy of chronological age to describe adulthood was given 
by Turner and Helms (424:24-25) when they explained the difficulty associated with age-
related terms such as "youth". In the Middle Ages, "youth" signified the prime of life and 
was immediately followed by "old age". For example, at age twenty, William the 
Conqueror had been victorious at the Battle of Normandy and at twenty six Charlemagne 
had won numerous battles before he was crowned King of the Franks. Similarly, 
(202:52) Napoleon was an army captain at sixteen and emperor at thirty two, and Mozart 
died at the age of thirty five and ten months. It is evident that adulthood is more than just a 
chronological age. 
Neugarten found thats chronological age is a poor predictor of the way people live. Turner 
and Helms (424:53) corroborated this: " ... age is no guarantee of maturity ... adult 
status does not mean that maturity is automatic ... maturity requires considerable 
conscious effort that depends on the individual and not on a preset age." Allport 
(9: 125) found that neither the adolescent nor society knows where maturity starts. 
In summary, adulthood as chronological age is inadequate description. Evans (101:38) 
and ~mmel (210:31) found similarly. Even a functional age (423:17) which predicts 
when a person is likely to die irrespective of chronological age, cannot describe what 
adulthood is. Datan (75:3-5) also found problems with the life span approach. While 
chronological age can help with administrative activities necessary for effective 
functioning of society, choosing chronological ages arbitrarily to indicate adulthood 
cannot assist in finding out what adulthood is. Stating that being adult is being eighteen or 
being sixteen does not describe what it means to be an adult. The importance of the 
5 Reported in Birren et al (33:319). 
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meaning of being an adult is corroborated by Evans ( 101 :38) when he found that to 
answer the question, What is the nature of-adulthood? one must ask the question 
What does it mean to be an adult? 
At this stage in the research, three directions for further investigation were identified. 
Firstly, the researcher considered it necessary to investigate the relationship between 
adulthood and maturity. However, it became evident that many researchers used 
"maturity" in more than a biological sense. For example, adult status through work or 
marriage indicates a sociological description, and adult tasks such as gaining self-
confidence, esteem and identity indicate a psychological description. It was anticipated that 
psychological and sociological descriptions of adulthood would have to be investigated for 
their adequacy later in the research6. 
Secondly, it was hoped that the research would contribute to answering Allport's question 
about when maturity begins. Thirdly, "full citizenship" has been emphasised in the 
preceding discussion because citizenship was apparently being used as a synonym for 
adulthood and just as in "full adult status", "full" implies degrees of citizenship and 
consequently, a continuum. It was recognised that just how the concept of citizenship 
and full citizenship relate to adulthood would require examination during the research. 
Since chronological age is inadequate description of adulthood, it was suspected that two 
other related approaches to describing adulthood namely, adulthood as a number of 
stages and adulthood as a phase in the human life cycle? or life span (423: 1), 
would also be inadequate. However, despite this early indication of inadequacy, the 
researcher found it necessary to examine stage and life cycle descriptions of adulthood, for 
three main reasons. 
Firstly, most of the literature on adulthood, as will be shown, relies on adulthood as a 
phase in the life cycle or as a number of stages. Consequently, it would have been 
scientifically irresponsible not to have examined these descriptions. Secondly, most 
researchers investigating adulthood regard it as a time span, frequently identified by 
chronological ages at the beginning and end of this time span. Once a time span has been 
chosen (and the criteria for so choosing are arbitrary), researchers then conduct extensive 
research into what experiences and events take place, and what tasks and 
6 
7 
Unless otherwise stated "investigated" and "examined" are shorthand for "investigated or examined 
during the research". This abbreviation is used to prevent repetition. 
In this thesis, "life cycle" is used. Fellow-researchers used different spellings such as "lifecycle" and 
"life-cycle" and these are retained only in original quotations. "Life line" and "life span" are taken 
to be synonymous with life cycle and the term "model" is taken to be synonymous with "theory". 
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requirements must be undertaken and met, during this arbitrary time span called 
"adulthood". 
Thirdly, the researcher eventually discovered a methodological error in many studies of 
adulthood. The collections of experiences, events, tasks and requirements were 
themselves taken to be descriptions of what adulthood is. For example, to find that 
parenthood happens in a time span called "adulthood" is different to finding that 
parenthood itself is a criterion (a descriptor) for adulthood. Similarly, 
Neugarten8 found that adults have an intuitive sense of a distinct middle age period. Does 
she mean that someone within a certain chronological age range will have this intuitive 
sense, or that having this intuitive sense is necessary to be recognised as an adult? The 
researcher was convinced that many researchers were not aware of this error of circular 
definition. With this background it is now possible to report the results of examining stage 
and life cycle approaches to adulthood. 
2.1 A BRIEF EXPLANATION OF THE STAGE AND LIFE CYCLE 
APPROACHES TO DESCRIBING ADULTHOOD . 
In most of the relevant literature studied by the researcher (and this was wide-ranging as 
the bibliography shows) it was found that most researchers examining adulthood attempt 
one or more of the following: 
i) to group chronological ages into age-ranges; 
ii) to locate various biological, sociological and psychological events or experiences 
in one or more of these age-ranges and then call them stages or phases (293:5); 
iii) to sequence certain biological, sociological and psychological events or experiences 
into a sequential life cycle; and 
iv) to attribute experiences during the stage of life called "adulthood" to the historical 
time in which a person is born and the historical events that person experiences 
during life: a phenomenon known as historicity. 
Nicholson (303: 15) and Merriam (280:5) found that the idea of human life moving 
through distinct phases was known to the Egyptians, Greeks, Romans and Medieval 
philosophers. Shakespeare9 referred to the seven ages of man - namely: infancy, school 
days, courtship, military service, magistracy, retirement and second childhood. Turner 
and Helms (424:17) found that these so called age-stage theories or modelslO " ... assert 
that certain developmental trends are based on internal biological states that allow for 
8 Quoted by Kimmel (210:7). 
9 In his play As you like it, Act II, Scene Vil. See Nicholson (303:19). 
10 Turner and Helms used "theories" and "models" interchangeably. Merriam (280:5) found that models 
can " ... loosely be called 'theories' ... ". 
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distinct spurts in growth and development. 11 Before the next stage can occur a person must 
have emerged from the preceding stage: the stages are relatively sequential and come in a 
definite order. The researcher found, as did Troll (423:5), that most researchers of 
adulthood consider descriptions of adulthood as stages or phases in a life cycle as 
developmental theory and that this in turn has two main branches namely, learning 
theory and stage theory. 
Troll (423:5) explained that stage theories stress the universality of change: "They 
assume that all people, at roughly the same time in their lives, meet the same problems or 
challenges." Troll (423:5) explained that stage and life cycle theories" ... assume that 
learning one task or living through one kind of experience makes one ready for the next, 
presumably, more difficult, task, or open to the next order of experience. 11 Similarly, 
Evans ( 101 :40) reported that some scholars find life to be a hierarchical series of 
overlapping stages and that people have to meet the requirements of one stage 
before passing to the next stage. Erikson 11 and Rapoport and Rapoport (332:4 }, for 
example, found adulthood to be several challenges which arrive in stages, the successful 
meeting of which can develop new qualities to assist in facing challenges in the next stage. 
The preliminary reading for this chapter revealed many life cycle theories. However, for 
the researcher, a life cycle offered by Kimmel (210:4)12 provided an understandable 
introduction to the stage and life cycle approach. A schematic representation of Kimmel's 
human life cycle is shown in Table Two on the following page. 
After considering Kimmel's findings on the human life cycle, it was noticed that 
researchers were describing adulthood as biological maturity, psychological 
maturity and sociological maturity. The reader will observe that biological 
experiences (puberty and menopause) and sociological experiences (marriage and children 
leaving home) are intermingled and shown on the one life cycle. In addition, although 
no psychological event is stated directly on the life cycle diagram, it is common 
knowledge that psychological experiences accompany all the events listed in the life 
cycle. 
Acknowledging the fact that, in reality, humans cannot be separated into biological, 
psychological and sociological parts or aspects, the researcher was reluctant to even begin 
a study of descriptions which treat humans as being divisible. The researcher found, as 
did Oberholzer and Grey ling (311 :35), that to attempt to demarcate transitions of 
11 Paraphrased in Kimmel (210:13-16). 
12 In his book, Kimmel presented his life cycle theory horizontally, but for ease of presentation it is 
given vertically. 
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adulthood reduces human life to " ... schemes and formulae, thereby totally overlooking 
the concrete human being in his uniqueness, in his perennial, unrepeatable individuality." 
TABLE TWO 
KIMMEL'S SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF THE 
HUMAN LIFE CYCLE 
Approximate age Event 
0 Conception/Birth 
6 - Begin school 
12 - Puberty 
18 - Vote 
Begin occupation 
Marriage 
Parenthood 
30 - Death of parents 
48 - Menopause 
Children leave home 
Grandparenthood 
65 - Retirement 
Death of spouse 
Great-grandparenthood 
Death 
At this point in the research, a methodological dilemma was encountered. The researcher 
suspected that an examination of individual biological, sociological and psychological life 
cycles would not assist in finding an adequate description of adulthood. There were three 
main reasons for this suspicion. Firstly, Troll (423:2) for example, found that in studying 
development, one can focus either on a series of states (stages) or on the process of 
change - the process of development. The researcher had difficulty understanding how 
development, which implies a dynamic, can be studied by examining a state or series of 
states, because the concept of state implies completion or finishedness. Similarly, it is 
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difficult to understand how one can study a process without knowing what the goal (the 
end product) of the process is. If adulthood is a completeable stage recognised by the 
achievement of some goal, then a continuum is impossible and this must be examined. 
Secondly, although Kimmel (210:4) acknowledged considerable individual variations in 
the order of the events (milestones) on his life cycle, he proceeded to show marriage as 
occurring before parenthood, death of parents before menopause and grandparenthood 
before retirement. The reader will know of families and friends where these three 
sequences have not held. Consequently, not only do events not happen in a pre-
determined sequence for every person, but lack of sequence is just as 
likely as a sequence. While life cycle theory provides general and approximate 
information when, in a certain population, certain events will happen to most people, it 
remains to be investigated whether or not these events can explain adequately what 
adulthood is. 
Thirdly, Neugarten, Moore and Lowe13 found that most middle aged people regard the 
prime of life to occur between the ages of thirty five and fifty. However, what is middle 
age and the prime of life? More importantly, does "prime" indicate that prime of life is 
better than the non-prime of life or that those in the prime of life are adults and those in 
the non-prime of life are not? Many researchers such as Kuhlen14 referred to the first 
half of life. Others such as Chickering and Havighurst (60:39), Jung15, Neugarten 
(297:vii), Peck (322:88) and Merriam (280:3) use the concept of the second half of 
life, and Hall16 the last half of life, to refer to adulthood. Troll (423:vii) referred to the 
adult years and to adulthood as the middle of life (423:2). 
The researcher considered the description of adulthood as a half of life or middle of 
life misleading because, for people who unfortunately die young, the second half of their 
lives is not in adulthood as defined by chronological age. It might be suggested that the 
idea expressed by "half of life" could be better expressed as "half of a full-term life". 
However, even this is misleading because, adulthood as a chronological concept takes up 
about four fifths of a full-term life. This example indicates again the inadequacy of 
adulthood as a chronological age, period or stage. 
The researcher considered that the three concerns just outlined, together with the major 
difficulty of the implicit definition of adulthood as a time span, as already explained, 
13 Quoted by Kimmel (210:6). 
14 Paraphrased by Kimmel (210:10). 
15 Reported by Kimmel (210:13). 
16 According to Jordan (195:7). 
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support the preliminary finding of the inadequacy of stage and life cycle approaches for 
describing adulthood. Stegner (404:47) found similarly. However, to meet the demands 
of scientific responsibility it was necessary to evaluate descriptions of adulthood as they 
are, not as the researcher thinks they should be. Consequently, it was considered 
necessary (and Katchadourian (202:48) corroborated) to assess biological, psychological 
and sociological life cycles for their adequacy in describing adulthood. The results of 
examining these three aspects of the human life cycle are presented later in this thesis17• 
In this chapter so far, the researcher has reported on stage and life cycle descriptions as 
chronological descriptions of adulthood. A third expression of adulthood as chronological 
age was found: namely, adulthood as historicity and it was considered necessary to 
examine it for the sake of thoroughness. 
2.2 ADULTHOOD AS HISTORICITY 
For the researcher, a person's historicity is the combined experiences a person has lived 
through by being born at a specific historical time. Some researchers use this concept 
to describe what adulthood is. Kimmel (210:20) for example, found that the historical 
time line intersects with a person's life line and is another age-related dimension 
affecting individuals' progression through their life cycles. Kimmel (210:24-25) also 
found that historical events affecting the whole of society, such as increased life 
expectancy "... make the experience of adulthood and aging different today than it 
was in the past ... ". He (210:22) sums the historicity of individuals into cohorts (age 
groups) with a cohort (a group of people) experiencing the same historical event and hence 
having similar attitudes, values and a personal world that will be with them throughout the 
life span. 
Three practical examples of Kimmel's finding are that: older people often experience 
difficulty understanding computers and some questionnaires issued by bureaucratic 
organisations; people born between World War One and the Great Depression learned that 
economic security and material possessions can disappear for reasons beyond their 
control; and everyone born after the 1940's experienced the threat of nuclear war 
(210:21). The researcher found it difficult to understand what Kimmel (210:22) was 
trying to express. He appeared to have found that rapid and escalating change and 
technological development have increased the complexity of tasks necessary for daily 
living and that adults are required to frequently enhance their skill levels. Consequently, 
the older one is (the longer one lives) the more change one has to adjust to, and hence the 
more difficult adulthood is. Troll ( 423: 10) also used cohorts to understand 
adulthood and she found that one age cohort will be different in many ways 
17 See Paragraph 3.0 in the current chapter, and Chapter Three and Chapter Four, respectively. 
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from another that grew up at a different time. The researcher found five main 
deficiencies in the description of adulthood as historicity. 
Firstly, adulthood as historicity implies that what adulthood is, changes because groups of 
people are born at different times and are influenced by different national and international 
events. Several researchers (135:v) (406:108) (365:145) (264:171) considered that 
adulthood is different for different nationalities, regions, social classes, genders, religions 
and professions, for example. However, as previously explained, the researcher was 
seeking a fundamental or universal (unchanging) description of adulthood. At this early 
stage in the research, it was found in a preliminary way that although the expression of 
adulthood changes from culture to culture and time to time, what adulthood itself is, 
does not change. 
Secondly, what is meant by difficult adulthood? If it means difficulty in being an adult 
or maintaining adult status, then what does it mean to be an adult and to maintain adult 
status? These questions can be re-stated as the main research question of the current study, 
namely: What is adulthood?. By finding out what adulthood is, the researcher hoped to 
identify hindrances that people experience in achieving and maintaining adulthood, no 
matter what historical events have led to these difficulties. Similarly, initial reflection 
indicated that it is not the historicity itself nor a current need to change which results in 
difficulty at any stage of adulthood or at any point on the life cycle. Rather, it is the 
person's current attitudes and responses to any event or need to change, which may 
or may not give rise to difficulty. It was recognised that just what the relationship is 
between people's attitudes and their adulthood would have to be investigated IS. 
Thirdly, while it is true that some older people may struggle to cope with new technology 
and ideas, not all do. Many older adults adjust quickly to change. Frequently, it is 
younger adults who experience difficulty with rapid change. The researcher anticipated 
that adulthood might be regarded by some people as having certain skills and that this 
would require investigation later in the research 19. The researcher also considered that 
Kimmel's mention of "level" had relevance for adulthood as a continuum. 
Fourthly, the researcher accepted that a person's past is an important aspect of how he or 
she will respond in the future, because as Symonds ( 411: 195) found, growing into 
adulthood entails meeting life's experiences with the same personality equipment provided 
from earlier years. However, just because people experience the same events during life, 
does not necessarily mean they will respond similarly to each new event. 
l8 Chapter Five. 
19 Current Chapter, Paragraph 3.3. 
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Fifthly, in personifying society, Kimmel (210:23) indicated that societies, as well as 
individuals, have life cycles. He also (210:24) expected that by the year 2020 in the USA, 
the population over sixty five will be fifteen percent of the total population. This will result 
in a "senior boom". In expressing these findings as problems relating to adulthood and 
ageing, he moves away from the problems of individuals to problems of society, 
such as the need for more old age homes and considerable demands on medical services. 
Social problems arising from the "senior boom" may give rise to difficulties for 
individuals but not necessarily so. "Old age" and "adulthood and aging" are 
emphasised in the previous sentence because they are an indication that the relationship 
between adulthood and ageing would require investigation later in the research20. 
2.3 SUMMARY OF THE INADEQUACY OF ADULTHOOD AS 
CHRONOLOGICAL AGE FOR DESCRIBING ADULTHOOD 
Having examined, adulthood as a chronological age and its three main expressions, 
life stage, phase in a life cycle and historicity, there was sufficient evidence to 
find that it is inadequate for describing adulthood. Even after a cursory examination of 
adulthood as chronological age, it was difficult to understand the basis for 
compartmentalising human experience into stages and phases, and to understand the 
choice of the criteria for such compartmentalisation. Fellow-researchers have found 
similarly. Riegel (343:689-690) found that human beings are neither stable bundles of 
traits, abilities or competencies in equilibrium. Instead, the human being is a 
changing being in a changing world and in concrete social settings. As Kakar ( 199:2) 
found: the study of the individual life cycle as a functional whole has been comparatively 
rare and (199:10), "What is more astonishing is the scarcity of attempts to comprehend the 
human life cycle in its stages as well as in its totality, either in religious or 
developmental literature ... ". 
Troll (423:16) found that chronological age has long been known to be an inaccurate 
measure of any kind of developmental changes before maturity and that attempts to find a 
workable developmental age for later years of life have been even less successful. She 
(423:9) reported findings of researchers such as Schaie and of Gagne21 who did not 
regard age-related changes as adequate descriptions of adult development. Coleman 
(63:95-96) corroborated this finding. 
Several of Kimmel's (210: 19) findings indicated that stage theory is inadequate for 
understanding human development, especially during adulthood. He found (210:3) that 
the developmental approach under-emphasises individual variation and stresses 
20 Current Chapter, Paragraph 3.2. 
21 Reported in Troll (423:5). 
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general trends that do not apply equally to everyone. Turner and Helms ( 424:7) 
found similarly and Graubard also used the phrase: " ... adulthood as a universal 
phenomenon". By undertaking a search for the universal, the researcher is not assuming, 
as Riegel (343:696) might, that humankind does not change. The researcher expected that 
what adulthood is, does not change but that expressions of it will change. Indeed, 
Katchadourian (202:50) and Vaillant (429:236) expected that a comprehensive 
definition of adulthood would reveal some universals. The researcher realised that part 
of his task in this research was to contribute to such a comprehensive definition. 
Kimmel (210:8) expressed the hope that future research would contribute to an 
understanding of human development, or at least the years of adulthood. The reader will 
notice that "the years" indicates that adulthood is again thought of as a period of time and 
that Kimmel implied that the developmental approach has not yielded adequate 
results. With the continual references to stages, life cycle and development in the 
literature on adulthood, the researcher wondered where the concept of adulthood as a 
continuum might have a place. As already explained22 a continuum implies possible 
movement up and down. However, stages of adulthood, the sequence of a life cycle and 
development as forward looking, exclude movement down or backwards along a 
continuum. The researcher anticipated that considerable research would be required to 
further test adulthood as a continuum. 
Two illustrations of the fundamental inadequacy of the age-stage approach can be 
given. Firstly, Turner and Helms (424:17) found that: "Age-stage theories are useful in 
that they help psychologists clarify and organise data." For the researcher this 
pre-arranged framework restricts investigation and interpretation and obscures what 
adulthood, in essence, is. The researcher wondered why researchers in this field were not 
alert to the inadequacy of adulthood as chronological age: the considerable difficulties with 
terminology, as outlined in this paragraph are a symptom of the lack of understanding of 
what adulthood is. 
Secondly, Kimmel (210:3) found that the developmental approach is necessary to 
understand general principles and that " ... if we do not understand them, we may be 
overwhelmed by the many individual variations on these development themes." Kimmel 
regarded understanding principles as possible only if individual variations are ignored or 
erased. However, for the researcher, this is a methodological error. In the human sciences 
one must seek for the general (universals) while recognising individual variations - the 
two are not mutually exclusive. Attempting to eradicate individual variations (uniqueness) 
22 Chapter One, Paragraph 2.2. 
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infringes human dignity and is also an inappropriate way of studying the human 
phenomenon of adulthood. 
Having shown chronological age and its associated concepts as inadequate for describing 
adulthood, the researcher turned to examine biological, psychological and sociological 
descriptions of adulthood. The researcher was assisted by Kimmel (210:30) in this regard 
who found that chronological age is, in fact, an index of biological, psychological, social 
and self-perceived changes that take place over time. In addition, he identified three ages: a 
biological age indicating a person's level of biological growth or physical health; a 
psychological age reflecting psychological maturity; and a social age, indicating 
a person's passage through socially defined milestones of social development23. It 
cannot be denied that biological, psychological, and sociological ages are closely related to 
chronological age: they are each expressions of an individual's part-development against a 
general chronological norm in society24. 
Considering Kimmel's finding together with the usage by fellow-researchers of the 
concept of maturity, the researcher decided to name three further descriptions of 
adulthood as: biological maturity, psychological maturity and social maturity. 
That adulthood is considered by some researchers to be a biological phenomenon cannot 
be denied. The researcher observed that chronological ages are used to identify 
biological events and that "life cycle", being so frequently used in the scientific 
literature of biology (both botany and zoology), orientates one to a biological 
description of adulthood. Many researchers used terms such as "fully mature", "fully 
developed", "fully grown up" and "ripeness" when referring to the attainment of 
adulthood. As Allport (9:125) explained, the adolescent (young adult) holds to many 
childish attitudes but is now physically and sexually mature to play adult roles. In 
this light the researcher decided that evaluating the adequacy of adulthood as 
biological maturity would be a logical next point of departure. 
3.0 ADULTHOOD AS BIOLOGICAL MATURITY 
A biological definition of adulthood is not straightforward. Katchadourian (202:30) found 
that in medical texts the question of what an adult is, is seldom raised. He searched in vain 
for a definition of "adulthood" in medical dictionaries and found that the term "adult" does 
not appear, or when it does, is defined as fully grown, mature, someone who has 
23 The researcher was again concerned about the use of "growth", "maturity" and "development". It was 
realised that further attention would be required to explain what development means in human terms. 
24 For example, if someone of chronological age twenty six has a biological age of fifteen, this means 
that the twenty six year-old has achieved biological development equivalent to that of a person with 
chronological age of fifteen. In effect, although someone has been living twenty six years, they may 
have four other chronological ages depending on whether or not that person's level of biological, 
psychological and sociological development, and self-perception, measure up to the norms of the 
general population in the society concerned. 
67 
attained full size, strength and reproductive capability, or has the ability to 
handle personal affairs. Troll (423:16-29) described biological adulthood in some 
detail and corroborated the findings just stated. Consequently, it is safe to state that there 
are three main criteria for biological maturity, namely, maximum size, maximum 
physical strength, and the capability of reproduction. However, seven examples 
can illustrate that these tlu"ee criteria are not adequate for describing what adulthood is. 
i) People may still be considered adult even though they are unfortunately affected by 
the growth disease known as dwarfism and may be only one metre tall. Similarly, 
some teenagers may be much taller than their parents and other adults, but they are 
not necessarily regarded as adults. In addition, some cultural groups are shorter 
than others which means that size (height) is not an adequate criterion for cross-
cultural evaluation of the attainment of adulthood. 
ii) Unfortunately, many adults cannot reproduce for many physiological and 
anatomical reasons, yet they are not denied adult status. In addition, some girls as 
young as six years25 old have given birth and boys as young as fourteen are 
capable of fathering children. However, this ability to reproduce does not 
automatically provide the child-mother and child-father with adult status. 
iii) Unfortunately, some children are affected by Progeria, a disease which induces 
premature physical ageing and makes a child of six appear sixty years old. 
However, despite looking like a very old adult, the affected child is not regarded as 
an adult. 
iv) Some adults do not look like adults and may, in certain circumstances, be asked to 
prove their age. When identification is provided, adult status is acknowledged. 
Providing some means of identification that proves to others that one is legally 
recognised as an adult is related to socio-legal descriptions of adulthood and the 
researcher realised that adulthood as sociological attainment would have to be 
investigated later in the research26. 
v) Some children are much stronger than many adults, but are not regarded as adults 
because of this. Conversely, many old people lose physical strength as they become 
older, but are not denied adult status. In addition, if through some unfortunate 
25 The youngest mother on record, a Peruvian girl, was delivered by caesarian section of a healthy male 
infant when she was five years and seven months. 
26 Chapter Four, Paragraph 5.0. 
68 
disease or accident, people lose physical height, mobility, strength or dexterity, it is 
widely agreed that their adult status is not (in most instances) diminished27• 
vi) Up until a hundred years ago in most Western European cultures, some children 
(those who had not reached maximum height or the ability to reproduce) were 
indeed regarded as adults. Consequently, height and ability to reproduce are not 
adequate for trans-temporal assessment of the attainment of adulthood. 
vii) Ethnographers28 for example, found (210:5) that in some past and present-day 
tribal cultures, attainment of puberty (a sign of sexual maturity) was, and is, not 
sufficient to be regarded an adult. Frequently, initiation ceremonies or rites had to 
be, and in some cultures still must be, successfully completed. Candidates for 
adulthood (initiates) had to, and have to, prove their adultness. However, it was, 
and frequently still is, males who undergo initiation. If adult status depends on 
completing an initiation, then most women would be excluded. It was anticipated 
that examining adulthood as sociological attainment would reveal why, in some 
cultures, adult status depends on successfully completing an initiation ceremony. 
The researcher realised that if a universal description of adulthood is uncovered, the 
distinction between male adulthood and female adulthood made by some 
researchers (200:90), would be invalid. 
The seven examples just listed should be sufficient to show that there are too many 
exceptions to adulthood as biological maturity for it to be an adequate, universally 
applicable, description of adulthood. Coleman (63:95) corroborated this: " ... in a 
classroom of 14- or 15-year-olds the diversity of size and function, with its related 
variation in interest patterns and skills, can span the range from early childhood to 
adulthood". He ( 63 :97) provided additional corroboration: "Although adulthood is 
difficult to define even biologically, probably in no human society is it 
synonymous with the attainment of adult size and physiologic function." 
Similarly, Kakar (200: 118) found that biological maturity "... has neither identical 
connotations in the world-views of different cultures nor even consists of a set of simple 
and easily agreed upon concepts within the same culture." Bischof (37:32) and Scharg 
(380:65) corroborated this. 
27 However, some disabled people report being treated like children. The researcher regarded this 
contradiction as a sign that adulthood is frequently regarded as the ability to perform certain physical 
and mental acts. 
28 The term "ethnographer" is purposefully employed instead of "anthropologist" for reasons 
already explained in Chapter One, Paragraph 3.3.2. 
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It is safe to state that adulthood involves more than growing to a certain height or weight, 
or being able to reproduce. However, it is frequently difficult to remember this because, 
as already mentioned, many researchers such as Kimmel (210:4) and Coleman (63:1-5) 
used biological or physiological terms even when referring to psychological and 
sociological events: terms such as "maturity", "development", "growth", 
"senescence29", "process" and "life cycle". Turner and Helms (424:17) used 
"unfolding". 
It is understandable that biologists and other scientists working from a physical science 
perspective use concepts of the physical sciences to describe biological phenomena. 
However, as Havighurst (157:1) found: "The lower animals rely more than human beings 
do on maturation, or 'doing what comes naturally', to meet the problem of growing up 
.. . Very little of human behaviour is such a crude product of maturation unformed by 
learning." Allport (9:98) expressed this finding adequately when he found that 
maturation means ripening without learning. The researcher found that human 
maturity is different from the maturity of other animals30 because human maturity requires 
considerable conscious effort and is not an automatic process. For example, Bischof 
(37:32) found that maturity is about attitude rather than a collection of activities. 
Consequently, describing adulthood is not a matter of describing merely biological, 
chemical, anatomical and physiological processes in the human body. Evidence from 
anthropologists was presented in Chapter One31 to illustrate the fact that humankind is not 
merely a biological, stimulus-response organism. Even when the word "maturity" 
is used, it implies more than biological maturity. For example, reaching maximum height 
or sexual maturity are all-or-nothing events, but as Turner and Helms (424:53) found, 
maturity is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon. In a previous study (344:38-84), 
the researcher explained in considerable detail why he arrived at the finding that using 
biological terminology to describe humankind is inadequate description. 
In this light, it is difficult to understand why many fellow-researchers used "adults" to 
name the mature individuals of all animals including humankind. However, humankind 
reserves the terms "children", "baby", "child" and "youth" for immature humans and 
29 Graubard (135:v) also used the term "senescence". Hodgkinson, reported by Chickering and Havighurst 
(60:38), used the term "middlescence", and Kennedy (205:208) and McMorrow (277) used 
"midolescence". 
30 Those researchers working from a psychological perspective are particularly prone to using 
biologicaVanimalistic analogies such as describing human painful and joyous experiences as "the grit 
in the oyster" (332:4) and "Like the lobster or soft-shelled crab, humans seem sometimes to outgrow 
their 'shells' ... ". (210:80) 
31 Paragraph 3.3.2. 
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does not use them to refer to the "young" of other animals. Indeed the young of other 
animals have been allocated their own special names such as "duckling", "piglet", 
"foal" and "yearling", for example. The researcher anticipated that using "adult" to 
refer to humans as well as non-human animals would lead to misunderstanding. It was 
also difficult to understand why some educationists accept the concept of adulthood as 
biological maturity and apply this understanding of adulthood to education. Evans 
( 101 :33 ), for example, first found that: "Continual adaption is one of the characteristics 
of human growth and development ... ", and then (101:62) found that adaption is the 
central learning task. 
However, humankind does not have to adapt and invariably does not adapt, but has the 
power to, and does, change the environment. This is corroborated by Vaillant (429:5) 
who found that adaption is to deal successfully with life's problems. The researcher 
became aware from Vaillant's mention of "dealing successfully with life's 
problems" and Bischofs mention of "attitude", that adulthood as a response to events 
would have to be examined when adulthood as sociological attainment was examined32• 
There is another kind of evidence which shows that biological maturity is inadequate for 
describing adulthood. Definitions of terms such as "developmental processes", "an 
individual's development", "adult growth" and "human development" are 
rarely provided. When definitions are attempted, the researcher found them difficult to 
understand. Troll (423:3) corroborated this, stating that the definition of 
"development" is a problem. Neugarten (298) defined it as processes " ... in which 
the organism is irreversibly changed or transformed ... and which vary in an orderly way 
with age regardless of the direction of change." The researcher doubted whether this 
definition could be applied other than to animals and plants. In addition, it stands to reason 
that if concepts such as growth, development and unfolding cannot be adequately defined 
when applied to humankind, more adequate descriptions must be sought. 
Based on findings expressed in the preceding paragraphs, the researcher attempted to 
avoid biologistic terms in this thesis except when in the quotations of fellow-researchers. 
This was difficult to do because, as already explained, and as will become even more 
evident, many researchers used biologistic terms in referring to psychological and 
sociological events. More adequate non-biologistic terms for "growth", "adapt" and 
"maturity", are not offered in this chapter because considerable explication would be 
required to uncover what these more adequate terms might be. The researcher anticipated 
32 See Chapter Four. 
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that as a result of the research, he would be able to propose a list of more adequate non-
biological terms in the conclusion to this thesis33. 
Despite the evidence already presented, which illustrates the inadequacy of describing 
adulthood biologically, it cannot be denied that humans encounter several biological 
events. These events are employed by some researchers to express adulthood. Even 
though, as already explained, there is a strong likelihood that biological stages and a 
biological life cycle will be inadequate descriptions of adulthood, the researcher as 
scientist was obliged to check this likelihood. Consequently, adulthood as a number of 
biological stages and as a phase in a biological life cycle were examined. 
3.1 ADULTHOOD AS A NUMBER OF BIOLOGICAL STAGES, OR AS 
PHASES IN A BIOLOGICAL LIFE CYCLE 
There are five main biological events used frequently in the literature on adulthood to 
indicate stages, namely, birth, puberty, menopause, senescence and death. While 
most researchers who regard adulthood as a biological phenomenon agree that only the 
last four events relate to adulthood, there are minor variations in the way they designate 
the stages. Some refer to the event itself as a stage, but others imply that a stage is 
between events. For example, one stage would occur between puberty and menopause, 
another between menopause and senescence and a third between senescence and death. 
Whatever the designation used, adulthood is implicitly defined as that mode of being 
which occurs after puberty. This definition raised a number of questions for the 
researcher. 
Firstly, why is the number of stages limited to four? For example, giving birth and having 
a heart attack are biological events which could be regarded as demarcating other stages. 
Secondly, how do the physical signs of each stage describe what adulthood is? For 
example, although senescence is regarded as a stage when one becomes less active, loses 
head hair and thinks more frequently about death, these physical changes do not describe 
adulthood. Many people who are approaching death retain considerable activity and do not 
lose their hair and consequently, cannot be said to have experienced senescence. In 
addition, becoming less active and losing hair can occur in stages before senescence. Even 
if someone has undergone puberty, they may still not be regarded as an adult. 
Consequently, a biological stage description of adulthood is an inadequate description. 
33 See Chapter Nine, Paragraph 4.1. 
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Even if biological stages cannot adequately describe adulthood, it might be claimed that 
expressing these stages as a biological life cycle would make the description more 
adequate. Kimmel's (210:4) findings regarding a human life cycle have already been 
extensively discussed in this chapter. He (210:3) found that humankind has a life cycle 
just like any other animal: " ... development is progressive, sequential, and follows the 
same pattern generatioP after generation ... ". To carefully examine adulthood as biological 
maturity the researcher extracted the biological events from Kimmel's model. It was 
possible to add several other events to the biological life cycle and these additional events 
are indicated by an asterisk (*) in the modified biological life cycle shown in Table Three 
on the following page. 
TABLE THREE 
A DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION OF A BIOLOGICAL 
LIFELINE (after Kimmel) 
- conception 
- birth 
-puberty 
*giving birth 
* peaking of physical strength 
* peaking of sexual activity 
* cancer developing 
-menopause 
* heart attack 
* senescence 
-death 
The inadequacy of a biological life cycle for explaining what adulthood is, can be 
illustrated with five main examples. 
i) Researchers reported considerable differences on the number of stages in 
adulthood and the chronological ages at which each stage begins and ends. For 
example, Oberholzer and Grey ling (311 :37) distinguished between early adults, 
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young adults, prime (mature) adults, late (older) adults, but also referred 
to prime adult as middle adulthood. Coleman (63:77) distinguished between 
late adolescence and early adulthood and Kimmel (210:4) identified 
adolescence, young adult, middle age, old age and senescence stages. 
Consequently, not only do researchers' findings differ on the number of stages, but 
they frequently also give different names to the same stage. 
Several biological events could be added to the life cycle description, as the 
researcher did with "giving birth", but this would apply only to women. Even so, 
giving birth is not sufficient for someone to be recognised as an adult. The fact that 
two children have sexual intercourse and the girl becomes pregnant, does not 
necessarily mean they fulfil the requirements of motherhood, fatherhood and in 
general, parenthood. In addition, the acts of fathering and mothering do not 
mean merely being the source of genetic material, but being responsible for the 
child's upbringing. In addition, as Katchadourian (202:42) found, there are 
variations across time and culture as to when the various biological changes occur. 
He (202:53) found that there is nothing fixed or immutable about life phases. 
The terms "upbringing" and "being responsible" are relevant for adulthood. 
For example, "upbringing" indicates the upbringing of the child to adulthood, 
whatever adulthood is. The researcher wondered about the relationship of 
adulthood and being responsible. If people in a society expect a person to be 
able to behave in certain ways and do certain things, and if one can describe 
what those ways and things are, then it would be possible to examine how well any 
person attained society's expectations. To remind the reader: the researcher was 
seeking the "ways" and "things" acceptable to all societies. The mention of 
society's requirements again indicated that sociological adulthood would 
need examining later34 in the research. 
ii) Sequentiality of the life cycle does not necessarily hold. For example, "having a 
heart attack" or "developing cancer" are events that can occur at any time throughout 
life, not only during adulthood. Even when sequence is self-evident such as birth 
occurring before puberty and puberty before menopause, this explains very little of 
what adulthood is. Troll (423:28) found that in a biological model of development 
the climacterium (end of reproductive capacity) would probably be considered the 
end of adulthood. However, it is common knowledge that most people are still 
considered adults after losing reproductive ability. Many researchers confirmed this 
by using the term "old adulthood". Although Kimmel (210:4) acknowledged that 
34 Chapter Four. 
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ages given on his life line model are approximate, menopause is recorded as 
happening at forty eight years old, parenthood at just before thirty years and death 
of spouse after sixty five years. However, one can become a parent at any age - say 
from nine to ninety years old, and death of a spouse can happen at any age - say 
from twelve years (in the case of an Indian youth married by parental arrangement) 
to ninety. Chronological-biological ages are so variable as to be meaningless. 
iii) The very fact of using "puberty" and "menopause" indicates that humans do not 
merely go through the biological change of achieving sexual maturity as a caterpillar 
pupating into a moth would do. Humans experience a uniquely human condition 
known as "puberty" which is not only a biological event. Even the biological signs 
of puberty cannot be described straightforwardly (202:34). Similarly, humans do 
not merely notice that hormone secretions from the gonads decrease, resulting in a 
decline in sexual and/or physical activity, but experience the uniquely human 
"menopause". Unlike, Havighurst (157:4) and Troll (423:3) who found 
menopause to be the result of physical maturation, the researcher found that 
menopause is not just a physical event but a social and psychological one 
resulting from the biological event - hormonal change. 
The researcher has previously stated that "having a heart attack" or "developing 
cancer", for example, are biological events. However, on further reflection it would 
be more adequate to call the biological events just stated: "myocardial infarction" 
and "onset of carcinoma". Having a heart attack and developing cancer are 
human events not just biological symptoms. Turner and Helms ( 424:405) found 
this: "Death is a process as well as an event ... ". For the researcher, process is a 
matter of biology and event is a matter of humanity. When Kimmel (210:4) referred 
to senescence, does he regard human ageing as similar to that of leaves ageing, 
since "senescence" is frequently used to describe the falling of leaves from a tree 
during Autumn? Indeed, Kett (206:286) found that in the 1800s, human life was 
frequently compared to seasonal cycles. The researcher found that referring to 
humans as one would leaves is inadequate, even as a part-description of adulthood. 
To explicate this distinction between biological process and human event further: 
Turner and Helms ( 424:402) gave a biological description of what happens at death 
and called this the "experience of dying". While all biological entities experience 
the biological process of death, for the researcher, only humans experience dying - a 
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unique human event with emotional, psychological and social consequences. 
For the researcher this applies for all events35 on the biological life cycle. 
iv) Kimmel (210:5) presented the life cycle as a journey, explaining that travellers are 
progressing to a goal. However, if as life cycle theory indicates, the journey is only 
a biological one, the only goal is death. Turner and Helms (424:iii) observed 
similarly, finding that death is the final developmental stage. However, since 
humans cannot ultimately evade death36; since "travelling" and "goal" indicate 
choice; and since most people would rather not die, Kimmel must have been 
referring to other goals. The researcher anticipated having to identify these goals. 
Adulthood as a journey arises frequently in the literature (447:109) and some 
researchers (423:vii) (249:51) used the concept of a map to explain the use of life 
cycle theory in studying adulthood. Chickering and Havighurst (60:38) reported 
how some social scientists regarded development as " ... the long climb up through 
the valleys and the foothills of youth and early adulthood". The researcher realised 
that adulthood as a journey could have relevance for adulthood as a 
continuum and that this would require investigation later in the research. 
v) Kimmel (210:3) found that development is circular in the sense that as each 
generation matures, it nurtures the next generation. However, in biological terms 
one generation does not nurture the next generation: an individual human 
nurtures several young people. Frequently, some adult animals are known to eat 
the young of the same species in the same area and some (fish and crocodiles) eat 
their own young. Sometimes there is no nurturing at all: one animal may leave the 
rearing to another and when a male lion takes over a pride, the lion cubs are 
frequently killed to induce the female to mate. 
After an examination of adulthood as biological maturity, the researcher found that it does 
not adequately describe adulthood. Hareven (154:16) and Stone (406:108) corroborated 
this. Even those researchers who regarded biological adulthood as a part-explanation of 
human adulthood, realised that there is more to being human than deterministic control by 
biological and chemical processes. Kimmel (210:4) found that: "Biological growth plays 
an initially central but decreasing role ... ". Corroboration came from Das (74:97) who 
found that in some Hindu cultures a women is considered to be in the last phase of 
adulthood when her eldest child marries - a social event. The evidence reported so far 
shows that attaining biological maturity is not in itself sufficient for someone to be 
35 The researcher considered compiling a list of biological events and their accompanying human 
experiences, but this would have deviated from the research question. 
36 Of course, one could choose to die earlier or to undertake certain healthier activities to extend one's 
life. 
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considered an adult. Turner and Helms (424:1) quoted Amiel who found in 1874 that: "To 
know how to grow old is the masterwork of wisdom and one of the most difficult 
chapters in the great art of living." What the relationship might be between adulthood 
and wisdom was recognised as needing further examination later in the research. 
The researcher did not disagree with the finding of many researchers that, in general, 
people experience some automatic, anatomical and physiological changes over which they 
have little control. However, it was found that identifying one or more of these 
biological changes as the beginning of adulthood and accepting a 
description of this biological change and all subsequent biological changes 
as a description of what adulthood is, is inadequate description. Biological 
changes do not explain a person's state of mind nor the way an adult is expected or 
supposed to behave while undergoing the biological event (change). 
Consequently, there must be more adequate criteria for describing adulthood. As already 
explained, all events in the biological life cycle are not merely biological events. There are 
psychological and social implications for the person experiencing the events. Further 
consideration of Amiel's finding: "To know how to grow old is the masterwork of 
wisdom and one of the most difficult chapters in the great art of living", shows this 
markedly. One could ask what comes first - the growing old or the wisdom? Surely 
wisdom is partially attained by growing old and growing old could be defined as 
the attainment of wisdom. In addition, describing life as a book is inadequate. For 
example, how it is possible to claim that one "chapter" of life is more difficult than 
another? Surely, experiencing childhood and early adulthood is just as difficult for the 
child and early adult, as late adulthood is for the late adult. What is meant by the great 
art of living? If it means living successfully, then what is it to live successfully? 
"Living successfully" again pointed the researcher to psychological and sociological 
descriptions of adulthood. 
Consequently, it was found that human biological events are also psychological and 
sociological experiences and more adequate description of adulthood could be found in 
examining adulthood as psychological maturity and adulthood as sociological 
maturity. Because biological terms alone are inadequate for describing human 
phenomena, the researcher used the term "attainment" rather than "maturity". Turner 
and Helms (424:18) and Allport37 also used "attainment", but in addition to the biological 
terms, not instead of them. Erikson (99:27) predicted that researchers of adulthood (adult 
development) would be drawn into " ... the wars of ideological redefinitions of human 
37 Paraphrased in Turner and Helms (424:55). 
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maturity ... ". However, while the researcher was seeking a more adequate definition of 
adulthood he did not intend pursuing any "war" or ideological programme. 
Before investigating adulthood as psychological and sociological attainment, the 
researcher examined (for completeness sake and to minimise misunderstanding) another 
aspect of adulthood as biological maturity, which arose during the research - that of 
ageing. Even though some researchers such as Kimmel (210:3) found the analogy 
between seasons of the year and the human life cycle, inadequate, fellow-researchers 
still related humankind and adulthood to ageing, that is, biological degeneration and 
deterioration with time (424:19). The researcher wanted to understand how ageing and 
adulthood were being related because this relationship could contribute to a more adequate 
description of adulthood. 
3.2 ADULTHOOD AS AGEING 
Gove (133:1395), for example, offered "age" as a synonym for "mature" and "adult", 
and much of the research into adulthood is undertaken under topic headings such as 
"Adulthood and Aging" (210), "Adult Development and Aging" (323) (377), 
"Middle age and aging ... " (297)38 and "Ageing: A Challenge to Science and 
Society" (34)39. The researcher found the concept of ageing to be a combination of 
chronological and biological description. Since chronological and biological adulthood had 
already been found to be inadequate descriptions, it was expected that adulthood as 
ageing would also be inadequate. However, the researcher's task as scientist was to test 
this assumption. 
Some researchers (424:19) (458) who used "adulthood as ageing" implied that as one 
becomes chronologically older the physical body gets older and is increasingly unable to 
function adequately. The decline of the physical body is associated with decline, weakness 
and obsolescence (154: 13) and is presented, in general, as an extremely negative 
experience (35:4). Turner and Helms (424:iii) regarded adulthood as an ageing process 
called "growing old". Consequently, description of adulthood for many researchers 
became a description of the problems people encounter as their bodies become older and 
do not function effectively. However, the researcher found five reasons why ageing 
cannot adequately describe adulthood. 
i) Ageing is not only applicable to humans but to all living beings and even non-living 
matter: it is universal ( 424: 19). However, as already reported in this chapter, 
38 The researcher was aware of other volumes of a similar nature such as Binstock and Shanas (30) but 
these were, to a large degree, repetitive of Neugarten's work. 
39 His volume contains forty nine papers on ageing. 
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adulthood is a unique human phenomenon not shared with animals. It is 
contradictory to expect a concept common to all living beings to adequately describe, 
on its own, a uniquely human phenomenon. 
ii) Ageing is not only applicable to adulthood but to one's whole life including 
childhood. Ageing is a lifelong process (202:34) - all humans begin to age 
(and die) the minute they are conceived. Several researchers (37:ix) 
(447: 113) corroborated this finding. Ageing, therefore, cannot be an adequate 
description of adulthood because it can also be applied to childhood. Consequently, 
there is no reason why one cannot refer to childhood and ageing and to regard 
ageing as the equivalent of growth, instead of deterioration, when applied to 
children. This finding led the researcher to question what the distinction is between 
ageing and growing. In addition, the researcher found phrases such as " ... from 
the peak of life to later adulthood ... ". (388: 112) to be meaningless. Just what does 
this peak involve? 
iii) Some adults unfortunately die relatively young and do not reach an age where 
biological decline becomes a problem for them. Similarly, some very old people 
experience few serious problems related to ageing. In this sense ageing is not a 
universal and consequently, is inadequate for describing adulthood fundamentally. 
iv) Even when biological decline occurs in a serious way, such as loss of control 
over urination (which in humankind is called "incontinence"), this does not 
necessarily deprive people of adult status. The biological problem just stated can be 
cured or alleviated with medical technology. One of Kimmel's (210:20) findings 
provided a further illustration of how the concept of ageing is inadequate for 
describing adulthood. He found that: " ... aging may mean physical survival and 
providing one's offspring40 with at least a reasonable chance of survival; for 
others, aging means illness, poverty, and isolation ... ". Terms such as "illness", 
"poverty" and "isolation" name uniquely human experiences: animals can catch a 
sickness or disease but only humankind experience illness. 
What Kimmel did not mention with regard to physical survival and assisting one's 
children to survive, is the fear, loss of dignity, depression and 
disappointment associated with such biological deterioration. Some researchers 
(36:12) (210:6) found that physiological decline is highly dependent on the 
presence of mild disease instead of on ageing alone, and it is widely accepted, 
40 For the researcher, human children are more than just young animals - offspring, progeny or the 
"fruit of one's loins". 
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albeit implicitly, that a person does not normally lose adult status because of a 
disease. For the researcher, the concept of ageing again illustrated the necessity for 
separating out for research purposes, the merely biological which is only one 
inseparable aspect of being human. Turner and Helms (424:287) corroborated this 
when they found that individuals do not age at the same rate; disease may make one 
person seem older - that is more aged; and that people may have the characteristics 
of old age at a number of chronological ages. 
v) There are frequent inconsistencies in the use of biological ageing. For example, 
Turner and Helms ( 424:22) gave two examples of biological ageing: a fourteen 
year-old adolescent girl in puberty and a seventy five year-old man. 
However, seventy five is merely a chronological label which does not describe 
ageing. In addition, puberty is a psycho-social experience and a biological 
hormonal event, and hormonal change is not ageing itself but a snapshot of 
ageing. A practical manifestation of inconsistently using ageing is that (264: 125) in 
most Western countries ageing is associated with being obsolescent, senescence, 
retirement, loneliness and shame. However, in Japan, ageing is associated with 
creativity, wisdom and activity. 
In summary, for the researcher, the concept of ageing by itself was so vague that it could 
not describe adulthood adequately. Turner and Helms (424:287) expressed this succinctly: 
"One of the most perplexing problems facing gerontologists is deciding when old age 
begins, or for that matter, defining exactly what old age is. Because of the ambiguity 
and uncertainty that swirls around these questions, formulating precise answers is 
nearly impossible ... adequate or totally satisfactory answers to the question [When is a 
person old?] are elusive. The definition of old age depends upon whom you ask41 ... ". 
As already explained, and as Turner and Helms ( 424:287) also found, to label someone 
"old" based on physical appearance has often proved to be unsatisfactory. As Rohlen 
(362:125) found, "Old age is not adulthood ... ". In corroborating the above 
criticisms of equating adulthood with ageing, Turner and Helms (424:3) explicitly 
distinguished between adulthood and ageing, and Bischof (37:ix) found it an error to 
equate ageing with being aged. Consequently, no necessary relationship between 
adulthood and ageing was found, and ageing cannot adequately describe what adulthood 
is. This explains why in a book entitled "Processes of Aging" ( 458), twenty seven papers 
41 The implications of this statement clearly indicate an inadequate approach to research. The whole task 
of research is to get rid of as much ambiguity as possible, and if this is impossible then science is 
impossible and progress in finding out what reality is, cannot be made. 
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on psychobiology, psychosocial problems of the old, and psychopathology, did not 
describe adequately what adulthood is. 
Ageing is a chronological-biological concept, and adulthood is more than just a set of age-
related biological problems. However, as Birren and Munnichs (35:4) found, the use of 
chronological age will be difficult to overcome. The evidence presented in this paragraph 
explains why Baer (16:239) wrote of an age-irrelevant concept of development and 
why he was seriously critical of researchers he called age-cataloging 
psychologists42. It is safe to state that the experiences people encounter arise not only 
from ageing but from several biological problems such as genetic deformity, disease and 
accidental injury. Hareven (154:14) reported the methodological complexities in relating 
ageing to historical change. 
The researcher realised again that the search for what adulthood is, would involve going 
beyond biological problems to examining social and psychological experiences. 
Indeed, part of the difficulty encountered by the researcher in understanding ageing was 
that some researchers included sociological events in their biological descriptions. For 
example, Williams et al ( 458) regarded ageing as mainly a biological process but then 
referred to successful ageing being dependent on certain behaviour and people's 
feelings. Since many developmental psychologists43 devote extensive time to studying 
biological development, it was considered unlikely that a developmental psychology 
approach to adulthood would supply an adequate description. For the researcher, 
experiences such as poverty, isolation, fear, loss of dignity, depression and 
disappointment indicated that adulthood as social attainment and adulthood as 
psychological attainment, would provide more adequate descriptions of adulthood. 
However, biological decline through ageing, disease or accident, for example, alerted the 
researcher to another biological concept of adulthood, namely, adulthood as 
possessing physical skills. Another indication of this concept came from the life cycle 
approach which records biological events such as peaking of physical strength 
which implies being able to undertake certain manual tasks. Consequently, before 
investigating adulthood as psychological and sociological attainment, the researcher 
considered it necessary to investigate adulthood as possessing certain physical skills. 
42 For example (16:239): "Thus he [the age psychologist] may study young monkeys rather than young 
children, and still speak to a warmly receptive Society for Research in Child Development." 
43 For example, Birren et al (33:v-xiii) devoted extensive space to genetics, brain maturation, 
malnutrition, biological foundations of language, prenatal influences, drug use, smoking, infectious 
diseases, radiation, stress and pregnancy. In their chapter on motivation they discussed the 
hypothalamus and pheromones. 
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3.3 ADULTHOOD AS POSSESSING PHYSICAL SKILLS 
In considering adulthood as the embodiment of skills, the researcher is not giving an 
animalistic connotation of human abilities as some researchers (210:vii) do when they find 
that adults usually reach the apex of their abilities in adulthood. Humans have abilities 
which can become skills, but although animals have abilities, one does not usually regard 
them as having· skills. It is well known that adults are required to possess skills such as, 
manual dexterity, physical agility and physical strength. In addition, adults are 
expected to possess certain mental (cognitive) skills. 
Coleman (63: 111) illustrated the relevance of examining physical skills in an attempt to 
describe what adulthood is. He offered several findings about youth growing into 
adulthood, one of which was: " ... a level of cognitive and physical abilities that, on 
average, closely approximates those of adults by mid-adolescence." However, this is 
another example of a predefinition of adulthood not being made explicit. The relevance 
of an examination of physical skills for a study of adulthood is further shown by Peck's 
findings that those people during their forties who cling to physical powers become 
depressed as these powers decline, but people who used their mental skills seemed to age 
more successfully. It was anticipated that just what these mental skills (resources) 
are, what they mean for adulthood, and what it means to age successfully, would be 
considered later in the research when adulthood as psychological and sociological 
attainment were examined. However, even initial reflection on adulthood as possessing 
physical skills, revealed five main reasons why it is an inadequate description of 
adulthood. 
i) There is a range of possession of physical skills regarded as the beginning of 
adulthood. In addition, even if consensus could be achieved on the number of 
skills to be gained before one is called an adult, there could be further variation in 
the level to be attained in each skill, and dispute as to whether or not all skill-
levels had to be attained simultaneously. 
ii) Even if consensus was achieved regarding the level, number and simultaneity of 
gaining skills, it is well known that some children are more physically skilled 
than some adults. 
iii) As people age, they may lose some of their skills, and in this respect Kimmel's 
finding that the apex of abilities is usually reached in adulthood is inadequate 
82 
description44. Certainly, some physical abilities such as hearing and sight may fail, 
but they may be restored by medical means and the effect of a decline in physical 
skills may be balanced or outweighed by gains in reasoning skills and creative 
language use, for example. 
iv) It is well known that unfortunately, through disease or accident some peopk~ may 
partially or fully loose, temporarily or permanently, some skills. However, this loss 
through illness or accident does not automatically disqualify someone from being an 
adult. For example, as a result of motor-neuron disease Hawking (160)45 has been 
confined to a wheelchair for at least twenty years. Even though he is unable to write 
and speak without the aid of a special communication computer package and a 
speech synthesiser, he has written one of the most acclaimed and successful books 
on astrophysics. Consequently, neither abundance nor lack of physical skills gives 
any indication of what adulthood is. However, what an abundance or lack of mental 
and social skills means for adulthood was investigated later in the research46. 
v) Even if a required set of physical skills and skill-levels necessary for adult status 
could be identified, it would not be the mere possession of the skills that would 
be indicative of adulthood, but how the skills are used. A twenty six year-old 
man might employ his superior physical strength and manual dexterity to bully 
others. Such behaviour would be regarded as childish (non-adult). Again, the 
concepts of psychological and sociological attainment seem more likely to offer a 
more adequate description of what adulthood is. 
During the investigation of adulthood as possessing physical skills, a major and far-
reaching distinction was revealed: the terms "an adult" and "being adult" named 
different phenomena. The researcher found that it was the failure to make this distinction 
that led to much of the confusion in terminology in the relevant literature. It was found that 
fellow-researchers moved from one phenomenon to the other without being aware that 
they were making this move, and used both terms interchangeably. The researcher 
suspected that this distinction was essential for continuing the search for the most adequate 
description of adulthood and decided to investigate it further. 
44 Turner and Helms (424:9) claimed that developmental psychologists actively seek to combat ageism 
and societal mis-conceptions about the ageing process. However, by actually allocating certain 
biological traits or physical skills to certain chronological ages, are they not contributing to ageism? 
45 Hawkin's book was on the UK Sunday Times best sellers list for 103 weeks. 
46 The researcher was aware of the danger of separating out thinking, doing (willing) and feeling, 
which according to Allport (9:259) are referred to as cognition, connotation and affection. As 
Allport explained, these three cannot be separated, and the approach in this chapter is an artificial 
approach for purposes of research only. 
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3.4 THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN AN ADULT AND BEING ADULT 
(ADULTHOOD) 
As already explained in this chapter, "an adult" names biological maturity and can apply 
to all living entities including humans. Consequently, "an adult" indicates only a 
biological condition of certain age, maximum size, ability to reproduce and having 
physical abilities. Consequently, any person who reaches biological maturity can be called 
"an adult". However, because humans are more than just biological beings, when 
applying "an adult" to humans, many researchers frequently, but unknowingly, name 
more than the biological concept. This leads to considerable misunderstanding. 
For example, Turner and Helms (424:53) referred to "adult maturity". If "adult" and 
"maturity" were being used to refer to biological maturity, then either "adult" or "maturity" 
is superfluous47. An adult is mature already in the biological sense and 
maturity in a biological sense implies that one is an adult. Turner and Helms 
(424:iii) provided another illustration of using "an adult" to name two concepts. They 
found that adult life is related to the ageing process (a biological process) and 
learning to age successfully (psycho-social experiencing). For the researcher, the 
psycho-social experiencing (whatever it might be) is experiencing unique to humans. 
Consequently, to describe adulthood adequately one must distinguish between the 
biological and the uniquely human. To do this the researcher employed the term "being 
adult". For the researcher, being adult is synonymous with adulthood. Goldstein 
( 130:69) made an identical distinction: " ... to be 'an adult' in the eyes of the secular law, 
then, is not to be confused or equated with 'being adult' ... ". Bouwsma ( 42:77) found 
similarly when he distinguished between manhood (being adult) and adulthood 
which he used to represent the biological process (an adult). Unlike Bouwsma, the 
researcher decided to use adulthood (being adult) to name a uniquely human 
phenomenon. A human may be adult (completed by predetermined biological growth) 
and still, in certain circumstances, not be being adult. A similar distinction can be made 
with "rearing young" and "fathering" and mothering" or "parenting". 
"Parenting", a uniquely human activity, implies more than just rearing, which is a solely 
automatic, instinctual, biological act. "Parenting" implies being a parent, which in tum 
implies social and psychological experiences. 
To clarify this subtle but essential distinction further: adulthood (being adult) is not 
described adequately by a description of an adult. For example, someone may 
47 The researcher anticipated that extensive misunderstanding is likely to arise from undisciplined use of 
terminology in discussing the phenomenon of adulthood. For example, Turner and Helms (424:53) 
found that young adulthood is a foothold in the " ... world of grownups ... ". What does grownup 
mean? If someone is a young adult are they not already grown up to some degree? 
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be neither able to reproduce nor be of maximum size, or may be physically disabled, but 
still be in the mode of being called adulthood. Consequently, unlike Katchadourian 
(202:50) the researcher did not find that biological maturity is essential to any definition of 
adulthood. The reader will be aware that it is the main purpose of this research to find out 
what the mode of being called "adulthood" (being adult) entails. 
The fact that a person can be being adult even when they do not have the physical 
characteristics of an adult is not denied by the fact that some people treat some physically 
disabled people as children or when some people are denied access to adult-only events, 
because they do not look like adults. All these two instances illustrate is that some people 
mistake being adult with the physical characteristics of an adult, and that the 
laws in some countries enforce rules linked to physical characteristics. It is interesting to 
note that most cultures have a legal definition of adulthood based largely on chronological 
age: anyone who reaches the age determined by a society as the start of adulthood is 
regarded as being adult. 
The error of associating being adult with having the physical characteristics of an adult, 
raised further questions. For example, although chronological-legal status does not 
adequately describe what adulthood is, perhaps socio-legal status (130:72) does. 
Although being physically disabled does not exclude a person from being adult, perhaps 
being mentally disabled does. These questions were considered later in the research48. 
The researcher considered that fellow-researchers are intuitively aware of the distinction 
between an adult and being adult, although most do not make this intuition explicit. For 
example, Hurlock49 seemed to use "an adult" to name only a biological phenomenon: 
"An adult ... is an individual who has completed his growth and is ready for his status 
in society with other adults". However, from his context, it is evident that he included in 
"an adult" sociological and psychological attainment. Also, when researchers used terms 
such as "genuine adulthood" (315:25), "real adulthood", efficient adult (37:2), 
"true adulthood" (42:79) and "responsible adulthood" (380:72), the researcher 
considered that they go beyond an adult, and are referring to being adult. 
Further evidence that a distinction is necessary between "adulthood" (being adult) and "an 
adult" is given by Malia (264) who found no precise equivalent of the Anglo-American 
"adulthood" in any other European language. He indicated that in French, German, and 
Russian there are different terms for maturity as ripeness, and maturity as grown-up. Troll 
(423: 1) found that adulthood as totally achievable or completeable was inadequate 
48 Chapter Four, Paragraph 4.0, and Chapter Three, Paragraph 2.0, respectively. 
49 As reported in Troll (423:1). 
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description because adulthood would then be the end of the line and that once reached, 
there would be no further development. The researcher found similarly to Troll: if 
adulthood was completeable, adult education would not be possible. Consequently, 
although many researchers used the term "maturity" synonymously with adulthood, and 
since researchers such as Shanan (388: 115) distinguished between physical maturation 
and social maturation, in this thesis "maturation" means only biological growth. 
Bischof (37:8) also used "maturation" to mean only biological growth. 
Consequently, even when some researchers used terms that imply biological maturity, 
they are referring to the human phenomenon of being adult. As already mentioned, 
the two main ways to continue the research into what being adult (adulthood) is, is to 
examine adulthood as psychological attainment and sociological attainment. 
Knowles (221 :29) corroborated this. The researcher realised that the extreme difficulty 
encountered in the research up until this stage arose because many researchers are unaware 
that their use of the term "an adult" conceals (has within it) "being adult". In 
summary, to describe more adequately what adulthood is, one must look beyond 
chronologistic grouping of events and biologistic descriptions of an adult, and find out 
what being adult entails. 
Already in this chapter, several mentions have been made of being adult as related to 
expected or required behaviour. Consequently, the researcher considered it 
appropriate to investigate being adult as psychological attainment. The 
appropriateness of such an investigation is indicated by Buhler's50 finding: " ... a sense of 
not having fulfilled one's goals [a psychological experience] was more important 
than biological decline in triggering maladjustment in old age." Similarly, Kakar 
(200: 118) found that the notion of ideal adulthood is described by psychological 
maturity, and Jordan (195:2) referred to becoming psychologically adult. Qkun51 found 
that maturity has, in addition to the biological, psychological and philosophical 
dimensions52. As Wei-ming (447:109) found, in the Confucian concept of adulthood, 
without a continuous effort to realise one's humanity, biological growth becomes 
meaningless. During an evaluation of the adequacy of adulthood as psychological 
attainment the researcher expected to find out the possible meanings of ideal adulthood 
and realising one's humanity. 
50 Quoted by Kimmel (210:12). 
51 Paraphrased by Turner and Helms (424:53). 
52 The researcher wondered why Jordan did not mention sociological dimensions. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ADULTHOOD AS PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTAINMENT 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Terms such as "mature", "grown-up" and "adult" which are used to indicate biological 
concepts are also frequently used to describe people's mental (psychological) 
attainment as expressed by their attitudes and behaviour. One sometimes hears 
statements such as" ... that was a very adult thing to do", and" ... she took a mature 
approach to the problem". Fellow-researchers gave an indication of the dual use of these 
terms. For example, Evans (101:40) referred to internal growthl and development, and 
Turner and Helms (424:53) to emotional maturity. Consequently, it is safe to state that 
there is some underlying concept of psychological attainment when the terms 
"adulthood" and "being adult" are used. 
When Jordan (195:4) found that adulthood in a psychological sense did not appear in the 
USA until the early twentieth century, the researcher considered that the word did not 
appear. There was a phenomenon before then, but it was not called "adulthood". "Mental 
(psychological) attainment", "attitudes" and "behaviour" have been emphasised 
in the preceding subparagraph because the researcher anticipated explicating them further 
as the research progressed. A relevant point of departure for continuing the research was 
the fact that adulthood can be expressed as possessing certain mental skills2. 
2.0 ADULTHOOD AS POSSESSING MENTAL SKILLS 
Some mental skills are expressed as intelligence, rationality, concentration, wide 
vocabulary, and emotional control. Troll (423:30-44), for example, mentioned 
intellectual skills which include, fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, 
creativity, cognitive processes, perception, learning, memory, thinking and 
problem solving. Coleman ( 63: 111) found that adulthood is indicated by a level of 
cognitive abilities. Turner and Helms found that: "Young adulthood marks a time 
when the ability to acquire and utilize knowledge nears maximum capacity ... The 
· sensorimotor, Preconceptual, Intuitive Thought, and Concrete Operations stages 
pave the way for Formal Operations, the zenith of cognitive maturity ... 
thinking is rational, systematic, logical and flexible. Individuals can engage in abstract 
thinking and employ deductive and inductive logic as they approach problems." 
1 "Internal growth" is an ambiguous term: it could mean psychological attainment or the growth of 
internal organs, such as liver or gonads, for example. 
2 Just what a mental skill is, requires extensive investigation. Lepisto (242:23-28) gave a brief indication 
of the complexity of this issue but further discussion was beyond the scope of the research. 
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The researcher found that adulthood as possessing mental skills is an inadequate 
description of adulthood for the same reason that possessing physical skills is inadequate. 
Merely possessing the skills is insufficient to be recognised as being adult - they have 
to be applied in certain ways in the affairs of life. It might be that under certain stressful 
circumstances such as the death of a relative or a heated argument, some people do not 
apply their intellectual and emotional skills. In those instances of non-application, it 
would appear to observers that those people would not be being adult. 
Consequently, psychological attainment is not just the gaining of mental skills but holding 
certain attitudes and behaving in certain ways. This is corroborated by the many 
psychologists who describe adulthood in terms of certain attitudes and behaviours. 
The researcher found it unnecessary to describe what intelligence, memory, thinking, 
cognitive maturity, concrete operations and formal operations (mental skills) are, because 
even if a required set of mental skills necessary for being adult could be agreed, this 
would not assist in describing adulthood. 
However, unlike possession of physical skills, unless a person gains a certain minimum 
of mental skills he or she is unlikely to be considered as being adult. For example, 
severely mentally disabled people can legally be: refused the rights of 
adulthood; forced to live in specially designated homes or hospitals; required to have a 
guardian (130:82) appointed to protect their affairs. Legal rights are refused and guardians 
are appointed because severely mentally disabled people, although regarded as adults 
(chronologically and biologically) may through no fault of their own, be considered 
unable of being adult, that is behaving in an accepted and required way. Since 
some may behave as children (in a child-like way), it may be said that mentally disabled 
people are still in the mode of being called "childhood" and are not yet in the mode of 
being called "adulthood". 
The researcher wished neither to diminish the dignity of mentally disabled people nor 
offend those who care for them. All the finding revealed is that some people regard some 
severely mentally disabled people, as being unable to fulfil the attitudes and behaviours of 
adulthood, whatever these may be. It is taken for granted that most people would treat the 
mentally handicapped with the same respect as non-handicapped people3. Since the 
finding that a biological adult can still be in the childhood mode of being if 
they do not have a certain minimum of mental skills, is bound to be controversial, the 
researcher realised that it required considerable explication and corroboration. In addition, 
3 The researcher was aware, as Nordenfelt (306) pointed out, that it is not as straightforward as it may 
seem to define who is handicapped, but the scope of the research did not permit a more detailed 
explication of "mentally handicapped". 
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since legal adulthood had again arisen, it was realised that its implications for 
adulthood would have to be investigated4. 
The researcher found that adulthood as psychological attainment was presented by many 
psychologists as psychological stages in a life cycle. On examining some of the 
relevant literature, numerous theories which involve differing numbers of stages were 
found. In addition to presenting their own theory, Chickering and Havighurst (60:17-30) 
summarised the life cycle theories of Buehler5, Erikson, Gould, Havighurst, Levinson, 
Lowenthal, Neugarten, McCoy and Sheehy, Jung, Perry, Kohlberg, and Fowler, for 
example. Merriam (280) provided similar summaries. The initial theory of Erikson (94) is 
mainly about childhood6 but is used, in part, by many fellow-researchers (101:40) 
(210:14) (158:vi) who attempted to refine it. 
Consequently, it was decided to begin by describing Erikson's findings on psychological 
attainment, including the findings of some fellow-researchers who have studied Erikson's 
findings and who attempted to make it a more adequate description. The researcher was 
encouraged by Chickering and Havighurst's (60: 17) finding that examination of life cycle 
theory "... holds promise for increasing our educational effectiveness for students 
throughout the life cycle." This was encouraging because the researcher hoped that the 
research would offer insights into adulthood that could enhance education. 
3.0 ADULTHOOD AS A NUMBER OF PSYCHOLOGICAL STAGES 
Erikson (94:247-274) found that human life can be characterised by eight ages7 in a 
broadly chronological sequence, on the grounds that each period is characterised by a 
particular developmental or psycho-social tasks. The names of the tasks and the 
periods in which they occur are shown in Table Four on the following page. This table is 
also offered by Kimmel (210:14), Evans (101:40), Turner and Helms (424:60-61), and 
Chickering and Havighurst (60:18), for example, in their descriptions of psychological 
stages. The reader may perceive the relationship between completing certain tasks and 
adulthood, but may wonder about the possible relationship between task completion and 
education. Havighurst (157:5) explained this concisely: "Education may be conceived as 
4 Chapter Four, Paragraph 5.0. 
5 
"Deubler": this spelling by Chickering and Havighurst ( 60: 17) is different from many fellow-
researchers who use "Buhler". 
6 This does not mean that the psychological stages of childhood are unimportant to adulthood, but 
merely that the scope of the research did not permit consideration of this relationship. If adulthood is 
found to be a continuum, it will have some consequences for the way childhood is described. Kakar 
(199:2-3) found a traditional Hindu theory of stages of life (ashrama) first recorded by Gautama (The 
Budda) in approximately 600 B. C.: it is similar to Erikson's stages of life. 
7 It has already been shown that chronological age is an inadequate way of describing adulthood and the 
researcher considered that Erikson's "ages" are better expressed as stages. 
8 In this thesis, "psycho-social" is spelt with the hyphen. However, Erikson spells it 
"psychosocial" and consequently this spelling in retained in original quotations. 
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the effort of Society, through the school, to help the individual achieve certain of 
his developmental tasks." 
TABLE FOUR 
A DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION OF ERIKSON'S 
PSYCHOLOGICAL STAGES OF ADULTHOOD, SHOWING 
RESPECTIVE PERIODS OF LIFE DURING WHICH EACH 
STAGE OCCURS, AND TASKS TO BE COMPLETED 
Stage Psychological Task Name of stage 
1 basic trust versus basic mistrust infancy 
2 autonomy versus shame and doubt early childhood 
3 initiative versus guilt prepuberty9 
4 industry versus inferiority puberty 
5 identity versus role confusion adolescence 
6 intimacy versus isolation young adulthood 
7 generativity versus stagnation maturity 
8 integrity versus despair old age 
The researcher questioned many of Erikson's findings on adulthood and many of fellow-
researchers' findings based on Erikson's work. However, it was decided to first present 
Erikson's description of the eight stages (ages) of human development together with 
fellow-researchers' reflections on them, without interruption. After the explanation the 
researcher's questions and brief answers (findings) are provided. 
Erikson (94:263), and Turner and Helms (424:18) regarded only the last three ages as 
relating to adulthood. Erikson found that each stage is a struggle between two opposing 
tendencies, and Kimmel (210: 13) found each struggle to be a crucial turning point and 
challenge. Chickering and Havighurst ( 60: 17) also used the term "challenge". 
Individuals must successfully resolve a challenge to be able to deal adequately with the 
next challenge. As Kimmel (210: 14) found: "Each stage in Erikson's conception of the 
life cycle represents a dialectical struggle between two opposing tendencies . . . The 
9 Note that Kimmel changed "prepuberty" and "puberty" to "play age" and "school age": the 
implications of this change are discussed later in this chapter. However, Erikson (98:22) himself later 
used "school age " and "play age". 
90 
dialectical struggle is both conscious and unconscious ... it involves both inner 
(psychological) and outer (social) processes". Fellow-researchers such as Evans 
(101:40), Kakar (199:2), Kimmel (210:14) and Havighurst (157:324) corroborated this 
description of Erikson's findings. 
However Riegel (343:689) and Evans (101:45) distinguished between periods of 
stability, and periods of instability. They found that studying periods of 
disequilibrium and change, as opposed to equilibrium and balance, offered a better 
explanation of human development. In addition, the transitions from one stage of life 
(period of stability) to another, are the most significant time of life because they 
provide more opportunities for development. Evans ( 101 :45) found that studying what 
happens to people during these transitions offers "... a set of clues which can help us 
understand ourselves and others as we are, and what we need to do to live fulfilling 
lives in society ... ". For the researcher, "what we need to do" implied meeting 
demands or norms, and this, together with the mention of society, again indicated 
adulthood as sociological attainment. The researcher wondered if "fulfilling life" had 
any implications for adulthood. In addition, one must ask: What is the basis of Evan's 
finding about the most significant time of life? 
Erikson (94:270-271) presented his psycho-social ages as an epigenetic chart to 
illustrate that human personality develops in steps and that: each psycho-social strength 
is systematically related to all others; that they depend on the proper development 
in the proper sequence; and that each item exists in some form before its critical 
time normally arrives and lingers after its critical time is past. For the 
researcher, this meant that each task has a time when it is most prevalent in the person's 
decision-making, and hence behaviour. Use of "psycho-social" is relevant because it 
indicated that psychological description and sociological description of adulthood cannot 
be regarded as distinct descriptions. The use of "personality" is an unnecessary 
complication: despite the difficulty surrounding this concept in psychology, one assumes 
that psychological attainment involves gaining those attitudes and behaviours which are 
recognisable as a unique persona. 
Havighurst (157:324) found "inner" to mean that a trait is not readily visible and can only 
be discerned by projective tests for getting beneath the surface of behaviour. However, 
Erikson (94:251) indicated that the attitudes he discussed are ways of experiencing 
and are ways of behaving which are observable by others. While it is true that 
there will be mental activity in each individual, it is also true that behaviour can be 
observed. While Erikson's finding corroborated the researcher's finding on the 
relationship between mental skills and psychological attainment, Havighurst's finding is 
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also relevant. In the research, an attempt was made to get beneath particular, visible 
expressions of adulthood and to uncover what adulthood is, fundamentally. 
Having listed the ages as he does, Erikson (94:268) indicated that integrity versus 
despair is the ultimate task, and accentuates this finding in two ways. First, he found 
that winning at this task is an ideal that can never be totally achieved. Second, he 
found that: "Only in him who in some way has taken care of things and people and 
has adapted himself to the triumphs and disappointments adherent to being the 
originator of others or the generator of products and ideas - only in him may 
gradually ripen the fruit of these seven stages." The reader will notice that, perhaps 
unknowingly, Erikson has provided a description of adulthood. Consequently, since the 
last three stages in his model are concerned with adulthood, and since achieving integrity 
over despair is the ultimate task in human development, Erikson's findings, logically 
extended, imply that winning or gaining integrity is the ultimate achievement of 
adulthood. 
As Erikson found, this ultimate achievement is an ideal, and for the researcher, an ideal 
of adulthood is that which is essential or fundamental to adulthood. Erikson found 
(94:268) that for individuals to become mature adults they must, to a sufficient 
degree, develop all the ego qualities mentioned, but that integrity (94:277) is the mature 
quality accrued from all the ego stages. Coleman (63:110) implied this ideal when he 
referred to "healthy adulthood", for in that passage he was not referring to medical 
concerns. Similarly, when Maslow (270:7) referred to the fullest development of 
human potential, the fullest degree of humanness or fullest humanness 
(270:24), impulse towards full development of humanness (270:25) and full humanness 
(270:27), again the concept of a continuum was uncovered. It was realised that just what 
the fullest degree of humanness might be, and whether or not it has implications for 
adulthood, are questions that would have to be examined later in the research IO. 
Erikson found that the final stage of integrity would be recognised by a wise Indian, 
a true gentleman and a mature peasant, and also that (94:268) ego integrity implies 
acceptance of the responsibility of leadership. According to Dicaprio (85:72), the 
implication of Erikson's description of integrity is that the mature person is one who 
has gone through all the stages successfully, accomplished most of the basic desires, 
is ready for death or at least does not face it with terror, is not feeling cheated, 
resentful, despairing, and not feeling tormented with feelings of regret, 
emptiness, futility or imperfection. The mature person concentrates on 
opportunities and satisfactions. The reader may again recognise that Erikson and 
10 The results of reflection on this phenomenon are recorded in Chapter Seven, Paragraph 4.0. 
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Dicaprio have provided part descriptions of adulthood. It was realised, that to be 
scientifically responsible, these part descriptions would have to be assessed for their 
adequacy later in this research 11. 
At this stage, the researcher wondered about the relevance of an ultimate task and fmal 
stage as an ideal of adulthood. The researcher considered that his seeking of a 
universal description of adulthood is supported by Erikson finding that an ideal would be 
recognised by a wise lndianl2, a true gentleman and a mature peasant. This finding 
indicated that there are universal or fundamental criteria for identifying who (if 
anyone) has achieved this final (ideal) goal. Erikson's mention of sufficient degree of 
development is another indication of adulthood as a continuum. It was realised that the 
possibility of an ideal of adulthood would have to be investigated later in the research 13. 
The researcher also became aware of the distinction between adulthood as an ideal 
and adulthood as a degree of actualisation of an ideal. It was considered that 
extensive misunderstanding resulted by not recognising this distinction. For example, 
Beyers Nel (27:8-9) found it necessary to emphasise that adulthood is no uniform 
concept, that it is a cultural concept, and he referred (27: 15) to "a new adulthood". For the 
researcher, a new adulthood is impossible - the phenomenon is perennially there, albeit 
unrecognised or recognised in different ways. It was decided later in the research to test 
whether this distinction is valid and, if so, what it means for adulthood. 
Other stage theories could have been described, but the results would have been repetitive. 
The researcher became immediately aware of numerous questions about adulthood as 
psychological attainment, which indicated its inadequacy for describing adulthood. 
Attempting to verbalise these questions was a frustrating task because it was first 
necessary to penetrate five apparent inconsistencies regarding terminology. Since the 
inconsistent and unexplained use of terminology in much of the literature posed a major 
difficulty for the researcher, it was decided to emphasise each difficulty with its own 
subheading. 
a) Inconsistency in terminology used to name respective periods of life 
Kett (206:285) explained that terms such as "child", "youth", "young people" and 
"young men" are used interchangeably. For example, "childhood" and 
"adulthood" are used together with "school age" and "old age" respectively, 
and these two sets of terms are used with "adolescence" and "maturity". Without 
giving an explanation, Kimmel referred to prepuberty and puberty, as play age 
11 Chapter Seven, Paragraph 3.1. 
12 Why Erikson chose "Indian", "gentleman" and "peasant" is not explained. Today, the term "peasant" 
is seen by some to be derogatory and is avoided in this thesis. 
13 Chapter Eight, Paragraph 2.0 and Paragraph 3.0. 
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and school age, respectively. To the researcher, school age and play age referred to a 
sociological description and are out of place in a psychological life cycle. 
Prepuberty and puberty indicate just two of the uniquely human bio-psycho events 
as already describedl4, but the researcher wondered why the other periods were not 
expressed in terms of bio-psycho events. For example, old age could be expressed 
as pre-dying or post-menopause, or some similar bio-psychological name. The 
researcher considered that when Coleman (63:77) referred to late adolescence and 
early adulthood, he was referring to the same thing. 
There are other examples of how inconsistent use of terminology might lead to 
misunderstanding. Kimmel (210:4) used "young adult" but preferred "middle age" 
and "old age" to "middle adult" and "old adult", respectively. Similarly, 
Nicholson (303:21-22) referred to later middle age, but then the retirement 
years. Turner and Helms (424:iii) referred to young adulthood, middle 
adulthood and old age and then later (424:iv) to early, middle and late 
adulthood. The researcher wondered why Kimmel did not use "middle adult" 
and "old adult" and why Turner and Helms did not refer to "old adulthood". 
Selim15 used young adulthood, adulthood, middle age and then, for some reason, 
retirement years. Troll (423:vii) referred to early and middle adulthood but 
regarded middle age as synonymous with later years of adulthood, and implied 
that old age is not adulthood: "... the transition out, from the later years of 
adulthood (middle age) to old age." 
Troll (423:2) indicated again that she did not regard old age as adulthood: " ... 
adulthood as the middle of life, a long-lasting time that blendsl6 into an equally 
long old age ... we want to know what adults are like as a group: what distinguishes 
them from children or adolescents on the one end and from the aging and aged 
on the other." Troll (423:13) illustrated this distinction yet again: " ... from the 
generation of young adulthood, the individual develops into the generation of 
middle adulthood and then into the generation of middle age." The mention of 
"time" in the previous sentence, highlights that adulthood is regarded by Troll 
merely as a time-span and this is confirmed by her excluding old age from 
adulthood. However, Wei-ming (447:115) found that the Confucian concept of 
adulthood regards old age as a more matured manifestation of adulthood. 
Erikson (98:22) also made a distinction between adulthood and old age. A further 
complication is given by Chickering and Havighurst (60: 19) who used the term 
"provisional adulthood". 
14 Chapter Two, Paragraph 3.1. 
15 Reported in Birren et al (33:18-19). 
16 The term "blend" is a mechanistic term inadequate for describing complex human reality. 
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After rationalising the use of terminology, the researcher realised that Erikson's 
periods of life are equivalent to modes of being. A more effective terminology 
use would be to name all the modes of being in terms of "-hood's". Erikson did 
this when he used "early childhood" and "young adulthood". Consequently, for 
the purposes of the research and to gain some uniformity, but without pre-empting 
future research, the researcher expressed the modes of being in Erikson's 
diagrammatic representation as follows in brackets: infancy (early childhood)17, 
early childhood (young childhood), play age (middle childhood), school age 
(late childhood), adolescence (early adulthood), young adulthood (young 
adulthood), maturity (middle adulthood) and old age (late adulthood). These 
changes in terminology did not make the theory's description of adulthood more 
adequate, but they assisted in understanding the theory. Despite this new 
nomenclature indicating four stages being relevant to adulthood, the researcher 
examined the adequacy of only three because Erikson recognised only three 
pertaining to adulthood18. 
Modes of being expressed as "-hoods" continued to hold the researcher's attention. 
For example, Erikson (96: 128) found adolescence to be a way of life between 
childhood and adulthood. The researcher wondered why fellow-researchers using 
the English language did not refer to adolescence as adolescencehood. At this 
stage in the research, a way of life was considered to be synonymous with a 
mode of being, but not with a period of life, which is a chronological concept. 
This finding implied that "-hood" indicates a mode of being and that there are many 
"-hoods" all included in the widest mode of being, that is, humanhood. References 
to patienthood and womanhood (96: 157), wifehood and widowhood 
(200:98), sagehood (447:116), and couplehood (37:10) were found. The fact 
that Erikson's numerous stages can be expressed in like terms of "-hoods", is 
another indication that adulthood is a continuum of some kind. 
b) The synonymous use of "stage", "age" and "period" 
Fellow-researchers such as Kimmel (210:14) used the terms "life cycle", "stage", 
"age" and "period" to refer to the same data (Erikson's findings) as if the concepts 
named by these terms are synonymous. However, as already explained, there are 
subtle distinctions in these concepts and to regard them as synonymous is evidence 
of inadequate description. 
17 Havighurst (157:42) also used "early childhood" and "middle childhood". Consideration of part-
modes of childhood was beyond the scope of the research and they are mentioned here because the 
researcher considered this inconsistency of terminology to be an indicator of the inadequacy of the 
stage approach for describing adulthood. 
18 It was also necessary to reduce the scope of the research. 
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c) The frequent use of biologistic terms and naturalistic metaphors 
The reader will, by now, understand that terms such "generator", "adapt", "blend", 
"ripen" and "fruit" are inadequate for describing human phenomena. In describing 
Erikson's findings, Kimmel (210: 13-14) referred to human life as a river or 
stream and each challenge as turbulence. He found the metaphor to be 
appropriate because " ... it expresses the sequential, progressive course of an 
individual through the eight turning points ... ". As previously indicated, 
humankind is more than biological being and a person's life is not merely a 
predetermined course like a stream. The researcher found that the approach of 
referring to humankind in a naturalistic or mechanistic way, makes it more difficult 
to understand adulthood, and is inadequate description 19. For example, Kimmel 
(210: 13) found that: " ... if one's raft is severely damaged during one of the early 
turning points, the later turbulent points will be more difficult to negotiate." 
While one can understand that "turbulence" might mean difficulties during life, just 
what "the raft" represents is not explained. A turning point, for example, is strictly a 
mathematical concept and on its own does not assist understanding. For example, 
one can ask: Turning away from, or towards, what? 
d) Several terms used to name the experience of moving from one stage 
to the next 
The researcher found seven terms used to name the experience of a person moving 
from one stage to the next. Erikson referred to task (94:268) and struggle 
(94:263), and also conflict and encounter. Kimmel (210:13) referred to turning 
point and challenge, and Riegel (343:689) and Evan's (101:45) to transition. 
In the remainder of this thesis the researcher decided to use "task", since terms such 
as "struggle", "conflict" and "challenge" imply a value judgement that may not hold 
for all people. For example, some people may find a particular task not a challenge 
but a problem, not a struggle but a joy. 
e) Adulthood defined as experiences undergone and attitudes gained 
during a certain time period 
It has already been shown how describing adulthood as a certain time period is 
inadequate description. However, it is understandable that psychological researchers 
employing a psychological approach, define adulthood as a person's likely duties 
to be fulfilled, motivational patterns to be gained or challenges (struggles) 
to be overcome, in a time period. Stone (406:106) also recognised this: "In relating 
age to 'adult' we have already decided what it is tc be adult." Examples of this mis-
19 The researcher found the phenomenological approach to be helpful in exposing the inadequacy of 
metaphor to describe human activity. Just why educationists (scientists) do this is uncertain but the 
researcher suspected it is because of uncertainty of what they have found. 
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description are shown by Erikson (94:264) referring to adult duty without defining 
what this duty is; Turner and Helms (424:33) finding that youth" ... seek to attain 
psychological maturity to face the challenges of adult life"; Kleiber and Maehr 
(215:ix) referring to " motivational patterns of adults in the wide variety of 
contexts characteristic of adult life ... the study of motivation in the adult years 
... "; and Merriam (280:4) referring to "changes in adulthood". Such was the 
considerable difficulty experienced by the researcher in understanding fellow-
researchers' descriptions of adulthood caused by this subtle distinction, that it is 
relevant to explain it further20. 
When adulthood is defined as a time period, the duties, motives or challenges are 
incidentals, that is, they do not define adulthood. For example, Kimmel (210: 14) 
found that Erikson's theory " ... seems to provide a useful descriptive frame 
work21 for understanding some general issues and changes during the adult 
years." However, on careful analysis of the findings of these fellow-researchers, 
this is not what they implied. They implied (and very rarely was this made explicit) 
that it is the duties, challenges and motives themselves which 
contribute to a person being regarded as being adult. This distinction was 
made (perhaps unknowingly) by Kleiber and Maehr (215:ix) when they 
differentiated between adult life (duties, motives and challenges) and the adult 
years (biology). The researcher found that some psychological researchers are 
unaware that they are offering descriptions of what adulthood is, in terms of duties, 
motives and challenges. 
It has already been explained that calling a time period in human life "adulthood", 
does not provide an adequate description of what adulthood is. Troll (423:3) 
corroborated the finding that psychological development in adulthood is not 
closely related to chronological age: "It is not being 40 or having lived 40 years that 
moves a man or women into re-evaluation of his or her condition, but having been 
married 20 years, or being at the peak of a career, or seeing the youngest 
child move out of the home." For the researcher, these experiences represented 
sociological events. Consequently, it was realised that in this research the 
researcher would have to investigate the relationship between duties, motivations, 
challenges and adulthood. Findings in this regard are provided later in this thesis22. 
20 The same difficulty arises in some of the literature of education: Warren gave interesting definitions 
( 444:9-10): Adult education: " ... planned, systematic voluntary programs in which a teacher or leader 
attempts to promote and facilitate adult learning." It is clear that "adult" refers only to the biological 
adult 
21 The fact that Kimmel said "seems", indicated some uncertainty on his part. In addition, the researcher 
wondered what the difference was between a description and a descriptive framework. 
22 Chapter Four, Paragraph 3.0. 
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Since many psychologists identified adulthood with a time period, and since adulthood as 
a time-span has already been shown to be inadequate description, it might be considered 
that the researcher wasted time in investigating their theories. However, the work of other 
scientists in this field cannot be so casually cast aside, firstly because of respect for them 
and secondly, because it was scientifically necessary. It was necessary to examine these 
theories in order to uncover the underlying or implicit definitions of adulthood 
being given in findings about duties, motivations and challenges. 
It was also necessary to illustrate the many inconsistencies in use of language in the 
psychological literature studied, because they are an initial indication of the inadequacies in 
the psychological stage descriptions of adulthood. Bishof (37:10) also found difficulty in 
explaining adulthood from a psychological perspective. However, it is a researcher's task 
to test preliminary findings, and it was considered important to find out if the implications 
of duties, motivations and challenges in the psychological descriptions did, or did not, 
contain clues as to what adulthood is. After considerable reflection on the psychological 
stage approach to defining adulthood, the researcher found eight main ways in which it is 
an inadequate description of adulthood. These inadequacies are reported in point form to 
keep this chapter to a manageable length. 
3.1 INADEQUACIES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL STAGE THEORY AS A 
DESCRIPTION OF ADULTHOOD 
a) The variability in type and number of stages 
It has already been shown how Erikson and fellow-researchers found three stages of 
direct relevance to adulthood. Peck23 subdivided middle age into four further stages, 
and subdivided old age into three further stages. Schaie (376:129) found five stages 
of adult cognitive development, and Vaillant (429:337) found that his eighteen 
adaptive mechanisms have a strong parallel with the stages of Loevinger and 
Kohlberg. Hamburg (150:403-440) listed eleven phases, and Schaie and Willis 
(377:451) regarded old age as comprising three stages; young old, old old, and very 
old. Evidently, this subdivision could continue to impractical levels and fellow-
researchers could compile extensive lists of stages and could select at random any 
number as their description of adulthood. For example, the researcher could 
arbitrarily build into stage theory, "location flexibility versus location 
inflexibility", that is, the adjusting which old people must undergo when moving 
into an old peoples' home because they cannot live in their existing home for 
financial or medical reasons. Like the researcher, Leopold (241:10) found that there 
is no agreement on the number of stages. 
23 Peck paraphrased in Kimmel (210: 17). 
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In seeking a universal description of what adulthood is, a description which 
comprises various stages is inadequate because different fellow-researchers would 
have different lists. The reader will notice that Peck is stating desirable changes 
where a person who has completed a stage is regarded as making more progress 
than a person who has not. The implication is that the person who does not make the 
changes is somehow less developed, less grown up and, by implication, less 
adult. The researcher realised that the relationship between completing stages 
and adulthood would require further attention, and reflections on this are presented 
later in this chapter24. 
b) Lack of evidence for sequentiality, and contradictions about 
completability of adulthood 
Erikson stressed that: "Nobody ... in life is neatly 'located' in one stage; rather, all 
persons can be seen to oscillate25 between at least two stages and more definitely 
into a higher one only when an even higher one begins to determine the interplay 
... ". Despite this caution by Erikson, the stages are still an inadequate description of 
reality. For example, stages one to four are given as occurring during childhood, but 
the researcher thought of situations where, for example, basic trust versus 
mistrust, is not limited to childhood. Similarly, the researcher found that the task 
of identity versus role confusion is not limited to adolescents: it is likely that a 
person who is forced to retire unwillingly at age sixty five will again face this 
challenge. As Allport26 found, someone of eleven years of age may have more signs 
of maturity than many adults. Even Erikson's concept of an epigenetic chart where 
every task is always present but that each one has a critical time, is still inadequate 
because there is no evidence that the sequentiality holds for all people. 
There is further evidence from life cycle theorists themselves. For example, 
Buehler27 regarded the five basic life tendencies to act at all ages, to some extent, but 
that they have periods of dominance at different points in the life cycle. 
Weathersby (446:52) reported that Loevinger's theory of ego development does not 
include so strict a notion as invariant sequence. Chickering and Havighurst (60:17) 
found that "... existential questions about meaning, purpose, vocation, social 
responsibility, dependence and human relationships . .. are confronted again by 
many 40-, 60- and 80-year olds." However, these issues could be confronted at any 
age. 
24 Paragraph 4.0. 
25 "Oscillate" is a mechanistic term inadequate for describing humans. 
26 Quoted in Schrag (380:64). 
27 Reported by Chickering and Havighurst (60:17). 
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Another example of this inadequacy is given by Kuhlen's28 finding that in the first 
half of life an individual is motivated by achievement, power, creativity and 
self-actualisation, but that these motives may change during life because they 
have been relatively satisfied and because the person moves into a new social 
position .. But the researcher found initially, that achievement, power and creativity, 
for example, could be motives throughout life, not just during a part of it. 
Achievement orientated business executives who retire to the leisure activity of 
sailing their yachts, for example, will still want to reach the ports they set out to 
reach, that is, experience achievement. However, Kuhlen's findings directed the 
researcher to the possible relationship between adulthood and human motivation, 
need and satisfaction of need (achievement). Even at this early stage in the 
research, it was recognised that motivation and satisfaction of needs could be 
relevant to an adequate description of adulthood. This is so because some ways of 
striving to satisfy needs, such as attempting to achieve wealth through theft, would 
not be regarded as being adult. "Social position" again indicated adulthood as 
sociological attainment. 
Contradictions about the completeability of tasks are illustrated by Erikson on the 
one hand frequently mentioning tasks being completed or won, but on the other 
hand, finding29 that in all stages of life there is no permanent resolution, only 
continual change. Erikson's concept of the epigenetic chart itself, implies that there 
is no permanent resolution of stages - each task has its critical time: it is already 
present in some form before and after its critical time. The researcher interpreted this 
as finding that one stage can never be totally over or resolved, and this confirmed 
that the sequential nature of stages is suspect. Further doubt is cast on the adequacy 
of the sequentiality of stages by Erikson finding that the ultimate task of adulthood 
cannot be fully achieved. In any event, Erikson's findings corroborated the 
researcher's and others' (63:1) initial findings that adulthood is completable or 
that perfect (362: 127), total, full, ultimate or ideal adulthood is unattainable. 
When Kakar (200: 119) found that the human goals of psychological maturity are to 
be strived for rather than achieved, he corroborated that adulthood is completable. In 
addition, Bouwsma ( 42:80) found that no person, whatever their age, can claim to 
be fully an adult, and (42:81) that it is impossible to achieve perfect maturity. 
c) Lack of explanation of concepts important to stage theory 
Although the terms are used extensively in everyday life and their meanings appear 
to be straightforward, the researcher experienced difficulty in finding detailed 
descriptions of what tasks, struggles, turning points, challenges and 
28 Paraphrased by Kimmel (210:10). 
29 Quoted by Evans (101:41). 
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conflicts are. As already explained, the researcher found these terms to be 
synonyms and decided to use "task" in this thesis to name them all. Still, without 
further extensive explication, the concept of a task is unhelpful in attempting to 
describe what adulthood is. 
In a similar way, the researcher found it difficult to gain an adequate understanding 
of what identity confusion, isolation, stagnation, despair (disgust), 
intimacy, generativity and integrity are. Despite considerable reflection, the 
researcher could find no relationship between adulthood and the concepts of 
intimacy, generativity and integrity30. If these terms, representing psychological 
attainments or failings, are used to describe adulthood, then fuller descriptions of 
them are necessary. For example, one can ask: Role confusion about what? 
and Despair (disgust) over what? Recognising when Erikson's four 
achievements of adulthood dominate in each task is relevant to this research because 
stage theory implies that succeeding at a task enables one to move from young 
adulthood to middle adulthood and then to old adulthood. This in itself implies that 
succeeding at a task contributes to one becoming more adult, and this again 
pointed to adulthood as a continuum. 
Erikson gave only an indirect way of recognising when intimacy, generativity and 
integrity dominate during a task and, consequently, gave a way of recognising 
someone's progress through the tasks. He found that each of the three adult tasks 
results in the emergence of one of the basic (enduring) (210:38) human 
strengths, namely, love, care and wisdom, and that the other tasks in the life 
cycle result in the human strengths of hope, will, purpose and competence. 
There is no doubt that Erikson related certain strengths to adulthood. For example, 
he found (96:265) that adulthood begins with the ability to receive and give love 
and care and that (95: 115) the central virtues of adulthood are love, care 
and wisdom. However, the researcher encountered difficulty in understanding the 
interrelationship of emerging human strengths, encounters (tasks) and 
modes of being. For example, despite Erikson's description, and Kimmel's 
comments on that description, one could still ask the following questions. 
• Would not most people recognise many more than eight basic human strengths? 
For example, the researcher thought of tolerance, perseverance, patience, 
respect and obedience as human strengths. Consequently, there could be a 
3o Listing these four psychological attainments enabled the researcher to again illustrate just how 
misleading psychological stage theory is, in its description of adulthood. If adulthood is regarded as a 
time span then the opposites of these four psychological attainments also occur in adulthood, as 
Erikson reported. Consequently, these psychological attainments cannot be used adequately to describe 
adulthood - but they are by many psychologists. 
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variety of selections of what the basic human strengths are. In addition, one could 
ask for descriptions of each basic human strength and for explanations about 
where they arise from, and how a strength relates to a task and to adulthood. 
• What does it mean for adulthood if love, care and wisdom, (and other basic 
strengths) are not, or only partially, achieved? Is there such a category as pseudo 
adulthood - falling short of an all-human maturity - as used by Erikson (98:16). 
Stegner ( 404:46) asked a similar question: Does growing anxiety represent a 
decline from adulthood? 
• If someone did not succeed at any task would there be emerging human 
weaknesses such as resignation, spinelessness, incompetence and hate? 
What would this mean for a person's adulthood? 
• Why is the emergence of hope, will, purpose, competence and fidelity 
limited to the child and adolescent, and why is love, care and wisdom limited to 
the adult? Do not children, at times, also express the virtues allocated to adults and 
vice versa? 
• Is it not possible that, for some people, emergence of wisdom occurs before that 
of love, and love before that of competence? It is safe to state that the emergence of 
care, or any other strength, is not limited to only one stage. 
• Could not hope, will, purpose and competence, for example, be applied 
towards robbing a bank? Even if psychological conflicts were resolved and the 
values of love, care, and wisdom had been attained in high degree, some people 
might still behave in ways thought inappropriate for someone in the mode of being 
called "adulthood". For example, bank robbers might conduct themselves with 
fidelity, love, care and wisdom among themselves, but would, most likely, not 
apply those values to other members of society. Even though bank robbers applied 
these values among themselves, there would be general consensus that they are not 
behaving towards others in society in a way that would be called "being adult". 
Even if we could isolate a set of characteristics for psychological adulthood which 
could be measured, such as a subjective sense of continuous existence and a 
coherent memory (396:63), this would still not be sufficient to describe what 
adulthood is. Consequently, the question for adulthood is not merely whether 
someone has attained certain human strengths by completing a number of 
tasks, but whether a person applies these strengths to activities considered to be 
appropriate. The researcher considered that finding out what these appropriate 
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activities are, would require examining3 l adulthood as a sociological 
attainment. 
d) Exceptions to how the strengths of love, care and wisdom emerge 
from task completion 
Erikson gave some explanation as to what completion of the various tasks 
entailed, that is, what actual events must be dealt with to complete a task and enable 
any strength to emerge. However, the researcher found that the events described in 
each of the three tasks related to being adult, are an inadequate description of 
adulthood. 
Firstly, during intimacy versus isolation, Erikson32 found that the individual is 
not capable of a fully intimate relationship until the identity crisis is fairly well 
resolved and that attempts at intimacy are frequently attempts to try and define 
oneself through a romantic relationship with another. However, cannot a child have 
an intimate relationship with the mother, and cannot late adults have intimate 
relationships with friends? In addition, one must ask what a "fully intimate 
relationship" is, since this seems to contradict Erikson's finding that none of the 
stages can be completed. It is difficult to know what Erikson meant by "define 
oneself'. If he meant finding out what one's part in the scheme of life is, it is safe 
to state that this conflict is a life-long one occurring in all stages, including 
childhood. 
Although Erikson33 stressed that he was not referring only to sexual intimacy, he 
found that " ... sexual intimacies often precede the capacity to develop a true and 
mutual psychosocial intimacy with another person, be it in friendship, in erotic 
encounters or in joint inspiration." However, how does this apply for example, to 
intimate friendships between lay people, and priests and nuns who have taken a vow 
of celibacy, have been celibate before taking Holy Orders, and other people who 
have not had sexual intimacies but who would claim to have developed true 
friendships? Also, what is true intimacy and what is its relationship to psycho-
social intimacy? 
Secondly, the stage of generativity versus stagnation involves producing 
something that will outlive oneself - leaving one's mark. However, does the 
productivity and leaving one's mark refer to any product, such as a bomb which 
kills many people and will be remembered for centuries? Thirdly, in integrity 
3 l To avoid repetition, "to be investigated or examined" means to be investigated later in the research. 
32 In Kimmel (210:15). 
33 In Kimmel (210: 15). 
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versus despair (and disgust), the ultimate task is to evaluate one's life and 
accomplishments and to affirm that one's life has been meaningful - to maintain a 
sense of integrity. However, it is safe to state that any person at any stage can 
experience (210: 16) despair and can evaluate their life's accomplishments. At this 
point in the research, the researcher wondered about the relationship of adulthood 
and the evaluation of meaningfulness of one's life, and the relationship of 
adulthood and integrity. For example, what would it mean for adulthood if a 
person evaluated their life and could not find meaningfulness? Initially, the 
researcher found no reason for doubting that all people including children, albeit 
subconsciously in many of them, are seeking affirmation of their meaning and are 
attempting to maintain integrity. But what does this meaningfulness mean 
for adulthood? 
The researcher has already explained why only three of Erikson's tasks have been 
considered in this paragraph. However, one further example, not considered to 
relate to adulthood by Erikson, can further show how inadequate the stage/task 
approach is. During the task, identity versus identity (role) confusion, 
Erikson found that people experience lack of certainty about who they are, or about 
the part they are playing in the scheme of life. He also found in this stage that one 
experiences the increasing social need to find one's role in life as a sexual, 
productive, responsible adult with a reasonably· consistent set of 
attitudes and values about oneself. The implication is that if this task is not 
completed and one does not gain a reasonably consistent set of attitudes and values 
about oneself, then one is not as adult as one could be. However, it is common 
knowledge that lack of certainty is not limited to early adults (adolescents). 
The mention of responsible adult, values and certainty of ones' part in the 
scheme of life, alerted the researcher to the possibility of a relationship between 
these three phenomena and adulthood: a possibility requiring further examination 
later in the research34. The reader might notice that evaluation of 
meaningfulness of one's life and certainty of ones' part in the scheme 
of life are synonymous and, consequently, the researcher anticipated further 
uncovering of the relationship between adulthood and meaningfulness later in 
the research35. 
e) The variability in type and number of tasks within each stage 
It has already been explained in subparagraph a) above that an inadequacy of the 
psychological stage description of adulthood, is the variation in the number of 
34 Chapter Six and Chapter Seven. 
35 See Chapter Six, Paragraph 2.2. 
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stages. It stands to reason, that because the transition between stages is represented 
by a task, there is no set number of tasks. Peck36, for example, added seven 
additional tasks to those given by Erikson: shifting from use of physical to 
mental powers; getting used to a lessening role of sex in human 
relationships; increasing emotional openness; continuing to be open to new 
experiences; establishing a varied range of valued activities; 
transcendence of bodily frailty and pain, and extending the significance 
of one's actions beyond one's lifetime. However, Csikszentmihalyi's 
(70: 112) and others' findings about life themes implied that there is only one major 
life task. A life theme refers to an existential problem which a person feels 
compelled to solve and which becomes a pre-eminent goal that focuses the person's 
conscious energy for most of his or her life. 
Peck's finding was that people who succeed at the tasks just listed, age more 
successfully. If, as Erikson and other life cycle theorists implied, moving through 
the stages is a progression, a movement towards an ideal, then Peck's findings 
imply that the extent of one's success in ageing is an indication of one's 
adulthood. For example, if one does not move from reliance on physical skills to 
reliance on mental skills, then one has not progressed to further adulthood, and this 
is reflected in unsuccessful ageing. In an attempt to explain successful ageing, 
Peck used terms such as "meaningful activities", "sense of satisfaction", 
"gratifying meaning", "comfort" in human interaction, and "enjoy" life 
immensely. The researcher again noticed the mentions of meaning and 
meaningful. The implications for adulthood are extensive because, Peck's list 
means that those who experience meaningfulness, a sense of satisfaction, and 
comfort and those who enjoy life immensely, are more adult than those who do not. 
This reflection on Peck's findings revealed for the researcher another concept of 
adulthood: adulthood as successful ageing. Despite biological ageing 
already being shown to be an inadequate description of adulthood, the researcher 
wanted to be thorough, and later in the research37 investigated psychological 
ageing for its adequacy in describing adulthood. 
Peck implied that achieving the tasks he identified in each adult stage, is necessary to 
achieve successful ageing because he defined successful ageing in terms of 
meaningfulness and satisfaction. Consequently, one can tell if someone is ageing 
successfully, that is, progressing and becoming more adult, by the meaning and 
satisfaction they express. It cannot be denied that, as one gets older, it is likely that 
36 In Kimmel (210:17). 
37 Paragraph 5.0 in the current chapter. 
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some adjustments in one's lifestyle will be necessary to avoid becoming depressed, 
frustrated and lonely, for example. However, does becoming depressed, frustrated 
and lonely imply that one is being less adult? As will now be explained, the 
researcher found five main reasons for responding with "No!" to this question. 
• Children and adolescents also become depressed, frustrated and lonely: these 
experiences are not limited to middle and late adulthood as Peck's findings 
implied. In addition, experiences of depression and frustration can vary from day-
to-day and even hour-to-hour. 
• Peck's implied explanation of successful ageing is not adequate, because one can 
still ask what makes activities meaningful and what gives rise to gratifying 
meaning, comfort and enjoyment. Since "age" has only biological connotations in 
the current research, the researcher considered that "become older more 
successfully" is more adequate than "age more successfully". 
• If satisfaction means being self-satisfied and content, this could mean that those 
people experiencing satisfaction will be unwilling to be open to progress. 
Consequently, if satisfaction means a halt to further becoming, then becoming 
older successfully and satisfaction are contradictions. 
• The implication from Peck's and Erikson's findings is that if some people 
consciously decide not to change, and thereby allow themselves to become 
depressed or lonely, they have not been successful at completing a task, they have 
not progressed and they are not being as adult as they could be. Troll 
(423:3-4) illustrated more directly, the implicit assumption in stage theory: as one 
moves through the stages one becomes a "... better person ... ". For the 
researcher "better person" can be expressed as "being more adult". Troll found, 
based on the separate findings of Piaget, Flavell, Werner and Harris, that 
development involves progression from simple to complex behaviour, and 
from undifferentiated to differentiated behaviour. The researcher took this to be 
another recognition of adulthood as a continuum. It was realised that just what a 
better person is, would need explicating later in the research38. 
• Peck used terms such as "may", "some" and "seem" which indicates inadequacy 
in description because his findings cannot be applied universally to adulthood. 
38 Chapter Seven. 
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f) Lack of credibility of development theory 
The researcher considered that the inadequacies already listed are the symptoms of a 
far more extensive difficulty, that is, the unreliability of development theory 
itself. This unreliability can be illustrated in four ways. As already explained in 
Chapter Two, chronological age is an inadequate way to describe adulthood. Evans 
(101:45) corroborated this when he found that transitions " ... do not have ages 
attached to them because there is no necessarily close correlation between the two. 
Each stage represents the level of development reached in understanding experience 
... ".However, in developmental theory there is still the tendency to view transitions 
as happening between stages of adulthood, and since these stages are demarcated by 
chronological ages, transitions are identified by ages. On the one hand, Evans 
acknowledged the inadequacy of chronological definition of adulthood but then used 
it in the stage approach. Similarly, Kimmel (210:8) found that: "At best, these 
theories have been able to describe only the interaction of culture [society], biology 
and psychological development." He (210:20) admitted that Riegel's theory39 is not 
well enough defined to do more than suggest directions for future research. 
Referring to models of the life span, Kimmel (210:29) found that: "Our speculations 
may be interesting, but they do not increase our understanding of the human life 
cycle very much.", and (210:30) "Developmental studies have one central concern: 
age." Katchadourian (202:49) listed difficulties with the stage approach and 
Neugarten40 found that adulthood is inadequately described by an invariant sequence 
of stages. 
As Troll (423:4) found, there is still difficulty distinguishing which changes of 
adulthood are "truly developmental." She (423:4) found that many theorists find that 
the elements4 l must be conflicting or mutually contradictory before true 
development occurs. The researcher wondered why the distinction true 
development was made. If new information just elaborates on earlier information 
there is no need to change, but if there is contradiction, the person is forced to 
reconcile this by constructing new concepts that put all the information together into 
a more complex whole. Ryff (368:89), like the researcher, found that "personal 
development" and "growth" require further explication. 
Another controversy in development theory is whether or not to consider 
retrogression as development. Troll (423:4) found that some adults restrict the 
variety of their experience, become less open and develop backwards instead of 
39 Quoted in Kimmel (210:18). 
40 Paraphrased by Merriam (280: 19). 
41 
"Elements": a mechanistic term inadequate for explaining the complexity of human existence. 
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forwards. Troll put backwards and forwards into quotation marks without 
explaining what this means. She (423:5) again defined adulthood, albeit implicitly, 
when she referred to some adults remaining open to new experiences and 
developing in a positive sense. But what is a positive sense? As Ryff (368:78) 
found, the majority of growth theorists view personal development as biologically 
determined, and this illustrates, as does the evidence in this chapter, that this 
approach is inadequate for describing the human phenomenon of adulthood. 
Although they do not make it explicit when they describe adulthood, many 
developmental theorists have to assume an expected normal life with no 
unforeseen events. For example, it is only with this assumption that Evan's 
(101:45) finding that transitions offer more opportunity for growth, is adequate. If, 
during the middle of a stage someone experiences the unexpected death of a dearly 
beloved spouse, this type of experience would provide the same or more 
opportunity for becoming than a transition experience. Ignoring the inadequate 
biologistic notion of growth, the researcher wondered about the consequences for 
the person's adulthood if the opportunity for becoming was not taken: would non-
action mean a person was being less adult. For the researcher, psychological stage 
theory wrongly implies that it does. 
In summary, after examining one major theory (Erikson's) and fellow-researchers' 
variations of it, the researcher found description of adulthood as psychological attainment 
within a life cycle context, to be inadequate. Jensen et al (193:28) corroborated this when 
they found that the means of determining psychological maturity are so uncertain and 
difficult to apply, that using the concept (life cycle - developmental theory) is 
impractical. 
The reader will find that many of the inadequacies to do with terminology and life cycle 
description as recorded so far in this chapter, can be found in other life cycle theories. The 
researcher realised that it was psychological attainment as presented by stage 
(developmental) theorists which was found inadequate and not psychological 
attainment itself. Consequently, even if: 
• Buhler is correct in that for some individuals a developmental sequence reflects 
different perspectives in their goal setting; 
• Kuhlen is correct in that in some people the life cycle can be regarded as two phases, 
one of expansion and the other of contraction; 
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• Jung42 is correct in that some people no longer have any clear sense of meaning or 
purpose in old age, try to cling to the first half of life, and that to shrink away from 
death is unhealthy and abnormal and ,robs the second half of life of its purpose; 
• Erikson's eight crucial turning points in life are valid, that each stage presents a new 
challenge which must be negotiated to provide a sound base for the next stage or 
challenge, and that the values of hope, will, purpose, competence, fidelity, love, 
care, and wisdom arise from these transitions:-
these would not describe what being adult is. Consequently, despite findings by 
Havighurst and by Leopold (241:13) that life span developmental psychology is of value 
to the adult educator, the evidence, as presented in this chapter, indicates that it is not. 
The researcher wondered at this point in the research what the relationship could be 
between adult development (as explained by psychological approaches) and adult 
education, and between adults' motivations and the need for education - two questions 
Merriam (280:vi) also asked. The researcher realised that the examination of psychological 
attainment as progression through certain tasks and achievement of certain human 
strengths, revealed another way of perceiving psychological attainment, namely the 
psychological ideal. In some of the literature giving psychological descriptions of 
adulthood the concept of an ideal of adulthood is raised frequently, both directly and 
indirectly. Coleman's (63:5) mention of "demands" raised the concept of an ideal to be 
strived towards. There is sufficient evidence to enable the researcher to regard varying 
degrees of actualisation of an ideal of adulthood, as another perspective of 
psychological attainment. 
4.0 ADULTHOOD AS ATTAINMENT OF A PSYCHOLOGICAL IDEAL 
All versions of the stage approach, as already reported, arrive at a final or ultimate task, 
which if completed results in an ultimate attainment. It is reasonable to find that 
completing the ultimate task and thereby achieving the ultimate attainment is, in effect, 
achieving ultimate adulthood. The reader may think of an ideal of adulthood as 
esoteric and impractical. However, in an education setting, people asked about (446:66-
69) the most valuable outcome from their studies responded with, for example: "I am 
more open and trusting"; "I have grown to be a better person"; and "feeling more 
complete and a whole person." It is reasonable to state that humans must have an idea of 
what a better person or a more open person is, to be able to claim that they are more so. 
Ultimate adulthood is an ideal of adulthood - the best possible adulthood that 
humankind can conceive. Goldstein (130:69) referred to "an ideal model for becoming 
adult" and Stegner (404:47) to "image of perfection ... highest ideals ... most 
42 Paraphrased by Kimmel (210:13). 
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civilized aspects." Kakar (200: 119) considered psychological maturity to be ideal 
adulthood and he ( 199: 10) found that the traditional Hindu view of the life cycle is an 
ideal one. The traditional theory of stages of the life cycle (ashrama) is based on an ideal 
of what should be, on ideal images. Erikson (98:18-19) referred to visions of adulthood 
and ideals. Ryff (368:90) found that ideals are guiding images and reported on Boulding's 
findings of the importance of images of the ideal personality for personal growth. 
According to Dicaprio (85:66), being grown-up is an ideal for the young person. 
Kimmel (210:20) found that theories of adult development lead towards an ideal of 
human fulfilment, and Evans ( 101 :45) also mentioned fulfilling lives. From the 
findings presented in this paragraph it was evident that several stage theorists had arrived 
at their own findings as to what an ideal of adulthood is. For example, in addition to 
Kimmel's human fulfilment, Maslow and Erikson identified ideals (attainments) of 
self-actualisation and integrity, respectively. 
The evidence just provided convinced the researcher that an investigation of adulthood as 
an ideal was relevant to the research. In addition, as already mentioned43, education is 
frequently defined as guiding young people to adulthood. Since adulthood itself is the 
ideal, the researcher expected that examining ideals of adulthood would reveal what the 
ideal comprises. This confidence was enhanced by Warren's (444:4) findings regarding 
the way some self-actualisation theorists claim to undertake their research. Warren found 
that some psychologists take a holistic view of the human being and use the 
phenomenological approach: "These theorists maintain that there exists within man, 
over and beyond his animal-like needs, a need to grow as a person, a need to 
actualize his potential as a human being ... Self-actualization theorists take very 
seriously the complexity of human motivation, but they do not try to dissect it into the 
greatest possible number of the smallest possible parts; they are more interested in the 
relationships than dissection." 
A methodological problem confronted the researcher. It was necessary to examine some 
ideals of adulthood in order to find out how adequately they described adulthood. 
However, it was found that almost all the researchers of adulthood consulted, perhaps 
unwittingly, offered some criteria which they expected adults to meet. Consequently, to 
keep the research within manageable scope, the researcher decided to examine only one of 
Erikson's ideals (adulthood as integrity) and one of Maslow's ideals (adulthood as 
being self-actualised). These were chosen because they are the most widely used in 
the psychological literature. A few other less frequently referred to ideals were also 
considered in the hope that they would contribute supplementary findings. 
43 Chapter One, Paragraph 2.5 
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4.1 ADULTHOOD AS BEING INTEGRATED (ATTAINING INTEGRITY) 
Building on his earlier study (94) where he found that attaining integrity is the ultimate 
task and (98:5) wisdom as the final human strength, Erikson (96:139) provided criteria 
which might be used to describe adulthood. He found that those who have attained the 
final stage of integrity show: 
• acceptance of one's own and only life cycle, and of the people who have become 
significant to it as something that had to be; 
• a new and different love of one's parents free of the wish that they should have 
been different, and an acceptance of the facts that one's life is one's own 
responsibility; 
• a sense of comradeship with people of distant times and of different pursuits 
who have created orders, objects and sayings conveying human dignity and 
love; 
• readiness to defend the dignity of one's own life style against all physical and 
economic threats; 
• acceptance that all human integrity stands and falls with the one style of integrity 
of which he partakes; and 
• wisdom, which is the accumulated knowledge, mature judgement and inclusive 
understanding of a culture. 
It is possible that some or all of the criteria just given could contribute to an adequate 
description of adulthood. However, the researcher was unable to judge whether or not 
they do contribute, for two main reasons. Firstly, the underlying fundamental 
principles on which the selection of those criteria was based, is not explained. The six 
criteria employed to define the integrity ideal of adulthood could be added to extensively. 
Secondly, even if these were accepted as a description of adulthood, they do not go far 
enough. For example, how does one show a new and different love of one's parents, 
and how does one defend the dignity of one's own lifestyle? The researcher also 
wondered what it means for adulthood, if one's lifestyle is considered undignified, or if 
as a child, one has been abused and hates one's parents, or if people of different pursuits 
are determined to kill one another. Does acceptance of one's own life cycle as something 
that had to be, imply a fatalistic giving-up-to-chance? What does it mean to state that all 
human integrity stands or falls with the one style of integrity which the person partakes? 
Consequently, the researcher found that adulthood as attaining integrity cannot, without 
further extensive explication, adequately describe what adulthood is. 
4.2 ADULTHOOD AS BEING SELF-ACTUALISED 
The reader might consider that an examination of self -actualisation has little to do with 
adult education. However, since educators and educands are motivated by an ideal, and 
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since self-actualisation is offered as an ideal, the relevance is self explanatory. Maslow44 
corroborated this relevance: "Self-actualisation should be the whole and main part of 
adult education of the best kind." In addition, the fact that Maslow (270:49) regarded 
self-actualisation as a matter of degree, indicates a continuum. Maslow (270:24) used self-
actualisation as a synonym for identity (seltbood) and found45 that people who have 
attained the ideal of self-actualisation: 
• are able to perceive themselves, other people and the world around them in an 
especially accurate and efficient way; they seldom filter their perceptions to fit 
their own preconceptions and desires; 
• have the ability to accept themselves and others without guilt or frustration 
concerning imperfections; 
• are humble and democratic, ready and willing to learn from others and to open 
themselves to others; 
• have a high degree of trust in themselves and have their own guides for 
behaviour. They have the ability to do what is right even thought it results in 
unconventional behaviour; 
• develop an individual code of ethics and behaviour: the forces of acculturation 
have less effect on them; 
• have a sense of mission and of fulfilling their destiny: they make no 
distinction between work and play, identifying themselves with their work; 
• have a sense of identification with humanity, sympathy for people, a desire to 
do what they can to solve the problems of humankind; 
• move from self-centredness to problem-centredness; 
• have a need for privacy sometime. They establish deep ties with only a few people 
and often seem to other people to be cold and ruthless, but their openness to 
others often leads to improved interpersonal relationships; 
• are more creative than usual and apply this with enjoyment of simple 
pleasures; 
• have value structures different from usual ones in that they always 
question conventional values before acceptance and rely on their own 
determinants; 
• have a tendency to view many situations in unconventional ways thus escaping 
tension and conflict; 
• are more able to transcend dichotomies, that is, they are both highly 
individualised yet highly socialised: acts are both selfish and unselfish, both active 
and passive both masculine and feminine; 
44 In private correspondence with Katz (203:9). 
45 According to Warren (444:38-39): Maslow (270:44-49) provided extensive description which was 
unnecessary for this thesis, and Warren's summary is more concise. 
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• experience strong emotional states called mystic experiences or, as Maslow 
called, them peak experiences. He stressed that these need not be supernaturally 
or theologically based. These are moments when the person is most fully himself, 
most fully integrated, most self-actualised. For the researcher, if self-actualisation is 
regarded as an ideal representing adulthood, then it follows that during these peak 
experienc;.;s the person is most fully being adult or near perfect adulthood 
as it is possible for a human to be; and 
• search for meta needs such as values of goodness, beauty, truth, justice, 
order, and unity (270:21-22). 
Dicaprio listed the traits of self-actualised people (85: 146-150) similarly to the lists offered 
by others and summarises them (85: 140) as: spontaneity, expressiveness, innocence, 
naivety, candidness, childlikeness, unguardedness, defencelessness, naturalness, 
simplicity, responsiveness, unhesitant manner, plainness, sincerity, unaffectedness, 
primitiveness, freely flowing outwardness, instinctiveness, unrestrainedness, and unself-
conscious. 
Even ignoring some of the conceptual difficulties (as illustrated by Ogilvie (315:28) when 
he used the phrase "the process of self-actualisation to maturity" which is tautologous), 
the researcher experienced the same concerns with self-actualisation as an ideal of 
adulthood as encountered with Erikson's ideal of integrity. Although some or all of the 
attributes of a self-actualised person may be taken as criteria for describing adulthood, the 
researcher could not decide how adequate they are because the basis for their selection was 
not supplied. For example, one could ask what it means to be open to others, and 
whether unconventional behaviour would be deemed non-adult behaviour? If forces 
of acculturation have less effect on self-actualised people and if they continually question 
conventional values, might this not result in behaviour which disrespect others? If one 
does not make a distinction between work and play does this not harm one's family? 
Similarly, how does one tell if someone is searching for the values of goodness and 
beauty, for example, and what implications, if any, does this search have for adulthood? 
Would this searching be evident in people's behaviour? 
In a similar way, although Maslow indicated that attainment of self-actualisation (ideal 
adulthood) is desirable, some of the criteria could apply to people who would harm 
others or behave in some other unacceptable (non-adult) way. For example, one criterion 
is that self-actualised people are able to perceive themselves, other people and the world 
around them in an especially accurate and efficient way; they seldom filtered their 
perceptions to fit their own preconceptions and desires. It cannot be denied that this 
attainment could apply just as well to bank robbers. In addition, one must ask if a 
successful bank robber could experience fulfilment and self-actualisation? 
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The fact the one can question almost every characteristic of someone who has achieved a 
high degree of self-actualisation, is evidence that one must go beyond self-actualisation in 
seeking a more adequate description of adulthood. For example, childlikeness is a 
characteristic of being self-actualised, but how can an adult be expected to be 
childlike? Clearly, there are some underlying characteristics the self-actualisation 
theorists have not explicated. Maslow (270:42) himself corroborated the requirement to 
look beyond self-actualisation, and he found that (270:44) the ideal can never be 
fully attained since it is on-going. 
At this point, the researcher was concerned about finding a point of departure for 
continuing the research. Initially, it seemed necessary to undertake an analysis of each 
criterion offered for self-actualisation to find the fundamental criteria underlying it. This 
would have required a major study on its own. However, because the original researchers 
did not give a rational for selecting their criteria and because the list of criteria could have 
been added to arbitrarily, it was decided not to take this route. Despite not yet knowing 
how to penetrate to the fundamental criteria underlying the self-actualisation and integrity 
ideals, the researcher suspected that it would be these underlying fundamental criteria that, 
if eventually identified, would provide a more adequate description of adulthood. 
The researcher expected that examining other ideals of adulthood would uncover similar 
concerns to those mentioned in regard to the ideals of integrity and self-actualisation. 
However, it was noticed that although many of the descriptions of the ideals were similar, 
many of them contained additional descriptors that could be helpful in ultimately 
describing what adulthood is. In addition, the researcher wanted to illustrate how similar 
some of the ideals were, because this could be an indication of some universal description. 
Consequently, it was decided to describe, very briefly, several other ideals of adulthood. 
4.3 OTHER IDEALS OF ADULTHOOD 
Dicaprio (85), in addition to those of Erikson and Maslow, described in some detail the 
ideals offered by Freud, Jung, Adler, Homey, Allport, Rogers and Fromm. Freud's ideal 
was the moral-ideal self - the ego ideal - the perfected self (85:29). He regarded the 
higher self (superego) as conscience - the self we would like to become. According to 
Dicaprio, a person achieving the perfected self would: give a hearing to all factions, 
compromising at times, being assertive at others; tolerate frustration and tension accepting 
that mistakes will happen; resist distractions and persevere despite obstacles; get to places 
promptly and apply oneself fully; concentrate, work hard and plan; respect others; see the 
world from the other person's standpoint; give up personal desires for the sake of a loved 
one, and sacrifice and give of oneself. Freud also spoke of fulfilment (85:40) and, 
according to Dicaprio, selfhood. Dicaprio referred to the person who has attained 
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selfhood (self-fulfilment, socialisation) as at peace with himself, living harmoniously 
in his environment, using all abilities fully, developing potentialities, not troubled by 
artificial standards and expectations of culture. 
Jung's ideal was the individuated person (85:42) or full growth (85:44) or fully 
developed person (85:50), the aim being wholeness or individuality. The implication is 
that the individual is complete, possessing in a balanced manner, everything that is 
required to be a fully developed human being. An individuated person is: natural and 
highly complex; harmonising his opposing qualities; aware of a profound inner life; 
continually discovering; philosophical and yearns to appreciate and participate in shaping 
inner and outer worlds; filled with awe, wonder and acceptance when facing unknowns; 
social, playful, serious, creative, rational and emotional; self appreciating; and at peace 
with himself. 
One of Homey's ideals (85:88) is being the true lover of mankind, the humane and 
considerate person (85:90). She referred to real self and ideal self and to the real self 
being the degree of actualisation of the ideal. A person achieving Homey's ideal will be: 
balanced and objective about things; not expecting too much of others and self; 
knowledgeable about the dominant direction of their behaviour; working for love and 
approval, power and domination, or to be independent of others; and learning from both 
positive and negative things. 
Allport's properly developed or fully functioning human (85:100) has eight 
requirements: self-extension; warm social relationships; emotional security; realistic 
perceptions; useful skills; worthwhile assignments; being objective about self; and 
awareness of guiding purpose, goals and values. Adler, according to Dicaprio (85:74) 
(85: 113), found that people have many goals, but that one is the most basic: everyone has 
a guiding goal. Adler's ideal human: develops warm and friendly relationships; has a 
realistic orientation to life's problems; does things because of social interest and 
concerns (even when working for his own ends it is in a social setting and in co-
operation with others); works to improve and prefect oneself; responds to the needs 
of others; has an ought conscience; has worked out a value orientation to life; 
respects the other; accepts emotions as natural and vital and uses them for constructive 
purposes; and is aware of guiding purposes, goals and values. 
Roger's ideal of the fully functioning person (ideal self) (85:123-129) is not a 
destination which is simply attained, but rather a style of living in which the person: 
participates fully in life; is open to experience; trusts the total response to a situation 
rather than simply intellectual reaction; feels that he has choices and that he is in control 
of his destiny; has principles and values which guide but are an integral part of self; is 
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willing to change and values guiding principles; is spontaneous and creative: is willing to 
give up security and go against opinion of loved ones; enjoys novelty and works to 
produce it; is in touch with emotions and feelings; and tolerates uncertainty, confusion, 
and pain. 
Fromm's ideal, being receptive to others (85: 153), entails being: accepting of certain 
inevitable conditions without undue frustration and resentment; faithful and 
responsive; modest and charming to others while retaining self respect; adaptable 
and socially adjusted; sensitive to the needs of others; optimistic, po!ite, trusting 
and tender; self-confident, assertive over one's rights; practical, economical and careful 
in money matters; patient; and (85: 167) quiet, forceful, warm, loving, sociable, 
inwardly directed, and working towards becoming highly productive. 
The researcher could have presented other ideals46 but this would have involved 
unnecessary duplication. An examination of the adequacy of Christian ( 42:77) and 
Muslim or Islamic (236:106-107) ideals of adulthood, provided similar results to those 
stated for other ideals. For example, the Confucian ideal of adulthood is conceived as a 
continuous effort towards self-realisation. 
In summary, so many questions can be asked about ideals of adulthood, that it is safe to 
find that they do not adequately describe what adulthood is. Personal growth theory (the 
search for the ideals of human potential) (368:70), is just that - theory, and does not 
adequately describe what is. The fact that psychological ideals of adulthood have been 
found to be inadequate descriptions, does not mean that the findings presented by the 
numerous fellow-researchers are incorrect. Rather, the findings do not search far enough 
to the fundamentals that give rise to the ideals. The researcher suspected that if a 
fundamental description of adulthood is uncovered, it is likely that some of the criteria 
listed for the ideals of integrity and self-actualisation and other ideals, might well be part 
of that fundamental description. 
It may seem inconsistent to reject the idealistic approach to describing adulthood and yet, 
at the same time, express the preliminary finding that what the human fulfilment theorists 
(personal growth theorists) have found might contribute to an adequate description of 
adulthood. However, the idealistic approach has within it the potential to reveal universal 
description. As Maslow found, in seeking for the ideal one must go beyond historical and 
cultural variations. Kakar (200:121) also provided evidence that indicates the commonality 
of ideals of adulthood across cultures. He found that all schools of Yoga emphasise the 
46 See, for example, Birren et al (36:22-25), Bischof (37:36-37), Coleman (63:5-7), Knowles (221:29-
30), Oberholzer (310:55-60), Weathersby ( 446:55), V aillant ( 429:80-85). 
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development of certain common adult virtues which do not markedly differ from those 
possessed by a healthy adult in the psychoanalytic tradition. 
The researcher became aware of the many questions that would need to be asked to find 
out if any of the ideals of adulthood could contribute to an adequate description of 
adulthood. For example, one could ask what a healthy adult is, and what the 
relationship between identity and adulthood is47. Since, as the researcher found, self· 
fulfilment, self-realisation (447: 113) self-actualisation and individualisation, 
are synonyms, a fact corroborated by Buhler and Kuhlen48 and Kakar (199:10), what is 
the fundamental principle they express? When Coan49 Iisted ideals of mental health, 
normality, fulfilment, rationality, saintliness, faith, self-denial, advanced 
intuition, a sense of oneness with the universal soul, a blissful state of 
detachment and so on, one can ask what mental health, saintliness and a sense of 
oneness are. Considering the lists of criteria and demands listed in this paragraph, the 
researcher had to remind himself that it is likely that any description which regards 
adulthood as a collection of isolated bits and attributes, would not be adequate. As Stegner 
(404:48) found, adulthood is not a precise cluster of qualities. 
The terms "healthy adult" and "mental health" again alerted the researcher to 
adulthood as psychological ageing. Despite showing earlier in this thesis that 
chronological and biological ageing cannot adequately describe what adulthood is, the 
researcher wanted to find out if the idea of psychological ageing held clues to what 
adulthood is. The results of this reflection are now presented. 
5.0 SUCCESSFUL PSYCHOLOGICAL AGEING (HEALTHY 
ADULTHOOD) AS A DESCRIPTION OF ADULTHOOD 
It has already been explained that there is an implication in some of the relevant 
psychological literature that successful ageing, or successful adjustment (429:275) is in 
some way an indication of a person's progress in adulthood. Ignoring the simplistic 
chronological definition of ageing, the concept of successful ageing is related to 
becoming more adult and it was considered necessary to explore in a preliminary way, 
the possibility of this relationship. For example, Havighurst et al (159: 161-168) referred 
to "optimum patterns of ageing" and Reichard et al (337: 178) referred to "adjustment to 
ageing", "adjustment to retirement", "growing old successfully", and so on. Some 
possible interrelationships are now listed in point form. 
47 The relationship of identity and adulthood is corroborated by a number of researchers contributing 
studies to a book entitled "Identity and Adulthood" (198), and by Ramanujam (331:38), for 
example. 
48 Reported by Kimmel (210:9) and (210:10). 
49 Described by Ryff (368:70). 
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• Evans' (101:48) found that a sense of being able to cope is the best humankind can 
hope for, and (101:45) that: "A successful transition from one period to another 
means no more than the capacity to cope with increasingly complex issues." 
Evans (101:45) also used the concept of fulfilled lives, implying that being unable 
to cope or being unfulfilled would indicate unsuccessful ageing. Unsuccessful 
ageing, by iinplication is an indication of lack of psychological attainment whether it 
be self-actualisation, realisation or individualisation. Havighurst (158:2) found that: 
"The tasks the individual must learn - the developmental tasks of life - are those 
things that constitute healthy and satisfactory growth in our society. They are the 
things a person must learn if he is to be judged and to judge himself to be a 
reasonably happy and successful person." 
It is relevant that Evans, and Havighurst and Chickering50 indicated a relationship 
between, on the one hand, learning and being able to cope, and on the other, 
being successful and being healthy. The researcher was attempting to describe 
adulthood in order to arrive at an adequate definition of adult education. However, 
many findings on successful ageing are unhelpful because they are defined in 
terms that themselves need defining. For example, Havighurst et al (159: 168) 
found that life satisfaction is a measure of psychological well-being, but what is 
well-being? Both Havighurst et al (159: 168) and Reichard et al (337: 178) implied 
that successful ageing can be measured by a happy optimistic mood and a 
positive self-image. But what is a happy optimistic mood and a positive self-image? 
Reichard et al (337: 178) indicated that successful ageing is to do with the way one 
responds to bad events such as failed achievements and retirement. Why, 
though, is the response to good events not included? However, the researcher 
considered that the finding of Reichard et al that successful ageing has something to 
do with the way one responds to events, was relevant to this research and 
revealed a requirement to behave in certain ways. 
• In a similar approach, Buhler5I (albeit unintentionally) found that maladjustment in 
old age is an indication of one's lack of progress in becoming, and Kimmel used 
psychological well-being similarly. Kuhlen (230: 125) referred to development 
leading to a well-adjusted person and that being happy and content is a sign of 
being well-adjusted. Peck used terms such as "sense of satisfaction", "comfort" 
and to "enjoy" life immensely, and Rapoport and Rapoport (332:4) used the term 
"enjoyment". The concept of well-being is frequently employed because as Sinha 
(396:57) indicated, psycho-social disorders can result from failure to complete a 
task. He found that anxiety, anomie, despair, depersonalization, 
50 Reported in Evans (101:50-51). 
51 Quoted by Kimmel (210:12). 
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meaninglessness, isolation, loneliness, feeling of anonymity and 
pessimism result from an intensified form of identity confusion. 
This list of consequences is similar to Erikson's findings about people who do not 
achieve integration. The researcher wondered why Sinha referred to the experiences 
listed as disorders, because most people would experience these emotions at some 
time and, in some instances, in quite severe forms without any sense of a disorder: 
they are part of living. Maslow (270:24) found that failure to fulfil personal growth 
results in neurosis52, Kuhlen53 corroborated the finding just presented: although 
people are less happy, see themselves more negatively and experience a loss of self-
confidence and greater experience of anxiety, with advancing age54, it is not the fact 
of becoming older by itself that causes these experiences. He found that it is 
physical illness, death of friends or loss of job opportunities, for example 
which give rise to the unhappiness, negativeness and anxiety. 
• Illness arising from not completing a task or conflict has further extensive 
implications for adulthood because it implies that someone who is ill through not 
achieving identity, self-realisation or some other ideal, is less adult - they have not 
progressed along the developmental path that most people seem to. When Maslow55 
referred to self-actualised individuals being at the top end of the health scale, he 
found that they have developed their inner nature to its fullest, or at least to a 
degree far higher than the average human being. Chickering and Havighurst (60:25) 
and Chickering56 also referred to work relating the healthy person with development. 
This implied that those people who have not progressed to adulthood in a sufficiently 
high degree are less healthy because of this and that those who are not healthy are 
less adult. Initially, the researcher found the comparison inadequate, but at this stage 
of the research did not reject it entirely. 
• On uncovering the initial possibility of relationships between adulthood and coping, 
psychological health, well-being and fulfilment, the researcher expected to encounter 
the concept of human need. This expectation arose from the researcher's experience 
of being a researcher in adult education where there are extensive findings on the 
relationship between needs and adult education. It was anticipated that further 
attention to the relationship between needs, adulthood and education would be 
52 His definition of neurosis is not the familiar one of a pathological condition but " ... a kind of moving 
forward, a clumsy groping toward health and toward fullest humanness, in a kind of timid and weak 
way under the aegis of fear rather than of courage." 
53 Paraphrased by Kimmel (210:10). 
54 By "age", the researcher assumed that Kuhlen meant biological ageing. 
55 Paraphrased by Warren (444:17). 
56 Reported by Evans (101:50-51). 
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necessary later in the research. The researcher did encounter the concept of need in 
relation to psychological attainment, but in a subtle way through Maslow's concept of 
self-actualisation which is based on his work on human needs. Evans (101:35) 
claimed to present findings about the needs of adult learners and again alluded to the 
relationship between adulthood and needs. 
Motivation, a concept which arose in association with need, initially seemed 
irrelevant to the research, but on further reflection supported the researcher's attempt 
to penetrate to the roots of what adulthood is and to find a fundamental description of 
it. Although Frenkel-Brunswik (111:77) and Kuhken (230:115) found significant 
shifts in motivations at different times of a person's life, the researcher wondered if 
there were fundamental motives at the root of superficial ones. Ryff (368:89) found 
that understanding motivation in adulthood required consideration of personal growth 
and development. Maslow found that although it is possible for humankind to be 
consciously aware of motivation, for the average person motivation is largely 
unconscious (444:47)57. The desire for various things or states are" ... symptoms, 
surface indicators of more basic needs." The researcher anticipated that identifying 
these basic or fundamental needs would help in adequately describing adulthood58. 
At this stage in the research it was recognised that a distinction had to be made 
between the awareness of the need itself and attempts to satisfy the need. It 
is one thing to experience a need and another to attempt to satisfy or action it, and in 
addition, there may be appropriate and inappropriate ways to satisfy a need. For the 
researcher, the word "appropriate" indicated some kinds of rules, values, 
demands, requirements or norms which help decide what is, and is not, 
appropriate. The reader may have noticed that throughout the examination of 
adulthood as possessing mental skills, as progress through psychological stages, and 
as attainment of a psychological ideal, frequent references to values, 
meaningfulness and responsibility were found. In addition, it was evident that 
many of the criteria for ideals of adulthood entailed acting according to human 
values such as being loving, honest, trusting, polite, considerate and caring. The 
researcher wondered if there was a relationship between adulthood and values, 
meaningfulness and responsibility and whether or not such an interrelationship could 
point the way to uncovering fundamental criteria for adulthood that go beyond the 
variable ideals already discussed. 
57 In considering Maslow's findings, the researcher remembered, as Warren (444:13) also found: "The 
validity of the hierarchy of needs theory is an open question at the present time." 
58 Chapter Six. 
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6.0 ADULTHOOD AND VALUES, MEANINGFULNESS AND 
RESPONSIBILITY 
The researcher found that there is sufficient evidence to state that there is an 
interrelationship between adulthood and values. For example, Kimmel referred to 
Erikson's basic human strengths as values, and (210:15) found that the challenge facing 
young people is to find a reasonably consistent set of attitudes and values. The 
implication in stage theory is that some values show more development than others. For 
example, showing the value (or strength) of care denotes a person who has been longer 
in adulthood than someone showing the values of fidelity or competence. Sinha 
(396:57) indicated that values are somehow involved in adulthood: he described the 
difficulty of youth being able to gain an adult identity and found that: "Old values have 
tumbled and the new are still in flux ... ", and (396:58) that traditional values and roles 
have broken down as guidelines for accepted behaviour, what is right and wrong, 
proper and improper. 
The ideal of adulthood as self-actualisation also indicates a relationship between adulthood 
and values. For example, self-actualised people establish their own guides for 
behaviour, have individual codes of ethics, question conventional values, and search 
for values of goodness, beauty, truth, and simplicity. The mention of "right and wrong" 
implied, for the researcher, something to do with a moral mode of being and it was 
suspected that this mode of being would have to be investigated later in the research59 for 
its relevance for adulthood. 
Further evidence for the interrelationship of adulthood and values is given by the Hindu 
life cycle based on dharma which is currently translated as law, moral duty, right 
action, or conformity with the truth of things (199:4). Parrinder (318:15) translated 
dharma as right, righteousness, justice, order, virtue, religion, piety, and 
general social and personal ideals. Jordan (195:1) also related adulthood to duty. The 
reader will notice that concepts such as moral duty, right action, justice and virtue are 
related to being moral. However, one could ask what "right action", "conformity with 
the truth of things" and "righteousness" mean. The researcher considered it relevant that 
life cycle theory from a Hindu perspective uncovers a relationship between ideals and 
values. Kakar (199:4-5) found that Hindu life cycle theory regards dharma as the 
ground plan of an individual's life which " ... will lead to self-realization. An 
individual's dharma is thus his ideal life cycle ... from which results happiness and 
final beatitude." 
In summary, it was found that there is a relationship between ideals and values and 
consequently adulthood and values. The researcher found initially that dharma (ideal 
59 Chapter Five, Paragraph 2.4. 
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life cycle) is equivalent to ideal adulthood. Kakar ( 199:5) asked how a person can know 
what his dharma (ideal life cycle) is and how his actions are to be judged as being, or not 
being, in conformity with dharma. The researcher anticipated that finding an adequate 
description of adulthood would contribute to answering Kakar's questions. 
On turning attention to the possible interrelationship of adulthood and meaning, the 
researcher considered that Erikson (99: 17) referred to meaning in the phrase: " ... the 
universal human need for ideological wholeness ... ". In defining identity, Mencher60 
included: " ... the acceptance of certain values, goals, or meanings." The researcher 
considered that when Weathersby ( 446:51) stated: " ... the central concerns that hold a life 
together", she was referring to meaning. She ( 446:52) found that the ego in her theory of 
ego development is " ... that aspect of personality that 'keeps things together' by striving 
for coherence and assigning meaning ... ". Kakar (199:5) showed an interrelationship 
between the ideal of self-realisation and meaning. Among the many disorders arising 
from an intensified form of identity confusion, Sinha (396:57) listed meaninglessness. 
Peck used terms such as "meaningful activities", and "gratifying meaning". 
Loevenger and Jung found that the search for meaning is in some way related to 
human becoming. Chickering and Havighurst (60: 17) found that life cycle studies " ... 
remind us that existential questions about meaning, purpose, vocation, social 
responsibility, dependence and human relationships ... " arise again and again at 
different ages. 
There was also some evidence for the interrelatedness of adulthood and responsibility. For 
example, some fellow-researchers used the concept of responsibility when referring to 
adulthood. Warren (444:85) found that the ultimate responsibility to learn and grow 
towards self-actualisation is the learner's. Similarly, he (444:84) found that a goal missing 
from Maslow's approach is " ... preparing adults to live as responsible citizens in a free 
society ... ". Kimmel (210: 15) found that the challenge facing young people is to find 
one's role in life as a sexual, productive, responsible adult. It has already been 
explained how successful ageing has something to do with the way one responds to bad 
or good events. 
The researcher considered that there was sufficient evidence to offer a preliminary finding 
of three interrelationships, namely: adulthood and values (ideals); adulthood and 
meaning and adulthood and responsibility. However, it was realised that further 
extensive research would be required to confirm these relationships and to assess whether 
they can play a part in a more adequate description of adulthood61. In addition, although 
the researcher suspected a wider interrelationship between the three relationships, 
60 Quoted by Thorat (418:66). 
61 Chapter Five and Chapter Six. 
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considerably more grounding work in this research would be required before testing such 
a suspicion. 
On considering the adequacy of psychological stage theories for describing adulthood and 
reflecting on the possible interrelatedness of adulthood, values, meaningfulness and 
responsibleness, the researcher was struck by the considerable lack of mention of the role 
of the fellow-human. The impression was gained that most psychological researchers 
regarded becoming adult or being more adult as a mechanistic, automatic process of 
"development" or "growth". This surprised the researcher, because of the fact that it is 
one's fellow-humans who: decide what mature, grown up and adult are; recognise one's 
adultness; provide the thoughts, plans, and actions on which a person uses his/her mental 
skills; enter into relationships in which people experience crucial turning points and 
challenges; and whose responses in relationships contribute to a person feeling fulfilled, 
meaningful and integrated. 
It cannot be denied that fellow-humans play a significant role in the satisfaction of need, 
ability to cope, attainment of well-being and any other psychological attainment. In 
addition, it is well known that human relationships take place within a society or 
community, and it has already been explained how separating out human experience into 
the biological, psychological and sociological is an artificial approach. This is why many 
researchers used the terms "psycho-social"62 (210:44) and "social-psychological" 
(297:viii). Although the use of words such as "the agogic" and "andragogic" was not 
expected, the researcher was surprised at the lack of acknowledgement of the fellow-
human in a person's becoming more adult. 
However, there was some evidence that fellow-researchers took this for granted. It was 
found that many psychologists indirectly indicated adulthood as a social phenomenon -
meaning the necessity for relationships with others. For example, completing a 
psychological task is regarded as learning what one needs to do to live fulfilling lives 
in society (210:45). In addition, sociological description (school age and play age) was 
found in psychological life cycle models. Coleman (63:97-98) found that: "In most 
societies adulthood is defined primarily in social terms ... ", and Kakar (200: 119) found 
that both individual goals and functioning take place within a social environment. He 
(199:6) found that the life cycle " ... is an inherent force in human beings which holds the 
individual and society together or, going one step further, the force which makes 
the individual and the society hold each other together." 
62 Because humankind cannot be split into separate aspects, this should more correctly be "bio-
psy_cho-social" . 
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Additional evidence is supplied by Kakar who explained his findings as similar to those of 
Erikson's mutuality: 11 ••• a growing person's readiness to interact with a widening 
social radius in predetermined steps and the readiness of society to welcome, invite and 
influence this interaction ... 11 • Erikson (99:20) expressed this finding another way: 11 ••• the 
interplay of life cycle and the social order begins at the very beginning ... 11 • For the 
researcher, both these findings indicated an individual needing the support of others to 
become more adult, that is, the agogic. Similarly, Kimmel (210:44) recognised the 
adult as an individual in interaction with others in society. 
Further evidence is given by Das (74:89) who alluded to the role of society in adulthood: 
11 
••• the individual is seen [in the conceptual system of South Asia] as constantly being 
transformed by his transactions with others since he can convey the essence of his nature 
and receive the essence of others by entering into relationships of transaction. 11 
For the researcher, the word "essence" implied fundamentals - the very root of what 
adulthood is. Das also found (74:119) that goals of the individual and the adult's 
functioning within his social environment are intimately interwoven and that any 
separation between the two is made only for analysis and description purposes. 
It has already been explained that every event for humankind, whether biological or 
psychological, is also a sociological event63. For example, it is well-known that some 
Tribal64 youths are required to undergo an initiation rite which may be a painful, 
frightening and/or joyous experience. The candidates for adulthood require biological 
strength and psychological attainments because without them they would be unable to 
endure the rite, that is, would not be able to prove to their society that they have 
achieved sufficient of these attainments to fulfil an adult role in that 
society. In the light of the evidence presented in this paragraph, the researcher 
considered that adulthood as sociological attainment would provide a more 
adequate description of adulthood than psychological attainment. 
63 Paragraph 3.0 e in the current chapter. 
64 
"Tribal" is not a derogatory term and is used officially, for example, by the Government of India. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ADULTHOOD AS SOCIOLOGICAL ATTAINMENT 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
As with other descriptions of adulthood presented in this thesis so far, adulthood as 
sociological attainment was found to be presented as stages and as a life cycle. For 
example, Evans (101:40) reported that some scholars regard life as a series of phases -
growing up, getting married, settling down, reaching a peak of career or occupation, 
retiring and then moving towards death. Consequently, an examination of life cycle 
theories for their sociological content was necessary to continue seeking for an answer to 
what adulthood is. 
The reader might consider that to examine sociological life cycle theory, after finding 
biological and psychological life cycle theories inadequate for describing adulthood, as 
scientifically unjustified. However, since almost all fellow-researchers studying adulthood 
from a sociological perspective researched it from a life cycle perspective, the researcher 
felt obliged, as responsible scientist, to continue seeking clues for what adulthood is, 
within the findings of life cycle theory. By examining an inadequate description, the 
researcher hoped to find some clues to a more adequate description. 
The researcher was still concerned about the artificiality of treating humankind as only a 
sociological being. However, based on the results reported in previous chapters in this 
thesis, it was realised that the sociological life cycle incorporated the biological and 
psychological life cycles. Consequently, although for convenience in this chapter the 
phrase "sociological life cycle" is used, it should be called a "bio-psycho-social 
life cycle". As already explainedl, every event for humankind is a social event: even death 
for a hermit in the middle of a vast desert is not merely a biological process. 
The researcher found that many theorists were unaware that they were discussing at least 
three concepts of adulthood when they used the life cycle approach. For example, 
when Kennedy (205:208) found that maturity begins around age fifty and continues to 
retirement or about sixty five years of age, he is using the chronological concept (50 to 
65), the biological concept (physical maturity) and the sociological concept (retirement as 
social role). This apparent lack of awareness on the part of many fellow-researchers, made 
the seeking of a fundamental description of adulthood difficult. For example, Chickering 
· and Havighurst's (60:29-48) life cycle theory incorporated psychological attainments 
1 Chapter Three, Paragraph 3.0 e. 
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(tasks) such as achieving emotional independence, adjusting to biological change, 
maintaining integrity and finding meaning, together with social attainments such as 
starting a family, managing a home and starting an occupation. 
It is also relevant that Kimmel (210:30-31) referred to perceived age as follows: "One 
person might feel, act, and look like an adult (and others would respond to that person 
as an adult) at the age of 16; another person might not feel like an adult until he or she 
finished graduate school at age 30." In seeking for a more adequate description of 
adulthood, the researcher was also seeking for that which makes one feel and act 
like, an adult and that which makes others respond to a person as an adult. 
Although the researcher is using "person" frequently, there is no certainty about what it 
means. For example, Wei-ming found that: "Adulthood, then, is to 'become a person"', 
but does not explain what it means to become a person? As already indicated, "person" in 
this thesis is synonymous with "human", and consequently, it was anticipated that seeking 
answers about being adult, would also reveal answers about being human. 
The researcher found considerable similarity in several sociological life cycle theories, 
with some researchers refining theories of other researchers. The theories of Chickering 
and Havighurst, and Kimmel were found to be comprehensive and representative of 
most other sociological life cycles, but at the same time, the two approaches were slightly 
different. Consequently, it was decided to examine only these two life cycle theories. 
2. 0 ADULTHOOD AS PROGRESS THROUGH A SOCIOLOGICAL LIFE 
CYCLE 
To avoid excessive duplication in discussing the adequacy or otherwise of each theory, 
both theories are first described briefly and then an assessment given. Schematic 
representations of the theories are presented in Tables Five and Six on the following two 
pages. The researcher found a similar inconsistent naming of stages and similar arbitrary 
allocation of chronological ages to certain events, as was found in psychological life cycle 
theory. These inadequacies have been adequately dealt with in the previous chapter. 
Sociological attainment is frequently expressed as social task or social role. Terms 
such as "preparing", "adapting"2 and"adjusting", indicate the undertaking of certain 
social tasks. Terms such as "marriage", "parenthood" and "employment" indicate 
social roles of spouse, parent and employee. Kimmel referred to these attainments as 
significant events or milestones. Weathersby ( 446:52) also referred to milestones 
and turning points. For the researcher, the distinction between social task and social role is 
unnecessary since it would be someone taking on the role of parent who would be 
2 "Adapting" is a biologistic term and is inappropriate for describing humans. 
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undertaking the task of starting a family and experiencing the significant event of 
parenthood. 
TABLE FIVE 
CHICKERING AND HAVIGHURST'S DEVELOPMENTAL 
TASKS OF THE ADULT YEARS3 
Chronological age 
and name of stage 
16- 25 
Late adolescence and youth4 
25-35 
Early adulthood 
35-45 
Midlife transition 
45-57 
Middle adulthood 
"Developmental" tasks carried 
out within the stage 
Achieving emotional independence 
Preparing for marriage and family life 
Choosing and preparing for a career 
Developing an ethical system 
Deciding on a partner, Starting a family 
Managing a homes 
Starting an occupation 
Assuming civic responsibilities 
Adapting to a changing time perspective 
Revising career plans 
Re-defining family relationships 
Maintaining a career or developing a new one 
Re-stabilising family relationships 
Making mature civic responsibilities 
Producing something that will outlive oneself'6 
Changing from sexual activity to 
companionship activity in marriage? 
Needing to find emotional strength to make 
new friends and establish new emotional 
relationships with children8 
(Table Five continued on next page) 
3 Chickering and Havighurst presented their theory horizontally across the page, but a vertical 
presentation was more convenient in this thesis. 
4 It was decided to present that part of Chickering and Havighurst's life cycle with late adolescence 
and youth because, as previously explained, the researcher found this stage to be synonymous with 
the stage of early adulthood. 
5 The researcher wondered why "managing a home" and "starting an occupation" were not 
expressed in terms of responsibility just as "civic responsibility" is. For example, one could refer 
to "family responsibility" and "occupational responsibility". 
6 Erikson paraphrased by Kimmel (210: 16). 
7 Peck paraphrased by Kimmel (210:17). The researcher was not sure whether companionship excluded 
sexual activity. For a happily married couple, one would think that sexual activity would be part of 
companionship. 
8 Peck paraphrased by Kimmel (210: 17). 
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57-65 
Late-adult transition 
65 + 
Late adulthood 
(Table Five continued) 
Preparing for retirement 
Adjustment to retirement 
Adjusting to declining health and strength 
Becoming affiliated with late-adult age groups 
Establishing satisfactory living arrangements 
Adjusting to death of spouse 
Maintaining integrity 
Experiencing fulfilment or failure, 
that is, having achieved or not achieved one's goals9 
Adjusting to one's closeness to death 
Developing valued activities besides work IO 
Accepting and transcending illness, frailty, pain 
or discomfort 11 
Finding meaning in the future potential of 
family, own ideas or future generationsl2 
TABLE SIX 
A DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION OF KIMMEL'S 
SOCIOLOGICAL LIFE CYCLE EXPRESSED IN TERMS OF 
MILESTONES 
- begin school 
-vote 
- begin occupation 
- marriage 
- parenthood 
- death of parents 
- children leave home 
- grandparenthood 
- retirement 
- death of spouse 
-death 
9 Paraphrased by Kimmel (210:9) (24:20) and stated by Buhler, as quoted by Kimmel (210:12). 
10 Peck paraphrased by Kimmel (210: 17). 
11 Erikson paraphrased by Kimmel (210:17). 
12 Erikson paraphrased by Kimmel (210:17). 
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The researcher found that both social task and significant event are included within the 
broader concept of social role. Adulthood as sociological attainment is also expressed as 
certain experiences. For example, Chickering and Havighurst referred to "experiencing 
fulfilment or failure", "re-stabilising family relationships", "adjusting to 
biological change", "preparing for retirement", and "finding meaning", all of 
which involve numerous experiences. 
The researcher found four main reasons why adulthood as a sociological life cycle is 
inadequate for describing what adulthood is. Firstly, the sequentiality and age 
grouping of roles and experiences do not necessarily hold for all individuals. For 
example, preparing for marriage and family life could occur at any point of the life cycle 
from ten years to ninety three, to give just two random ages. Civic responsibilities may 
occur at say, eighteen or only at sixty five, and retirement may take place at forty in the 
case of those employed in some armed-forces in some countries. In addition, the 
researcher considered that children attending school are fulfilling their civic responsibilities 
in ways appropriate to them. If Chickering and Havighurst meant retirement in the sense 
of leaving full-time employment, their classification does not describe people who retire at 
forty years to take up a strenuous (but enjoyable) task of sailing around the world, for 
example. 
Similarly, Kimmel (210:4) indicated grandparenthood as occurring after the age of forty 
eight. The critical reader would be aware that if a young person had a baby at age ten, say, 
and that baby in tum had a child when he/she was ten, the grandmother would reach 
grandparenthood at the age of twenty. Although the life cycle shows marriage coming 
before parenthood and parenthood before retirement, for example, the reader will be aware 
that these progressive conditions do not necessarily hold. Starting an occupation is a 
relevant example: one can start an occupation after schooling has finished, after university, 
or even without attending school. Kimmel (210:7) also found that during middle age, 
people make much of their contribution to society. Even in a narrow financial sense this 
may not be true, and is not true in terms of other pursuits such as sport, art, science and 
literature. Athletes may give their best between the ages of thirteen and twenty and be 
remembered for setting several world records. Later, they may contribute very little in any 
other career or may contribute much in business. The researcher considered it unnecessary 
to give further examples of the inadequacy of describing adulthood by assigning 
chronological ages or age-related stages or sequences to any sociological events that are 
claimed to indicate adulthood. 
Secondly, Kimmel's life cycle illustrated how many events could be added to a 
sociological life cycle. A life cycle based on Kimmel's but adding the researcher's 
selection of milestones is given in Table Seven on the following page. 
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TABLE SEVEN 
A REVISED SOCIOLOGICAL LIFE CYCLE SHOWING 
NUMEROUS ARBITRARY (*) ADDITIONS 
* being born 13 
* play with mother 
* begin creche 
- begin school 
* begin primary school 
* begin secondary school 
* graduate from secondary school 
-vote 
- begin occupation 
* begin university 
* graduate from university 
* begin occupation 
- marriage (decide on a partner) 
* move to a new country 
- parenthood (start a family) 
- death of parents 
- children leave home 
* change occupation 
*divorce 
*re-marry 
* become a city councillor or member of parliament 
- grandparenthood 
* death of a child 
- retirement 
* death of a grandchild 
* win £8 million in a state lottery 
- death of spouse 
* move to smaller house or old-age home 
-death 
13 It could be argued that people are not aware of their birth. However, there is evidence that they are 
aware and that this is recorded in the subconscious. 
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Thirdly, some of the events such as developing an ethical system, re-defining family 
relationships, adjusting to biological change, maintaining integrity and establishing 
satisfactory living arrangements, are not completeable tasks and will continue throughout 
life. Chickering and Havighurst identifying an ethical orientation in adulthood, is 
relevant to the research. As already explained, just what the relationship between being 
moral and being ethical, and being adult (if any) was considered later14 in the research. 
Buhler, and also Kimmel (210:9), placed fulfilment (achievement of goals) or experience 
of failure (non-achievement of goals) during late adulthood. However, it is common 
knowledge that most humans experience fulfilment and failure during the whole of life. 
Fourthly, although the sociological life cycle takes into account many usual or general 
events, it does not show unexpected events such as onset of serious physical illness, 
death of friends, loss of employment, serious accident, or winning a very large sum of 
money in a lottery. Erikson IS recognised the onset of crises when he found that each of 
the eight periods of the life cycle: "... has its stage of ascendence when physical, 
cognitive, emotional, and social developments permit its coming to a crisis ... ". 
However, it is well-known that crises are not limited to peaks of expected "growth 
phases" and can arise with unexpected events, such as those just listed. Neugarten16 
found that serious life events only become crises if they occur out of time, that is, when 
based on chronological age, they should not occur. Some fellow-researchers (311:30) 
(310:30) (435:235) called these crises boundary, crisis or border situations (after 
Karl Jaspers). The researcher added several unexpected events to Kimmel's life cycle as 
shown on the previous page, to illustrate that any number of arbitrarily chosen roles and 
experiences could be used to identify adulthood as a life cycle. 
In summary, social attainment cannot be adequately described by using a sociological life 
cycle approach and consequently, the approach is not adequate for describing adulthood. 
The researcher was surprised that many fellow-researchers still employed this approach 
because as Malia (264:169) found: " ... the body of evidence for delineating patterns of 
adulthood in a given country is so vast and yet so fragmented that as a practical matter the 
task of investigation becomes virtually unmanageable." Jordan ( 195: 1) corroborated this. 
However, "ethical", "relationships", "companionship", and "friends" have been 
emphasised because they indicate the possible relationship between being adult and 
being ethical, and adulthood and the andragogic. Just what these relationships 
might be was considered later in the research17. In addition, "responsible" and 
14 Chapter Six, Paragraph 4.0 and Chapter Seven. 
15 Quoted by Kimmel (210:15). 
16 Reported by Chickering and Havighurst (60:18-19). 
17 Chapter Seven and Chapter Six, Paragraph 2.5, respectively. 
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"meaning" have been emphasised because, as reported in the previous chapter, a 
possible relationship was uncovered between them and adulthood. 
The reader is reminded that many sociologists researching adulthood, pre-define it as a 
certain time-span identified by an age-range. Chickering and Havighurst did this as 
indicated by the term "the adult years" and by allocating chronological ages in their life 
cycle. Rudolph and Rudolph (365:145) stated that they approached adulthood from the 
perspective of the family, but many (32:7-10) (299:6) fellow-researchers then found that 
marriage or parenthood for example, are indicators of adulthood because they occur within 
a particular time-span. However, as will be shown, these same researchers, probably 
unknowingly, employed the roles and experiences themselves as indicators 
of adulthood. Consequently, implicit in sociological life cycle theory is description of 
adulthood in terms of roles and experiences. It is for this reason that the researcher 
decided to examine adulthood as fulfilling various social roles and encountering 
certain experiences. 
3.0 ADULTHOOD AS FULFILLING CERTAIN ROLES AND 
ENCOUNTERING CERTAIN EXPERIENCES 
There is evidence from many researchers that undertaking certain social roles is indicative 
of a person's adulthood. For example, Das (74:89) found that adulthood is associated 
with social roles and values, and Knox (223:252) found18 that adults and society 
expect that individual adults will be proficient in major life roles and as persons 
generally. Allport (9:125) implied that the young adult is sufficiently physically and 
sexually mature to play adult roles. As was expected, fellow-researchers arrived at 
different findings regarding which role is the most indicative of adulthood. Indeed some 
fellow-researchers found that a combination of roles is necessary to describe adulthood. 
However, it was found that the roles of wage earner and parent were most frequently 
mentioned as indicating one's adulthood. 
For example, Troll (423:113) found, and Stegner (404:42) and Kimmel (210:6) 
corroborated, that: "Adulthood itself is defined by participation in the world of the 
job. It begins with entry into a first job and ends with retirement from a last job." 
Coleman (63: 111) found that: "The family figures prominently in socialization toward 
work roles ... ", and Hareven (154:17) corroborated this. Kett (206:283) implied that 
entering the role of wage earner is regarded as adulthood, when he found that a 15-year-
old who had left home was regarded as a "young man" whereas a 17-year old still 
following the plough was likely to be regarded as a "large boy". Turner and Helms 
18 He corroborated his finding by reference to several fellow-researchers. 
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(424:33) found that adulthood begins with individuals leaving the family and 
completing formal schooling19. 
Coleman (63:63), Nicholson (303:124) and Gutmann (146:167) found that the 
definitive step into adulthood comes with parenthood. Turner and Helms 
( 424:2) corroborated the work of the researchers already mentioned when they found " ... 
events of adulthood ... " to be, " ... occupational status, marriage or parenthood 
... ".The Confusion ideal of adulthood (447:109) entails being married and being a father, 
and Kimmel (210:6) found that a useful definition of adulthood is the shift in roles 
brought about by entrance into the work20 and family cycles. The researcher found that 
leaving the family and the school is related to the roles of wage earner and parent by many 
researchers, because they assumed that one must be legally permitted to work and be 
financially independent to start one's own family. 
Reflecting on this evidence, the researcher found that adulthood as certain social roles is 
inadequate for describing adulthood as the following examples illustrate. 
• Starting a job and earning a wage does not automatically make a person an adult. 
Many children in some cultures become involved in work but they are not necessarily 
regarded as being adult. Coleman (63:16), for example, found that: " ... even though 
young people were fully incorporated into the labor force, they were not described 
as full adults21." In addition, because someone does not have a paying job does not 
automatically take away her adult status. If this were so, it is likely that some people 
in economically depressed countries where unemployment is extensive and who have 
no hope of ever earning a wage again, would not be regarded as being adult, no 
matter what their other qualities. Besides, Kett (206:290-295) provided evidence of 
how social role changed for some young people in farming communities with the 
seasons because during summer they would be "adult" workers on the farm and in 
winter would return to school and be "children". 
• Becoming a parent does not automatically make a person an adult, as Nicholson 
(303: 124) corroborated. Some parents are referred to as being unadult-like or 
immature, and if starting a family was an indication of adulthood, all those who do 
not have children, for what ever reason, would not be regarded as adults. 
l9 The researcher wondered if the word "and" implies both conditions, or one, or the other. If both are 
implied, why not one, and if only one, why one and not the other? 
20 The researcher chose "wage earner" rather than "worker" and "employee", because leaving home 
and school implies becoming financially independent; a person staying at home on a farm, for 
example, would also be working. A wage earner could also be an employer, not an employee. 
2l Coleman's use of "full adults" implies that adulthood can be finally achieved. However, evidence in 
this and the previous chapter shows that it cannot. Similarly, Nicholson's use of "the years of full 
adulthood", is inadequate because full adulthood is an impossibility. 
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• Leaving one's birth family does not automatically make one an adult and staying with 
one's birth family does not necessarily mean a person is not an adult. Some people 
who do live alone or with a non-family group, are not regarded as adults. In some 
cultures where extended families are usual, it is expected that many adults will live in 
the same home. The expression of this role could be enhanced by changing it to 
"leaving one's family home" because, in a sense, one is always part of a family, no 
matter where in the world one is - one can never leave the family. However, even this 
change does not make "adulthood as leaving the family" adequate as an indicator of 
adulthood. 
• Merely leaving school does not automatically make one an adult. The researcher 
imagined some people still in school (particularly when school is defined as 
university and college22) who would be regarded as adult. Many people who have 
left school are not regarded as adults. For example, Kimmel (210:6) found that only 
those who begin to work or marry at the end of high school can claim to be beginning 
" ... full participation in society as an adult." Surely a studious, full-time, 
post-graduate student is being adult, while a person who works full-time and is 
married but spends his income on over-use of alcohol, is not being adult? The 
Confucian (447:109) concept of adulthood also referred to" ... fully participating 
member of society ... ", but just what is meant by "participating fully in society", 
needs examination. The researcher considered that diligent students are participating 
fully in society at the appropriate level for them; merely because they do not earn a 
wage does not make them non-adult. 
• Most people in older adulthood who have retired, are regarded as being adult 
Consequently, Troll's finding which regarded retirees as non-adult, is inadequate. 
Does retirement indicate that someone is past doing their best and that they should be 
"led out to pasture"23 to make way for better more up-to-date people? The researcher 
found not, because some of the most active people have already retired from one paid 
job and have either taken up other paid or unpaid appointments: they do not retire 
from being productive. Nicholson (303:225) reported an interviewee as stating: "I've 
retired from work, I didn't retire from life". It could be added that work means "paid 
work" because, is not all life, some kind of work? Kimmel's (210:7) finding that 
retirement is socially determined is only true if retirement is related to chronological 
age. If retirement is defined as a state of mind or an attitude to life, then retirement is 
22 As in the United States of America. 
23 This metaphor is inadequate description, and demeaning to humans. 
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not socially determined, but by personal choice. Neugarten24 coined the term 
"young-old" to describe people old in chronological age but who are still active in a 
variety of activities after the socio-legal retirement age. In so doing, she implied that 
being old has nothing to do with age but with attitude and response to ageing and 
forced socio-legal retirement. 
• Many of the roles are contradictory, as Coleman (63:1) found: children in the past 
were brought quickly into adult productivity and they were brought up in the 
home and workplace. If one is a wage-earner but lives with the family what does 
this mean for one's adulthood? If one has left home, earns a wage by working during 
the day but then attends school in the evenings, what does this mean for one's 
adulthood? It is likely that different researchers would arrive at different answers to 
these questions and a fundamental description of what adulthood is, would be 
impossible. 
Consequently, the researcher found that using social roles25 alone, to describe adulthood, 
is inadequate. The researcher wondered if the fundamental principles underlying social 
roles (and hence more adequate description of adulthood) would be uncovered by 
examining adulthood as encountering certain experiences. The ample evidence 
supplied so far in this chapter, makes it unnecessary to provide further evidence that 
adulthood cannot be adequately described by allocating certain experiences to a time span 
or age groups, and then calling them "adult experiences". However, the researcher 
decided to investigate the experiences themselves because many researchers imply that 
they indicate being adult. 
Humans, consciously and subconsciously, encounter all kinds of experiences during the 
time they are awake. Life cycle theorists imply that certain experiences such as 
loneliness, fear of death, despair on retirement and experiencing the death of 
a spouse, are identified with adulthood. However, as previously explained, the term 
"ageing" is frequently used to refer to the general increase in certain experiences with age 
- a chrono-biological process with no relation to social experiences. Furthermore, it is 
possible for all humans, no matter what their age, to experience loneliness and fear of 
death, for example. As Evans (101:44) found, some people experience the death of a 
relative or close friend early in life, and others experience this unfortunate event for the 
first time in their fifties or sixties. This means that different researchers could select, at 
24 Quoted by Kimmel (210:7). Hareven (154:15) was not sure that terms such as "young old" and "old 
old" are useful. It cannot be denied that "young old" is contradictory and could lead to 
misunderstanding. 
25 Some researchers offered variations on the social roles of wage earner and parent, and these can be 
shown to have one or more of the inadequacies listed above. To give only one example: Turner and 
Helms (424:33) found that: "To actively shape a dream is no longer a remote thought, but a reality of 
everyday life. Adulthood has begun." However, children can also shape their dreams at their own level. 
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random, a variety of different experiences as their indicators of adulthood, and a 
fundamental description of adulthood would be impossible. 
However, Rapoport and Rapoport (332:4-5) presented findings which provide a clue to 
the relationship between adulthood and experiences. Assuming that "growth" means 
becoming and "bad times" and "good times" mean bad and good experiences, 
respectively, the researcher found similarly to Rapoport and Rapoport (332:4-5): bad 
experiences and joys " ... are the stuff of which new growth is made ... ". They found that 
the challenge in life is to tum bad times as well as good into chances to grow, and that 
the way ahead lies in developing the capacity to growth. Ignoring for the moment the 
need for definitions of good and bad experiences, "growth", for the researcher, means 
becoming more adult and the chance to grow, and the capacity for growth mean 
the chance to become and the capacity for becoming more adult. Rapoport and 
Rapoport implied that an adult approach is one that meets challenges, and further enhances 
one's confidence, happiness and determination. 
Consequently, it is safe to find that it is not encountering certain experiences that indicates 
adulthood, but the way one responds when the experiences are encountered. 
Symonds ( 411: 194-195) corroborated this, finding that personality is acquired from 
responding to the vicissitudes of living. Van D~µ Daele (432:53) found that some 
psychoanalytic researchers sucQ. as Adler, Sullivan, Fromm"' and Homey regarded 
humankind as being successively socialised to some ideal of conduct. 
Further reflection corroborated this finding. For example, becoming more adult is not an 
automatic process: it is one's choices or responses that indicates adulthood. An 
experience such as loneliness is not an automatic, predetermined experience - the result of 
biological growth or some mysterious psychological process. The death of a spouse and 
friends leads to aloneness, but loneliness comes about through the past and current 
choices (responses) of those people who are alone. Is not loneliness the result of the 
unwillingness or inability of the individual to initiate new relationships26? Similarly, the 
social role of retiree could mean either the beginning of the end of life and associated 
misery, or the beginning of extensive new opportunities for happiness and achieving 
satisfaction. 
Csikszentmihalyi (70: 112-113) explained how different choices in a crisis situation may 
result in appropriate and inappropriate behaviour. He assumed that two boys are affected 
by the same trauma - both fathers mis-using alcohol and deserting their families. One child 
could formulate the problem as the father being no good and that men are irresponsible. 
26 This does not negate the fact that much loneliness could be alleviated by the willingness of fellow-
humans reaching out to initiate a relationship with someone who is lonely. 
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This child does not want to grow up like his father and spends the rest of his life resisting 
a masculine identity. The other child may regard the father as being unhappy because he 
could not achieve the education he had hoped for and that this drove him to drink. The 
child sets the goal of helping people to become educated. 
Ryff (368:79) again illustrated the relevance of one's response to a crisis: he found that 
" ... people may do the most personal developing under difficult conditions. Self-insight 
may come from the hard times in people's lives ... In this sense, personal development 
may often be forced on people in the shape of terrible events that require them to 
discover within themselves unknown resources and self-knowledge. The critical question 
is how this happens." He asked the same question another way: "Why do some 
individuals achieve self-actualisation, maturity, or individuation, and others do not?" 
Erikson (98:5) confirmed the concept of crisis as a period of heightened potential. The 
researcher considered that the term "require", in Ryffs finding implies some 
fundamental reason for discovering the unknown resources within themselves. The 
researcher hoped that the research would contribute to answering these two questions 
posed by Ryff. 
In summary, being encountered by experiences in itself explains very little about what it 
means to be adult. However, how one behaves while being encountered by 
experience is significant. The imperatives, "Act your age!" (195:9) (33:20) and, "Grow 
up!" (363:68) imply some direction towards a kind of behaviour, and as Stegner (404:39) 
found: " ... the qualities we call adult are on the side of 'sanity', 'normality', rationality, 
continuity, sobriety, responsibility, wisdom, conduct as opposed to mere behaviour ... 
It is unthinkable that we should call 'adult' anyone who is unstable, extreme, or even 
idiosyncratic." 
Despite the fact that one must question what it means to be unstable or extreme, at this 
point in the research, it was realised that being adult is not so much about taking on 
certain roles or experiencing certain experiences, but the degree to which 
one adequately fulfils the roles or responds to the experiences - how one 
behaves. Phrases such as "ideal of conduct", "appropriate and inappropriate behaviour" 
and "how one behaves", have been used several times in this thesis so far. Schrag 
(380:65) used similar phrases when he found that being mature has to do with 
appropriate behaviour. In addition, Jordan (195:8) found that adolescence as opposed 
to youth, is descriptive of a mode of behaviour. 
The researcher realised that how one behaves must be examined to find a more 
adequate description of what adulthood is. This can be corroborated from experience. For 
example, when there are seriously unhappy circumstances in a relationship between 
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spouses, between parents and children, and between employer and employee, one hears 
statement such as: "they were not adult enough for marriage"; "they were not mature 
enough for parenthood" and "he did not have the experience for the job". Consequently, it 
is not enough to find that adulthood is indicated by the milestones of graduation, marriage 
and retirement (210:5). These milestones tell us nothing of what goes on (the behaviour) 
in, for example, marriage and what someone has to do (how one has to behave) in 
marriage to be considered an adult - to adequately fulfil the role of spouse. 
The researcher considered the distinction between role and experience to be artificial. 
Being in any role entails certain experiences and being in many roles simultaneously, 
involves being encountered by many experiences. The researcher considered that "mode 
of being" is a phrase which includes role and experience together. Consequently, the 
extent of one's adulthood is assessed by the extent of the appropriateness of one's 
behaviour (response) for any particular mode of being. However: What is the 
appropriate behaviour for a particular mode of being? 
With the finding that adulthood is appropriate social behaviour, a number of 
issues which had been encountered in the research for this chapter and which had initially 
confused the relationship between adulthood and experiences/roles, could be placed in 
perspective. 
• The human phenomena of death, retirement, divorce, the family, vocational 
development, parenthood, the empty nest syndrome27 and marriage, are essential 
aspects of being adult (424). Several researchers (210) (37) (424) (377) (297) writing 
about adulthood have chapters in their books on the phenomena just given. At this 
point in the research it was possible to explain why this is so. As previously 
explained, most psychologists who employ the life cycle approach assumed some 
ideal of psychological attainment - an ideal that can never be attained but which 
humankind aspires to. As far as it is possible to tell, sociologists who employ the life 
cycle approach are also aware, albeit intuitively, of some ideal of sociological 
adulthood. It was uncovered in this part of the research that the ideal has to do with 
approved social behaviour. 
• Historicity - a person's whole past experiences resulting from being born at a specific 
time and living through certain major events, affects one's attitudes in later life. This 
may or may not be true, but the question for adulthood is how people respond in a 
current mode of being, irrespective of their background. Troll (423:5) wondered 
27 The empty nest syndrome (137) (154:17) refers to the parental experience of children leaving the home 
to start a life of their own. This biological description is inadequate for describing the human 
phenomenon. 
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whether certain kinds of experience have greater effect on future behaviour than at 
other times. However, it will be the person's response to the kinds of experience 
that will have an effect on the future, not the experience by itself. 
• People find it more difficult to accept an event such as a family death if it is out of 
time, that is, does not happen when expected28. This may or may not be true, but the 
question for adulthood is how people respond when the unfortunate death occurs, 
whether it be in time or out of time. 
• It is found by some (210:20) researchers that culture, gender, social class and ethnic 
origin affect the way people experience loneliness. It may or may not be true that 
people in lower socio-economic groups experience more loneliness because they have 
not developed sufficient interests and friendships. However, loneliness is 
loneliness whatever the gender, race, religion or social class29 of the person 
experiencing it. The question for adulthood is how people respond to loneliness. 
• Roles and experiences (modes of being) are frequently thrust on people without 
choice. A prime example is parenthood. For a human, the very act of having a child 
means being not only the biological co-creator of a child, but also the parent - the one 
expected to look after the child. One can do this well or poorly. A parent who does 
not fulfil this responsibility is still a parent, albeit a poor one. If a child is given up 
for adoption, then the expectancy of society is formally transferred from one person 
(or couple) to another. One could state that after an adoption the original parents still 
remain mother and father, but not parents. While it may be true that some 
circumstances may make it more difficult to fulfil a role adequately or to deal with a 
"bad" experience appropriately, what is important for adulthood is the extent of 
adequacy and appropriateness. 
• Humans are simultaneously in many modes of being, and the requirements of each 
mode frequently conflict (9:182-183). This may or may not be true, but it is how one 
responds when faced with conflicts that indicates one's adulthood. Weathersby 
(446:52) explained that each stage of development is" ... a qualitatively different way 
of responding to life experience ... ". In addition, Adler30, in referring to 
development, used phrases such as "one's method of facing problems" and 
"one's whole attitude to life". For the researcher "method" and "attitude" in 
these instances were synonymous with "response to experiences". 
28 Weathersby paraphrased by Evans (101:45). 
29 The researcher is uncomfortable with the way people in the United Kingdom refer to "class", because 
the implication is that the people in the "upper class" are better ontologically than those in the 
"middle class" and "working class". 
30 According to Weathersby (446:52). 
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• Milestones are events that stand out in a person's memory or future plans as 
significant, age-related turning points, or markers, or personal reference 
points (210:5). But a turning point for, or to, what? A marker of what and a 
personal reference with regard to what? In the light of the researcher's findings about 
Rapoport and Rapoport's (332:4-5) concept of growth, it is possible to state that the 
turning points, markers and reference points are towards further adulthood. Just 
as the researcher did, Kimmel (210:5) asked what determines the significance 
of events on the lifeline, and what makes these events important along the life cycle. 
The researcher initially considered these events as significant because they provide a 
person with the opportunity, depending on their behaviour, to become more adult. 
At this point in the research it was also possible to clarify terminology which would assist 
further understanding. The researcher found that the many similar terms used in life cycle 
theory such as "challenge", "conflict", "task", "turning point", "conflict", 
"role", "crisis", "milestone" and "experience", can be included within the phrase, 
"mode of being". It is in this light that the researcher found Riegel's (342:99) finding to 
be correct: "Crises, conflicts, and contradictions ought to be regarded as constructive 
confrontations and the basis for development, rather than in a negative manner and a cause 
of disruption." It stands to reason that a crisis would be an opportunity if the person 
experiencing the crisis was able to respond appropriately. This finding is supported when 
Lieberman (248:150) and Loeb (252:162) referred to adapting and coping as socially 
acceptable responses. 
From the extensive explanation just given, adulthood as responding (behaving) 
appropriately was the most adequate description of adulthood so far uncovered during 
the research, and it was decided to investigate what it means to be behaved 
appropriately. 
4.0 ADULTHOOD AS BEING BEHAVED APPROPRIATELY 
It is safe to state that for most people, appropriate behaviour is dictated by social norms. 
For example, Katchadourian (202:50) referred to social imperatives of adulthood and 
social schedules for defining adulthood. Fellow-researchers found that: there are social 
expectations about the proper time to marry or change occupations (210:7); young 
adults need to gain greater insight into society's demands and expectations 
(424:53); adulthood requires constant compliance with certain norms and demands V 
(311 :54 ); many people feel they have failed if they ,do not marry when they are supposed 
to or do not act their age (423:45); every social group has expectations (approved 
behaviours) of its members (33:316-317); maturity is related to maturity of behaviour V 
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(37:32); and the individual finds himself faced with the demands and expectations of 
the society around him (157:4). 
In addition, Thoits3I, and Birren et al found that role-identities suggest how one ought to 
behave, and Kakar (199:6) referred to the child gaining a comprehension of" ... his 
expected role in the adult world ... ". Allport (9:181) made explicit the relationship 
between social role and behaviour: "A role is a structured mode of participation in 
social life. More simply, it is what society expects of an individual occupying a given 
position in a group." This concept is frequently referred to as socialisation, 
enculturation and acculturation. Although a subtle distinction can be made (27:9), the 
researcher considered that acculturation (9: 169) and enculturation (27:9) are synonymous 
with socialisation. For the researcher, socialisation could also be described as 
adulthoodisation (adulthood as being socialised). 
Stegner ( 404:39) found that " ... if the term 'adult' means anything, its meaning must be 
social. One does not declare oneself adult; one is perceived to be." Albrecht and Gift 
(5:237) found that socialisation involves learning to meet behavioural expectations. 
In Japanese tradition (362: 128), adulthood is part of life-long socialisation, and 
Coleman (63: 1) found that: "Every society must somehow solve the problem of 
transforming32 children into adults ... ", and he (63:10) referred to socialising agencies. 
He (63:45) also found that: "Society at large is faced perennially with an invasion of 
barbarians33. Somehow they must be civilized and turned into contributors to 
fulfilment of the various functions requisite to societal survival." It is now well-accepted 
that socialising is not limited to young people but to all people throughout life. Coleman 
(63:52) found similarly: socialisation does not stop with departure from school but 
continues throughout the whole of life. Allport found (9: 170-171) that: "Finally, in 
adulthood, there is ordinarily a successful blending34 of the traditional and the personal, 
of culture and self-image." 
The researcher also found that when some researchers use the term "citizenship" they 
are referring to the end goal of socialisation - that is, appropriate behaviour. Indeed, 
Williams et al (458:300) illustrated the relationship between successful ageing and 
appropriate behaviour when they found that successful ageing may depend on behaviour 
such as social and civic responsibility or appropriate behaviour for older people. 
31 Quoted in Ishii-kuntz (182:1-2). 
32 The word "transform" is mechanistic and inappropriate for describing humans. 
33 
"Digesting" implies humans are some kind of fodder or food. He adds that society has the job of " ... 
converting and digesting them [youth] ... ". The researcher was unsure whether Coleman was writing 
seriously, because to refer to other humans as "barbarians" and as bits of society, is inadequate 
description and dehumanising. 
34 "Blending" is mechanistic and inappropriate for describing humans. 
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Lozier (256:288) corroborated this when finding that success in late life can be seen in 
terms of meeting social expectations and displaying appropriate behaviour. 
Finding that expected or appropriate behaviour is that which adheres to society's 
norms (210:60) raises the question of what society's norms are. The researcher found 
that identifying some of society's norms is not as straightforward as it might seem. 
Firstly, norms can be mere preferences for everyday conduct, something Coleman (63:15) 
drew attention to when he reported that a number of writers of conduct-of-life literature 
frequently referred to young men in the eighteen to thirty age bracket as giddy, 
romantic and almost harebrained. Similarly, Sinha (396:56) reported that in some 
regional dialects of India the term "donkey's twenty-five" is used to refer to youth, 
meaning that they are rash, indiscreet, impulsive, foolish, unwise and 
impetuous. On the other hand, norms can be moral preferences: for example, most 
people would not dispute that laziness at work and unfaithfulness in marriage, are 
unacceptable ways of behaving. Then again, norms can be of such force that they become 
laws: jail penalties are imposed for some instances of, for example, abusing one's 
children, stealing, being drunk and disorderly, and physically assaulting 
others to achieve one's goals. Most people would agree that the examples of behaviour 
listed are inappropriate and consequently, unadultlike. 
Although most of the behaviours just listed would be recognised as unadultlike 
behaviours, the researcher identified seven main difficulties in attempting to use socially 
acceptable behaviour as a way of judging a person's adulthood. 
a) The arbitrariness of a list of behaviours 
Birmingham (32: 17) and Nicholson (303:98) illustrated that long lists of differing 
expressions of what adult behaviour is, are obtained when people of differing ages, 
social classes and races are questioned. Consequently, it would be possible for 
different researchers to include arbitrarily in a list, only those behaviours they 
thought were appropriate. Who decides on what is appropriate? 
b) Some acceptable behaviours are not acceptable in some instances 
Some people might assume that because laziness and disloyalty are unacceptable 
behaviours, their opposites, industriousness and loyalty are acceptable. While 
industriousness and loyalty are acceptable in many circumstances, there are many in 
which they are not. For example, bank robbers may be industrious and many Nazis 
were loyal to Hitler. Coleman (63:3) listed amongst others, the following capabilities 
of adulthood: self-direction, self-management, capability as consumer of cultural 
riches of civilization, intense concentrated involvement in an activity, and (63:100) a 
developed sense of hierarchy of values. However, to be consumers of cultural 
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riches, some people might apply their self-management and intensely concentrated 
activity to stealing art treasures. This would be regarded as unacceptable behaviour 
by most people. The researcher realised that to obtain a fundamental description of 
adulthood, it would be necessary to seek the underlying principles which people 
use to judge whether a behaviour is deemed socially appropriate or 
not. 
c) Some inappropriate behaviours are appropriate in some instances 
In general, one would not expect adults to use violence to solve disputes. However, 
for the researcher and probably many people, violence would be justified in 
prott'1cting an elderly person who was being attacked by seve.ral robbers. Indeed, to 
ignore the pligh.t of the victim, would be undesirable behaviour. The researche0 
again realised that the search for a universal description of adulthood would entail · 
.... 
fii;iding· the funiiamental criteria that make violence acceptable behaviour in some 
settings and not in others. 
,, 
d) Some behaviours are practised simultaneously 
It is possible that a person could be romantic and impulsive, but at the same time, be 
industrious, faithful in marriage and a loving parent. Several questions arose from 
this fact. Firstly, does the degree of appropriateness of each behaviour differ? 
Secondly, if it does, then at what point does a number of minor inappropriate 
behaviours equal one major inappropriate behaviour? More importantly, what 
fundamental principles are used to "weight" the appropriateness of behaviours? 
Thirdly, if someone practises one or more behaviours which are inappropriate, and 
consequently loses adult status, can one re-gain adult status? Examples in politics 
and business in the United Kingdom indicate that one can: some individuals 
involved in fraud, deceit and extra-marital affairs, resign and a few years later ·are 
elected or offered high office, with their adult status apparently restored. 
e) Appropriateness of behaviour seems to changes with age 
The fact that adulthood is frequently conceived of in terms of adhering to social 
norms is frequently mentioned in a disguised way in the sociological literature by 
discussions on social ageing35. Neugarten36, Birren et al (33:17) and Kimmel 
(210:59) found that humans are equipped with a social age clock or age norms 
(210:55) which define how people should behave at certain ages. The term "should" 
indicates that there are certain norms of behaviour regarded as occurring in 
35 Is there such a phenomenon as social ageing? Kimmel (210:30) found that a person may be 
chronologically thirty five, but socially twenty one, meaning that he is still in training for a 
profession, unmarried and childless. People may perceive various ages, but this does not mean that 
they apply to everyone. 
36 Paraphrased by Turner and Helms (424:2!)., 
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adulthood and others not. Conducting oneself as an adult incorporates doing certain 
things adults are expected to do. Havighurst (157:271) found that in middle 
adulthood, old leisure-time habits such as strenuous game~. courting and social 
dancing become inappropriate and lose their attractiveness. "Adultlike" for 
Coleman (63:110), meant narrower and more focussed interest patterns and more 
sedentary leisure activities. Evans (101:39) also found that social norms are 
frequently allocated to various ages. He found that: "Obviously, being an adult has 
different meanings at different times. The adulthood of a grandson is clearly 
different from the adulthood of a grandfather." 
Like the researcher, Lehr (240:101) found age norms are applied inconsistently and 
are misleading. Many people of all ages enjoy social dancing, for example, and there 
is no immediately evident reason why they should not. Nor is there an adequate 
reason why contravening the social norm of not 'acting one's age' indicates lack 
of adulthood. Again the researcher realised that the search for a universal description 
of adulthood would entail finding the fundamental principles (criteria) that 
lead some people to decide that a certain behaviour is acceptable at one age and not at 
another. 
f) Societies may have different norms 
It is a fact that different societies have different customs and traditions and that the 
criteria for acceptable behaviour arising from these will be different. What might be 
considered an adult way to behave in one society might be considered unadultlike 
behaviour in another. For example, in most societies today head-hunting to prove 
one's adulthood is regarded as inappropriate. In the UK, the circumcision of young 
girls, marriage of people under the age of consent and the sacrificial slaughter of 
animals is outlawed. This relativity of regional norms is a considerable difficulty in 
the concept of adulthood as adhering to socially approved behaviour. 
Various religions' ideals of adulthood also illustrate the inadequacy of societal norms 
for describing adulthood. For example, Bouwsman (42), Lapidus (236), Wei-ming 
(447), Rudolph and Rudolph (365) and Rohlen (362) presented findings about 
adulthood from Christian, Islamic, Confucian, Rajput37 and Japanese 
spiritualism perspectives, respectively. As Rudolph and Rudolph (365:145) 
found, there are variations even within the same tradition: in Indian adulthood each 
of the four social orders Brahman, V aish, Kayastha and Rajput, involve different 
adulthoods. Jordan (195:1) found that in the USA, the multiplicity of cultural 
traditions leads to different concepts of adulthood. If each society, religion or 
37 One of the social orders in the Indian caste system. 
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class/caste requires different norms to be met for adulthood, then a universal 
description would seem impossible. 
Just as the reader might , the researcher wondered how, in the face of considerable 
evidence of different kinds of adulthood, the researcher can find albeit initially, that 
there are universal norms of acceptable behaviour. In a very preliminary way the 
researcher considered that the many different adulthoods (modes of acceptable 
behaviour) arise from different expressions of the essence of adulthood 
(universal norms of acceptable behaviour). The current research is partly 
oriented to testing this initial finding. 
g) Some of a society's norms may conflict with personal norms 
There is ample evidence that in some societies the expected behaviour is so abhorrent 
to some people that they choose not to respond as expected. Allport (9: 182) found 
that acculturating for the requirements of adult life, does not necessarily mean 
making someone more adult. In referring to people in psychotherapy being 
adjusted to society, he (9:305) found that: "Society itself is sick. Why, then, make a 
patient content with injustices, hypocrisies, and wars? ... It is doubtful that we 
can accept society (any society) as a standard for a healthy personality." The idea 
of transcending social values is expressed by Das (74:101-102) when he noted the 
distinction between man-in-the-world and the renouncer (sanyasi) in Hindu 
philosophy: "... the sanyasi, stands for a wider morality of humanity, 
transcending the close morality of particularistic bounded groups ... the sanyasi 
can be seen as representing the whole society at one and the same time, whereas 
those who are within the society can represent only parts of it." Thorat (418:80) 
found similarly during his investigations into the Hindu caste system. 
The findings of Allport, Das, Thorat and others, presented in the previous subparagraphs 
indicated that adulthood as socially appropriate behaviour is not the most adequate 
description of adulthood. Allport implied that there is some other standard of 
behaviour for a healthy personality; Das' finding led the researcher to find that the 
sanyasi is more adult than the man-in-the-world, and Thorat implied that those who 
reject the caste system are more adult than those who accept and promote it. The 
researcher considered that this transcending of social norms in some instances, is what 
Kohlberg38 referred to as the postconventional stage, in his theory of moral reasoning, 
and what Jung39 referred to as deliverance from convention. The term "transcend" has 
been used summarily in this chapter, and to avoid misunderstanding a preliminary 
definition is now given. 
38 According to Weathersby (446:53). 
39 According to Ryff (368:77). 
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Maslow (270:259-269) gave thirty five instances of transcendence, of which one is related 
directly to culture/society. Transcending one's culture entails being still rooted in it but 
rising above it, being independent of it in various ways and able to examine it in a 
detached and objective way. Maslow (270:260) referred to the "resistance to 
enculturation of the self-actualizing person", and Ogilvie (315:28) corroborated this 
finding when he found that the self-actualiser rejects the dominance of the socialised 
super-ego and " ... strives to determine his own interpretation of reality and to be self-
responsible ... ". 
Other examples of transcending social norms as being more appropriate 
behaviour, than adhering to some social norms, are those individuals who 
opposed slavery in the USA and other countries; opposed forced child labour in the cotton 
mills in England and opposed apartheid in the Republic of South Africa. As the reader 
might imagine, the researcher encountered considerable difficulty at this stage of the 
research. Careful phenomenological study up until this point revealed that adulthood as 
practising socially appropriate behaviour was the most adequate 
description of what it means to be adult. However, several examples were found of 
instances where socially appropriate behaviour might be considered 
undesirable and that it was appropriate behaviour to refuse to act according to 
social norms. For example, Birren and Renner (36:20-21) found that many social norms 
were superficial and not adhered to, and that many older people felt that some socially 
unapproved behaviours had to be undertaken to succeed. 
The contradiction just stated, revealed that adulthood as adhering· to socially acceptable 
behaviour, is inadequate for describing fundamental adulthood. It was realised that the 
search would have to extend beyond socially approved behaviour. Since the 
researcher was seeking a fundamental description of adulthood, he was simultaneously 
seeking a fundamental description of what appropriate behaviour is. A fundamental 
description of what appropriate behaviour is would be a description applicable to different 
societies and different roles, and to the same societies and roles over time. 
As Beyers Nel (27:7) expressed it, the researcher was searching for the " ... qualities 
demand by adulthood." Friedenberg (112:248) found that the mature person is 
recognised by a fundamental style of life: a person may know what must be done to 
be adult, but may not do it - may not behave appropriately. Some fellow-researchers might 
think that a fundamental description of adulthood as fundamentally· appropriate behaviour 
is impossible. However, the results of the research so far indicated that a fundamental 
description was possible and that the researcher had to seek it. It was expected that there 
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would be considerable difficulties in attempting to extend the explication of fundamental 
adulthood to fundamentally appropriate behaviour. 
Evans ( 101 :36) found that humans need guiding principles and a strong enough sense 
of self to act on them, if they are to understand their proper role and be able to fulfil it. 
He added that these principles have to be learned. The researcher realised that the current 
research had become one of seeking fundamental principles which would assist 
people, no matter what their age, culture, historicity and role or experience, to answer the 
questions: "What must I do to continue to be considered as being adult in a 
particular role or in the face of an experience which is joyous or sad? What are the 
demands of adulthood that must be met: how does the ideal of adulthood require 
me to respond to the crisis I am now encountering or role I am now undertaking? 
How then do some researchers indicate their awareness of the existence of fundamentally 
appropriate behaviour? The researcher considered it significant that researchers using 
psychological and sociological perspectives very frequently used the words 
"responsible" and responsibility" to imply adulthood. It became evident that the kind 
of behaviour required for a person to be recognised as being adult, is responsible 
behaviour. 
5.0 ADULTHOOD AS BEHAVING RESPONSIBLY 
So many findings regarding the relationship between adulthood and responsibility 
were found that they cannot be listed in this chapter because of limited space. Only a few 
examples are now provided to ground the finding that fundamentally appropriate 
behaviour is expressed by many researchers as responsible behaviour. 
• Writers' in the early and middle nineteenth century (63:16) implied that what makes 
youth, youth, is irresponsibility, implying that adulthood is adulthood because of 
responsibility. Beyers Nel (27:19) found that the cardinal aspect of adulthood is 
being responsible. Maslow (270:45) found that taking responsibility is a great 
step towards self-actualisation, and Warren (444:82) found that the hope of the 
adult educator is that adult learners will become more responsible. Ogilvie 
(315:28) found that the self-actualiser is self-responsible and accepts 
responsibility for his own life. Oberholzer and Grey ling (311 :55) and Bergevin 
(26:9) corroborated this. Jensen et al (193:29) corroborated this when they defined 
an adult as someone who has assumed responsibility for himself and usually 
for others. Similarly, Stegner (404:40) found that sobriety and responsibility are 
basic to most definitions of adulthood. 
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• Havighurst (157:142), when referring to the person's desire to achieve, mentioned 
socially responsible behaviour, and mature behaviour is defined by Shrag. 
(380:65) as a greater sense of responsibility. Kakar (200:121) found that both 
the social and individual aspects of psychoanalytic notions of adulthood are prevaded 
by ideals of moderation, control and responsibility. Similarly, Erikson (98:26) 
found that fulfilment of the individual life cycle depends on remaining responsible. 
• It is understandable that Kimmel (210:27) referred to the tasks of raising children, 
producing in society, and earning a stable income as responsibilities. Evans 
(101:39) found that for all people " ... adulthood is the acceptance of 
responsibility for living independently in society." Havighurst (157:268) found 
that in middle adulthood, society makes maximum demands upon men and women 
for social and civic responsibility. 
• Turner and Helms ( 424:55) found that: "Clear-cut standards of responsibility are 
needed so that individuals can define their own adult roles." Coleman (63:53-54) 
found that maturity is achieved by assuming responsibility for the well-being 
of another: "Marriage ... signals the acceptance of responsibility for the welfare 
of the spouse; parenthood obligates one to accept responsibility for the welfare 
of the child." He (63:63) also identified economic adulthood as responsibility to 
meet one's obligations for oneself; familial adulthood (marriage) as the 
responsibility of maintaining a separate household, and parenthood as 
responsibility for children. The researcher considered that "assumption of 
responsibility for the well-being of another" again indicated the andragogic. 
• Turner and Helms (424:24) indicated how children in the middle ages took on adult. 
responsibilities. However, if children take on adult responsibilities then are they 
not being adult for the time that they have the role? Similarly, Kennedy (205:208) 
related adulthood to community responsibilities and responsibilities for 
determining one's own future. Coleman found that the opportunities of 
responsibility have been withheld from youth and they have been given 
insufficient" ... opportunity for responsible action ... ". He (63:vii) also found that 
"These activities [working] of young persons included the opportunities for 
responsible action ... in short, all that is implied by becoming adult ... ". 
• Kimmel (210:30-31) claimed that a forty year-old will have greater family 
responsibility; Neugarten, Moore and Lowe40 found that both men and women 
have most responsibilities in their thirties and forties; and Benaim41 referred to the 
40 Quoted by Kimmel (210:6). 
41 Reported by Bischof(37:3). 
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middle years as the responsible years. The researcher does not need to alert the 
reader to the inadequacy of equating responsibility with chronological age, but offers 
these instances to show that responsibility is a quality by which researchers recognise 
being adult. 
• That there is a relationship between responsibility and education is illustrated by 
various school curriculum documents. McCool (274:3) found that the school should 
be a caring community and that this implies young people taking responsibility 
for themselves, and (274:4) that the aim of education is to help people to be, 
amongst other things, responsible for their own actions and to take 
responsibility for their own development. Similarly, the Scottish Consultative 
Council on the Curriculum (59:5) found that one of the long term aims of social 
education is to prepare children "... to participate fully, effectively and with 
confidence as responsible adults ... ",and (59:10) to accept responsibilities. 
• Kimmel (210:5) and Nicholson (303:98) found that some anthropologists regard the 
series of tests of courage and endurance in tribal societies and events in some western 
societies such as the bar mitzvah, confirmation, marriage ceremony and even the 
awarding of a driving licence, are instituted to initiate people into new -
responsibilities. Havighurst (157:143) corroborated this when he indicated that the 
adolescent is assigned responsibility for continuing tribal life. A ritual is 
experienced for making a young person responsible for the welfare of society. 
Coleman (63:112) found "adolescence" and Kenniston42 found "youth", to be 
periods of life before the assumption of adult responsibilities. 
• The mention of a driving licence again raises the question of legal adulthood 
described earlier43. Society attempts to control which individuals undertake certain 
activities through as system of legal ages. Societies do this because it is assumed that 
some people can only be responsible (130:71) for their behaviour in certain 
activities at particular ages. For example, in a particular society it may be assumed 
that a person is adult at age eighteen for drinking purposes because he or she will act 
responsibly towards alcohol at that age. As Coleman (63:143) found, the legal age 
of majority is " ... the age at which one is deemed legally competent to assume 
responsibility for his person and property ... ". Lapidus (236:93) found that the 
Islamic adulthood ideal, (mukallaf) is of a legally and morally responsible person. 
As Coleman (63:9) indicated, sometimes people need a piece of paper to have their 
responsibility recognised. However, as Goldstein (130:84) found, to be an adult in 
law is not necessarily to be an adult. To be able to do the work of adults one needs 
42 Mentioned in Coleman (63:112). 
43 Chapter Two, Paragraph 2.0. 
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formal certification whereas in the past, parents assessed a child's ability to do a task 
with responsibility attached to it. Societies can indicate that some people are no 
longer considered responsible for any activity by legally banning or disqualifying 
(130:82) them from doing it, as in the case of those banned for careless 
(irresponsible) driving. Consequently, it is safe to state that being responsible is 
the underlying principle of adulthood as a legally approved age. 
• It has already been explained44 how, within certain Hindu cultures in India, the life or 
death of a father affects a person's adult status. Similarly, among the Punjabis, the 
sons continue under the authority of the father, being bound by his decisions and 
paying him their wages. It is self-evident that it is impossible to automatically make 
someone responsible by legally pronouncing that they are responsible. The reader 
would probably be able to recount many daily instances of people being regarded as 
legally responsible, but not actualising that responsibility. 
The researcher considered that the evidence just presented was sufficient to find, in an 
initial way, that adulthood as sociological attainment can be better expressed as 
adulthood as being responsible. Coleman (63: 110) provided further corroboration 
when he found that concern and responsibility for the other is an ideal of 
adulthood. Consequently, it was found that the most adequate description of what 
adulthood is, was the concept of adulthood as being responsible. This finding 
implies that being responsible is the essentiality of adulthood. No matter what other 
criteria are used to describe adulthood, if responsibility is not included, the phenomenon 
being described is not adulthood. Consequently, to continue seeking for the most adequate 
description of adulthood, the researcher had to consider the question: What does it 
mean to be responsible? 
44 Chapter Two, Paragraph 2.0. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ADULTHOOD AS BEING-RESPONSIBLE, BEING-RESPONSIBLE AS 
BEING-MORAL, AND BEING-MORAL AS BEING-ETHICAL 
1.0 INTRODUCTI&N 
It is safe to state that there are extensive implications for the way adulthood is regarded 
and studied, if fellow-researchers corroborate the finding that the most adequate 
description of adulthood is adulthood as being responsible. Consequently, before 
reporting the results of examining adulthood as being responsible, the researcher 
considered it necessary to present results of further reflection on the methodology 
employed in the research. Why the researcher employed hyphens in "being-
responsible" and "being-moral" in the title of this chapter, is explained later in this 
chapterl. 
1.1 A PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH: THE MOST APPROPRIATE WAY 
OF STUDYING ADULTHOOD? 
It is a trui~m that the question: What does it mean to be responsible? is a philosophical 
one. Sharp (389: 17) also found that the idea of responsibility needs to be explored in a 
philosophical way. In the introduction to this thesis2 it was shown how most 
researchers have found that a study of adulthood requites an interdisciplinary approach. 
Bischof (37:4) corroborated this when he found five methods for finding out who is an 
adult: historical, biological, psychological, statistical and miscellaneous methods. Schaie 
and Willis (377:18) gave six theoretical approaches to adult development namely, 
behavioural/social/learning, psychoanalysis, humanistic, individual differences, 
information processing, and the dialectical approach. 
These methods (except information processing)3 might well be appropriate for examining 
the problems and opportunities people encounter in certain chronological age spans. 
However, from the evidence so far presented in this thesis, it is safe to state that these 
methods cannot uncover what adulthood itself, is. The researcher found that the most 
adequate way to research humankind as whole beings and to find out the fundamental 
reasons for human responses to any event or experience, is philosophical method. 
1 Paragraph 2.0. 
2 Chapter One, Paragraph 3.3. 
3 It is inadequate description to describe humans in mechanical terms. 
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Some psychologically and sociologically orientated researchers4 may dislike the finding 
just stated and may attempt to show it to be incorrect. For example, Kimmel (210:8) 
referred to armchair theories that have not been empirically tested. However, as will now 
be shown, many fellow-researchers including some psychologists, indicated that a 
philosophical approach could be more effective than other methods for finding out 
what adulthood is. 
• Becker (24: 148) found that some researchers are intuitively aware of a fundamental 
reality by which people live, and found that humans are governed by deep and 
relatively unchanging components of the personality. Cone (65:93) noted the 
influence of existential philosophy on therapeutic theory and it is also relevant that 
Merriam (280:v) has written on the philosophical foundations of adult education. 
However, care is required because, as Maslow (270:164) found, some philosophy is 
a technology and not a philosophy of ends which he claimed puts it together with 
inappropriate methods for studying humans. Consequently, Katchadourian's 
(202:49) finding that defining adulthood is basically a taxonomical venture is 
inadequate. 
• A further item of evidence is most relevant to this study. To uncover their 
implications for adult education, Merriam (280) undertook a survey of almost all 
major psychological and sociologically theories regarding adulthood. She (280:21) 
concluded that adult development is an intriguing and frustrating area of inquiry, and 
(280:24) that there are still many contradictory . findings and perplexing 
questions. It is not surprising that her section on implications for practice (280:24-31) 
contained numerous questions which cannot be answered by developmental theory. 
• Datan (75:9), quoting Kierkegaard, found that: how we think about adulthood is 
determined by our underlying viewpoint on the life of a person. Troll (423: 1) 
found similarly. Das (74:89) found that: "An enquiry into the nature of adulthood in 
India has to necessarily begin with the concept of the person." Kakar (200: 119) 
quoted Schaeffer who found that both individual goals and functioning within a social 
environment are embedded in a vision of reality, a shared image of the nature of 
humankind and the world in which humankind lives. Erikson (98:19) also referred 
to all-embracing religious and ideological world visions related to visions of 
adulthood. Weathersby ( 446:52) in explaining her theory of ego development, 
referred to world views and to Loevinger (another ego developmentalist) using 
insights form philosophy. 
4 Some researchers who are neither psychologists nor sociologists may use psychological and 
sociological approaches. Consequently, the apparently long-winded phrase "psychologically and 
sociologically orientated researchers" is employed. 
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• Geiger5 found that in his later writings, Maslow became more philosophical and 
realised that it was impossible to separate the pursuit of psychological truth from 
philosophical questions. Geiger quoted from letters in which Maslow held mental 
dialogues with Plato, Socrates, Bergson, Spinoza, Locke and Hobbes. Maslow, 
according to Warren (444:21), decided that the good man may best be defined in 
terms of the degree to which he fulfils the definition of man; the degree to 
which he is fully human; the degree to which those capacities which are distinctive 
of the human being, which are not held in common with other animals, are 
developed and actualized. Maslow (270: 122) indicated that philosophical 
anthropology might be helpful for an investigation of humanness. This 
corroborated the researcher's explication of the role of philosophical anthropology 
earlier in this thesis6. 
• Okun 7 found that maturity has, in addition to the biological and psychological, a 
philosophical dimension. In questions such as What determines our moral 
conduct? Allport (8:55) found that: "There are, to be sure, ultimate problems of 
philosophy and theology that psychology cannot even attempt to solve." Kidd 
(207:16) found that the concepts encompassed in the ideals of Maslow and other 
humanistic psychologists were not invented by psychologists but by philosophers, 
mystics and poets. Kastenbaum (201 :47) referred to the potential of the 
phenomenological approach for describing adulthood. In addition, Maslow 
(269: 16) found that the efforts of some existential philosophers " ... will not only 
enrich psychology. It may also be an additional push towards the establishment of 
another branch of psychology ... ontopsychology". 
The researcher's initial finding at the beginning of the research, that a philosophical 
approach would be necessary to uncover the fundamentals of adulthood, was supported 
by the evidence just reported. Consequently, it was surprising that Stone ( 406: 106) found 
that researchers who work on the curricuium for adults are moving away from the 
philosophical approach. In addition, it was anticipated that continuing the research would 
test Wei-ming's (447:122) finding that:" ... although adulthood can be recognised, it can 
never be defined." If a fundamental description of adulthood can be obtained, it would 
assist in exposing what Rosenblatt (363:66) referred to as adulthood as a pose, a set 
of trappings without concern for integrity, or emotional and intellectual responsibility. 
5 In Maslow (270:xxi). 
6 Chapter One, Paragraph 3.3.2. 
7 Paraphrased by Turner and Helms (424:53). 
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Having again grounded the fact that the research was necessarily philosophical, the 
researcher proceeded to examine what it means to be responsible. It was revealed in 
the previous chapter how being responsible is the essentiality in adulthood. As 
anticipated, education is frequently perceived as assisting people to become more 
responsible. For example, Sharp (389:31) found that more conscious efforts are needed in 
teaching responsibility in schools. Consequently, to find out what adulthood is, one must 
find out what it means to be responsible. Maslow (270:45) corroborated the necessity of 
examining responsibility: "This matter of responsibility has been little studied. It doesn't 
tum up in our textbooks, for who can study responsibility in white rats?" However, since 
Maslow's time there has been considerable philosophical research <>n responsibility8. 
2. 0 SOME PHENOMENA NAMED BY "BEING RESPONSIBLE" 
The researcher realised that much of the writing about responsibility comprised 
descriptions of many different theories of responsibility. There is also considerable debate 
on what is, and what is not, a responsible action. Sharp (389: 17) admitted that giving 
criteria for what being responsible is, is very difficult. Since an existential 
phenomenological approach requires going beyond individual instances of being 
responsible and beyond examining theories of responsibility, it was realised that it was not 
necessary to study in detail the extensive literature on responsibility. This decision was 
not disrespectful to fellow-researchers, and was based only on grounds of scientific 
requirement. A phenomenological approach required finding out what being responsible 
is, as a fundamental and universal phenomenon. 
For example, one could ask a child (John) who is misbehaving, the following question: 
"Now John, is hitting James being responsible?" The questioner is referring to a specific 
action of a specific person in a specific setting. However, the researcher was interested in 
individual examples of being responsible only in as far as they could assist in describing 
the phenomenon at the radix (the fundimentum, the essence, the '-ness') of all instances 
of being responsible. Just as one can search for the tree-ness of all trees, so the 
researcher was required to search for the being responsible-ness in all instances of · 
being responsible. The use of the term "responsible-ness" indicated that being responsible 
is a continuum. This was corroborated by Sharp (389:21 ): "We should forget the idea of 
seeing it [responsibility] as an individual 'something' that pupils either have or do not 
have. It is not like that. They are all responsibly in their own way." 
To distinguish between the one fundamental phenomenon of being responsible 
which is at the root of (is expressed through) many different instances of being 
responsible (responsible behaviour), the researcher decided to use a hyphen in the former. 
8 For example, Glover's (127) book is 197 pages; Jonas' (194), 247 pages; Niebuhr's (304), 178 pages; 
Pritchard's (329) 269 pages; and Gustafson and Lancey's (145) 310 pages. 
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Consequently, the researcher considered that being-responsible (with the hyphen) was 
an adequate way to express the universal phenomenon that had to be sought in this 
research so as to provide a fundamental description of adulthood. The hyphenated 
term "being-responsible" might appear unusual to some readers: it is certainly used 
sparsely in the literature. However, the researcher struggled without success to find 
another term that could adequately name the universal in all acts of being responsible. 
The researcher realised that in using the term "being adult" earlier in this thesis9 to 
distinguish the human from the merely biological (an adult), he was also, unknowingly 
attempting to express the universal in the varieties of human adultness. It was only the 
uncovering of the distinction between being-responsible and being responsible, that 
enabled the researcher to find that he had been attempting to name two phenomena with 
"being adult", namely, being adult (used to name any of the many variations) and 
being-adult (the one universal, the '-ness' in all instances of being adult). It is safe to 
state that being-responsible is synonymous with being-adult. 
The implication that being-responsible is a fundamental phenomenon is given by Kleiber 
(214:240). He found that with graduation from high school or college there is simply a 
replacement of one set of responsibilities for another. In other words, being-
responsible is always there, but is manifest (expressed) in different ways. So 
when Evans (101:44) implied that the 20-year-old needing to find his way into the world 
of adulthood has different responsibilities facing him from the retired person, this is true. 
However, having different responsibilities does not deny the ever-present- the universal 
of being-responsible. 
In summary, the researcher realised that the research had to continue by asking the 
question: What is being-responsible? As in all scientific work, one must begin by 
observing what is. It was decided to first examine some findings of fellow-researchers 
and then undertake radical reflection on these in the light of personal experience. 
A minor methodological problem was encountered in examining the relevant literature. 
Many fellow-researchers appeared not to be aware of the distinction between being-
responsible and particular instances of being responsible, just as the researcher had not 
been aware of the distinction between being adult and being-adult. Consequently, many 
researchers used the one term "being responsible" (without the hyphen) to name both 
phenomena. It was decided that when it became evident that fellow-researchers were 
attempting to describe the universal, their definitions are described in this thesis as "being-
responsible". 
9 Chapter Two, Paragraph 3.4. 
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2 .1 BEING-RESPONSIBLE AS BEING THE CAUSE OF SOMETIDNG 
As Stein (405:1222) reported, "responsible" means chargeable with being the author or 
cause of something. Consequently, one can say: "That man was responsible for the car 
accident" or, "Mr Jones was responsible for the company's excellent sales results." If, in 
general, people consider the result caused to be favourable, the person responsible is 
praised and may be rewarded. If the result caused is considered unfavourably (a car 
accident) the responsible person is blamed and perhaps punished. 
However, it is safe to state that being the cause of something is not the phenomenon 
people have in mind when they think of adulthood. This can be illustrated 
straightforwardly by seemingly paradoxical statements such as: "It was the 
irresponsibility of the man that made him responsible for the accident", and: "The 
man was responsible because he was not responsible". In other words, it was the 
man not being-responsible, that led to him being responsible (the cause of) for the 
accident. This means that being-responsible has a more fundamental meaning than being 
the cause of something. 
2. 2 BEING-RESPONSIBLE AS HAVING RESPONSIBILITY 
Babcock Grove (14:1935) and Stein (405:1222) found that being-responsible means 
accepting responsibility. For example, a person could say: "I accept responsibility for the 
car accident" or "I accept responsibility for not meeting our company's profit targets." 
Haydon (161:47) called this "role-responsibility". In both these instances, people have 
admitted that they were the cause of something happening that should not have happened, 
and for something not happening that should have happened. In both instances the 
expectations of others have not been met. Other road users expected the car driver to drive 
responsibly, and senior managers in a company expected their subordinate to do all 
possible (act responsibly) to meet the profit targets. 
In the two instances just given, people have accepted responsibility after the event. 
However, it is common knowledge that people can accept responsibility before the event. 
For example, one might say: "I would like the responsibility of leading that department", 
or "I want more responsibility", or "I accept the responsibility senior managers are 
offering me for meeting our company's profit targets." These examples show that 
responsibility can also be given and accepted prior to any event happening. When a person 
is given responsibility before the event, this indicates that the person is expected to cause 
something, and by implication, not cause something else. In addition, a person accepting 
responsibility, is an implicit acknowledgement that he/she is aware of the expectation to 
cause something and not cause something else. 
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However, for the researcher, being-the-one-who-is-expected-to-cause (being-the-one-
who-has-responsibility) is not the radical phenomenon people have in mind when they 
think of adulthood. For example, senior managers might say: "We cannot give any more 
responsibility to Mr Smith because he is sometimes irresponsible." Similarly, as already 
explained IO, law-makers in some countries do not allow people under the chronological 
age of eighteen years to drive a car because they are not considered responsible enough at 
that age. 
In addition, even if people are given and accept responsibility, they may not act 
responsibly. In other words, the responsible person (the person given responsibility) may 
not be responsible; may not fulfil the expectations. The researcher realised the 
distinction between the responsible person and a responsible person. The examples of 
responsibility so far, have been of the responsible person, that is, the person 
responsible - for the accident or for completing a project successfully. These meanings 
of "responsible" do not assist in explaining what a responsible person is, that is, what 
being-responsible is. 
It is safe to state that people are not usually given responsibility if they are not trusted to 
meet others' expectations. For example, awarding a young person a driving licence is an 
acknowledgement that he or she is trusted to meet the expectation of driving safely. 
Giving children responsibility of a Saturday morning job to eain pocket money is a 
recognition that they are trusted to meet the expectations of the employer and customer (to 
do the job properly - responsibly) 11. Consequently, it is safe to state that responsibility is 
awarded only to those who are considered to be trustworthy (worthy of trust). 
2. 3 BEING-RESPONSIBLE AS BEING TRUSTWORTHY 
Stein (405:1222) found that being-responsible means being reliable and dependable; 
Babcock Grove (14:1935) found that it means being trustworthy, and Simpson and 
Weiner (394:Vol VIII:542) found that it means, being reliable, trustworthy, of good 
credit and repute. Haydon (161:47) called this "virtue-responsibility". Further 
evidence for being-responsible meaning being trustworthy, is given by statements such as: 
able to discharge obligations (405:1222), capable of fulfilling an obligation or trust 
(394:Vol VII1:542) and able to answer for one's obligations (14:1935) (161:55) (145:6-
7). Initially, the researcher considered that it would be necessary to further the research by. 
explicating the meanings of "reliable", "dependable" and "trustworthy". However, there 
were two main reasons why this was not done. 
10 In Chapter Four, Paragraph 4.0. 
11 The researcher became more and more aware of how, at the doctoral level of study, using everyday 
language can lead to confusion. For example, one could say: "To conduct his responsibility 
responsibly." 
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Firstly, on examining a number of dictionaries, it became evident that there was 
considerable circular definition, one term being defined in terms of the others. For 
example, someone who is trustworthy is reliable and dependable, and is capable of 
responsibility. Secondly, using an existential phenomenological approach requires one to 
ask direct questions of the phenomenon. Consequently, the researcher asked: "Trusted to 
do what, relied upon to do what and depended upon to do what? 
It has already been shown in this chapter that people are considered responsible when they 
meet the expectations of others. In the same way, a person is recognised as trustworthy by 
consistently meeting·others' expectations. Consequently, people are considered reliable or 
dependable when they do what they say they will do or what they are told to do. 
This finding is corroborated by a finding of Simpson and Weiner (394:Vol VIII:542) that 
"responsible" is derived from respondsere (re-spondere ) which means to pledge, 
promise or warrant. The fact that responsibility is always a relation between 
persons ( 41 :235) - a relationship of trust - was an indication that agogy was involved. It 
was realised that the possible relationship between trustworthiness, responsibleness and 
adulthood, would have to be investigated later in the researchl2. 
It has already been shown how expectations might be expressed explicitly in definite 
instructions such as to meet a company's profit target. It has also been shown that 
expectations can be expressed implicitly in, for example, a person being awarded a driving 
licence. The researcher had so far concentrated on examples of others' expectations with 
regard to very specific tasks (meeting profit targets and driving safely). However, almost 
all people are aware, to some degree, of the implicit trust placed in (responsibility given 
to) every human, to meet the expectations of how we as humans act towards others in 
everyday life. There is implicit trust that: people will not orally or physically abuse others: 
the shopkeeper will give the correct change; people will dress in a way that will not upset 
others; we will assist another who falls down ill in the street, and so on. 
The researcher distinguished between being trustworthy with regard to meeting technical 
requirements and with regard to meeting the expectations of interpersonal actions. Is this 
distinction valid? For example, the marketing manager of a major airline may be 
responsible for increasing the number of first class passengers who fly with her company 
by ten percent. Senior managers consider the marketing manager trustworthy enough to 
meet their expectations (to be given the responsibility) and she will be held accountable if 
the trust is not fulfilled. 
12 Chapter Six, Paragraph 2.5. 
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The trust may be fulfilled by an innovative and expensive marketing strategy. However, it 
might also be fulfilled by finding ways to "steal" passengers from a rival airline by 
illegally breaking into its computer system and taking names and addresses of its first 
class customers. It is safe to state that even if the expectations (targets) of senior managers 
are met, achieving the target by being dishonest would disqualify the marketing manager, 
in the minds of most people, from being called "responsible". Indeed, if the marketing 
manager was caught and the matter became public, she would in all likelihood be 
dismissed. Even if her senior managers secretly approved of the dishonesty, told her to do 
it, and she was not caught, this would not invalidate the fact that she behaved 
irresponsibly. 
Another example shows this distinction more clearly. In a team of thieves, a young thief 
who does what he is told, does not tell on his fellow-thieves when caught, and achieves 
his weekly target income from thieving, might be considered trustworthy (responsible) by 
other, more experienced, thieves. However, most people, will regard the young thieve's, 
and all thieves', actions as irresponsible (not worthy of trust). 
The two examples just given reveal that being trustworthy in terms of meeting technical 
goals is not sufficient for someone to be considered responsible: the targets one accepts 
and the way one achieves the targets (meets expectations) are also important. In other 
words, the trust (responsibility) must be an acceptable one and be fulfilled in an 
appropriate way - in a way that is approved or deemed acceptable by most people in a 
society. An examination of lexicographers' meanings of "respond" corroborated this. In a 
response, as opposed to a reaction, the physical actions, (behaviour) must satisfy or give 
satisfaction (394:Vol VIII:542). Similarly, one meaning of "responsive" is: readily 
inclined to respond appropriately (14:1935). Before considering just what a satisfactory 
or appropriate response is, the researcher considered that it would be helpful to reflect on 
the distinction between responding and responding appropriately. 
In dictionaries consulted for this research, one meaning of "responsible" is: being called 
upon to respond, being able to respond and being capable of responding. Indeed, 
although it is obsolete and rare, the word "responsable" is listed by Simpson and 
Weiner (394:Vol VIII:542) and mentioned by Ginsberg (126:234) as "response-
ability". For the researcher "responsable" indicated the unique human capability to 
respond. 
It is common knowledge that while humans and animals can react, only humans can 
respond. This means that only humans are capable of responding, that is, are 
responsable. Being responsable is different from, and involves more than being 
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reactable13 because, it requires being capable of rational conduct (394:Vol VIlI:542) 
(405:1222). A response indicates some thinking14 which involves choice and culminates 
in some physical action, even if that action is speech. It might be that most people in some 
instances are not aware of the choices they make, but choice is still involved. For 
example, a motorist who unconsciously decides on the spur of the moment to cut-off 
another motorist in retaliation, has probably done so without consciously thinking about 
the consequences of his actions. 
Although responsableness is a universal human phenomenon, some people unfortunately 
suffer brain damage or become mentally ill, and are not responsable. In addition, some 
people might deliberately or inadvertently, make themselves unresponsable, as for 
example, when they become drunk on alcohol. The reader may be aware that much of the 
determinism versus free will debate, is in fact, debate about whether humans are 
responsable beings and whether or not, in certain instances, some people lose for a time, 
their responsability and consequently should not be punished for their inappropriate 
responses (their irresponsibility)15. The scope of the research did not permit investigation 
of this debate. However, being responsable does not necessarily mean that people will 
make appropriate responses. For the researcher, the word "responsible" (with an "i") 
implies not only being responsable, but actually making a satisfactory or appropriate 
response. What is an appropriate response? 
When Tennyson and Strom (415:298) find that counsellors should go beyond 
responsibility to responsibleness, they imply being moral. Sharp (389:21) showed 
that being responsible requires some kind of criteria by which to recognise it: "When we 
talk about 'irresponsibility' or people not showing responsibility, what we are in fact 
talking about is the difference in value perspective, the difference in some shared 
acceptance of what is good, acceptable, correct behaviour." He (389:21) found that 
responsibility education involves inculcating or teaching moral capacity or 
capability, moral content and moral conformity. In addition, Gaden (117), Haydon 
(161:57), McLaughlin (276), Niebuhr (304:65), Pritchard (329:1) and Pybus (330) make 
it explicit that becoming responsible is a moral matter. 
Some lexicographers found that being responsible involves a sense of being morally 
accountable, and Friedenberg (112:249) found that all aspects of maturity have moral 
significance. Glover (127:1) referred to "moral responsibility". It is relevant that 
lexicographers do not express this sense as "being moral". Rather, they refer to being 
13 The researcher realised that "reactable" is not a word in the English language, but used it to contrast 
"responsable". 
14 The term "rational" cannot be used because it is ambiguous - it could mean capable of thought or, the 
different concept of, careful and systematic thought. 
15 As reported in several chapters in Glover (127). 
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morally accountable for one's actions (394:Vol Vlll:542); having the character of a 
free moral agent (14:1935) and having a capacity for moral decisions (405:1222). 
However, just as being responsable does not necessarily mean that someone is 
responsible, so being moralable (having a capacity for moral decisions) does not 
necessarily mean that someone is moral. Having made this distinction, it is possible to 
state that a more fundamental meaning of being-responsible is being moral. 
Consequently, being-responsible means both choosing or accepting moral goals 
(obligations) and fulfilling them morally. The researcher considered that Frankl ( 110: 109) 
corroborated this finding: "... responsibility is always responsibility for the 
actualization of values", and (110:59) "As long as he [humankind] remains conscious 
he is under obligations to realise values." 
2. 4 BEING-RESPONSIBLE AS BEING MORAL 
Initially, the researcher was worried about the finding that adulthood can best be described 
as being moral, because this meant that adulthood is essentially a moral 
concept. This was a concern because, from experience, the researcher considered that 
adulthood as a moral concept would be so foreign to many educationists in the United 
Kingdom that they would not even consider its validity. However, as in all science, it is 
not the researcher's task to persuade colleagues of the validity of results, but to encourage 
them to undertake the same reflection using the same methods to see if they arrive at 
similar results. 
The second reason for worry was this: as most philosophers who study morality and 
morals16 will know, humankind has been striving since its beginning to find out what it 
means to be moral. Attempts to answer this question have produced an extensive 
literature. It seemed, initially, that to continue to penetrate to the roots of what adulthood 
is, would involve the researcher in extensive examination of many moral theories, moral 
dilemmas and models of moral development. The thought of undertaking a thorough 
analysis of the kind just mentioned was daunting. However, on further reflection, it was 
realised that an existential phenomenological study would not require an examination of 
theories and models of morality or moral development. It was necessary to examine the 
phenomenon directly, by asking what it means to be moral. 
However, the reader may be aware that some psychologists have provided extensive 
descriptions of moral development. To simply state that these descriptions are not relevant 
to a philosophical study of being moral, may seem scientifically irresponsible. 
Consequently, before examining the phenomenon directly, the researcher considered it 
16 The reader may notice how misleading use of the English language can be. One could say "moral 
philosophers", but this could also mean philosophers who are moral. 
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necessary to briefly explain why it was found that many psychologists' findings on moral 
development would not contribute to finding out what it means to be moral. 
Thomson (417:47-64) provided an extensive summary of three of the most widely known 
cognitive-developmental theories of moral development, and the outline description now 
presented is based largely on Thomson's findings. Kohlberg, and Kohlberg and Gilligan 
found six stages of moral development, ranging from fear of punishment to a wish to 
adhere to a universal sense of justice. Kohlberg and Gilligan found that all individuals 
progress through the same stages and that the progression through the stages in sequence 
is common to all cultures. Hoffman is reported as finding four stages, Bronfenbrenner 
five and Garbarino and Bronfenbrenner three. 
The researcher has already presented 17 reasons for psychological and sociological stage 
descriptions of adulthood, being inadequate: these reasons also apply to stage descriptions 
of moral development. Wilson (462:x) also described considerable methodological 
inadequacies in the developmental stage approach, and found ( 462: 110) that: 11 ••• 'moral 
development' is a name for nothing clear ... 11 • Thomson (417:54), and Murphy and 
Gilligan (293:78) reported reasons given by several educationists, who considered that 
stage theory is inadequate description of reality. In summary, stage theory of moral 
development does not explain what it means to be moral (act morally or responsibly). It 
merely provides a list of ways in which people arrive at a moral decision. Someone might 
have developed to the highest stage and still act irresponsibly. As Petersl8 found:" How 
do children come to care? This seems to me to be the most important question in moral 
education; but no clear answer to it can be found in Kohl berg's writing. 11 
Since stage theory of moral development only tells how people thought, not how they 
behaved, "moral development" is a misnomer and would be more adequately named, 
"moral reasoning development". The questions still remain: What does it mean to be 
moral and what does it mean to come to care? Similarly, Weinreich-Hastel9 found that a 
person grows into a state of moral maturity wherein he can not only generalise from the 
rule but also generate new rules. However, how does a person generate these new rules 
and how can one tell if they are moral? It was to answer these and similar questions that 
the researcher returned to a philosophical examination of being moral. 
Dictionary and etymological definitions of being moral have already been given in this 
thesis20. In essence, being moral, is behaving according to generally accepted 
17 Chapter Three and Chapter Four. 
18 As reported in Thomson (417:57). 
19 As reported by Thomson (417:49). 
20 Chapter One, Paragraph 2.4. 
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social rules or customs (which are frequently drawn from surviv~ traditions or 
religious commands) (81:265). Since, as already explained, being-adult means being-
responsible and since being-responsible means being moral, if a person behaves 
immorally (badly or wrongly) he/she is not being-adult. A similar finding was recorded in 
Chapter Two: being-adult as being behaved appropriately21. However, as already 
explained, a major problem arises from using social behavioural norms to judge 
someone's adulthood: the norms change from time-to-time and place-to-place. A similar 
difficult arises with morals. 
It is well known that morals change with time and place. For example, at one time in 
Ancient Greece and at another time in the United States of America it was not immoral to 
own and trade in slaves. However, today, it is regarded as immoral. In one community it 
might be seen as desirable (moral) for a man to have more than one wife, yet in another 
community having more than one wife would be considered immoral and even illegal. In 
the Republic of South Africa at one time, one section of the community considered it 
immoral for people of different races to have sexual intercourse. This moral was enshrined 
in law under the Immorality Act. However, today it is no longer, by most people, 
considered immoral. 
The examples just given indicate instances of moral behaviour - of being moral. Being 
moral (being behaved according to social and/or religious norms) may with time, or in 
another society, turn out to be being immoral. How is it possible for some act to be moral 
in one culture and immoral in another, and moral at one time and immoral at another time 
in the same culture? The only explanation the researcher found for these apparent 
contradictions was the fact that with time, humankind has uncovered morals which 
reveal that, for example, subjugating another human being is wrong and that 
discriminating against people because of their skin colour or religion is wrong. With time, 
humankind has uncovered these universal morals which apply in all cultures and all 
settings, and which enable people to become more moral; The researcher considered that 
some policy-makers (398:2) had recognised this when they found that: " ... it is also 
possible to show moral concern and commitment without necessarily basing these on a 
religious view of life." Degenaar (81 :265) found similarly when he described critical 
morality and distinguished it from traditional morality. 
Consequently, the researcher considered it reasonable to state that there are universal or 
fundamental morals which underlie all particular morals. If these fundamental morals 
could be identified, they could assist is assessing whether any particular moral is 
good or bad, that is, whether acting according to it would be being-responsible or 
21 Chapter Four, Paragraph 4.0. 
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being-irresponsible. Ulich (425:146-147) showed how morals and morality could be bad 
when he used the term "vulgar morality". He expressed universal morals when he 
asked: "What, then, is 'moral' or 'ethical' in the true sense of the word?" Just as it was 
possible to distinguish between being adult and being-adult and being responsible and 
being-responsible, it would have been possible to distinguish between being moral 
(particular) and being-moral (universal). Being-moral is the fundamental - the 
moralness - in all particular instances of being moral. However, the researcher decided 
not to use "being-moral" to name fundamental moralness, for two interrelated reasons. 
Firstly, from the examples just given of how some morals change with time and place, it 
should be evident, that in some rare instances it may be necessary to behave immorally 
(against a particular moral) if one is to be responsible. For example, Gustafson and 
Lancey (145:7) showed how it may not always be moral to tell the truth and to fulfil one's 
obligations. However, since universal morals do not change, the implication is that 
they can always be, and should always be, adhered to (obeyed). Consequently, 
although some particular morals may also be universal morals, the two phenomena, being 
moral and being-moral, are radically different. The researcher considered that using 
"being-moral" to name the universal phenomenon, would not, in this instance, have 
sufficiently differentiated the universal from the particular. 
Secondly, although the word is used to name several things, the researcher considered that 
it would be adequate description to use "ethics" to refer to universal morals. It is 
relevant that Garbarino and Bronfenbrenner referred to their highest level of moral 
development as "ethical behaviour"; that Kohlberg22 referred to his highest stage of 
moral reasoning, that is, to fulfil a sense of person commitment to universal moral 
principles and the belief in their validity, as "universal ethical principles"; and that 
Erikson (100:94) found ethical traits to be a sign of more advanced development than 
moral or ideological ones. In addition, Jonas (194:x) found that responsibility is at the 
centre of the ethical stage and ( 194:38) stated that the principle of responsibility is the 
starting point of ethics. 
Consequently, being-moral could be more adequately expressed as being ethical, and 
adulthood as being-moral was revealed as adulthood as being ethical. This means 
that phrases such as "ethics for responsibility" (194:22) and "ethics of responsibility" 
(145:15) are tautologous. At this stage, the researcher considered that there was no need to 
hyphenate "being ethical" because the term was already naming a universal phenomenon. 
Even at an earlier stage in the researcb23, when preliminary explications of "moral" and 
"ethical" were conducted, the researcher's intuition was to distinguish between an 
22 Both reported by Thomson (417:52). 
23 Chapter One, Paragraph 2.4. 
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existential-ethical and an existential-moral continuum. The discussion just presented 
revealed some justification for that earlier differentiation. 
The critical reader might be concerned that the researcher has nierely used a "play on 
words" to create adulthood as an ethical continuum and in so doing, make the "research" 
fit his preconceived ideas. However, there are two reasons why the decision to use "being 
ethical" instead of "being-moral" can be regarded as responsible science. Firstly, it would 
have been possible to have used "being-moral" throughout the thesis, but this would 
surely have led to misunderstanding because of the changeability of morals. Another term 
was needed to name being-moral and "being ethical" was a reasonable choice. 
Secondly, since being-adult and being-responsible have been shown to be more 
adequately expressed as being ethical, continuing the research would require an 
investigation of what being ethical is. It was anticipated that during this investigation, 
whether or not there are universal morals (ethics); whether or not the distinction between 
being-moral and being ethical is valid, and whether or not adulthood is an ethical 
continuum, would be further tested. With this background, it is possible to report results 
of the investigation into what it means to be ethical. 
2.5 BEING-RESPONSIBLE AS BEING ETHICAL 
It is self-explanatory that the word "ethical" is derived from "ethics". The researcher found 
that "ethics" is most frequently used to name two phenomena. 
• Ethics as a discipline 
"Ethics" is used to name the discipline or the branch of science or branch of 
philosophy24 (105:112) (52:285) concerned with the study of morals, morality and 
moralness. Consequently, "ethical" is used to mean pertaining to ethics (the 
discipline) and in this sense, is not synonymous with "moral". For example, Klein 
(216:546) found ethics to be the science of morality; Gove (14:780), the 
discipline dealing with what is good and bad or right and wrong: with moral duty 
.. and obligation; Kirk:P~trick (~13:432), t_!>._~ science of morals ... that branch of ~ * ph!~~~~pli,_~-~~i~~)s concerned wit~_ -~-':':!!la~--char~!?-~~~ .~!~ coild1J~ 
Murray· et al (294:312), the science of morals and the department of study 
concerned with the principles of human duty; the whole field of moral science. 
That ethics is a branch of philosophy concerned with morals, morality and 
moralness is shown by its older name often used in the literature, namely, moral 
philosophy (7:2) (249:11). Flew (105:112-113) used the term "philosophical 
24 The researcher (355) found in a previous study that science is not only natural science, and that 
philosophy is only one scientific approach. Consequently, the statement "branch of science or branch 
of philosophy" is made only to reflect findings of fellow-researchers. 
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ethics" to distinguish moral philosophy (ethics as a discipline) from lay ethics 
(ethics as morals). 
It is evident that ethics as a discipline cannot assist with explicating what it means to 
be ethical. Although it was a side-issue, the researcher wondered why more 
researchers did not name the study of moral and morality, "moralogy"?25. 
However, since the researcher was involved in investigating what it means to be 
moral, the explication so far confirmed an earlier preliminary finding26 that the 
research would partly come under the auspices of the discipline of ethics. 
• Ethics as a moral code or a set of standards or principles. 
Flew (105:112) found that: "To the layman the word 'ethics' suggests a set of 
standards by which a particular group or community decides to regulate its 
behaviour - to distinguish what is legitimate or acceptable in pursuit of their aims 
from what is not." One can frequently observe written codes of ethics, rules of 
conduct (294:312), or rules of behaviour (213:432) in numerous professions 
such as journalism, medicine and business. In addition, many researchers also refer 
to ethics as a moral code; a system of morals; moral beliefs (395:480), a group 
of moral principles or a set of values (14:780), and the moral principles by 
which a person is guided (294:312). 
It was found that using "ethics" to name a moral code was misleading. The circular 
dictionary definitions of moral as ethical and ethical as moraI27, added to this 
difficulty. It is possible that, in many instances, codes of ethics are the application 
of societies' moral codes to specific professions. However, there is still the 
connotation in some Western countries, that a moral code pertains to society in 
general and is mostly to do with sexual morality. Consequently, an organisation's or 
a profession's code of ethics may include parts of a society's moral code, but is more 
likely to be code of conduct or behaviour not related to morals. Perhaps this is why 
most professions and organisations call their codes "ethical codes" and not "moral 
codes", and why there is frequent reference to "professional ethics" and not to 
"professional morals". 
It has already been explained why being moral may not always be being-responsible 
and why being ethical better describes acting according to universal morals. 
However, acting according to an ethical code, may also not always be being-
25 The researcher is aware of the Institute of Moralogy, 2-1-1 Hikarigaoka, Kashiwa, Chiba, Japan. 
26 Chapter One, Paragraph 2.4. 
27 Erikson (95:222) also found difficulty with dictionary definitions: " ... the dictionary, our first refuge 
from ambiguity in this case only confounds it, morals and ethics are defined as synonyms and 
antonyms of each other." 
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responsible. For example, there may be clauses in a profession's code of ethics 
which prevents professionals advertising or publicly debating the profession's 
mistakes. If this were the case, the code of ethics is in place to protect the interests of 
the professionals and not the clients. Consequently, being ethical (being 
fundamentally moral) would require a professional to act against certain parts of the 
code of ethics, that is, be unethical. To lessen misunderstanding from what some 
might regard as a contradiction, the researcher realised that it was necessary to use the 
hyphenated term "being-ethical" (and not "being ethical" as originally intended) to 
name the fundamental underlying all particular instances of being ethical. 
The researcher realised that striving to explicate being-ethical (the fundamental) would 
involve seeking a fundamental code of ethics which transcends particular 
professional codes of ethics and social moral codes of behaviour. As Gilligan28 found, 
there is a need to: " ... shift from moral ideology to ethical responsibility ... ". It was 
realised that seeking such a code would involve investigation under the auspices of ethics. 
The researcher recognised that investigating being-ethical would not involve describing 
numerous different moralities (descriptive ethics) (15:2) or assessing various moral 
values in order to propose any best ordering of morality (normative ethics) (15:3) 
(105:113). That there is some relationship between adulthood and being-ethical is given 
by Chickering and Havighurst, and Coleman ( 63: 110) who mention respectively, that 
adulthood is about developing an ethical system and that adulthood involves further 
involvement in ethical issues. In addition, in Chapter One29, it was shown how the aim 
of education is something worthwhile and that adulthood is frequently given as that which 
is worthwhile. Consequently, the relationship between worthwhileness and being-
ethical had been revealed. 
3.0 WHAT ARE FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS? 
In summary, the researcher realised that he was searching for a code of fundamental 
ethics, and was involved in the discipline of fundamental ethics. In a preliminary 
way, the researcher anticipated a code of fundamental ethics from which professional 
codes and moral codes are derived. The very fact that he has identified being-ethical as the 
fundamental phenomenon underlying being moral and being ethical, makes this 
anticipation explicit. When some researchers used "meta-ethics" (15:4) (105:114) it was 
considered that they were attempting to distinguish fundamental ethics from descriptive 
and normative ethics3o. 
28 Paraphrased by Evans (101:44). 
29 Chapter One, Pargaraph 2.5. 
3o It has already been mentioned that "philosophical ethics" is used to distinguish ethics as a discipline 
from lay ethics. However, Baetz (15:4) used it in a different way, that is, as synonymous with meta-
ethics to name fundamental questioning. The researcher considered this use of "philosophical ethics" 
potentially misleading because since "ethics" and "moral philosophy" are synonymous, it would be 
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In addition, the researcher considered that at least two researchers corroborated the reality 
of the fundamental of being-ethical. Das (74: 102-103) referred to the morality of 
humanity which is different from the morality of the caste, and Scheffler (378:27) 
referred to universal good and universal standard. For the researcher, 
"fundamental" also indicated a seeking for universal facts - an attempt to find " ... 
underlying harmonies between different cultures ... " and to find out if there "Is there a 
larger measure of trans-cultural moral agreement than first meets the eye?" (15:2-4). 
The researcher considered that Jonas (194:43) corroborated the findings just stated when 
he found that an ontological examination of humankind would be required to find out 
what ontological responsibility is. 
At this stage in the research, difficulty was experienced in finding a scientifically 
appropriate point of departure to continue investigating what being-ethical is. For 
example, the researcher wondered where to begin searching for answers to questions such 
as: 
• Is it possible to identify such a phenomenon as being-ethical (fundamental ethics)? 
• If there are fundamental ethics, what gives them fundamental authority and what is 
meant by fundamental authority? 
• If fundamental ethics are already there waiting to be uncovered, in what form are they 
there? 
• Why are fundamental ethics gradually uncovered: why were they not all evident at 
once at the beginning of humankind? 
• What conditions must prevail to enable humans to uncover fundamental ethics? 
It was remembered that only humans are capable of being-responsible and being-ethical. 
Consequently, the researcher realised that it would not be possible to find out what being-
ethical is, other than by finding out what it means to be human. This approach of 
attempting to find out about being-ethical from what it means to be human, is not an 
unusual one. Fromm (116:viii) explained how in psychoanalysis, ethics is necessary for 
an understanding of personality, and how how many fellow-researchers found that an 
understanding of human values was essential for understanding humankind's nature. 
Jung31 recognised that psychology and psychotherapy are bound up with the 
philosophical and moral problems of humankind. Hanfling (153:127-164) took a chapter 
in his book to review "... attempts to deduce a recipe for the conduct of life32 from 
particular features that distinguish Homo sapiens from other animals." Peter's (324:234) 
possible to refer to "philosophical moral philosophy". In contrast, fundamental ethics makes it 
possible to refer to fundamental moral philosophy, which is less likely to mislead. 
31 Paraphrased by Fromm (116:viii). The recognition of the interdependence of various disciplines 
justifies the interdisciplinary nature of the research as explained in Chapter One, Paragraph 3.3. 
32 Referring to the principles that guide human conduct as a recipe is, inadequate expression. 
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found that a fundamental task for those who wish to advance educational theory, is to 
arrive at a concept of humankind. Fromm (116:6-7) also found that to know what is 
good or bad for man - how humankind ought to live and what humankind ought to do, 
required an understanding of the nature of humankind. 
The researcher could not find another more appropriate point of departure other than by 
seeking answers to what it means to be human. For example, to begin describing what 
any group or society regarded as ethical behaviour would merely be a particularistic 
approach and would not yield fundamental answers. Again, the researcher was afraid of 
the scale of the research involved, but the scientific obligation had to be met. 
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-Consequently, it was considered safe to devote most attention to those aspects of being-
human that would help to explicate being-ethical. The researcher had only a vague idea 
what these might be, and it was expected that they would be uncovered as the research 
progressed. 
Secondly, as already explained, the researcher has reported in some detail in another 
thesis4, his results on seeking a description of being-human. It was considered 
unnecessary to duplicate this effort in this research, and undesirable to merely reprint the 
results of the previous research in this thesis. Consequently, when the reporting on a 
certain aspect of being-human has to be curtailed in this chapter, the reader is referred to 
the other thesis and the detailed results of fellow-researchers. 
Thirdly, as one would expect, the researcher decided to narrow the scope of his reading of 
fellow-researchers' findings on being-human. The rationale for limiting the scope of 
reading can be explained as follows. The results of seeking a description of being-human 
are frequently reported in books and papers under titles containing the word "human" or 
its variations, such as On Being Human (211), On Becoming Human (122), The Study 
of Human Nature (445), Human Nature: The Marxian View (436), In Search of 
Humanity (263), The Waning of Humaneness (253), and The Farther Reaches of Human 
Nature (270). Some results are reported under titles containing the word "man", such as 
Man's Search for Meaning (108), Between Man and Man (50),The Phenomenon of Man 
(80), On The Eternal in Man (379), Diagnosis of Man (441), Total Man (132), Man The 
Unknown (58), Man and his Symbols (197), What is Man? (192), Knowing Man (289) 
and The Destiny of Man (171). It is evident from the literature that "mankind" and 
"humankind" are used to name the same phenomenon, that is, being-human. It has already 
been explained5 why "humankind" and "humans", as opposed to "mankind" and "man", 
are used in this thesis. 
The selection of book titles6 by the researcher did not imply preference for any fellow-
researcher's view of humankind, or school of thought. The researcher's task was neither 
to favour nor disagree with any view or school of thought, but to seek the reality of what 
being-human is. Of course, the titles listed, and many others, were studied to find out 
whether or not fellow-researchers' findings corroborated the researcher's findings. 
A wide range of other books that do not have "human" or "man" in their titles, also report 
results of investigations into what it means to be human. It has already been explained that 
only humans can be ethical. Consequently, although it may not be made explicit, books on 
4 See Robb (344:38 - 88). 
5 Chapter One, Footnote Thirteen. 
6 From the researcher's own small library. 
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morality, ethics, education, religion, theology and law, for example, record to some 
extent, what researchers have found about being-human. Most of the body of knowledge 
called "philosophy", including ontology, moral philosophy, epistemology and axiology, 
for example, records findings on being-human. In addition, when researchers study in the 
disciplines of anthropology, sociology and human psychology, to name just a few, they 
are also searching for what it means to be human. 
However, it has already been explained why the researcher was not seeking answers 
about everything to do with humankind. For example, the researcher was not concerned 
with findings on how societies come about and operate; on human memory, intelligence 
and thinking; comparisons of marriage, birth and death ceremonies between human 
cultures; and the origin of religions and their doctrines. For the researcher, these are all 
expressions {manifestations) of being-human, but not the fundamentals - the essences 
- of being-human. Dallmayr (73:4), expressed this methodological point as follows: 
"While prolific in generating detailed information about man, behavioural analysis is mute 
on the sense of human being ... the accumulation of behavioural data is not directly 
synonymous with a growth in comprehension [about being-human]." 
In this light, the researcher considered it unnecessary to read widely in most of the 
literature in sociology, psychology, cultural anthropology, jurisprudence, and theology, 
for example. Only a very small section of literature in these fields was consulted - when 
researchers had investigated what it means to be human, fundamentally. This explains 
why in Chapter One, the researcher explained that the interdisciplinary research was to 
take into account some of the findings of ontology, andragogics and philosophical 
anthropology 7. 
Seeking for the fundimentia (essences) of being-human means seeking for that which 
is uniquely human - that which makes being-human different from being-something else. 
What is it about being-human that fundamentally separates it from being-animal and 
being-plant? Why does humankind have society, culture, laws, religions, and God/gods, 
and animals do not? Why is it that only humans are capable of responses, but also have 
instincts and reactions just as animals do? The reason for seeking essences was to find out 
if they could provide a basis for a fundamental (more adequate) description of adulthood. 
The researcher has explained in detail how humankind is so radically different to, and 
separate from, animalkind and plantkind, that humans are biological exceptions: " ... 
man is a being with an exceptional appearance, exceptional activities and an exceptional 
position in the realm of the living." (344:40) Geering ( 122: 11-12) differentiated between 
7 Some researchers (31:191) still use "anthropology" to name only the fundamental study of being-
human. 
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animality and humanity, and showed how the distinction between humans and animals 
was made early in the Western cultural tradition. Ingold (181:16) corroborated this 
finding: " ... if, in other words, all humans are the kinds of beings who, according to 
western judicial precepts, can exercise rights and responsibilities - then they must differ in 
kind from all other beings which cannot. And somewhere along the line, our ancestors 
must have crossed a threshold from one condition to the other, from nature to 
humanity." In the light of the findings just presented, the researcher did not find as 
Cupitt (71: 102) did that humans are talking animals. 
Similarly, Buber (51:8) found that: " ... man is not a thing among things, and does not 
consist of things ... nor is he a nature able to be experienced and described, a loose bundle 
of named qualities." As Oberholzer and Grey ling (311 :22) found: " ... although man is 
also a biological being, we may never regard him as an object of biology by separating his 
biological functions ,from his humanness." Heidegger (163:32) employed the term 
"Dasein" (Being-there) to name human Being because it is so different from the Being 
of other entities. Jaspers ( 189: 178-179) found similarly, that human Being is the 
exception of Being, and Sartre (370: xxxviii-xliii ) used Being-for-its.elf for human 
Being (who has to be what it8 is). 
Before presenting further results, the researcher considered it necessary to explain how the 
word "being" would be used in this thesis. The reader will have noticed the capital "B" in 
"Being" in the previous subparagraph and may remember being alerted in Chapter One9 to 
the difficulties surrounding the word "being". The researcher understood that "Being" 
with the capital "B" is used by some researchers (163) (316) to name being as beinglO, 
the beingness of anything, being without qualification (457:4), Being as a 
whole and, similarly expressed, Being as such (245:9). Being as being, is a very 
different concept to being something. Levin (245: 11) explained Being as the " ... 
horizon, field, or clearing within which beings appear ... Being is not a being, but 
rather the dimensionality within which all beings are to be encountered." In a similar 
way, Sartre (370:xxiv) distinguished between the phenomenon of being and the 
8 The researcher is certain that Sartre did not intent to offend, but using the word "it" to refer to humans 
would usually be taken as diminishing dignity. 
9 Paragraph 2.3.1. The researcher has noticed that fellow-researchers such as Olafson (316:xix), May 
(271:39) and Williams (457) have experienced difficulty in obtaining a well-grounded meaning of 
"being". Heidegger (163:1) found that the meaning of "being" is not understood at all, and that 
(162:73) difficulties are encountered immediately the question: What is meant by to be and being? is 
asked. Baldwin found the word "being" to have " ... as many specific definitions as there are 
philosophers" (l7:Vol 1:109) and that: " ... Being is a simple term, and therefore strictly indefinable." 
(17:Vol 2:420-421) Similarly, Williams (457:4) found that all but one of the uses of the verb to be 
remain sources of considerable philosophical and linguistic difficulty. 
10 The researcher preferred not to use the more usual phrase in philosophy "being qua being" because 
the Latin component makes it unnecessary philosophical jargon. 
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being of phenomena (that is, being something, or in the case of humans, being 
someone). 
Although it was beyond the scope of the research to examine the grammar and etymology 
of the term "being" 11. the researcher considered that the use of the capital "B" in "being" 
would not be necessary in this thesis. It does seem reasonable to use "human Being" to 
name that aspect of Being which applies only to, and to all, humans. However, for the 
researcher, "being-human" serves this purpose. Consequently, from now on in this 
thesis "being-human" is used in place of "Dasein" (the Being of human beings) and 
"human Being" (capital "B"), except in quotes of fellow-researchersl2. 
What is it that makes being-human unique? Because being-human is biologically 
exceptional, it is more than just a physiological, anatomical, stimulus-response or 
causal-instinctual reaction subject to natural deterministic laws. Being-human is not 
a matter of being subject to causal-mechanical processes and the laws of mechanics. 
Consequently, findings about being-human which describe it in animalistic or mechanistic 
terms, such as appetites, instincts, adaptability, reacting, interface, contacts, 
growth, development, and maturity, for example, are inadequate. 
The reader will realise that the philosophical anthropologists' findings that it is inaccurate 
to apply the terms "growth", "development" and "maturity" to being-human, has 
radical implications for an investigation of what adulthood is, because, as shown in 
previous chapters, these inadequate terms are used extensively in current descriptions of 
adulthood. The researcher realised that more adequate terms would have to be found to 
describe human "growth" and human "development". It was the researcher's 
expectation that more adequate terms would be uncovered during the investigation of what 
it means to be human. 
Some researchers have found that existence is the uniqueness in being-human. For 
example, Heidegger (163:67) used "existence" solely to identify being-human (Dasein) 
and Viljoen and Pienaar (439:31), Frankl (109:129), Luijpen (257:15) and Luijpen and 
Koren (258:33-39) found similarly. Gove (133:796), in defining existence, observed 
that it is " ... the condition of man ... ". Sinclair (395:492) qualified the use of the 
11 The reader is directed to, for example, Heidegger ( 162:52-70) and Verhaar ( 438) in this regard. 
12 Previously the researcher (344:40-41) and fellow-researchers such as Oberholzer and Greyling 
(311:148-150) have used "anthropos" to indicate that humankind is the only being which is human, 
and to refer to being-human - the universal appearance without any connotation of age, social status, 
type of employment, race, colour or gender. Etymologically, the use of "Anthropos" to refer to man -
the human being - is acceptable as shown by Partridge (319:20) and Onions (317:40). Murray 
(294:360) and Gove (14:93) used the term "anthropic" and Gove used "anthropeic", from Greek 
anthropikos. Although further reflection is necessary to corroborate it, the researcher's initial 
finding was that "anthropos", "Dasein" and "human Being" are synonyms for "being-human". 
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terms "experience" and "existence" as human existence and experience, and 
Macquarrie (262:65) found that existentialists confine their use of "existence" to the" ... 
kind of being that belongs to man." Foulauie (106:50) also found that existence is the 
prerogative of humankind, and Luijpen and Koren (258:38) call man, "existence". 
Findings from many fellow-researchers could have been presented to illustrate that the 
essence of being-human is existence; only humankind can claim that kind of Being 
which is existence; and only human beings exist. Since being-human is the only 
mode of Being that is existent, being-human is being-existent. Expressed another 
way: being-human is existence. Heidegger13 expressed this succinctly: "The being 
that exists is man. Man alone exists. Rocks are, but they do not exist. Trees are but 
they do not exist. Horses are but they do not exist. Angels are, but they do not exist. God 
is, but he does not exist ... The existential nature of man is the reason why man can 
represent beings as such, and why he can be conscious of them." 
The finding just stated may surprise some readers as it did the researcher initially. It does 
seem unusual to state that only human beings exist (or only being-human is 
existence), because as already explainedl4, many dictionary definitions and everyday 
language indicate that "existence" is used to name that which is real, living, material 
or actual. However, it is frequently the case that the scientific use of terms is different 
from the everyday use. In this thesis, the researcher reserved "existence" to name only 
being-human. Deciding on a name for non-human-being was outwith the scope of the 
research15. 
Uncovering being-human as existence represented major progress in the research. It 
illustrated in a straightforward way that, since adulthood is a human phenomenon and 
since being-human is being-existent, adulthood is an existential phenomenon. It 
was also realised that since being-ethical is a uniquely human phenomenon, adulthood 
is also an ethical phenomenon. It was the uncovering of these two findings together 
at this point in the research that enabled the researcher to consider it safe to state in a 
preliminary way that adulthood is an existential-ethical phenomenon. 
Preliminary findings must be supported by further evidence. In addition, the researcher 
wanted to find out what an existential-ethical phenomenon is, and what its implications for 
education, if any, might be. Consequently, the research continued by investigating what it 
·means to be an existent, that is, what being-existent is. Before describing the results 
13 In Kaufmann (204:272). 
14 Chapter One, Paragraph 2.3.1. 
15 Sartre (370: xxxviii-xliii) offered Being-in-itself, that is, entities which are, and Heidegger used 
presence-at-hand (163:67). 
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of reflection on what being-existent is, it is necessary to provide two further 
methodological clarifications. The first clarification involves five aspects of terminology. 
• The fact that humanhood and adulthood are existential phenomena revealed that 
"human existence" is a tautology because existence can only be human. Perhaps 
with time, humans will be regarded not as Homo Sapiens which shows esteem of 
humankind for the intellect (153:131), but Existens - the Homo being unnecessary. 
• Because the researcher is concerned only with being-human (existence) the term 
"existential-ethical" in the title of this thesis is more adequate than the term 
"ontological-ethical" would have been, because "ontological" indicates all of 
Being. Bonhoeffer (40:75) also recognised the need to distinguish between the 
ontological and the existential when he used terms such as "ontic-existential" and 
"ontological-existential". 
• Heidegger corroborated the researcher's realisation that the research was conducted 
under the auspices mainly of philosophical anthropology. He (163:38) found that if 
existence is to be adequately described, it must be done so as philosophical 
anthropology. However, Jaspers16 and Von Gebsattel (440:171) suggested, and 
the researcher found similarly, that "existential anthropology" would be an even 
more adequate name for the discipline. 
• Although in Chapter One it was explained that the methodological approach would be 
an andragogical one by means of ontological phenomenology17, such an approach 
can only be achieved as existential phenomenology. Indeed, Luijpen (257), 
Brockelman (47), Beyers Nel (28:78), Erasmus and van Wageningen (93:37-43) and 
Luijpen and Koren (258) explained an approach known as existential 
phenomenology18. Macquarrie (262:21) explained why most existentialists are 
phenomenologists: " ... phenomenology seems to offer the existentialist the kind of 
methodology he needs if he is to pursue his investigation into human science."19 
• The research could ultimately be regarded as a study in fundamental ontology, 
because as Heidegger (83:34) found: " ... fundamental ontology2°, from which alone 
all other ontologies can take their rise, must be sought in the existential analytic of 
16 Heidegger (163:496) in footnote xv (H.301) credited Jaspers with the original concept 
17 Chapter One, Paragraph 3.3.1. 
18 Because of the doctrinal nature of existentialism as already explained, the researcher did not use the 
terms "phenomenological existentialism" (258:18), or "existentialist phenomenology" 
(262:24). The researcher also strove in the research to avoid the danger explained by Du Plooy and 
Kilian of allowing the existential phenomenology approach to become a 
19 
philosophic school (90:37). 
"Human science" is vague because in one sense, all science is human science. What Macquarrie meant 
was, science which investigates being-human. 
20 Heidegger (164:276-277), in a later finding, expressed dissatisfaction with the accuracy of this term - a 
debate outwith the scope of this research. 
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Dasein." Since "Dasein" names only being-human, Heidegger (163:244) made clear 
that the task (problem) of fundamental ontology is appropriately and primordially 
explicating what it means to be human. For the researcher "fundamental 
ontology" is synonymous with "existential philosophy". 
In consolidating the cumulative description of methodology employed in this 
research, it is safe to state that the research was research in philosophical (existential) 
anthropology using an existential phenomenological approach and an andragogical 
perspective. The relevance of existential phenomenology to education is shown by 
Vandenberg (430:22). He found that: "The analysis of the educational problem into 
its root questions indicated that the proper resources for the formulation of 
educational problematics and educational theory are those of existential 
phenomenology. 11 21 
The second clarification is also about terminology, but more specifically, about lessening 
misunderstanding caused by the difficulty encountered in expressing findings about 
existence. As will become evident, the researcher encountered three main. difficulties in 
finding the words to express the complexity of being-human. 
• 
• 
• 
In some instances there are no, or only inadequate, terms in the English language for 
describing human phenomena. May (272: 16) found similarly. This meant that the 
researcher found it necessary to occasionally coin new words such as "moralable", 
"reactable" and "being-human"22. 
One of the major advantages and wonders of the English language is that it allows the 
use of several names to name one phenomenon, and the converse - one name to name 
many different phenomena. For example, the six questions: What is Dasein? What is 
human Being? What is existence? What is being-human? What is humankind? and 
What does it mean to be human? ask the same thing. In scientific work a disciplined 
approach to language use must be employed to lessen misunderstandings. As already 
explained, in order to lessen misunderstanding in this chapter the terms "being-
human" and "existence" are mostly used, and other synonymous terms are employed 
only when necessary. 
In attempting to uncover what it means to be existent, the researcher found that the 
part-essences which existence is, could not be described in a hierarchical, prioritisable 
way. Redfield (333:732) found similarly. Because being-human (existence) is the 
21 Vandenberg also stated that the roots of the problems of moral education are to be found in 
existential, phenomenological ontology. As already explained, the researcher found ontology 
to do with all Being, existence to do only with being-human, and found that "ontology" is not needed 
in the phrase "existential phenomenological ontology". · 
22 This explained for the researcher why the language in some of the works by Heidegger and Sartre, is 
difficult to understand, and why they frequently had to use hyphens. 
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biological exception, it cannot be described in terms of a list of properties, qualities, 
characteristics or appearances. These part-essences are, in reality, inseparable and 
interrelated, and ideally should be described all at once - simultaneously. However, 
this ideal is practically impossible and the researcher followed the principles of 
phenomenological reduction in allowing being-existent to uncover its part-essences as 
the research progressed. The inseparability of part-essences will result in some 
repetition in this chapter. 
The word "part" in "part-essences" creates the erroneous impression of something that 
can be described in bits or pieces. Consequently, the term "existentialia" is more 
adequate description. Heidegger (163:67-70) found similarly: "The essence of Dasein 
lies in its existence ... Because Dasein's characters of Being are defined in terms of 
existentiality, we call them 'existentialia' ... [which] ... are to be sharply 
distinguished from 'categories' - characteristics of Being for entities whose character 
is not that of Dasein." Van Rensburg et al (435:272) referred to existentialia as 
anthropologic categories indicating categories belonging to humankind, and the 
researcher interpreted Oberholzer and Greyling's (311 :89) "anthropological-
ethical-ontological laws" as being synonymous with existentialia. 
With this additional methodological background it is now possible to record the results of 
asking: What is being-existent?23 
2.0 BEING-HUMAN AS BEING-EXISTENT 
An etymological analysis of "existence" confirmed that it was originally coined to 
indicate something that can step out of itself. Existence is derived from Latin 
existens (216:560), exsistere and existere meaning to stand forth, appear, to 
cause to stand still, to put and to place (216:560), stand forth, emerge 
(319:625) and emerge, appear, proceed and be visible or manifest (317:336), to 
come forth, to put, to step into life and to stand (435:272). Heidegger (163:32) 
found, that Dasein " ... in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it ... Dasein 
understands itself in its Being ... with and through its Being, this Being is disclosed to it." 
Sartre (370: xxxviii-xliii) found similarly. Gove (133:796) observed that existence is a 
human phenomenon: " ... the condition of man in his factuality, characterised by a 
passionate self-consciousness and sense of responsibility in the face of 
contingency and freedom." 
23 The reader may remember that in Chapter One, Paragraph 2.3.1, the researcher anticipated the 
requirement to explicate Being in more detail. However, the findings as just expressed indicated that 
this was neither necessary nor desirable. :rhis research was strictly concerned with being-human, that 
is, existence, and it is this which required explicating. 
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Yalom (468:479) found that: " ... the ability to be self-aware, to step outside oneself, to 
view oneself from a distance is one of the human being's most valued attributes24• It is 
what makes one human." However, what does it mean to "step out of oneself', "to stand 
forth", to be responsible in "the face of contingency and freedom", and how is being-
human an issue for itself? For the researcher, being-human is an issue or a problem for 
itself because it alone questions its being. As Morris (287:18) found, the emergence of 
awareness-of-existence and the emergence of man, may be thought of as simultaneous. 
Consequently, being-existent involves being-questioning of one's being-human25• 
2 .1 BEING-HUMAN AS BEING-QUESTIONING OF ONE'S BEING 
Some researchers claimed that humankind is not animalkind because of intelligence, 
language, culture and rationality, for example. However, depending on how these four 
phenomena are defined, fellow-researchers presented a case to show that animals exhibit 
some degree of them. However, where humankind does differ from animalkind, as far as 
it is possible to know26, is that only humans ask questions. As Morton (289:7) found: 
"Man is the only animal27 that asks questions. He asks them all his life and all the 
time. And it's not just some inquisitive people who ask questions, but every man, 
woman and child." Not only do humans ask questions, but they ask fundamental 
questions about their own being. Heidegger (163:27), May (271:41) and Frankl (110:44) 
found similarly: only humankind28 is capable of asking questions about its own being-
human, and only humankind has enquiring as one of the possibilities of its 
being-human29. 
Asking questions about one's being-human does not involve questions such as: What 
shall I wear today? How do I find a mate? and What shall I make to eat tonight? Rather, 
questioning one's being-human involves asking fundamental, ultimate (existential) 
questions such as: Where did I come from? What am I? Why am I here? Where 
do I go when I die? and What is it all about? Geeting (122:21) provided a similar 
24 The phrase "most valued attribute" is vague. For example, why is that ability more valued than any 
other, who values it, and what is an attribute? For the researcher, being-existent is not an attribute, it 
just is, being-human. 
25 Strictly speaking, the whole phrase, "being-questioning of one's own being" should be hyphenated, 
because it names one phenomenon. However, such a use of hyphens is likely to be distracting and in 
these instances, only the word next to the word "being" is hyphenated. 
26 From now on in this thesis the phrase, "As far as it is possible to tell", is omitted, because almost 
every finding about being-human must be qualified by it. 
27 As the reader will be aware, the researcher has found that humankind is not animalkind. Consequently, 
using fellow-researchers' findings which indicate that humankind is another animal, is not an 
indication that the researcher finds similarly. 
28 The reader is reminded that when paraphrasing fellow-researchers, "man" has been changed to 
"humankind". However when fellow-researchers are quoted, the word "man" is retained. 
29 This must be of some interest to archeologists and pre-history biologists. Arguments could continue 
as to the biological nature of the first human. However, if this definition of being-human is accepted, 
then the first pre-human that asked a question about his/her being, became the first human. Of course, 
exactly when that was, will in all likelihood, never be known. 
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list of questions. The researcher used "being-questioning" to distinguish fundamental 
questioning from being questioning about anything. 
It could be argued that all humans do not ask such questions. However, the researcher's 
experience is that people from all social backgrounds and cultures ask existential 
questions at some time in their lives, if even for a fleeting moment. Morton (289:7) 
corroborated this and Hanfling (153:32) found that anyone capable of purposive reasoning 
asks such questions. The reader may claim that a human baby is not capable of purposive 
reasoning and cannot speak, and consequently, cannot and does not, ask existential 
questions. 
However, as Oberholzer and Greyling (311:151) found: "Our experience of reality is far 
stronger than our cognitive involvement with it." This finding expressed the researcher's 
finding that being-human involves a pathic involvement (from Greek pathos and 
paschein meaning deep feeling) rather than a gnostic knowing (from Greek gnosis 
meaning knowledge). Humankind feels and experiences before expressing these feeling 
and experiences into words. Consequently, as far as it is possible to know, babies do ask 
existential questions albeit in a baby-like way, by wondering pathically: What am I? 
Where am I? Who is going to care for me? Even if one is not convinced that all humans at 
some time and with varying degrees of consciousness ask existential questions, it is still 
safe to state that each human, unless severely mentally disabled, is capable of asking 
existential questions. 
In addition, it is safe to state that humans vary in their level of consciousness of 
asking existential questions, and in their skill of verbally expressing them. Some humans 
may live their whole lives being unaware that they question, even fleetingly, what life is 
about. Others, contemplative nuns or monks and some philosophers for example, are very 
aware of their questioning and consciously pose the questions for themselves, and make 
finding answers a full-time occupation. 
For the researcher, it is this awareness of one's asking existential questions that some 
researchers, particularly psychologists, call self-consciousness. It may take a crisis 
event such as the death of a spouse or child, a serious accident, loss of a job, winning 
millions of pounds in a lottery, or the birth of a baby, to bring about such questioning in a 
more conscious way. In a preliminary way, the researcher found that a person's degree 
of consciousness of asking existential questions and the frequency with 
which the questions are asked, is related in some way to adulthood and education. It 
was anticipated that just what these relationships (if any) might be, would be revealed 
during the research. 
180 
It is reasonable to ask why humans ask existential questions. The researcher, from 
questioning his being-human and from dialogue with colleagues about why they question 
their being-human, found similarly to some fellow-researchers. As Jenkins (192:11) 
found, to ask the question What is being-human? is to express 11 ••• our wonder, 
puzzlement, bewilderment, hope about what we are up against here. 11 Humankind is faced 
with a massive contradiction. The known universe contains a thousand million suns and 
possibly billions of planets; planet Earth is populated by over five billion humans, and 
humankind may eventually become extinct. From a very early age individuals know they 
will eventually die. In this light, it is understandable that humans ask the following or 
similar questions: What is the meaning of it all? Why am I here? What is my 
purpose? What is the meaning of my life? and Is my life meaningful? As 
Adler (2: 15) found: "From the first days of childhood we can see dark gropings after this 
'meaning of life'. Even a baby is striving to make an estimate of its own powers and its 
share in the whole life which surrounds it." Yalom (468:463) found that humans crave 
meaning and are uncomfortable in its absence, and Phenix (326:344) found similarly: 
11 
••• the fundamental human motivation is the search for meaning." It is safe to state 
that being-human entails being-searching for meaning. 
2. 2 BEING-HUMAN AS BEING-SEARCHING30 FOR MEANING 
According to Frankl (109:30), Freud considered that any person who questioned meaning 
and the value of life, was sick. However, Frankl did not find similarly, reporting that a 
person asking questions about meaning " ... proves that he is truly a human being ... " 
and that (108:154) " ... the striving to find a meaning in one's life is the primary 
motivational force in man ... Man's search for meaning is a primary force in his life 
and is not a 'secondary rationalisation' of instinctual drives." Frankl (108:156) found that 
humankind's desire is for a life that is as meaningful as possible. Yalom (468:422) found 
similarly. 
But what is this "meaning" that being-human entails being-searching for? Initially, the 
researcher found this question difficult to answer. Fellow-researchers, far more skilled 
than the researcher, have encountered the same difficulty. For example, Yalom (468:422) 
found that: 11 A satisfying response to the riddle of life's meaning has throughout written 
history eluded the grasp of every great thinker." Ogden and Richards (314: 1) showed how 
many attempts to find answers to the problem of meaning have been unsuccessful and that 
"Even the methods by which it is to be attacked have remained in doubt." 
It would have been impossible and unnecessary for the researcher to investigate 
extensively the meaning of "meaning" in this research. For example, Flew (105:225) 
30 The researcher realised that "being-searching" is an unusual and perhaps ungrammatical term. 
However, if one can speak of being-questioning why can one not also speak of being-searching? 
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referred to a philosophy of meaning, and Ogden and Richards (314: 186) provided at least 
sixteen definitions of "meaning": the latter (314:xiii) reported that philologists, 
philosophers and psychologists have hardly touched the central problem of meaning. 
Britton (45: 1) found similarly: "On the whole, however, the question of the meaning of 
life does not loom large in the teaching or writing of professional philosophers nowadays 
... ". In light of this difficulty, the researcher again employed the phenomenological 
approach and began by examining everyday experiences named by the word "meaning". 
In the phrases, "she has a mean understanding of the situation", "she is no mean tennis 
player", "he is a mean person", and "the mean of the distances", the word "mean" is used 
to imply inferior or poor, very good, small-minded, not generous or nasty, and 
equally far from two extremes, respectively. In addition, "mean" indicated: a 
reference to ("I mean him not you"), seriousness ("I said I'm angry and I mean it"), 
intention ("I mean it to be used by a young child not an adult") and determination ("I 
mean you to have it and not him"). 
Another use of "meaning" is more relevant to the research than those already mentioned, 
and it is found in questions similar to: "What does that word mean?" and "What does she 
mean?" The first question asks for the word (the name) to be related to the thing or 
phenomenon it names, or as Bullock et al (52:513) stated, for the word to be 
understood in terms of the agreed rules for its use. Postgate3 l found similarly: " ... it 
is the nature of the correspondence between word and fact ... which is the proper and the 
highest problem of the science of meaning." Asking what a word means, is asking what 
phenomenon or phenomena it names, and it is precisely this that the researcher was 
involved in at this stage in the research regarding the word "meaning". In this paragraph 
so far, the researcher has used the phrases "What is meaning?", "the uses of meaning", 
"meaning is used to imply" and" 'mean' indicated". The reader will recognise that these 
phrases could be replaced with phrases similar to: "What does 'meaning' mean?" and 
" ' • ' 
1132 
... meanmg means ... . 
The second question shows that when someone is asked "What do you mean?", they are 
asked to give a more detailed explanation. For whatever reason, the name given to 
the phenomenon may not be recognised or may be ambiguous. Or, particularly when 
considering being-human, the complexity of the phenomenon requires various words 
(names) in a statement to be explained step-by-step. For example, by asking what being-
human is, the researcher has been required to explain what being-questioning and being-
searching are. 
31 Quoted by Ogden and Richards (314:2). 
32 The reader, like the researcher, may be enthralled by the apparent absurdities in phrases such as "the 
meaning of meaning" and the previously mentioned "the responsible person was irresponsible". 
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The reader will be aware that philosophical research is about attempting to describe, as 
adequately as is humanly possible, the phenomena named by words and to provide 
adequate names to additional things or phenomena uncovered. The researcher found 
similarly to Postgate in this regard: " ... there have been no questions which have caused 
more heart-searchings, tumults, and devastation than questions of the correspondence of 
words to facts." In the light of the revealed complexity so far reported in this thesis about 
being-adult, being-responsible and being-human, the reader may also find as Postgate did. 
However, questions of the type: What is the meaning of it all? What is the 
meaning of life? What is the meaning of my life? Is my life meaningful? and 
What does it mean to be human? are of a different order to those already asked in 
this paragraph. The reader will notice that the two questions: What is being-human? 
and What is meant by "being-human"? are asking the same thing. The researcher found 
that "meaning" in questions like these can be synonymous33 with "purpose", 
"significance", "worth" and "the requirement-on-me". However, before providing 
the results of reflection on meaning as purpose, significance, worth and requirement-on-
me, it is necessary to point out the significance for the research, of how people frequently 
do not make the distinction between the universe, (everything or life in general) and 
themselves. Britton (45:3) also observed this lack of distinction when people reflect in a 
non-scientific way. 
It is understandable that humans, in wonderment about the vastness of the universe, ask 
what it is all about, why it is there and what the point of it is. The physical sciences can 
answer, and have answered, some questions about the formation, ages, sizes, movements 
and numbers of planets, suns and galaxies; the estimated mass of the universe; and cosmic 
phenomena such as black holes, red dwarfs and super strings. Similarly, the physical 
sciences can answer, and have answered, many questions about the varied manifestations 
of life on planet Earth: how they came about, reproduce, move, organise, feed, excrete 
waste, see, hear and breathe, and how they affect one another. 
However, for the researcher, the physical sciences cannot answer questions about the 
meaning of life. As Hanfling (153:x) found: "The difficulty that faces us here is as if we 
were asked about the meaning of grass, or of the Atlantic Ocean." For the researcher, 
what can the meaning of life be if it is not for humankind? As Adler (2:10) found: 
33 See Yalom (468:423) for example. The scope of the research did not permit more extensive 
examination of the synonymity of "purpose", "significance", and "worth". This would have required 
detailed excursions into semantics (that branch of linguistics that studies meaning in language), 
semiology (the science of signs) and the detailed study of the distinction between connotation 
(the meaning proper of an expression) and denotation (the actual thing or things to which an 
expression refers). The reader is referred to relevant sections of Bullock et al (52) and Ogden and 
Richards (314). 
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meaning is meaning for humankind: " ... if another truth existed, it could never 
concern us; we could never know it ... ". More specifically, the researcher found and 
Britton (45:3-20) corroborated, that when humans ask: What is the meaning of life? they 
are asking, What is the meaning of life for me? When they ask: Why is there a universe? 
they are asking, Why is there a universe with me in it? or, in other words, Why am I 
here? Consequently, to ask questions about the meaning of the universe, life or "it all", is 
to ask questions about the meaning of one's existence and 1ife34. 
The inseparability of questions about the meaning of life in general and about the meaning 
of an individual life, is not surprising to existential philosophers. They are aware of the 
fact that being-human is being-in-the-world, and that being-human can only be 
understood from the perspective of being-in-a-personal-world created or designed by 
assigning meaning. As some fellow-researchers found: being-human involves giving 
meaning to the world (257:2), being intentionally directed at the world (439:32), 
designing a world (90:132), constituting the world (51:38), and permeating the 
world with the presence of humankind (144:3). Before going on to describe the relevance 
of assigning meaning for being-searching for meaning, it is necessary to give three main 
reasons for deciding not to describe being-in-the-world in more detail at this point in 
the thesis. 
Firstly, the researcher expected that as the research into what being-human is, progressed, 
what being-in-the-world is, would also be uncovered. Secondly, being-in-the-world is a 
complex category and a detailed philosophical description of it would have required 
considerable space in this chapter. This would have detracted from the main purpose of 
the research at this stage, namely, explicating being-human, in order to find out what it 
means to be ethical. Thirdly, a description has been provided by the researcher (344:47-
49) and also, far more adequately, by Heidegger (163) and Luijpen (257:19-25), for 
example. 
What relevance then, can being-assigning of meaning, have for being-searching for 
meaning35? The researcher found as Adler did (2:9) that: "Human beings live in the realm 
of meanings. We do not experience pure circumstances ... We experience reality always 
through the meaning we give it; not in itself, but as something interpreted." For the 
researcher this meant that being-human involves hearing the song of a lark, rather than 
acoustic stimuli, and seeing the seven colours of the rainbow rather than internal reflection 
and refraction of light waves inside millions of raindrops. The researcher realised that care 
34 The reader wjll be aware that conducting this research into what it means to be being-searching for 
meaning, was part of the researcher's being-searching for his meaning. Jenkins ( 192: 11) found that 
questions about being-human are questions about ourselves. 
35 In undertaking this part of the research, the researcher had to keep reminding himself that the reason 
for the continual asking of wide-ranging questions was to find out what it means to be ethical. 
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would be required at this point in the explication, because assigning of meaning could be 
mistakenly interpreted as arbitrarily giving any meaning one so chooses. 
There is more to assigning, creating, designing or permeating my world with meaning, 
than just giving meaning in the sense of giving some phenomenon a name. As Bullock et 
al (52:513) found, the bearer of a name is not its meaning. For example, while 
most people would agree that a dog is a four legged canine, to a shepherd and an Eskimo 
"dog" means an animal to assist with work. To a child who has experienced a savage 
attack by a dog, "dog" means a vicious thing that can hurt. If these are the only 
experiences one has had of "dog", "dog" does not mean best friend or friendly play-thing, 
for example. 
For the researcher, being-human involves assigning or creating meaning by 
experiencing things and phenomena. Someone can tell me that a dog is a four legged 
canine, but unless I experience "dog" by, at a superficial level examining pictures of dogs 
in a book or listening to others' stories, say, and more extensively, by touc~ng, smelling 
and being with dogs, "four legged canine" is meaningless. As Britton (45:4) found: " .... 
all my knowledge about the world comes to me through my own experiencing of it 
... ". This finding was considered most relevant for the research because it revealed that no 
one can experience meaning for another (108:154). 
In light of the explication just given and the analysis of linguistic complexity surrounding 
"meaning" already described, the researcher was able to make a relevant and subtle 
distinction between finding meaning and experiencing meaningfulness. It is 
essential to emphasise how experiencing meaningfulness is different from 
finding meaning. Frankl ( 108: 171) expressed it this way: " ... the meaning of life 
differs from man to man, from day to day, and from hour to hour. What matters, 
therefore, is not the meaning of life in general but rather the specific meaning of a person's 
life at a given moment." Similarly, Jenkins (192:121) found that rather than voluminous 
information which gives rise to even more questions, we want " ... experience in which 
we can rest while we live ... ". These findings are corroborated by Oberholzer and 
Greyling's (311:151) findings presented earlier, that being-human involves, primarily, a 
feeling and experiencing of reality. 
All humans, unless mentally damaged, are to some degree or other being-searching for 
meaning because they want to experience (feel) meaningfulness. As Fromm (115:29) 
found: "All passions and strivings of man are attempts to find an answer to his existence 
... ". Even when Sartre and Camus36 set out to prove lack of meaning, they ended up 
finding some personal meaning. How else is it possible to know that one's life is 
36 In Yalom (468:427-428). 
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meaningful unless one experiences it as so? Even if another tells me that my life is 
meaningful, unless I experience it as so, it is not meaningful fo me. This finding 
raises the possibility that some meanings attributed to life (by self or others) may not result 
in the experiencing of meaningfulness. Consequently, it was realised that it is more 
adequate to state that being-human involves being-searching for the experience of 
meaningfulness rather than being-searching for meaning. 
The researcher wondered what it feels like to experience meaningfulness? It was found 
that experiencing meaningfulness ranges from quiet inner satisfaction to peak 
experiences as described by Maslow, and intense mystical or spiritual experiences. 
Morton (289:157-160) described enjoying moments which show people what life might 
be like, moments of exhilaration when one forgets everything else but what one is 
experiencing, moments of ecstasy, vision and glory, and moments when one penetrates 
the mystery radiance of wonder. Morris (287:4) summarised many of the findings stated 
in this paragraph when he reported that humans are unable to escape the perhaps 
unpleasant task of asking themselves what significance they attach to their own presence 
in the world. "We are chained to this puzzle, the meaning of our own existing. And the 
surprise is that, as study continues and awareness grows, the unpleasantness slowly turns 
to a new and somehow deeper sense of what it means to be man." 
The researcher realised that to progress the research, it would be necessary to investigate 
in more detail what people feel when they experience meaningfulness. However, it was 
also realised that examination of individual's descriptions of peak or mystical experiences 
would have been a digression from the main theme of the research. In addition, while the 
researcher was intuitively aware of the possible relationship between experiencing 
meaningfulness and spiritual experiences, there was insufficient scientific grounding to 
employ the question What does it mean to be spiritual? as a point of departure. 
Relying on the phenomenological approach, the researcher realised that whilst it is 
straightforward to find (assign or create) the meaning of things and phenomena by 
experiencing them, the researcher wondered how one experiences meaningfulness of 
one's own life. When people are asked why they think their life has no meaning, they 
may answer that their life has no purpose or importance or worth, or that they just do not 
know what to do. Consequently, to continue seeking for an answer to what being-
searching for meaningfulness is, it was necessary to consider "purpose", 
"significance", "worth" and "the requirement-on-me". 
The question, What does my life mean? could be expressed for some people as: Is there 
a purpose for my life and if so what is it? However, the researcher considered it 
most relevant that in the list of questions asked about the meaning of life, one rarely 
encounters the question: Am I here? Consequently, the question: Why am I here? admits 
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to a belief in at least the possibility of a purpose: a purpose is already presupposed. 
However, the researcher found as did Hanfling (153:22)37 that, just as meaning cannot be 
arbitrarily given, so a purpose that leads to experiencing meaningfulness 
cannot be just any purpose one chooses or another chooses on one's behalf. 
Although there can be as many answers to the meaning of life as there ·are humans, as 
Adler (2: 10) reported: " ... we can distinguish some [meanings] which answer better and 
some which answer worse ... ". The researcher wondered how one judges better and 
worse. 
As Britton (45:16-17) found: " ... one might think of the meaning of life as something 
which some power not of ourselves has put before us to pursue ... one could imagine a 
featureless god who set before men some goal and somehow drove them to pursue it." He 
found that unless the purpose is accepted by the person as worthwhile, it would seem 
arbitrary and not valued, and the pursuit of it would not result in experiencing 
meaningfulness. The researcher summarised this finding as follows: unless the selected 
purpose is worthwhile, the person does not experience meaningfulness. Unless 
one can answer why (give reasons) a purpose was selected, one could still not 
experience meaningfulness. Frankl (108:106) related purpose to high moral behaviour 
and this was relevant to the research because it was further contributory evidence to being-
human as being-ethical. 
The revelation that being-searching for the experience of meaningfulness is the search for 
a worthwhile purpose, progressed the research for three mafo reasons. Firstly, as 
already explained, "worthwhile" implies something to do with being-ethical38. 
Secondly, as already explained, education is about the pursuit of that which is 
worthwhile39. Thirdly, worthwhileness in being-ethical and in education is 
not just the whim of some philosophers (educationists), but is grounded in 
existence, that is, in being-human. 
The researcher was encouraged at this stage in the research because having found that 
worthwhileness is grounded in existence, there would be a strong possibility that further 
explication of what worthwhile is, could lead to a description of being-ethical. It was 
realised that the implications of grounding being-ethical in being-human are extensive. It 
would mean that adulthood and humanhood and all human phenomena, such as education, 
are existential-ethical phenomena. Consequently, to progress the research the researcher 
37 The researcher had difficulty understanding Hanfling's finding (153: 129) that the purpose of an acorn is 
to develop into a tree because that is what they were designed for. Surely, only humans are capable of 
having a purpose, designing and intentionality. 
38 Chapter Five, Paragraph 2.5. 
39 Chapter One, Paragraph 2.5. 
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was obliged to ask: What is it that makes a purpose (goal) worthwhile? In other 
words: What kinds of purposes contribute to experiencing meaningfulness? 
Some religious people40 may state that any God-given purpose, as documented in 
relevant Holy Books or Texts, is worthwhile (468:424). However, it is safe to state that if 
the purpose is not accepted as worthwhile, the pursuit of God's purpose would not result 
in experiencing meaningfulness, a finding Hanfling (153:48) also came to. There is 
evidence of this in experience: many religious people, despite strong faith41, keep 
searching for meaningfulness and frequently ask God for clarification on what His 
purpose for them is. Some religious people, may leave their religious affiliation because it 
does not contribute to experiencing meaningfulness. The researcher was concerned that 
those readers with a religious background would be offended by the finding that belief in 
humankind's interpretation of God's purpose for humans, might not lead to experiencing 
meaningfulness. In addition, the researcher was concerned that the use of "God" would 
be interpreted by non-religious readers as an ulterior proselytising motive, with a 
corresponding loss of respect for the scientific integrity of the research. 
However, for the researcher, findings are merely findings and, as always in scientific 
work, no offence to any group or person is intended. Findings are always preliminary -
stepping stones to even more adequate answers. Consequently, just what God could be 
and what relevance, if any, God could have for being-human, being-ethical and being-
adult, were questions considered later in the research42. It is safe to state that no one can 
experience purposefulness for another and, therefore, cannot legitimately tell another 
what his purpose, in being-human is43. As Morton (289:36) found: "Seeking is a very 
personal business." One's purpose and the experiencing of meaningfulness has to be 
sought and discovered and accepted as worthwhile. Frankl (lOS.:122) found similarly. 
As Ogden and Richards (314:xiv) found, the search for meaning is not just giving a 
meaning but acting as a "prospector." Britton (45:13) corroborated: the search for 
meaning is "not a wish but a discovery", and Frankl (108:157) found that meaning has 
to be detected. 
The researcher considered that Adler (2:9) presented a clue: "Even at its source our 
experience is qualified by our human purposes. 'Wood' means 'wood in its relation to 
mankind', and 'stone' means 'stone as it can be a factor in human life'." Admittedly, a 
40 For the researcher at this stage in the research, a religious person is one who belongs to a religion, 
and believes in a God that can be appealed to for assistance. This description is inadequate, but the 
scope of the research did not permit further explication at this stage. 
41 The scope of the research did not permit a study of what strong faith is. 
42 Chapter Eight, Paragraph 4.0. 
43 The qualifier "in being-human" is necessary because people in authority (managers and teachers, for 
example) frequently do tell others what their purpose is with regard to specific tasks. 
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human life is not an artefact or thing, but the researcher found in a preliminary way that a 
human's purpose is in some way related to the purposes of fellow-humans. In other 
words my experiencing of meaningfulness is related to my experiences with 
fellow-humans. At this point in the research, the researcher had only a suspicion of 
what this purpose might be, and it was realised that this would be returned to later in the 
research44. 
The reader might be disappointed that the researcher was unable, at this stage in the 
research, to uncover what purpose being-human involves, or expressed differently, what 
purpose or purposes enable humans to experience meaningfulness. However, the goal at 
this stage in the research was to explain what is meant by being-searching for the 
experience of meaningfulness, and as just described, being-searching for a worthwhile 
purpose is one way that being-searching for experiencing meaningfulness is manifest. At 
this stage in the research, it was realised that considerable scientific uncovering would still 
be required before worthwhile purposes could be identified. 
One could ask, as the researcher and Hanfling (153:15) did, why humans want to find a 
purpose. Clues to answers to this question are given in other existential questions such as: 
What is my significance? Am I important? Do I count? and Do I matter? As 
Hanfling (153:46) pointed out, significance indicates a relationship between meaning and 
importance. However, for the researcher, there is an assumption in the questions just 
stated which, when made explicit, again revealed the relationship of meaningfulness 
with fellow-humans. When humans ask if they matter, count or are important, they are 
asking whether or not they matter, count or are important to other humans. Adler (2:9) 
corroborated: " ... we always experience circumstances in their significance for men 
... ".Ogden and Richards (314:196) found "significance" to be the relation of the thing or 
phenomenon to other things or phenomena - its place in a system as a whole. For the 
researcher, the whole just referred to is humankind. 
It could be claimed that some humans want to know if they matter, count or are important 
to their God, and are not concerned about their importance to other humans. In some 
religions, the question, Do I matter to God? would not arise because it is taught that all 
humans and all things always matter to God. For people who do not recognise any God, 
the question would also not arise. In other religions however, a bountiful harvest or a 
storm killing one's family may be taken as indications that one does, or does not, matter to 
a God. Morris (287:34-35) found that because humans want to be wanted, recognised and 
cherished, they have anthropomorphised God into a God who will love unconditionally. 
However, for the researcher, it is ultimately the response of fellow-humans when one 
44 Paragraph 2.4 in the current chapter. 
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experiences a disaster or a great joy, that provides, or does not provide, experiences of 
meaningfulness. In religious terminology, it is only through other humans that a God can 
show that a person matters. 
The researcher considered that finding, albeit in a preliminary way,_that the fellow-human 
has a part to play in one's experiencing meaningfulness, is evidence for the andragogic 
in being-human, as alluded to earlier in this thesis45. Further testing of this evidence 
would be undertaken later in the research46. It was also realised that just what relevance (if 
any) God, however this Being is perceived, might have for being-human, would have to 
be explored later in the research47. 
Why do humans want an answer about their significance? Why do humans want to know 
if their contribution counts to their fellow-humans? Again the answer is given in other 
existential questions such as: Do I have any worth? Does my life have any 
worth? and Is life worth living? Consequently, being-searching for experiences of 
meaningfulness is being-searching for affirmation of one's worth - for the experience 
of worthiness. But what is this worth one seeks affirmation of? Several lexicographers 
give clues. "Worth" is frequently used synonymously with "value" (334:604) (317:1013), 
"having substantial or significant value" (134:2637), and" ... that quality which renders a 
thing valuable ... " (259:1573). Ogden and Richards (314:171) found that: "The 'meaning' 
of anything is presumably its value ... ", and that (314:249) value is a synonym for 
meaning. 
But what is the value of a human: what is that quality that renders a human valuable? It is 
possible to think of the value of a human in terms of a monetary price as follows: 
• a slave might have been valued at £10 or £100; 
• in some societies a man is expected to pay to the parents of his future bride, several 
cows or camels, depending on the attributes of the woman concerned. This material 
value is frequently called the "the bride price"; and 
• a person's salary could be interpreted as her value to her organisation, and one 
frequently hears metaphors such as "worth one's salt" and "worth her weight in gold". 
It is also possible to think of the value of a person in utilitarian terms - of what they can do 
for one. For example: 
• a business associate may be valuable because he can introduce one to his colleagues 
and thereby contribute to one's business success; 
45 Chapter One, Paragraph 2.6. 
46 Paragraph 2.4 in the current chapter. 
47 Chapter Eight, Paragraph 4.0. 
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• a mother may be regarded as valuable because she looks after the children, cooks tasty 
meals and maintains the home; 
• parents may be valued by their children because they earn an income which provides a 
particular lifestyle; 
• a chief engineer in a manufacturing company may be valued because of his expertise; 
• a teacher may be valued because she can assist others in passing examinations. 
However, the reader may detect a non-utilitarian and more fundamental way of valuing a 
human. The researcher found that this could be revealed by phenomenologically testing 
the monetary and utilitarian ways of valuation just listed. 
• Why is placing a monetary price on human life repugnant to most people? Most people 
would hold that a human life is priceless. This is witnessed in the no-expense spared 
to save people when they are stranded on a mountain or at sea, after an accident. 
• Treating humans like animals or chattels is also repugnant and unacceptable to most 
people. In times of slavery, even if one paid the lowest price for one's slaves, there 
would be some general expectation of what was a decent way to treat the slaves. Why, 
despite the terrible acts of some convicted criminals, do most people not 
want to see them treated cruelly? This respect for humankind extends even to 
death. Elaborate funeral and burial rites are devised to show respect to the dead 
person's body, and most people are horrified when shown Second World War 
pictures of dead human bodies being thrown and stacked like lumps of dead meat. 
When shown television pictures of children starving to death with bodies of skin and 
bone - too weak to swipe the flies from their eyes and mouths, why do most people 
experience considerable anguish? 
• Most people become upset when they find out they have been used by others - treated 
like objects or things. Using others as a means to an end is usually frowned upon and 
people who do this are usually shunned and despised. As Baier48 found: "It is 
degrading for a man to be regarded as merely serving a purpose .. [in doing so we] 
reduce him to the level of a gadget, a domestic animal, or perhaps a slave." 
• Even when a Chief Engineer in an organisation is not capable of fulfilling his tasks, he 
is still valued. For example, he is given sick leave on full pay, representatives of his 
firm visit him in hospital and ultimately, if he cannot return to his post, another less 
taxing position may be found for him so that he is not left destitute. Similarly, even if 
a father unfortunately becomes a quadriplegic in a car accident and cannot play with 
his children or earn an income, he is still valued for himself and treated with care, if 
not by his own children, then by others. 
48 Quoted in Hanfling (153:45). 
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• Even in war, where the objective is to kill other humans, there are still expectations to 
treat prisoners humanely and to kill humanely. For example, weapons such as 
biological weapons, poisonous gases and laser guns are generally banned. 
In summary, the researcher found that the word "dignity", from Latin dignus - worthy 
(435:252), best describes the inviolable, inalienable, fundamental (existential) value or 
worth of a human49. Fundamentally, the value of a human arises not from his or her job, 
earning power, or good works for example, but from the fact that he or she is human. As 
Morton (289:118) found, human dignity is the right of every man, woman and child. 
Each person is unique but has the same fundamental (existential) worth (value) from 
conception50. As Harper, quoted in Morris (287:33) found, it is the irreplaceability of 
the individual that is the real meaning of the dignity of humankind. Morris (287:33) 
corroborated, finding that: " ... this craving for ultimate recognition, this need to believe in 
the irreplaceability of the individual, is the prime motivator of humankind." Ginsberg 
(126:237) expressed the same finding this way: "The goal is to live in dignity ... One 
person's premature death, one person dying in agony, one person killed by another, 
anywhere on earth, is a horror for the human community. A person's life is of infinite 
value. Necessarily, we all must die, but no one need die in those ways." The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights51 begins with the recognition of inherent dignity, and as 
Borowitz52 found, " ... there is something about every human being which is identified 
with the absolute source of value in the universe." 
In light of the findings just presented, one could think in terms of inequality-within-
equality. On the one hand, no human is the same as another human: no human is 
repeatable. As Frankl (108:172) found: "Everyone has his own specific vocation or 
mission in life; everyone must carry out a concrete assignment that demands fulfilment ... 
everyone's task is unique as is his specific opportunity to implement it." On the other 
hand, all humans, as Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights pointed out 
(44:28), are born equal in dignity. As Frankl (108:212) found: "An incurably psychotic 
individual may lose his usefulness but yet retain the dignity of a human being ... " and 
(109:108) " ... it [dignity] is always to be ascribed to the individual person whether he 
preserves this dignity or tarnishes it." Van Rensburg et al (435:252) found that: "A 
human does not have a value as an object does. Man is the focal point of all values in the 
49 Dictionary explanations of "dignity" include pride, sense of superiority, high office, stateliness and 
rank. However, these meanings are of a contingent nature and are not the same a dignity as 
fundamental human worth. 
5o The researcher realised this finding would be controversial and that many medical and fellow-
researchers regard being-human to begin after only so many weeks in the womb. For the researcher 
however, once the genetic complements from ovum and sperm have joined, the embryo is human. 
51 Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10th December 1948. ( 44:27). 
52 In Braybrooke ( 44: 11). 
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man-world relation - therefore we do not speak of human value but of man's dignity." 
Consequently, for the researcher, just as "human existence" is a tautology, so is 
"human dignity". 
At this point in the research, the investigation seemed to have come full circle. It is safe to 
state that the question, Is my life meaningful? could also be asked as: Is my existential 
worth (dignity) being respected? Consequently, being-searching for the experience 
of meaningfulness is ultimately being-searching for respect for dignity, or 
expressed differently, being-searching for dignifiedness53. It has already been shown54 
how some psychologists' findings about life themes imply that there is only one major 
life task, and that a life theme refers to an existential problem which a person feels 
compelled to solve and which becomes a pre-eminent goal that focuses that person's 
conscious energy for most of his or her life. The researcher considered that for 
humankind, the searching for experiencing of dignifiedness is that fundamental, 
major, life task. 
By "dignifiedness" the researcher means the experiencing of respect for dignity. 
This finding has an interesting implication because someone saying: "My life has little 
meaning" is saying, "I am not experiencing respect for my dignity". In addition, the 
explication so far reported indicates that being-human is being-dignified. As 
Maslow found: "When an individual's esteem needs are not gratified, he lives 
possessed by insecurity and inferiority; he feels unable to cope with life and its 
problems." For the researcher "esteem needs" are the need for dignifiedness (444:35). 
Oberholzer and Grey ling (311 :56) also found the inseparability of meaningfulness and 
recognition of dignity: "Even if a person loses all his material possessions, but retains his 
self-respect, he has managed to save his greatest treasure and has in fact lost nothing." 
They (311: 155) continued: "It is this dignity of which man is the bearer that contains the 
will to meaning ... and moreover embodies his supreme experience and assignation of 
meaning." Higgs (167:47) corroborated: "Human dignity is a prerequisite for 
meaningful human existence. "55, and Frankl (108: 105) found that a human can 
retain his dignity even in a concentration camp. Wilson (463:27-33) provided a detailed 
explication of dignity as a sense of worth, self-respect, self-esteem and security, and in 
addition, gave a comprehensive account of the relationship between dignity and 
education. 
53 As used by Gove (134:623). 
54 Chapter Three, Paragraph 4.0. 
55 As already explained, "human dignity" and "human existence" are tautologies. 
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Initially, the researcher considered that experiencing of meaningfulness arises from 
experiencing of dignifiedness. However, on further reflection it was realised that 
they are the same phenomenon, but that dignifiedness is a more adequate expression 
of meaningfulness. Consequently, since phenomenological reduction had revealed that 
experiencing dignifiedness is a more fundamental description of what experiencing 
meaningfulness is, the researcher decided to use the term "dignifiedness" and 
"dignifiedlessness" in place of "meaningfulness" and "meaninglessness", 
"purposefulness" and "purposelessness", and "worthiness" and 
"worthlessness". 
It is safe to state that the reason humans search for experiences of dignifiedness is to avoid 
its opposite - experiences of dignifiedlessness. Consequently, being-searching for the 
experience of dignifiedness implies not only seeking wa~s for achieving the 
experience, but also actualising some of them so that dignifiedness is experienced to 
some extent. The researcher realised that this finding applied to all the "being-searching" 
existentialia mentioned in this thesis so far. 
That being-searching involves both seeking and implementing the results of the 
seeking, was relevant to the research because the existential questions: What is the 
meaning of my life? What is my purpose? Does my life have any worth? and Does my life 
have any significance? are all asking the same thing56: What is required of me? They 
are asking What must I do? Britton (45:6) found similarly: the "The Meaning of Life" 
is a practical problem and could be expressed as How am I to live - in what 
manner? He also found that an answer to existential questions is needed in order to know 
how to live. Morris (287:38) expressed the same finding as follows: "When I seek 
recognition for the worth of my existence in the world, what I am actually doing is 
seeking advice on how to live my life so as to be eligible for this recognition." 
Consequently, the researcher wanted an answer to the question: What must one do to 
experience dignifiedness? or synonymously, What is being-dignified? A clue was given 
by Van Rensburg et al (435:252) who found that:" ... even the child must dignify his 
own being." Several lexicographers (259:360) (134:632) (394:656) found that "dignify" 
means to exalt, elevate mind or character, make excellent, make worthy, ennoble, 
being worthy of something, and to invest with honour. Among other things, "honour" 
means high respect, nobleness of mind, allegiance to what is right or accepted 
standard of conduct; "exalt" means to make lofty or noble, and "~oble" means of lofty 
character - morally elevated. 
56 Perhaps Jenkins (192:16) exaggerated when he found a thousand and one ways to ask the question: 
What is man? 
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But what does it mean to exalt, elevate, ennoble, make excellent and make worthy, one's 
own being-human? Of what does one have to be worthy in order to experience 
dignifiedness, and against what standard is excellence and elevation judged? The reader 
will notice that the questions just asked begin to penetrate to the very essence of what 
being-human is. At first sight, the questions may appear unanswerable. However, what 
else can a human be worthy of but some ideal of being-human? As Morton (289:18) 
found, although people may be content with their lives, they still "look for something 
better than they already know." 
How else can humans know if they are ennobling, making excellent, elevating and 
exalting, than by comparing with some ideal of more elevated, more noble, more lofty, 
more excellent? How else can one know if a person is morally elevated unless there is 
some ideal called "morally elevated"? Scheffler (378:25) found that humans create 
ideals to which they try to conform, and Yalom ( 468:422) provided further evidence of 
being-human requiring ideals, when he grouped meaning, goals, values and ideals 
together. He (468:422) found that: "We apparently need absolutes - firm ideals to which 
we can aspire and guidelines by which to steer our lives." Fellow-researchers have 
come to similar findings. For example, Barnes (20:9) recognised that justifying one's life 
involves the belief that one's conduct is harmonious with the image selected as the 
admired ideal pattern of life. The researcher considered that Luijpen (257:261-262) 
showed the closeness of the relationship between meaning, value and an ideal when he 
noted that: "Among ancient philosophers the term 'good' was used for what is known 
currently as 'value'. By this term they meant that which perfects - that which means a 
fulfilment of human tendency and desire." For the researcher, ideal human and perfect 
human are synonymous. 
The researcher was startled by the radicalness of this finding. To experience 
dignifiedness, one must find an ideal of being-human and strive to achieve that ideal. 
This, in tum, means that being-human involves finding an ideal and striving to 
achieve it. The radicalness of the finding became even more evident when it was realised 
that worthwhileness is judged in terms of contributing towards achieving 
the ideal. As Wilson (463:30) found, dignity has to be judged by transcendental values -
in terms of pure reason and goodness. 
At this point in the research, numerous questions confronted the researcher. For example: 
Just what is the ideal of being-human which one strives to be worthy of? 
Could there be a variety of ideals? Even if one could identify an ideal, how would one 
strive to achieve it? Can ideals ever be achieved? It was realised that considerable further 
research would be required to answer these questions, and results of attempting seeking-
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answers to them are presented later in the research57. Consequently, it was only in a 
preliminary way that the researcher found, that to experience dignifiedness, one must be 
involved in finding, respecting and striving to elevate, ennoble, and enhance (for example) 
one's own dignity to become more like some ideal of being-human. As long as it 
is remembered that every human is dignified from the moment of conception, the word 
"dignification" could be used to describe the human activity of becoming more 
dignified - more like the ideal. 
Despite awaiting the results of further reflection, the researcher was able to arrive at 
additional preliminary findings. These are listed in point form to keep this paragraph to a 
manageable length. 
• Bearing in mind that humans' concern about mattering and counting, is concern about 
whether or not they matter and count to other humans, it was anticipated that the 
fellow-human would play an essential role in dignification. Further 
reflection in this regard was undertaken later in the research58. 
• Whatever dignification is, it is unlikely to be a one-off event. One can imagine having 
dignity respected in the home, workplace, school, church, temple, mosque or 
synagogue and cricket club, for example. It is also safe to state that it is unlikely that 
any human will experience dignifiedness continually. There are bound to be many 
events in people's lives that threaten them with the experience of dignifiedlessness. 
Therefore, one must continually seek for dignifiedness. As May (272:33) pointed out, 
dignity and worth are not given: they must be solved. Consequently, being-human 
means to be perennially involved in dignification, or synonymously, 
perennially attempting to find answers to existential questions, as a 
means of experiencing dignifiedness. Morton (289:24) corroborated this finding. 
• The explication of being-searching for dignifiedness had uncovered further evidence 
of being-human as being-ethical. For example, in this paragraph, "worthwhile", 
"ideal", "perfect", "allegiance to what is right", "code of conduct", "lofty 
character", "noble", and "morally elevated", have been mentioned. It is also 
relevant that "worth" can also mean moral excellence (259: 1573) and moral 
intellectual or personal value (134:2637). Britton (45: 197) found that questioning the 
meaning of life " ... involves considering the evidence we have: making judgements 
according to our own lights as to what is and what is not good ... ". 
57 Chapter Eight, Paragraph 3.0. 
58 Paragraph 2.4 in the current chapter. 
196 
• Some readers might consider that extensive reflection on being-searching for the 
experience of dignifiedness is irrelevant to education. It was realised that just what the 
implications of being-human as being-ethical are for education, if any, would have to 
be considered at the end of the research59. However, some fellow-researchers such as 
Wilson (463:27-33) gave an indication of the interrelationship of respect for 
dignity and education. Van Rensburg et al (435:252) found that: "Th1ough 
education the child's dignity is protected." The researcher considered that replacing 
"child's" with "human's" would be safe. 
In summary, explicating being-human as being-searching for meaning, uncovered that 
being-human involves perennial dignification. It was realised that just what 
dignification is, would have to be investigated. Once again, the researcher experienced 
difficulty in finding a scientifically legitimate point of departure which could progress the 
research. Once again, the existential phenomenological approach of returning to 
experience proved helpful. It was realised that a fundamental question could be asked 
about being-searching perennially for the experience of dignifiedness, namely: Why do 
humans want to experience dignifiedness? Why do they not stop searching? 
For the researcher this was a relevant question, because as the reader will be aware, 
existential questions appear almost unanswerable. No one can provide meaningful 
answers60 for another (289: 10), and because existential questions cannot be answered 
absolutely, once-and-for-all, or finally, the seeking has to be perennial and can only 
result in temporary answers, if any. As Adler (2:9) found: meaning is always more or less 
unfinished and incomplete, and Britton (45:14) corroborated this. So, what is it that 
demands of humans that they seek the experience of dignifiedness? 
2. 3 BEING-HUMAN AS PERENNIALLY SEEKING TO ALLEVIATE 
THE EXPERIENCE OF EXISTENTIAL DREAD 
It is safe to state that unless severely mentally damaged, humans' experience of having 
dignity diminished - of being a "no-one", is painful. As will now be explained, this pain is 
referred to by some fellow-researchers as existential suffering, existential pain or 
existential dread. Morris (287:4) expressed the interrelationship of experiencing one's 
own significance and existential dread as " ... the pain of having to struggle to establish 
and certify one's own significance in the world." Consequently, dignification is an attempt 
to alleviate existential dread. 
59 Chapter Nine, Paragraph 4.14. 
60 Answers that lead to experiencing dignifiedness (meaningfulness). 
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Existential dread is an ever-present, pervasive experiencing of fear of annihilation 
of one's existence - of not existing (non-being). Existential dread is not the same as 
contingent fears such as the fear of spiders or of being struck by lightening, a finding May 
(271:51) also arrived at. With contingent fears, a feared object can be identified, and once 
the object is removed, the fear disappears. In addition, one can be taught to overcome the 
fear of spiders or death. 
However, with existential dread no particular object can be identified as the source of fear 
and it cannot be totally overcome - it is always present. As Morris (287:25) found, 
existential anxiety is not psychoneurotic anxiety - it is a kind of ultimate ache with no 
therapeutic cure. Existential dread is a fundamental or existential experiencing of fear 
arising from awareness that one's existence, and all one's acts (468:465) could be 
annihilated at any time, and will eventually be annihilated in death (271:42-47). Being-
human means perennially experiencing existential dread. When Frankl 
( 110: 116) wrote of 11 ••• suffering beyond all sickness, a fundamental suffering, the 
suffering which belongs to human life by the very nature and meaning of life ... 11 , he 
described existential dread. 
The researcher considered that May (271:50) when he referred to 11anxiety116l, adequately 
described existential dread: "Anxiety is not an effect among other effects such as pleasure 
or sadness. It is rather an ontological characteristic of man, rooted in his very existence as 
such. It is not a peripheral threat which I can take or leave, for example, or a reaction 
which may be classified beside other reactions; it is always a threat to the foundation, the 
centre of my existence. Anxiety is the experience of the threat of imminent non-being. 11 
Goldstein62 found similarly: anxiety is not something we have but something we are; that 
anxiety is the individual's becoming aware that his existence can become destroyed, that 
he can lose himself and his world, that he can become nothing. Macdonald (260:7-13) 
and Tillich (420:41-74) also provided an extensive description of existential anxiety. 
These findings revealed for the researcher that the experiencing of existential dread is a 
normal human experience. It is only (271:50) when people cannot cope with normal 
experience that neurotic symptoms appear. 
On reflection, it is understandable that humans experience existential dread. 
• Being-human means having no choice in being born. Other humans decide to, or by 
accident, give other humans life, or expressed differently, force or thrust being-human 
upon others. In addition, all humans find themselves at birth in situations they do not 
choose. Initially, humans have no choice but to be in a vast, apparently disinterested, 
indifferent universe: to be, as Morton (289:67) expressed it, 11 ••• an inconspicuous 
61 He explained in some detail why he prefers "anxiety" over "dread". 
62 Paraphrased in May (271:50). 
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speck in a fluid universe." In existential terminology (272:18) (468:9), being-human 
means thrownness, but not as a stone into a pond, but into the arms of a fellow-
human (a parent initially) who accepts, supports and educates the child. 
• Being-human means, as Britton (45:5) expressed it, being faced with the terrible 
question of why one has been brought into existence at all. Not only that, humans are 
aware (in varying degrees) that the answers they seek to their own existence cannot be 
provided by another: there is no "all-knowing-one" to easily explain existence. Each 
human realises (in varying degree) that he or she, and only he or she, can find 
meaningful answers. Yalom (468:9) found that every person is in existential isolation: 
"No matter how close each of us becomes to another, there remains a final, 
unbridgeable gap; each of us enters existence alone and must depart from it alone." 
• Being-human means being aware that there are no final or certain answers and that the 
seeking must continue in spite of this. Being-human means being aware of one's own 
certain death and continuing to live, despite knowing that all one's efforts will 
eventually be forgotten in the scale of the universe. Ginsberg (126:235-237) explained 
in detail how being-human involves living with the knowledge that death is the 
ultimate condition and that the human task is to live meaningfully while knowing this. 
May (271:42) expressed this as: " ... he [humankind] is the being who is always in 
dialectical relation with non-being, death." It was outwith the scope of the research to 
investigate in detail the relationship between death and existential dread, and the reader 
is referred to Y alom ( 468:29-211) in this regard63. 
• Being-human means being encountered by an impenetrable and hidden future. No one 
can know exactly what will happen in the future, and no one can predict for oneself or 
another, what is going to happen. Maslow (269:60) adequately identified that 
existential dread incorporates both the need to know and the fear of knowing. 
• Being-human means realising that boundary or border situations (435:235) (310:30) 
(468:159) such as one's own death, death of one's parents or the pending death of a 
terminally ill child, are inevitable (inescapable and unavoidable) (108:178), and that 
there is nothing humankind can do against them. In addition, humans must deal with 
crisis situations which arise from unexpected and drastically disturbing 
events (either pleasant or unpleasant) such as a loss of a limb, divorce, loss of 
employment, a sudden increase in wealth, or the birth of a baby64. 
63 Sutherland (410:22-23) found that the most critical inheritance of humans is awareness of our 
finitude. However, as the research results in this chapter show so far, this finding is inadequate. 
Knowing that one will surely die, is only one contribution to existential dread. Humans dread not 
being able to face death with dignity. 
64 Jaspers (188: 177-222) provided an extensive explanation of boundary situations. 
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• Being-human means dealing with depersonalisation, numberfication and 
standardisation (stereotyping) in much of the social interaction in the contemporary 
modem world (344:96-115), leading to what May (271:56) referred to as human 
beings losing their world, losing experience of community and experiencing 
alienation. Jaspers (187:33-49) and Oberholzer and Greyling (311:111-127) provided 
extensive corroboration of this reality. 
It is understandable that people experience everyday fears about their own death, physical 
disfigurement, and seeing a loved one suffer, for example. But what is it that gives rise to 
continually present, inescapable existential dread? In the previous paragraph it was 
explained how being-human requires dignification (perennial searching for experiences of 
dignifiedness). For the researcher, existential dread arises because humans are 
uncertain about their ability to respond in ways that will lead to 
dignification. The existential question becomes: Will I respond in a dignified way; a 
way enabling me to experience dignifiedness rather than dignifiedlessness? As Camus65 
found, a human can attain full stature66 only by living with dignity in the face of 
absurdity. The researcher considered that Frankl (108:156) found similarly when he 
referred to meaning as something confronting existence. 
Consequently, searching for dignifiedness becomes searching for ways to experience 
dignifiedness in the face of the potential for dignifiedlessness. Humans are searching for 
dignifiedness because they do not want to experience the pain of dignifiedlessness. Y alom 
(468:463) found that meaning is an anxiety emollient. As Frankl (108:106) found: "The 
way in which a man accepts his fate and all the suffering it entails ... gives him ample 
opportunity - even under the most difficult circumstances - to add a deeper meaning to his 
life." 
The dreadfulness of existential dread became even more evident for the researcher when it 
was realised that to respond, is to choose how to act and every choice is a risk that 
can lead to dignifiedness or dignifiedlessness. Frankl (110:51) referred to man's 
responsibility as having "awful depth" and as being "fearful", and Yalom (468:9) 
ref erred to the "terrifying implications" of freedom. "It is fearful to know ... that every 
decision from the smallest to the largest is a decision for all eternity." Being-human means 
being encountered, and being encountered means being forced to choose because not 
responding is also a choice. As Harmse (155:14) found: " ... man cannot escape by 
refusing to act because refusal itself is also an act!" Britton (45:19) corroborated: "We 
must make up our minds one way or the other." In light of the findings about existential 
65 In Yalom (468:427). 
66 The researcher, interpreted "full stature" as being the ideal already referred to. 
200 
dread just stated, it is understandable that Tillich ( 420) called the results of his 
investigation into what it means to be human: The Courage to Be. 
The researcher considered that the findings just stated are corroborated by what Frankl 
(108:103-104) found from his experiences in a concentration camp: " ... man does have a 
choice of action .... Every day, every hour, offered the opportunity to make a decision, a 
decision which determined whether you would or would not submit to those powers 
which threatened to rob you of your very self, your inner freedom." Not only are humans 
forced to respond, but they have to respond appropriately (make the correct choices) 
if they are to experience dignifiedness. An i!ldication that the appropriate responses 
necessary for experiencing dignifiedness are ethical ones was given by Frankl 
( 108: 107) when he found that suffering offered the chance to make use of opportunities of 
attaining moral values. This finding contributed further to the researcher's preliminary 
finding of being-human as being-ethical. 
In summary, existential dread arises because humans are inescapably confronted by a 
dilemma: humans want to know what is required of them so that they can experience 
dignifiedness rather than dignifiedlessness, but do not know for certain what to do, 
and whether or not they are fulfilling . the requirement. It is safe to state that 
being-existent requires that every situation an individual finds herself in (unique 
situatedness) demands or beckons (109:84) for an answer in the form of an 
appropriate response. 
The researcher considered that words such as "demands" and "appropriate response" 
are relevant to the research. They emphasise the reality, already mentioned twice in this 
paragraph, that humans cannot accept just any meaning or purpose. As Frankl found: "H 
the meaning that is waiting to be fulfilled by man were really nothing but a mere 
expression of self, or no more than a projection of his wishful thinking, it would 
immediately lose its demanding and challenging character; it could no longer call 
man forth or summon him." The reader will notice that phenomenological analysis has 
again led the researcher to being-human as doing that which is required in such a 
manner so as to experience dignifiedness. 
Frankl (108:122) came to similar findings: " ... it did not really matter what we expected 
from life, but rather what life expected from us. We needed to stop asking about the 
meaning of life, and instead to think of ourselves as those who were being questioned 
by life - hourly and daily .... Life ultimately means taking responsibility to find the 
right answer to its problems and the tasks it constantly sets for each individual." Frankl 
(108:122) also found, the answer to being-called " ... must consist, not in talk and 
meditation, but in right action and right conduct." Similarly, Yalom (468:464) found 
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that humans seek meaningfulness to gain values which constitute a code to place possible 
ways of behaving into some approval-disapproval hierarchy. At this stage, the 
researcher considered that there was some evidence to find, in a preliminary way, that 
being-ethical was essential to experiencing dignifiedness. 
The researcher was concerned about two questions which arose from the investigation of 
existential dread and dignifiedness: What is the power or force of the call to respect 
dignity? and Why do humans continue seeking dignifiedness? It was decided to report the 
results of further reflection on these phenomena . 
2.3.1 THE FORCE OF THE NEED TO RESPECT DIGNITY 
The reader will have detected by now, that being-answerible is not optional in being-
human - it is what being-human is. At the beginning of this research, the researcher was 
not rationally unaware of the strength of the obligation inherent in being-answerible. For 
example, Frankl (108:154) found that the will to meaning, (which, in light of 
explication in this chapter so far, could be called the "will to dignity") rather than the will 
to pleasure (Freud) and the will to power (Adler), is the primary motivational force 
for humankind. Some readers, without undertaking similar reflection, and despite the 
evidence already presented in this chapter, may doubt that there is such an obligation. 
Even if they do acknowledge it, they may not be rationally aware of the power of the call 
or demand. 
Consequently, the researcher considered it necessary to present additional evidence from 
experience to show the all-powerful extent of the obligation of being-answerible. Five 
examples have already been provided in the previous paragraph showing how it is 
anathema to most humans to diminish the dignity of another - even when the other has 
done terrible things. There are five additional experiential examples which show the 
relationship between respect for dignity and dignification {perennial experiencing of 
dignifiedness ). 
• It is well-known that despite being ill-treated or even severely physically beaten or 
sexually abused by a parent, a child will still want to remain with the parents. Why? 
For the researcher, the explanation is that existential pain is far greater than 
physical and mental pain. May (271:51) found similarly and Frankl (108:36) 
corroborated in his descriptions of his reactions to being beaten in a concentration 
camp:" ... it is not the physical pain which hurts the most (and this applies to adults as 
much as to punished children); it is the mental agony caused by injustice, the 
unreasonableness of it all." What other source of dignifiedness (however minimal) in a 
vast universe does the child have but his parents - the one's who gave being and who 
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should, and still could, provide dignifiedness. Imagine the existential dread - the 
experiencing of nothingness - if the major source of meaning (parents) is removed67. 
• It is also well-known that charismatic leaders are charismatic because they provide that 
which is necessary for the respect of dignity. So strong is the need for respect for 
dignity that leaders who are skilled at manipulation can command the most extreme 
loyalty, even convincing their followers to die for them or their ideals. 
• It is well known that being ignored is hurtful. Ignoring another conveys that she is of 
so little worth that she is not worth noticing or arguing with or. bothering about - that 
she is nothing. Ignoring another causes so much existential pain because it raises 
awareness of non-being. Frankl (108:37) found similarly when he was being beaten in 
a concentration camp: "The pain he caused me was not from the insults or the blows. 
That guard did not think it worth his while to say anything, not even a swear word, to 
the ragged, emaciated figure standing before him ... ". 
• The reader will know that many languages have words and phrases which are 
deliberately used to diminish the dignity of (belittle) others. These words might range 
from mild insults such as "silly", "stupid" and "scatter-brained" to the most vile insults 
such as calling someone "scum" or "dog shit"68. Another way to diminish human 
dignity is to insult an individual's family members. Most people are aware that 
despicable oral insults are likely to arouse extreme violence from a victim and may 
even result in the one who insults being killed. Why? Because, although people who 
use such insults may not be aware of it, they have extensively heightened the victim's 
existential dread - a pain too much to bear for some. It is relevant that Frankl (108:39) 
used the word "indignation" to refer to anger that arises when dignity is infringed. 
The researcher found that people working in the self-esteem movement have become 
aware of the fundamental need to respect dignity. Self-esteem workshops and books 
are designed to assist others to respect their own dignity, so that attempts by others to 
diminish dignity have a lesser effect. Coleman (63:5-7) regarded attaining self-esteem 
as an ideal of adulthood, and Brandon ( 43) used "self-esteem" in a way almost 
indistinguishable from dignity. The researcher considers that Frankl (108:99) 
expressed the synonymity of dignity and self-esteem when he found that: "The 
67 This does not mean that other sources of meaning cannot eventually be established, such as foster 
parents. As a member of the Aberdeen Children's Hearing System in Scotland, the researcher sits with 
two other panel members to find (and ultimately decide on) ways to best help children who have been 
ill-treated by their parents. Those instances when children have to be removed from the family home 
for their own safety are the most traumatic for all concerned, because in most instances the children 
know how "cruel" their parents are being, but cannot acknowledge it. Even if they do acknowledge it, 
they still want to stay with the parents. 
68 The researcher was concerned about using such a term in an academic thesis. However, just seeing the 
printed words is likely to exacerbate the experiencing of existential dread in the reader and it was for 
this reason that the term was used. Some readers, will know of even more vile insults. 
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consciousness of one's inner value [dignity]69 is anchored in higher, more 
spiritual things, and cannot be shaken by camp life. But how many free men, let 
alone prisoners, possess it? Without consciously thinking about it, the average 
prisoner felt himself utterly degraded." Just what these spiritual things are and their 
relevance for being-human, was considered later in the research 70. 
• When participants in management workshops 71 are asked why people want to work, 
some of the reasons given are: money, excitement, enjoyment, challenge, 
achievement, belonging, meeting people, travel, self-satisfaction, to contribute 
something, status, respect, power, recognition as a "great" person, to change society, 
and to keep busy. When participants are asked to state which reason is the 
fundamental motivator, most initially respond with "money". However, they soon 
realise in discussion that if many of the other items in the list are absent from the 
workplace, people become dissatisfied, no matter what the salary level. On being 
asked, for example: What is it that makes you feel satisfied? What makes you feel 
good about yourself? and What is it that gives you a sense of belonging? participants 
almost always agree that recognition by others of the worth or value of their 
achievement, is the fundamental motivator. In effect, they are saying that 
recognition of dignity - human worth - is the major motivator at work. 
From the evidence presented in this thesis so far, the reader will be aware that 
dignification is the major motivator in life, not just in the workplace. 
The examples just given corroborated the finding that respect for dignity depends on 
other humans and the person's own attitude. No matter how self-satisfied a 
person might be, this is not sufficient to experience dignifiedness. The achievement or 
challenge or "good work" has to be recognised as worthwhile by another human if 
dignifiedness is to be experienced. More importantly, the examples ground in experience, 
the inescapable, ever-present demand: find out how to respect dignity and act 
accordingly, or experience diminishment of dignity (dignifiedlessness). The 
existential fact of the demand to respect dignity led the researcher to his other scientific 
concern with human dread: Why do people even bother? 
2.3.2 WHY DO HUMANS CONTINUE TO SEEK DIGNIFIEDNESS? 
Why do humans want to be involved in dignification? Yalom (468:462) asked a similar 
question: Why. do we need meaning? Being-human, that is, being-searching for 
dignifiedness, appears to be a hopeless situation (or absurd, as Camus72 expressed it). 
69 The researcher's brackets. 
70 Chapter Eight, Paragraph 5.0. 
71 As part of his management consulting work the researcher conducts, amongst others, management 
workshops for eight to twelve participants entitled, Effective People Management. 
72 In Yalom (468:427). 
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There are no final answers, no end to the search and no one (289: 10) to provide answers. 
Existential dread cannot be eradicated, only alleviated (108: 123), and no person can 
undertake the suffering for another. Why then even bother to respond appropriately: why 
try to alleviate existential dread? An unhelpful and circular, and therefore inadequate 
answer would be, because humans want to experience dignifiedness. 
For the researcher, the searching continues because it is the only hope there is - there 
is nothing else to be done. If one decides to stop the searching, one might as well choose 
to die. As Morton (289:9) found: "We know we must go on trying to find an answer ... 
even if we are aware that we cannot ever find a final or complete answer . .. [This is so 
because] ... It is a part of his [man's] life. Indeed it is his life." 
Some psychologists and psychiatrists (108:159) (110:44) (92:119) (468:421) report that 
inability to cope with existential yearning (existential frustration), is one of the main 
reasons why people come to see them, and why they base their therapeutic work on the 
principle that much mental illness is due to inability to experience meaningfulness73. 
Without knowing it, most people manage to find the support to cope with existential dread 
but others who, for whatever reason, experience so much dread, become depressed and 
suicidal (468:419-420) and may state: "My life has no meaning", "I have no 
purpose", "I am worthless", or "I have no reason to live". Frankl (108:118-112) 
provided a harrowing account of this in a concentration camp 74. 
However, in apparent contradiction, if anyone ever did stumble upon a final answer, they 
would also lose the reason to live. As Morton (289:46) found: " ... certainty would be the 
end of life." They would have found the ultimate answer - there would be no point in 
going on - they would have reached the end. The only way to explain this situation would 
be that they would cease being-human and would have become something else - an all-
knowing being - possibly what some people would call "God"75. The researcher found 
that this is what some fellow-researchers call the existential tension required for 
human life - seeking without the possibility of a final answer. For example, Allport (8:67) 
found that: " ... salvation comes only to him who ceaselessly bestirs himself in the pursuit 
of objectives that in the end are not fully attained." It was anticipated that just what 
73 See for example, Frankl (364) whose approach is called Logotherapy (from Greek logos denoting 
"meaning"), and May et al (273) and Yalom ( 468) who referred to "existential psychotherapy". 
14 It has already been explained that being-searching for meaning is not an indication of mental illness. 
Similarly, the existential psychiatrists or psychotherapists, consulted for this research found 
existential dread and yearning not to be indications of illness. The findings of Frankl (108) (109) 
( 110), Yalom ( 468) and May et al (273) report, in straightforward language, the complex onticity that 
being-human is; that being-human entails experiencing and coming to terms with existential dread. 
75 Just what relevance, if any, God (however perceived) has for being-human, is discussed in Chapter 
Eight, Paragraph 4.0. 
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"salvation" means and what these unattainable objectives are, would be uncovered during 
the research. 
That humans experience varying degrees of existential dread was another indication of an 
existential continuum. It is safe to state that all humans, unless mentally damaged, 
experience existential dread to some degree. Even a human who has been brutalised 
cannot escape existential dread76. Some people may experience very little existential dread 
all of their lives and may not even be aware of the subtle dread always in the 
"background". There may be very little physical evidence of this seeking in many 
individuals. In some other individuals the seeking may be very evident. For example, the 
researcher undertaking this research is, in part, a manifestation of attempting to overcome 
experiencing dread. Similarly, one frequently hears of very successful doctors, sports 
people, entertainers and business people, for example, who give up their well-paid 
occupations to go on a "spiritual quest"77 - to find more dignifiedness than their current 
lives allow them to experience. 
Up until this point in the research, the researcher was encouraged by the progress made in 
explicating what it means to be human. Phenomenological reduction had revealed that 
being-human, means being-searching for experiencing of dignifiedness. Initially, it 
seemed as if the question, Why do humans seek dignifiedness? was adequately answered 
by finding that humans need to alleviate existential dread. 
However, another question was encountered which phenomenological reduction could not 
assist in answering. Why do not humans just give up and die, when faced with 
the impossibility of answers about existence? Initially, Morton (289:158) seemed 
to have an answer: "We live and want to live in order to find out what life really is." 
However, as already reported, we know we will never find the answer to this, so again, 
Why not just die? The fact that some questions about being-human cannot be answered 
was not a disappointment. Being-human is ultimately an unfathomable mystery and 
means living with, and having to respond appropriately to, the fact of unanswerable 
questions. As Frankl (108:187) found: " ... ultimate meaning necessarily exceeds and 
surpasses the finite intellectual capacities of man ... ". That this ultimate question could not 
be answered was not a hindrance to the research. As Adler (2: 11) found: "We shall not 
find an absolutely perfect answer, an answer established once and for all; but, 
nevertheless, we must use all our ability to find an approximate answer. We must struggle 
76 Frankl (108:78-79) explained how severe diminution of dignity results in loss of self-respect, loss of 
feeling of being an individual with an inner mind and personal value - and results in behaviour 
equivalent to animal life. This is what the researcher means by brutalisation. 
77 Just what relevance the term "spiritual" might have for being-human is explained in Chapter Eight, 
Paragraph 5.0. 
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always to find a better answer ... ". Of course, the reason for wanting better answers is to 
experience dignifiedness. 
Although one cannot find totally adequate answers to ultimate questions, such as why 
humans bother to seek dignifiedness, one can still ask: How do humans know whether or 
not they are responding appropriately? and How can humans find better answers and 
experience dignifiedness? One could answer that people know when they are responding 
appropriately when they are experiencing dignifiedness. However, this answer would lead 
in circular fashion to another question: How can humans experience 
dignifiedness? 
Some preliminary findings in response to this question have already been presented in this 
chapter. For example, in some way, the experiencing of dignifiedness is related to 
experiences with fellow-humans; and that when people ask if they matter and count, 
they want to know if they matter and count to fellow-humans. In addition, it was 
anticipated that the fellow-human would play an essential role in dignification. 
On further reflection, the researcher confirmed the essential role of the fellow-
human in dignification. Who other, than a fellow-human, could affirm, recognise 
and respect another human's dignity? What other, than the responses of fellow-humans to 
my responses, can indicate whether I am responding appropriately? Who else, but a 
fellow-human, has the ability and opportunity to let it be known that I count and that 
what I do matters? In short, without the fellow-human, dignification (perennial 
experiencing of dignifiedness) would not be possible. As Oberholzer and Greyling 
(311:15) found, a person has to be" ... accompanied so as to be able to live a life worthy 
of a human being." As Wilson (463:29) found: " ... preserving one's dignity - and 
preserving other people's for the sake of social peace and harmony - is certainly one of the 
strongest motives in social action and behaviour ... ". 
The findings just stated, were additional contributory evidence to being-human as an 
agogical phenomenon, as outlined previously78. Consequently, to continue uncovering 
what being-human is, on the way to finding out what being-ethical is, phenomenological 
analysis demanded an investigation of just how the relationship with the fellow-human 
contributes to experiencing dignifiedness. 
2.4 BEING-HUMAN AS BEING-YEARNING FOR A BENEVOLENT 
FELLOW-HUMAN 
Since it is only another human who can contribute to alleviation of existential dread, it is 
safe to state that the striving to alleviate it, is manifest as existential yearning for a 
benevolent fellow-human. This yearning is an inescapable, always-present, 
78 Chapter One, Paragraph 2.6. 
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hankering for one who will respect my dignity, no matter what flaws I have or what 
mistakes I make. Not only that, the yearning is for a fellow-human who will also help me 
maintain my dignity in the face of my apparent insignificance, and when encountered 
by boundary and crisis situations. As Friedenberg (114:169-170) found with regard to 
adult students: "What they are more likely to want is some assurance that the various roles 
each fills in society are meaningful, and that they are capable of filling them without 
embarrassment. ... reassurance, however, is what a large part of our clientele come to us 
for." 
As Oberholzer and Greyling (311:15) found: "Deep down in the human mind is the 
yearning to be recognized by others ... ". Morris (287:59) found that: "My pride in myself, 
a favorable look at myself, is possible only in the presence of others." Wilson (463:30) 
found that dignity has much to do with the recognition of our worth by others. Adler 
(2: 182) found the same: "The oldest striving of mankind is for men to join with their 
fellow men." Morton (289:139) found similarly: "Generally this [meaningfulness, joy and 
happiness] comes to him through someone else - someone who inspires affection and 
interest or, more probably, someone who is fond of him and interested in him and inspires 
him about life." Frankl ( 108: 176) found that the meaning of life can be discovered in three 
different ways, by doing a deed, by experiencing a value and by suffering. However, is it 
not other humans who recognise the deed; who manifest the value; and for whom the 
suffering is undergone? 
By respecting my 79 dignity and showing how to maintain dignity in the face of dignity 
threatening boundary and crisis events, the fellow-human contributes to my experiencing 
dignifiedness. As Jenkins (192: 102) found, it is in relationship that a person becomes 
" ... more and more worthy of his or her own proper and personal name." Consequently, 
the support of a benevolent fellow-human is not something one can do 
without, even if one thinks one can. The need is fundamental (311: 15) and is always 
present no matter how financially or personally secure one is or how pleasant one's life 
situation. The yearning is for someone who can be consulted on personal (even intimate), 
interpersonal and career matters (perhaps difficulties), be trusted to keep confidences and 
be relied upon to give honest advice based on no other criterion but my well-being. 
In this way, the fellow-human accompanies me on the way to my hidden future, and 
supports me through many obstacles that may threaten dignity, including knowing that we 
both will ultimately die. In so doing, the fellow-human alerts me to those of my responses 
which might lead to me diminishing my own dignity. Since there is no other source of 
experiencing dignifiedness known to humankind other than in relationship with fellow-
79 "My" is used for ease of expression and does not mean the researcher only. 
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humans, being-human means being-dependent on fellow-humans. It is because 
searching for experiences of dignifiedness is not optional for humans that being-dependent 
is not optional. As Adler (2: 11) found: "The weakness and the limits of the individual 
human being make it impossible for him to ensure his own aims in isolation. If he lived 
alone and tried to meet his problems by himself he would perish." 
It has already been explained BO how being-human is being-in-the-world. May (271: 
59-60) expressed how world, meaningfulness and relationships are inseparable: "World is 
the structure of meaningful relationships in which a person exists and in the design of 
which he participates." Adler (2: 11) and Bergevin (26:20) found similarly, as did Morton 
(289:143): "We can understand ourselves only in relation with other men, only in 
relation with particular people with whom we have a personal relationship", and 
(289:159) "Without other people we would not know what to look for in life." Maslow 
(270:335) summarised succinctly for the researcher, the relationship between adulthood 
and the andragogic: " ... basic human needs can be fulfilled only by and through other 
human beings ... ".For the researcher, Morton's finding could be re-stated as: without 
fellow-humans we would not know what to do to experience digniftedness and 
we would not experience it. In light of the evidence just presented, it is safe to state 
that being-human, that is, being-dependent, is also being-relational: being-yearning is 
the yearning for relationship with other benevolent humans. 
As already alluded to in the examples of being-yearning just presented, humankind is not 
seeking just any kind of relationship, but relationship with a supportive and benevolent 
fellow-human. As Oberholzer and Grey ling (311 :9) found: "Everyone needs a trusted and 
reliable fellow-creature who will stand by him on his way to the unknown. We need one 
another, and above all we need somebody with whom we can face the hidden future in all 
possible circumstances"; and (311:11) [A person's deepest longing is]" ... for a fellow-
being who will accompany him to the last frontier of his existence and who will help him 
to preserve his dignity in the face of that ultimate boundary, death." 
However, if the fellow-human's task is to protect and maintain dignity, benevolence is 
not sufficient. Unless the fellow-human is more knowledgeable of those responses 
that contribute to dignifiedness and those that diminish dignity, it is not possible to guide 
another to experiencing dignifiedness. The fellow-human must be more experienced in 
what is entailed in experiencing dignifiedness. As Oberholzer and Greyling (311:13) 
found: in its fundamental sense " ... companionship is the willingness of one person to 
help another in situations of which the one has had experience while the other has so far 
80 Paragraph 2.2, in the current chapter. 
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been spared." Consequently, only those relationships with benevolent and more 
experienced fellow-humans will be dignifying. 
For the researcher, several questions arose from the findings just stated. For example, 
How does the benevolent, more experienced fellow-human assist another to experience 
dignifiedness? What does "benevolent" and "more experienced" mean? What must 
accompaniment comprise if it is to lead to experiencing dignifiedness? What does being-
dependent mean? The reader might wonder (as did the researcher) where one seeks for 
answers to these difficult questions. It would be understandable to try to find answers in 
very specialist fields in psychology, counselling and psychotherapy for example. 
However, as previously indicated in this thesis81, the researcher found that it was only in 
the very limited and recent literature of agogics (science of accompaniment) that being-
relational, being-dependent, accompaniment, and their interrelationship in dignification, 
are specifically, explicitly and systematically studied82. As Oberholzer and Greyling 
(311:19) found: " ... human life is a matter of relationships. In the agogic sciences the 
emphasis is on this relational existence ... ". 
It was explained in Chapter One that since the researcher was investigating adulthood, that 
andragogics (the science) and andragogy (the practice) would be the focus for the 
research. That being an adult entails andragogic relationships is corroborated by, for 
example, Sonnekus83, Kilian (208: 19-20), Du Plooy, et al (89:157); Viljoen and Pienaar 
(439:68) and Pratt (328: 164). However, because the researcher was seeking a 
fundamental description of what it means to be human, it was realised that at this stage in 
the research, it would be legitimate to employ a wider agogic perspective. 
In agogics (as already explained) "agogue" names the benevolent and more 
experienced fellow-human, and "agogee" the one being accompanied. In addition, the 
terms "accompaniment" and "agogy" name the assistance given by the agogue and the 
practice of accompaniment, respectively. As also previously explained, "the agogic" 
names the inescapable relationality of accompaniment that being-human is. 
Recognition of the agogic is evident in the work of some researchers working from a 
psychologistic perspective. For example, Maslow (270:50) suggested a "psychogogy" 
to mean education of the psyche, and Bugental84 used "ontogogy to describe helping 
81 Chapter One, Paragraph 2.6. 
82 This does not mean that counsellors and therapists are not involved in agogy. They are, as will 
become evident later in this thesis. All that is stated here is that they are not aware of it as agogy, and 
it is not studied as a main focus. 
83 As quoted in Morrow (288:159). 
84 In Maslow (270:50). 
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people to "grow to their fullest possible height85 ". Consequently, the researcher 
considered that further investigation of what being-agogical is, and in particular what it 
means to be an agogue, would provide further insights into being-human, being-ethical 
and adulthood. 
2.5 BEING-HUMAN AS BEING-AGOGICAL 
The researcher has already given considerable background to the agogic, the 
interrelationship of its modes and the appropriateness of some terminology used to 
describe it86. As is to be expected with any relatively new science, there are some 
controversies, some misunderstandings and differing uses of terminology. The scope of 
the research did not permit attempts to solve theoretical problems in agogics87, but the 
researcher hoped that some of the answers revealed by the research would contribute in 
this regard. 
Despite the newness of, and the controversies surrounding agogics, the researcher 
considered that the discipline is sufficiently well grounded to provide reliable findings 
about being-human. This grounding has been provided by researchers who would call 
themselves agogicians88, and those who probably would not89. But even if agogics was 
not well-grounded and there was even less documentation, the researcher's own 
phenomenological existential research, as recorded in previous studies (344) (346) and 
more currently in this research, revealed that an agogic perspective is the most adequate 
way to continue seeking for what it means to be human, and for what adulthood is90. 
By this stage in the research, it had been revealed that dignification entails being-
agogical. Being-agogical entails agogee and agogue participating in agogy so that both 
experience dignifiedness. Although the agogee is the one who is accompanied and 
supported, it must be remembered that both agogee and agogue are seeking experiences of 
meaningfulness. Just as with many other existentialia, people are involved in seeking for, 
and participating in, agogical relationships with varying degrees of awareness. It is 
also safe to state that the extent of dignifiedness experienced by humans will depend on . 
the extent of the quality of accompaniment. Consequently, to continue the research, 
the researcher sought answers to the question: What is agogical accompaniment? 
85 The reader will notice the inadequate use of biologistic terms, "grow" and "height", and the mis-
spelling of the root "agogy" as "ogogy". 
86 Chapter One, Paragraph 2.6. 
87 See, for example, several essays in Beard and Morrow (22) and see Robb (346). 
88 Such as, Oberholzer, CK (310), Van Rensburg, Kilian, ~d Landman (435), Oberholzer, CK and 
Greyling (311), Oberholzer M 0 (312), Harmse (155), Du Plooy, Griessel and Oberholzer M 0 (89), 
Du Plooy and Kilian (90), Viljoen and Pienaar (439), De Jager, Reeler, Oberholzer M 0, and 
Landman (82), and others as recorded in Smit (397). 
89 Such as Buber (50), Rogers (360), Rogers and Stevens (361) and Maslow (270:40-51). 
90 The researcher respectfully invites fellow-researchers (philosophers) to test this finding. 
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It has been previously explained how the Greek terms agoge meaning accompaniment and 
agogos meaning leader, guide, attendant or accompanist, have been used as the 
roots for "agogy", "agogue", "agogee" and "agogic". However, agogos itself is derived 
from ago (414:1) and the definitive, agein meaning to lead (213:938) (90:31) (89:2) 
(82:9) (209:3) (435:397), guide (414:1) or accompany (435:397) (311:22) (90:31)91. 
Since the researcher was seeking answers to what agogical accompaniment (and not just 
any accompaniment) is, it was considered scientifically permissible to use the term "the 
agein" as English language shorthand for the actualisation of agogical 
accompaniment. 
The reader may wonder why it is necessary to qualify "accompaniment" with "agogical" 
or to use the scientific term "the agein". The researcher was seeking the fundamentals -
the essentials - in being-human. Consequently, just as being-questioning does not involve 
questions such as, What shall I wear today? or How do I find a mate?; just as existential 
dread does not involve being afraid of spiders or of being robbed, so age~n is not about 
being accompanied to a dance, to the dentist or on a weekend holiday. In addition, the 
agein is not just the everyday assistance given to fellow-humans in activities such as 
mending a car tyre puncture, dealing with a difficult employer or passing an examination. 
By asking, What is the agein? the researcher was seeking what Jenkins (192:100) referred 
to as the essential humanity of human relationships or what Oberholzer and 
Greyling (311:24) referred to as " ... the primary and highest existential datum of 
our humanness." The word "humanness" is also used by Morris (287:27). 
The agein is the actualisation of the relationship of agogee and agogue. It is not something 
one does or gives to another. For the researcher, the agein is also expressed as the "1-
Thou" relationship of Buber (51) as the something- the spirit (121:31) between the I and 
the Thou. The agein is mutual existential accompaniment - guiding, escorting, 
accompanying, going with (311:22-23), showing the way, directing (414:1), 
going before, piloting (89:2) and supporting assistance (209:3) on the way to a 
hidden future with all its potential threats to dignifiedness. However, the agein is far more 
than a just a non-committed, casual, non-caring, pointing-the-way, or a non-intimate, 
solely financially based contract. An agogue becomes existentially involved with the 
agogee and this implies for example, being companions (311:22-23); mutual 
involvement (311:23); being together (89:2) and acting together (435:397). 
The researcher considered that Kakar (199:6) expressed the Indian equivalent of the agein 
and agogue when he found that dharma is derived from the root dhr meaning to uphold, 
91 Oberholzer and Greyling (311), Greyling (140:1-6), Ten Have (414:13), Yonge (471:160-167) and 
Van Enckevort ( 433:42), for example, gave even more detailed explanations of this derivation. 
212 
support or nourish and in some instances to mean upholder or sustainer. Despite the 
biological connotation of "nourish", the researcher considered that Coleman (63:97-98) 
came to the same finding and illustrated the distinction between an agogue and non-
agogue: "Probably the most basic contrast between adult and nonadult is between those 
who are considered capable of providing at least some forms of nurture 
and those who are considered to require some form of nurturing92." 
The agein is not limited to the caring professions: a shopkeeper and bus conductor - any 
person in a position of being asked for assistance which ultimately can affect another's 
experiencing of dignifiedness, has the potential to be an agogue. Kakar (200:122) 
examined a Hindu Yoga view of adulthood and found that: "The adult93 ... is not an 
isolated being but an individual embedded in a multiplicity of relationships. He is 
a partner (to the spouse), a parent to his children (and a child to his parents) ... ". He 
(200: 123) also described how being a householder (the responsible/adult person) in the 
Hindu yoga view of adulthood requires one to care for all those in need of care. Kakar 
explained that the word for marriage, "vivaha" means to support or sus~in. He found 
that the ideal of Hindu adulthood is loving and caring relationships. 
The agogue is one who will: take a benevolent interest not only because he is told to 
or paid to; not tum back when times become difficult; not tum away when the agogee 
fails; have the courage to point out when the agogee is about to do, or has done, 
something which diminishes dignity; continue to comfort even when others will not; keep 
a promise or confidence; not lie or cheat or demean; share burdens and successes; and will 
not gloat when troubles beset the agogee. The agogue is one who is sympathetic 
(simultaneously affected with the same feeling as the agogee), empathetic (puts oneself 
in the experience of the agogee) and compassionate (feeling pity and wanting to help). 
The linguistic root in "sympathetic" and "empathetic" is "pathic" from the Greek pathos 
and paschein meaning that which arouses the tender emotions, and more generally, 
feeling (435:323). This is relevant to being-agogical because it reveals that agein is a 
pathic, not a rational, phenomenon. Even if one knows rationally that all conditions are 
right for experiencing dignifiedness, one may still not experience (feel) it. The pathicality 
of being-agogical revealed that the researcher's earlier use94 of "searching for the 
experiencing of dignifiedness" (feeling), rather than just "searching for dignity" 
(rational), was scientifically appropriate. In addition, this finding corroborated earlier 
92 "Nurture" and its forms imply a biologistic concept and "care" would be more adequate. 
93 One must not lose sight of the fact that these conditions also apply to children. 
94 Paragraph 2.2 in the current chapter. 
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findings95 that being-in-the-world and experiencing dignifiedness, are essentially pathic 
phenomena. 
Using terms such as "sympathetic", "empathetic" and "compassionate" in describing the 
agogue may give the impression that being-agogical requires the agogue to be over-gentle, 
non-critical, namby-pamby and mollycoddling96, and indulging of the agogee. However, 
this is not the case. Since the agogue is concerned with guiding the agogee to experiencing 
dignifiedness, anything that the agogee does or attempts to do that could diminish dignity, 
has to be pointed out courteously and helpfully. In other words, in some situations the 
agogue may have to be firm but fair. Respect for dignity requires the agogue to point out 
how the agogee's opportunities for experiencing dignifiedness can be enhanced. 
It may be, that in situations where what the agogee does or attempts to do will seriously 
diminish dignity of self and others, and he has to be physically or legally restrained. This 
means that although an agogue will not tum away when the agogee fails, it does not mean 
that the failures are ignored or treated as acceptable. For example, sub-standard work 
submitted by a student should not be accepted even if the student is experiencing some 
personal difficulty. Instead, additional understanding and additional support could be 
offered to improve sub-standard work. Agogues working with criminals may be 
supportive and compassionate, but would neither pretend that the crimes were acceptable 
nor make excuses for criminal acts. 
For the researcher, the agein is very similar to the unconditional regard of Rogers 
(360:184-185), and to Fromm's (116:159) finding that love is" ... the affirmation of the 
potentialities and care for, and the respect of, the uniqueness of the loved person ... ". 
However, one term adequately describes the agogue's combined attitudes of benevolence, 
sympathy, compassion and firm guidance, namely "love as agape". Downie and Telfer 
(86:29) used "agape" in a similar way. Frankl (364:176) found similarly: "Love is the 
only way to grasp another human being in the inner most core of his personality. No 
one can become fully aware of the very essence of another human being unless he 
loves him." For the researcher, "inner most core" and "very essence of another" means 
regarding another human not just as a name or number, but as a unique manifestation of 
being-human. 
As Frankl (110:133) continued: "Love, then, is an entering into direct relationship 
with the personality of the beloved, with the beloved's uniqueness and singularity." 
McGlynn97 found similarly: love enables man to intuitively understand his personal 
95 Paragraph 2.2 in the current chapter. 
96 Namby-pamby means "weakly sentimental" and mollycoddling means "pampering". 
97 In McDonald (275:Vol 5:726). 
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relationship to the other and reveals him as a unique personal being. May 
(271:38) corroborated: "One must have at least a readiness to love the other person, 
broadly speaking, if one is to be able to understand him." Wilson (463:31) found similarly 
when he described building self-esteem as love, and making pupils feel that they belong, 
and that this involves a certain type of relationship98. Fromm (115:33) described the need 
for productive love:" ... of care, responsibility, respect and knowledge. If I love, I care 
- that is, I am actively concerned with the other person's growth and happiness ... ". 
The reader will be aware by now that agogical accompaniment (the agein) is not just any 
accompaniment, but that which is beneficial to the agogee because it elevates, uplifts, and 
improves. Previously, the researcher had (344:81-88), as have fellow-researchers, used 
the term "authentic agogues"99 and "authentic agein" to describe genuine, reliable, 
and trustworthy agogues, and genuine agogy. However, in this research it became evident 
that the use of "authentic" was inappropriate for one main reasonlOO. "Agogue" and 
"agogy" already have within them the connotation of genuineness (authenticity). If the 
one who accompanies does not have the best interests of. the other at heart, 
that person is not an agogue and the accompaniment is not agogy. Rosenblatt 
(363:66) expressed this finding when referring to the attributes of ideal adulthood as 
helpfulness, guidance, gentleness and self-sacrifice. 
Consequently, for any one instance of accompaniment, one is either an agogue or is not an 
agogue. However, it is reasonable to find that some agogues will be better agogues than 
others. For a variety of reasons, some agogues will be more effective than others, in 
doing what must be done to accompany another to experiencing dignifiedness. 
Consequently, in this thesis, the words "more effective" and "best quality 
possible" are used to indicate that agogues can always improve their accompaniment and 
that agogy can always be enhanced. 
' 
The researcher wondered why an agogue would want to be involved in offering the best 
quality agogy possible. Some people might be offended by such a question, because they 
might claim that they are not agogues for any personal gain such as praise, money or 
status. They may be agogues because they enjoy helping people and enjoy seeing the joy 
98 Wilson may dispute that he found similarly, because he stated that unconditional love has nothing to 
do with dignity and that a feeling of belonging is different from a feeling of being dignified. However, 
as explained in this chapter, experiencing dignifiedness is an experiencing of meaningfulness and 
security, and is nothing to do with status or pride. 
99 From Latin authenticus and Greek authentikos (317:63) meaning something authoritative, entitled to 
acceptance or belief as being reliable; genuine not counterfeit, and (435:225) trustworthy, reliable and 
of undisputed origin. 
lOO There was a secondary reason. The researcher was vaguely aware that authenticity was underlying 
many of the findings being uncovered and expected to have to make this explicit later in the research. 
However, authenticity as the opposite of bad faith is a complex phenomenon and the considerable 
explication that would have been required, would have been a distraction at this stage in the research. 
215 
others experience as a result of the agein. They might claim that they do it for its own 
sake, because it is a good thing to do. But what is it that gives agogues the good feeling, 
the joy, pleasure or satisfaction that comes from the agein? 
From the results of reflection already presented in this chapterlOI about why humans 
continue to live and perennially search for dignifiedness, the answer became evident. It is 
the agogue's own experiencing of dignifiedness that gives rise to his or her 
satisfaction and joy, when he or she sees the experiencing of dignifiedness in the other. It 
is in accompanying the agogee to experiencing dignifiedness that the 
agogue experiences dignifiedness. The researcher considered that Erikson (98:10), 
working from a psychological perspective came to the same finding: " ... the moral rule 
of adulthood is to do to others what will help them, even as it helps you to grow." 
Although the psychologistic "growth" can now be regarded as "become more 
dignified", Erikson's finding illustrated that some psychologists recognise adulthood as 
an ethical phenomenon and the role of agogy. Just what "the moral rule" might be, is 
discussed later in this chapterl02. 
The degree of dignifiedness experienced by the agogue will depend on the degree of 
dignifiedness experienced by the agogee. In other words, the degree of dignifiedness of 
the agogue depends on the quality of his or her accompaniment. The agogue and 
agogee are mutually dependent for experiencing dignifiedness. As Adler (2: 12-13) 
found: " ... life means - to be interested in my fellow men ... people make mistakes if they 
do not see that their whole significance must consist in their contribution to the life 
of others ... it is only when a man's life is recognized by others as having significance for 
them that we call him a genius." Hemming (165:69) referred to this mutual dependence as 
"Mutuality of caring". Allport (8:30) came to the same conclusion from a 
psychological perspective: "In proportion as an individual is democratically socialized he 
finds it intolerable to seek happiness at the expense of others." These findings 
corroborated an earlier finding: " ... my experiencing of meaningfulness is related to my 
experiences with fellow-humans"l03. 
The findings just presented are not the researcher's views, theories or opinions and have 
been uncovered cumulatively, and are grounded in the results of extensive fundamental 
radical reflection, already presented in this chapter. Despite this, the researcher was still 
concerned with the finding that agogues undertake agogy ultimately, for their own 
experiencing of dignifiedness (personal gain). The researcher wondered what this would 
101 Paragraph 2.3.2. 
102 Paragraph 4.0. 
103 Paragraph 2.2. 
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mean for altruisml04 and for the quality of agogy. It was realised that this question would 
require further attention later in the research. To progress the research, the finding that the 
agogee and agogue are mutually dependant for experiencing of 
dignifiedness was employed as a point of departure. 
Up until this point in the research, the researcher had concentrated on the agogee as the 
one being-searching for experiences of dignifiedness by seeking for, and responding to, 
an agogue. However, it had been revealed that by the very act of initiating and being 
involved in actualising the agein, the agogee also affects the dignifiedness of the agogue. 
Consequently, agogy is not a one-sided relationship. The agogee, in seeking experiences 
of dignifiedness, affects the dignity of the agogue, and the agogue, depending on the 
quality of his agogy, affects the extent of dignifiedness of the agogee. There is mutual 
change, interdependence and mutual involvement. Consequently, being-human 
means being-interdependent (311 :22-23) or even more adequately, being-
independent-in-dependence (311 :60). 
Being an agogee is not passively being told by the agogue what to do· to experience 
dignifiedness; it is a working together - a sharing of experiences. Agogee and agogue 
are interdependent in their striving for experiences of dignifiedness. It is safe to find that 
the agein is not actualised by a mere two-way conversation, a casual or fleeting 
relationship. It is an intimate, mutual commitment that is there before words appear, that 
results in mutual change. In other words, the agogical relationship is dialogical 105• 
Consequently, one can refer to the agogic-dialogic and to agogical-dialogical involvement 
(311:16). Oberholzer and Greyling (311:23) continued: the agein (the agogic-dialogic) 
(mutual accompaniment as interdependence) is a primordial fact integral and 
inalienable to existence - the essence of existence. For the researcher, this means that 
being-human is being-dialogical. It was decided to continue explicating being-human, by 
investigating the meaning of being-dialogical. 
2.6 BEING-HUMAN AS BEING-DIALOGICAL 
Being-dialogical is unique to, and the essence of, being-human. As Ginsberg (126:241) 
found: dialogue " ... is the humanity of being human." He also described how fellow-
researchers find that we (humans) are dialogue. As Oberholzer and Greyling 
(311: 15) found: existence is characterised by dialogical involvement with well-disposed 
fellow-humans. In other words being-human is being-dialogical. Strasser (408) 
found similarly, as did many other fellow-researchersl06. Erikson (100:44) referred to the 
human need of a mutuality of recognition by face and by name, and (100:45) referred 
104 That the explanation of morality cannot be reduced to self-interest (105:11). 
105 "Dialogical relationship" is a tautology because dialogue can only be relationship. 
106 See Robb (344:38-88) for specific references. 
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to mutual recognition between mother and infant as a model of some of the most 
exalted encounters throughout life. 
In the dialogic, the agogue and agogee influence and cause change in each other. May 
(271 :63) expressed this mutual involvement as follows: "The essence of relationship is 
that in the encounter both persons are changed . ... relationship always involves 
mutual awareness ... being mutually affected by the encounter." As Ellenberger 
(92: 119) found, interpersonal experience is called encounter - not in the sense of a chance 
encounter but the decisive inner experience resulting from it for one or both of the 
individuals concerned. "Something new is revealed, new horizons open up a sudden 
liberation from ignorance or illusion, enlarge the spiritual horizon, a new meaning in 
life." Again the researcher noticed the word "spiritual" being used in relation to the 
accompaniment of the agogee by the agogue. 
Frankl ( 110: 146) arrived at the same finding but expressed it in terms of love: love must 
necessarily enrich the lover. "Either you really love - in which case you must feel 
enriched, whether or not the love is returned; or you do not really love, do not actually 
intend the inner being of another person ... ". Howe (173:6) found the same. Similarly, 
Jenkins (192: 102) referred to the " ... deepening intimacy of relationship in which two 
people discover one another and in the discovering actually contribute to that which is to 
be discovered in one another." The inseparability of dialogue and love was shown by 
Howe's (173:3) finding that: "Dialogue is to love, what blood is to the body", and by his 
(173:7) reference to dialogical love - participation in which, enables the other to realise 
his own being. 
As Frankl ( 110: 146-14 7) found: "In mutual love a kind of dialectical process takes 
place ... ", and similarly, according to May (271 :38): " ... the etymological relationship 
between knowing and loving is exceedingly close .... knowing another human being, like 
loving him, requires a kind of union, a dialectical participation wit~ the other." 
Having revealed that the agein (the agogic-dialogic) is an expression of spiritual love, 
the researcher was not surprised to find references to spiritual love in fellow-researchers' 
findings about dialogue, as just reported. 
In dialogue, both humans are called by the dignity of the other and by their own dignity. 
Dialogue is a mutual existential corrective. Agogee and agogue learn from the 
responses of each other, what contributes to dignifiedness and what does not. Dialogue 
is a reciprocal enhancing of dignifiedness. Dialogue implies (311 :24) fellowship, 
reciprocal committedness, interdependence and co-existence - a mutual sharing of 
experiences with the agogue sharing what has been dignifiedful for him or her. For the 
researcher, being-dialogical reveals that being-existent is, in fact, being-co-existent. 
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This is corroborated by Ginsberg's (126:227) "We as intersubjectivity" and Buber's 
"I-Thou". 
The fact that being-human is not possible without other humans is shown by Geeting 
(121:18) when be explained that: "In those odd instances in which an infant has been 
physically kept alive and nurtured by animals, the potential for humanity remains dormant. 
... Such a child, though developing a certain physical likeness to an adult human ... can 
only minimally be referred to as a human being." Coleman (63:4-5) found that: 
"Adulthood cannot be accomplished merely by the acquisition of self-serving capabilities. 
These must be augmented by capabilities for mutually rewarding involvement with 
others." It was anticipated that just what "mutually rewarding involvement with others" 
entails, would be revealed later in the research. 
Dialogue is a personal experience and it is for this reason that the researcher considered 
findings such as that of Maslow (to satisfy love or affection or belongingness needs 
an individual must find a group to which be can relate), are not adequate ~444:35). It is 
not the group or the neighbourhood or society that relates to another, but a specific fellow-
human. In addition, dialogue can occur even when one of the participants is not physically 
present to the other. Dialogue need not be face-to-face but through the telephone or the 
written word. Consequently, educators and educands may dialogue through the medium 
of a book, journalist and reader through the medium of the newspaper, and counsellor and 
potential suicide through the medium of the telephone. 
However, listing modes of communication through which dialogue may be facilitated, 
may mislead the reader. As the reader may be aware by now, "dialogue" as used in this 
thesis is not the phenomenon referred to in everyday conversation, that is a two-way 
discussion. The scope of the research did not permit extensive investigation of Buber's 
(50:17-59) extensive findings on what dialogue is. However, be made explicit that the 
relationship between two humans intent on each other's dignification is genuine 
dialogue - not pseudo-dialogue, or technical dialogue. For the researcher genuine 
dialogue is agogic dialogue. 
Even more revealing is the fact that existential dialogue (being-dialogic) does not need 
words. As Geering found (121:34): " ... genuine dialogue may on rare occasions even 
dispense with words." Ginsberg (126:225) found similarly: "The dialogue I open with 
you, my reader, is without words. This dialogue is that openness between human beings 
that usually lies concealed beneath the operations of words .... Something other than this 
writing bolds us together, something not on the page but in the heart." 
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The essentialness of being-dialogic to being-human is so self-evident that many people 
take it for granted. For example, even in the womb, the child is in relationship with the 
mother. As soon as the child is born, there is a seeking for the mother's face and voice. 
As Erikson (100:40) found, the newborn looks up and searches the inclined face of the 
motherly person. He also found that this developing eye-to-eye relationship is dialogue, 
as essential for the psychic development and survival of the child, as is the mouth-to-
breast one for its sustenance. Where such contact is established, the human being will 
thereafter always look for somebody to look up to and all through life will feel 
confirmed by uplifting encounters. Geeting (121:17) gave an almost identical 
account to that of Erikson's, but referred to a spiritual bond or cord taking over from 
the physical bond (umbilical cord) and explained that the spiritual bond is just as 
important, if not more important, for the infant's survival. 
Since dialogue does not necessarily need words, it can occur even when the agogue is 
dead. One can still enter into dialogue with the author of a document. Each person is 
probably experiencing many instances of agein with different people, _sometimes as 
agogue and sometimes as agogee. Oberholzer and Greyling (311 :22) referred to perennial 
companionship, "perennial" implying that every instance of accompaniment is not the 
same but has its variations, fluctuations and nuances. The pedagogic, andragogic and 
gerontagogic modes of the agogic are not to be regarded as mechanistic, water tight 
divisions (414:8) (435:219). They represent an interrelated continuity and progression, 
one mode being founded on the preparation that takes place in the previous mode. As 
Oberholzer and Grey ling (311 :23) found: " ... we cannot say exactly where and when the 
agogic in the pedagogic mode is concluded and proceeds to the andragogic mode ... ". As 
Viljoen and Pienaar ( 439:200) found, agogy continues throughout the life of a person. For 
the researcher, this evidence that being-agogic-dialogic is a continuum, is further 
evidence that adulthood is a continuum. 
The researcher wanted to know in more detail how the mutual existential corrective that is 
dialogue, takes place. From the agogee's perspective, it is the agogue who sets an 
example which inspires the agogee to work towards and to become like the agogue in 
some way. In Buber's words, the agogue is the agogee's Thou and vice versa. Frankl 
( 110: 146-14 7) corroborated this: "For the loved one wants to be worthier of the lover, 
a worthier recipient of such love, by growing to be more like the lover's image ... In 
mutual love each wishes to be worthy of the other, to become like the other's vision 
of him: each outbids the other and so elevates the other." Adlerl07 wrote metaphorically 
of the wise, loving and more knowledgeable older brother who takes responsibility for 
107 In Maslow (270:50). 
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improving the younger brother. As Ginsberg (126:227) found, the purpose of all 
dialogue is to find out the best way to live. 
Sinha (396:57) found that other adults serve as " ... role-models which the individual 
tries to emulate and regards as providing guidelines for his conduct, and of what is 
right and wrong, proper and improper ... ". Sinha (396:63) found that an individual 
usually looks to parents, teachers, elders or someone from their peer group whose 
qualities he tries to introject into himselfl 08. The findings just stated about 
improving and elevating the agogee, and the agogee wanting to become like (in the image 
of) the agogue, could be misleading. It seems as if they contradict two existentialia, 
namely inequality-in-equality and uniqueness. However, it must be stressed that in no 
way is there any hint of inferiority of the agogee, nor of attempts to produce a replica of 
the agogue. 
For the researcher, the improvement or elevating is about the enhancement of the way one 
is human. For example, Adler (2:184) found that: "It is only through our interest in our 
fellows that any of our human capacities develop." Similarly, Oberholzer and 
Greyling (311:15) found that: "In the presence of a benevolent fellow-being I become 
conscious of myself and through his intervention I realize what I have to do to comply 
with the demands of pure humanness." As Geering (121:40) found, without 
relationship, humans cannot actualise true humanity, develop true personhood and 
would perish in solitariness. For the researcher, personhood and humanhood are the same 
phenomenon 109. 
At this stage in the research, the researcher wondered what pure humanness, true 
personhood and true humanity were, and what their relationship, if anything, to 
dignifiedness, was. It is possible that all three terms just listed name the same ideal of 
being-human, as previously reported in this chapterl 10. It was realised that the 
relationship, if any, between the agein, dignifiedness and some ideal of being-human 
would require investigating during the research 111. 
For Oberholzer and Greyling (311:24), the agogue is an example, a precept. Hanfling 
(354:33) illustrated how the agogue as inspiration, elevator, improver, uplifter and 'older 
brother', calls or demands: "Someone asks a question; it requires an answer. Someone is 
108 
109 
110 
It is relevant that Sinha (396:63) found that the sample of youth studied in India seldom found 
inspiration from personalities in the past, not from their parents or teachers: that the young do not 
possess clear-cut role models. 
The researcher noticed that both Buber (51) and Geering (121) seemed to distinguish between 
personhood and humanhood (humanity): why they did this is not easy to understand. 
Paragraph 2.2. 
111 Chapter Seven, Paragraph 3.0. 
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counting on me to do something, and will be surprised or upset if I do not do it." As 
Britton (45:12) found: "To say that there is a meaning in life is to say that there is 
something that may serve as a guide in our lives." For the researcher, in practice, this 
guide is the agogue. The agogee, in striving for dignifiedness, will want to be what the 
agogue expects him to be and shows him what to be. With support from the agogue and 
having experienced the joy or satisfaction that dignifiedness brings, the agogee will l:now 
for the future what is required to experience dignifiedness in other relationships. 
Not only that, the agogee will have become more experienced with regard to experiencing 
dignifiedness and will know what is required to be the best possible agogue. A relevant 
point was revealed at this stage in the research. If the agogue is to be more experienced, 
and if the agogee works toward being like the agogue, then there must be some inequality 
between agogee and agogue. However, this is inequality-in-equality because both are 
of equal existential worth (dignity): the agein could not be actualised if both were of equal 
experience. 
Although, in normal circumstances, each person is surrounded by other humans during 
everyday activities, and is involved in many relationships, the reader may detect that not 
just any fellow-human, or just any relationship, will contribute to alleviating existential 
yearning. It is for this reason that the researcher used the term "benevolent " in the title 
of this subparagraph. It is safe to state that only those humans who are willing to 
accompany and have the other's best interests at heart, that have the potential to alleviate 
yearning. 
Although by this stage in the research, the researcher had revealed being-human as being-
agogic-dialogical, and had shown dignification as integral to it, several questions arose 
about its practical implications. For example, How does the benevolent, more experienced 
fellow-human assist another to experience dignifiedness? What does "benevolent" and 
"more experienced" mean? Since the agogic-dialogic arises from the perennial search for 
recognition of dignity and experiencing that recognition (dignification), it was realised that 
the questions just listed could be re-phrased as follows: What must accompaniment 
comprise if it is to lead to experiencing dignifiedness? What must the agogue do in 
support of the agogee, so that the agogee's responses allow the experiencing of 
dignifiedness? In other words, what must the agogue do to respect the dignity of the 
agogee so that the agogee will respond in a way that respects the dignity of the agogue and 
others? and What does it mean to be a more effective agogue? 
Before presenting the results of seeking answers to these questions, it was considered 
necessary to lessen potential misunderstanding by answering a number of additional 
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questions about, being-agogical-dialogical. These are given in point form to keep this 
chapter to a manageable length. 
• The agogue is the representative of life and society 
When it is stated that life or society calls, demands, beckons, or expects, it 
is through the agogue that one becomes aware of "life's" or "society's" demand. 
Although further study is required to confirm this, it is through the agogic-dialogic 
with many agogues, that agogees experience whether society and life are meaningful 
or not. When it is found that humankind is a social being and cannot realize himself 
without the social (153:190), this means that humans are dependent on the agogue for 
experiencing dignifiedness. Scheffler (378:25) found similarly: "The child, initially 
unself-conscious, comes to be aware of itself through the reactions of others to its 
acts. We first learn about ourselves through seeing our reflections in the eyes and 
attitudes of others; concurrently we learn to act so as to evoke the favorable responses 
of others." 
• The agogue is motivated by benevolent self-interest 
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Some readers (particularly those who consider themselves altruistic) might be 
distressed and offended by this finding because it indicates that altruism - unselfish 
service to others - is indeed motivated by personal gain - the experiencing of 
dignifiedness. As revealed in this chapter, the researcher found that nothing is done 
for itself sake. Whether we are aware of it or not, all responses intended to assist 
another, are undertaken to experience dignifiedness. This finding contributes to 
answering the question askedll2 by many fellow-researchers: Why be moral? The 
good feeling, the joy, pleasure or satisfaction that comes from being involved in agogy 
(helping and assisting others) arises because one experiences dignifiedness. Morton 
(289:28) found similarly but used different expression: happiness is the sense of 
comfort and joy we find through the knowledge that some people love us and that we 
love them113. By now, the reader will realise that knowledge is not sufficient - it has 
to be experienced, and that experiencing love gives rise to happiness and joy because it 
leads to experiencing dignifiedness. 
A practical example can illustrate this finding and also show the relationship between 
dignifiedness and education. One can imagine involving adults who attend adult 
education classes in the evening, in the following question and answer session (as the 
researcher has done from time-to-time. 
As reported by Pritchard (329:225-248). 
Hemming (165:67) showed how in the close-knit hunter societies, responding according to kindness, 
generosity, consideration, affection, honesty, hospitality and compassion, are regarded as necessities 
for survival. 
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Question: Why do you want to attend conversational Spanish lessons? 
Answer: So I can enjoy my holiday more. 
Question: Why will learning to speak Spanish help you to enjoy your holiday more? 
Answer: Because I will be able to speak to local people in their own language. 
Question: Why will speaking to people in their own language help you to enjoy your 
holiday more? (At this point most people usually become annoyed) 
Answer: Because it's a sign of respect and we should make the effort. 
Question: Why do you want to show respect to the local people? 
Answer: Because they will treat me better - show me respect because I have 
made an effort to respect them. 
A similar interview could be shown for a parent taking evening mathematics classes so 
as to help her child with his school work. For the researcher, this interview illustrated 
that an everyday need to learn a language can be traced back to the striving to 
experience dignifiedness. 
Consequently, when researchers from whatever discipline, and praCtitioners from 
whatever profession, speak of meaningful experiences or striving to maximise the 
well-being of others, this means, fundamentally, helping them to experience 
dignifiedness. Some people in the caring professions who honestly feel they undertake 
their duties because they love others and want to help, may be offended by this 
finding. It must be remembered that the findings about being-agogical are not views or 
opinions but findings uncovered from scientific reflection. Fellow-scientists are 
invited to undertake reflection on this phenomenon to see if they arrive at similar or 
different findings. 
If some agogues are offended by the finding that all altruistic deeds are partly done for 
the doer to experience dignifiedness, they may feel this way because of the assumption 
that being involved in agogy for personal gain adversely affects the quality of agogy. 
But this need not be so. There is a distinction between experiencing benefit as an 
unintentional consequence of assisting another, and helping another because 
one expects benefit. For the researcher, intentionally initiating a relationship with 
the motive of experiencing dignifiedness is an ulterior motive which in itself would 
make experiencing dignifiedness less likely114. In addition, it would disqualify one as 
an agogue because the well-being of the agogee was not the major motive. Y alom 
(468:482) expressed this finding more adequately: "Meaning, like pleasure, must be 
pursued obliquely. A sense of meaningfulness is a by-product of engagement." 
By engagement, Y alom meant full commitment and action, and for the researcher this 
114 Allport (8:68) came to the same finding: that happiness is not itself a motivating force and it cannot 
be achieved by striving directly to attain it. 
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commitment and action must be to the good of the agogee. Morton (289:52-53) found 
similarly to Y alom: meaningfulness does not come from achieving the thing sought but 
arises from things that happen to one on the way. 
Consequently, being an effective agogue is not a matter of consciously saying, for 
example: "Today I will help students experience dignifiedness so that I will experience 
dignifiedness." lithe agogue concentrates on the well-being (enhancing the dignity) of the 
agogee, the agogue's own experiencing of dignifiedness will happen. With this additional 
background, and at this stage in the research, it was realised that being-yearning, being-
agogical and being-dialogical revealed the fact that it is the behaviour of the agogue and 
agogee, one to the other, that provides the degree of dignifiedness they individually 
experience. The researcher was now faced with a demand to find out what responses 
(behaviours) of the agogue contribute to experiencing of dignifiedness - for the agogee 
and, consequently, for the agogue. 
2.7 THE REQUIREMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE AGOGUE 
So far, the researcher has recorded summarily, results of preliminary reflection on what 
the agogue should be like, that is, the requirements to be fulfilled to be an effective 
agogue. Some of the terms used have included: "benevolent", "respect dignity", "maintain 
dignity", "loving", "trustworthy", "honest", "having well-being as a prime motive", 
"willing", "fair", "firm", "more knowledgeable", "more experienced", "helpful", 
"supporting", "courageous", "keeps promises", "sympathetic", "empathetic" and 
"compassionate". Ellenberger (92:119) added to this list by finding that an agogue is a 
philosopher who reveals a new way of thinking, a person of great life experience, of 
practical understanding of human nature, of heroic achievements, and of independent 
personality. 
It cannot be denied that a detailed explication of what it means to be benevolent, 
compassionate, trustworthy and courageous, for example, would provide a 
detailed description of what it means to be an effective agogue. However, for three main 
reasons, the researcher considered that this approach was not the best way to further the 
research. Firstly, how would one select the phenomena to be explicated? Secondly, even 
if one had some criteria on which to ground such a selection, the scope of the research 
would have become unmanageable. Thirdly, it was realised from preliminary analysis that 
each of the phenomena listed was an umbrella term (name) for a group of desirable 
behaviours (responses)- desirable because they support, protect and enhance dignity. 
It is safe to state that an effective agogue strives not to do anything (and largely succeeds) 
which diminishes the agogee's dignity: to avoid doing anything that leads to 
the agogee experiencing dignifiedlessness. It was realised that a better way of 
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uncovering the demands on an effective agogue would be to reflect directly on personal 
experiences of dignity-enhancing and dignity-diminishing behaviours. 
Consequently, the researcher reflected on his own experiences as a lecturer and student in 
the educational setting of a university and compiled a list of as many possible actions of 
lecturers that would result in students experiencing dignifiedlessness. This list 
was expanded by imagining additional hypothetical instances of behaviour by lecturers 
that would diminish students' dignity115. The university setting was selected for this 
research because the relationship of lecturer and student is an andragogical one, and an 
examination of the andragogic is a requirement of the research as expressed in the title of 
this thesis. Consequently, in the description to follow, references to the agogue, agogee 
and agogy, for example, are in fact, references to the andragogue, the andragogee and 
andragogy. 
As was expected, the researcher compiled an extensive list of behaviours that would result 
in students experiencing dignifiedlessness. After reflecting on each of the dignity 
diminishing behaviours, it was possible to translate them into their opposites, that is, 
dignity enhancing behaviours. Once this was done, it was also found that the many 
behaviours that would make for effective agogy could be adequately categorised under 
seven criterial headings. The results of this reflection are now presented. 
2.7.1 AN EFFECTIVE AGOGUE TREATS THE AGOGEE AS A PERSON 
EQUAL IN DIGNITY TO HIMSELF 
To fulfil this criterion (demand) the lecturer would have to: 
• Treat students with respect by talking to them as valued, intelligent individuals, and 
avoid being patronising and condescending. 
• Find ways of criticising and correcting work which encourage further effort, and 
which avoid belittling and embarrassing students. 
• Genuinely thank and praise students when appropriate, and avoid shouting. 
• Consult as far as possible regarding course content, teaching styles, the nature of 
assignments and modes of course assessment. 
• Really listen when students talk, and give students ample opportunity to offer their 
views and experiences, and to ask questions. 
• Arrive punctually for lectures, give ample notice when, in rare instances, lectures are 
cancelled and prepare thoroughly for lectures. 
• Honour the full time commitment allocated to teaching, even though he prefers 
research. 
115 A student in the United Kingdom gave a list of complaints against lecturers that diminished dignity: 
see Tobin (421:v). 
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• Ensure any student was not treated adversely merely because of his race, gender or 
religion, for example. 
2.7.2 AN EFFECTIVE AGOGUE MAKES CONSIDERABLE EFFORT TO 
PUT AGOGEES AT THEIR EASE IN HER COMPANY AND WITH 
REGARD TO THE LEARNING TASK AHEAD 
Some people may interpret this criterion as "spoon-feeding" students or being superficially 
nice. However, as will soon become evident this is not the case. This criterion requires the 
lecturer to: 
• Make an effort to learn students' names. 
• Be self-revealing by, for example, issuing a course handbook with a short biography 
and photograph of herself - without being boastful. 
• Show students that she is not perfect by recounting the errors she made with regard to 
the topic under study. This would also mean avoiding using academic titles, dress and 
technical jargon to show one's "superiority". 
• Show, without any doubt, that when a student wishes to talk after lectures or makes a 
separate time to meet with her, that this conversation is welcome. This would entail 
avoiding any indication, even body language, that the student is "making a pest of 
himself' or is an inconvenience. 
• Give full information about the course and subject, and explain what students are 
required to do to excel and how they can ask for extra assistance if needed. 
• A void belittling or insulting others with whom the student may have dealings and 
thereby causing doubt and anxiety about the advice students may receive from others. 
2. 7 .3 AN EFFECTIVE AGOGUE GIVES THE BEST ASSISTANCE 
POSSIBLE 
It is common knowledge that most university lecturers are required to take on at least three 
roles: teaching, research and administration. However, as far as students are concerned, 
the main assistance lecturers offer is teaching. Consequently, to fulfil this criterion, the 
lecturer must: 
• Prepare lectures, laboratory demonstrations, tutorials and other learning events to the 
highest standards so that students are kept interested and enthused. 
• Offer students the most recent developments in the field by making efforts to keep up-
to-date. 
• Help students to avoid the drudgery of excessive note-taking and unnecessary 
administration by offering up-to-date, legible handouts and reference lists, and by 
using modem teaching aids. 
• Allow students the opportunity to ask questions and not use his status or authority to 
prevent questions. 
• Create the best environmental conditions possible, such as clean and noise-free, 
lecture rooms. 
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• Take time to give sufficiently clear instructions regarding assignment objectives and 
due dates. 
• Listen willingly to suggestions for improving teaching and learning, and changing, 
when complaints are justified. 
• Look after his own health and private life so that these do not deteriorate to a level that 
diminishes the qucJity of his assistance to students. 
2.7.4 AN EFFECTIVE AGOGUE IS HONEST AND TRUSTWORTHY 
This requirement is not meant to offend fellow-lecturers. It serves to indicate that to be an 
effective agogue, the lecturer has to: 
• Say, "I don't know" when she does not know the answer to a student's question, and 
avoid pretending she knows the answer when she does not. 
• Admit it when mistakes occur in an examination question or in marking scores, for 
example, and ensure mistakes are corrected and apologies given. 
• A void distorting facts in lectures so as to present the picture of reality she prefers. 
• Keep almostll6 all confidences and avoid talking about one student to another that 
. . 
would in anyway reflect badly on the other. 
• Make explicit, facts and personal opinions in her teaching and avoid surreptitiously 
trying to influence students without telling them she is trying to influence them. 
• Avoid undertaking criminal activity (such as supplying the questions in advance of an 
examination) even at the request of students and even when such an act may bring a 
short-term solution to the students' problems. 
• A void (except in very rare instances) 117 breaking laws of the land, flouting current 
social norms and endangering the safety of others which leads agogees to mistrust the 
advice being given. 
• Acknowledge the assistance given by students in preparing a paper or project, and 
avoiding claiming personal credit for all the work done. 
• Insist on top quality work even though the students may resist and show displeasure. 
2.7.S AN EFFECTIVE AGOGUE DOES NOT USE OTHERS AS A 
MEANS TO AN END 
To fulfil this requirement the lecturer would have to avoid: 
• Getting students to undertake research and then claiming it as his own. 
• Having sexual relationships with students, even if the students wish such a 
relationship. 
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"Almost" is a necessary qualification to take into account rare instances when keeping the confidence 
would result in considerable harm to others. The justification for not keeping a confidence is 
discussed in Chapter Seven, Paragraph 2.5. 
It has already been explained in Chapter Five, Paragraph 2.4, that breaking a law may be necessary to 
be ethical. However, the rare circumstances that would permit such a response, are discussed in 
Chapter Seven, Paragraph 2.5. 
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• Using students to get extra payments (for himself or for his department) from 
commercial companies by, for example, accepting "donations" for displaying 
advertising or from sales of educational products, without informing the students. 
• Using students or their work in experiments without telling them and gaining their 
approval. 
2.7.6 AN EFFECTIVE AGOGUE PUTS THE AGOGEES' INTERESTS 
FIRST 
This criterion does not mean that a lecturer or her family must suffer hardship, because if 
this happened, she would not be able to give the best assistance possible and the students 
would experience dignifiedlessness. However, it cannot be denied that there will be 
instances when, to protect the dignity of students, a lecturer will have to respond in such a 
way that may damage her own interests. For example, to fulfil this criterion, a lecturer 
would have to: 
• Set and mark essays despite the considerable marking load involved, because it is 
educationally necessary to do so. 
• Risk the wrath of university management by failing the majority of &tudents if the 
work was genuinely below standard. 
• Accept the likely unpopularity of suspending a student caught cheating in an 
examination. 
• Tell the truth about the limited job prospects after qualifying or the chances of passing 
an examination (where there is a policy of allowing only a certain percentage of 
students to pass). Such an action may dissuade students from enroling in the lecturer's 
course and consequently, may result in reduced funding for her department. 
• Reject the dictates of any political, religious or other pressure groups, for dealing with 
problems (even though she agrees with them) without reference to the students' 
principles. 
• Reject requests from superiors, subordinates or any other authority (including legal 
authority) which require the lecturer to diminish the dignity of students. 
• Spend additional time with students when it becomes clear that this is necessary for the 
students' well-being. 
• Forego enjoyable, additional paid or voluntary work, during or outwith working 
hours, which reduces time or attention available to students. 
• Forego the income from the sale of her own textbook to students when a better 
textbook is available. 
2.7.7 AN EFFECTIVE AGOGUE AVOIDS ALL ULTERIOR MOTIVES 
For the researcher, an ulterior motive is a person's real motive, hidden by the pretence of 
another motive. In some ways this criterion demands an advanced form of honesty and 
requires the lecturer to avoid: 
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• Giving special treatment to one student or a group of students because of favours or 
gifts given, or because they are friends of friends, for example. 
• For example, setting students a long exercise and then cancelling a lecture to 
supposedly allow students extra time to complete the exercise, when the main reason 
for cancelling, is the lecturer's inability (for whatever reason) to· attend. 
• Involving students in doing work for the lecturer's department under the pretence of 
"research" or "experience". 
• Directly striving for professorships, knighthoods, international prizes or even 
scientific knowledge, for example, which leads to postponing meetings with students, 
inadequate preparation for student meetings and attending to the student but not really 
listeningl 18. 
• Presenting a course with the supposed aim of enlightening students when the real goal 
is to indoctrinate them. 
In summary, the list of requirements just presented under seven criteria! headings, is a list 
of requirements for etTective agogy, that is, the requirements an agogue must fulfil 
to some degree, in order to enable the agogee to experience dignifiedness and, in tum, to 
experience dignifiedness himself or herself. The reader will be aware that the same 
reflection could have been conducted for the relationships of manager and employee in 
a commercial company; doctor and patient in a hospital, parent and child in the 
family home and warden and inmate in a prison, for example. Although different 
words would have been used to express the requirements, the same principle of treating 
others so that they experience dignifiedness and not dignifiedlessness, would be present. 
It was realised that although the list of requirements for effective agogy had been 
uncovered using instances from the andragogic, the seven general criteria, with some re-
wording would apply to all agogic relationships. Consequently, although the 
researcher had intended to limit the research to an andragogic perspective, and although 
the expression of the demands within each of the seven criteria! headings would be 
different for different institutional settings, it was decided to continue the research within a 
broader agogic perspective. The researcher considered that this widening of the 
perspective of the research was scientifically responsible for two main reasons. 
Firstly, as the reader is aware, the researcher was seeking fundamentally for what it means 
to be human, and consequently, the findings revealed about the agogic, would apply to the 
andragogic. Secondly, one major purpose for undertaking the research was to hopefully 
offer recommendations for educators to assist in enhancing the practice of educating. In 
118 Macdonald (260: 19), although he does not use the word "agogic", illustrated how ulterior motive and 
one's own dignifiedness are related: "If a man fails in his personal life [essentially a life of 
relationships] his most brilliant successes in public life will not make up for it." 
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widening the perspective of the research, the researcher would be able to offer 
recommendations for educators of children as well as educators of adults. Consequently, 
although the researcher would still be researching adulthood from an andragogic 
perspective, this would be undertaken within an agogic perspective, and references to the 
pedagogic and gerontagogic, would be made. 
For a number of reasons, some readers might be concerned on reading such an extensive 
list of required responses. The researcher decided to consider some of these possible 
concerns because doing so, would likely reveal more about what being-human is. 
3. 0 SOME POSSIBLE CONCERNS ABOUT THE REQUIREMENTS FOR 
EFFECTIVE AGOGY AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR BEING· 
ETHICAL 
Four main concerns about the requirements for effective agogy were identified. 
Firstly, it is understandable that a person reading the requirements for effective 
agogy without reading the earlier chapters in this thesis may claim that the code is merely 
an invention based on the researcher's whim and personal preferences of how people 
should behave towards one another. Worse, the researcher could be accused of thrusting 
his values on others by trying to make them appear logically inevitable, or by giving them 
a false backing of expert authority 119. That this is not the case can be shown in the 
following ways. 
• The list of agogic requirements was cumulatively uncovered from the researcher's 
fundamental investigation of what it means to be human. As the results recorded in 
this chapter show, the requirements for effective agogy arise from the 
fundamental human need for experiences of dignifiedness achieved by the 
protection, maintenance and enhancement of dignity through agogic-dialogic 
interdependence. It is true that the researcher's fundamental investigation was a 
personal search, but does this fact invalidate the list as a scientific contribution to 
understanding being-human? Is not all philosophy undertaken from a personal 
perspective? What other perspective can there be? Hopefully, fellow-researchers will 
repeat this part of the research to see whether or not they arrive at similar findings. 
• Indeed, some fellow-researchers have arrived at similar requirements for effective 
agogy. For example, the researcher previously uncovered a similar list for the 
journalist as agogue (344:217-237), and Oberholzer and Greyling (311:54-60) 
provided ten characteristics of adulthood and (311:74-86) ten criteria which an 
agogue should strive to meet if he or she is to alleviate the agogee's existential 
119 Wilson ( 460: 166) has found that some modem philosophers attempt to "cheat" in this way. 
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yearning. Fellow-researchers who are not agogicians and do not refer to dialogue in 
terms of agogy, arrive at similar lists of requirements. For example, the researcher 
considered that Howe ( 173:70-83) referred to the effective agogue, when referring to 
the dialogical person who is required to be an authentic, open, disciplined and 
related person. Within these four criteria Howe described many of the requirements 
listed by the researcher for an effective agogue. 
Secondly, it could be claimed that the requirements for effective agogy are 
artificial, abstract and unrealistic. For the researcher, the list of agogic requirements is not 
artificial or abstract because, it was uncovered from experience. However, it is self-
evident that it would be impossible for any human to fulfil totally, all the requirements. 
Consequently, it is not possible, nor expected that any person would fulfil all the 
requirements fully, all the time. However, it is reasonable to find that the more a 
person responds according to the requirements, the more dignification 
there will be. It is relevant that the prospect of totally fulfilling the list of requirements 
would be an ideal because, earlier in the researchl20 it was revealed that the ideal of 
being-human was relevant to finding out what adulthood is. It is safe to state that the list 
of requirements is also a list of the ways in which any person would want to be treated by 
others. Additional evidence that the list is not unrealistic is shown by the fact that many of 
the requirements are being met already in relationships without people being aware of it. 
For example, when the researcher has asked groups of managers to list the qualities of an 
effective or ideal leader or "boss", a list similar to the following results: 
• gives genuine praise whenever possible and in public; 
• polite (says thank you, no sarcasm or insults, courtesy); 
• fair but firm; 
• open (honest) but with confidences maintained; 
• respectful and assertive; 
• takes genuine interest in one's job but does not interfere; 
• takes genuine and appropriate interest in one's non-work activities; 
• consults often and widely; 
• informs on progress of projects; 
• helpful instead of blaming; 
• caring when people have personal difficulties; 
• loyalty: protects one from unwarranted criticism from senior management: tells 
senior management about subordinates' excellent work; 
• competent so that his/her inadequacies do not make others' working lives difficult. 
120 Paragraph 2.2 in the current chapter. 
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The researcher considered that Schwartz (381: 17 6-179) provided corroboration of this in a 
very practical way. He promoted an effective leadership approach called "Being 
Human" or the "Be-Human" approach. In this approach a leader is encouraged to ask: 
"What is the human way to handle this [problem]?". Schwartz's "human way" is to act 
agogically ("You are a human being. I respect you. I'm here to help you in very (sic) way 
I can"). Schwartz's suggestions for a human approach to problems were very similar to 
some of the requirements of agogy already presented. 
Thirdly, it is an implication of the list of agogic-dialogic requirements that the degree to 
which they are fulfilled would determine not only how good a lecturer was as a lecturer, 
but also how "good" a person (human) the lecturer was. It might seem objectionable 
to judge the goodness of another human. However, from the researcher's experience, this 
kind of assessment happens perennially on almost every new meeting of two humans, and 
during existing relationships, albeit implicitly. In addition, the researcher suspected that as 
humans, we are continually assessing ourselves with regard to "goodness". The 
researcher was aware of another implication of the list of agogic requirements: by fulfilling 
more and more of the requirements, a person could become not only a better lecturer but a 
"better" human. It was realised that just what becoming a "better" human means 
for being-human, would have to be investigated later in the research12t. 
Fourthly, it could be claimed on the one hand, that the list of requirements for effective 
agogy is not extensive enough, and on the other hand, that some of the requirements are 
outwith control of the lecturer. It was expected that fellow-researchers would contribute to 
making the list more comprehensive. For example, only seven general criteria have been 
uncovered and fellow-researchers may find more. The seven criteria state requirements 
only for the effective agogue, and it could be claimed that another code should be prepared 
for the agogee. It could be true that in some instances some organisational or economic 
reasons prevent an agogue fulfilling more fully some of the requirements. For example, it 
may be claimed that lack of funding could hinder "creating the best environmental 
conditions possible, such as clean and noise-free lecture rooms." Similarly, large class 
sizes would inhibit learning students' names. 
However, even within financial and physical constraints, lecturers, if they wish to be 
effective agogues, are obliged to do all they can to ensure students are given the best 
assistance possible. In extreme cases this may mean having to clean the lecture rooms 
themselves and obtaining financial sponsorship for essential equipment and materials. 
However, there may come a time when a lecturer considers that she is no longer able to be 
an effective agogue because her health and personal life is being so badly affected that she 
121 See Chapter Eight, Paragraph 2.0. 
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cannot fulfil many of the requirements of agogy. In these instances, the lecturer as agogue 
would know that she cannot do what is necessary to enhance dignifiedness, and would be 
faced with resignation as an extreme example of putting the agogees' interests rmt. 
At this stage in the research, a major finding was uncovered. 
4. 0 THE CODE FOR EFFECTIVE AGOGY IS ALSO A CODE OF 
FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS 
The researcher considered that the list of requirements that lecturers must strive to meet if 
they want to be called "effective agogues", could be called a "code for effective 
agogy". In addition, as the reader probably has, the researcher noticed that all of the 
requirements in the code for effective agogy are the kinds of behaviour that could be 
called "ethical". It became more and more evident that protecting, maintaining and 
enhancing of dignity is, in fact, ethical behaviour. In other words, each adherence 
to a requirement for effective agogy is an instance of ethical response, and each non-
compliance is an instance of unethical response. This is corroborated by the researcher 
finding that the list of agogic requirements could be used for assessing the goodness of 
a person (human). Although the researcher would use "ethical" instead of "moral", it 
was considered that Hanfling's (153:199) finding that "moral reasons exist independently 
of religion" corroborated the finding just stated. 
Since the code for effective agogy lists ethical responses it is also a code of ethics. 
However, unlike professional or organisational codes of ethics, having been uncovered 
from existentialia, the code for effective agogy is a fundamental code of ethics. As 
already reported in this thesisl22, there are seven main reasons for socially acceptable 
behaviour not being an adequate description of adulthood. In addition, it has been 
explained how moral codes and particular codes of ethics are not adequate for describing 
adulthood123. In summary, the relativity of just what appropriate social behaviour, moral 
behaviour and ethical behaviour are, made them unsatisfactory for describing adulthood, 
and it was realised that a fundamental list of behaviours would be required. The 
researcher considered that the code for effective agogy is that fundamental code 
of ethics, and that Ulich's (425:154) "truly ethical decision" is a decision based on 
the fundamental code of ethics. 
The researcher realised that the fundamental code of ethics, described what Downie and 
Telfer (253:64) had found in a preliminary way. They found that an attitude of respect for 
persons would give rise to the fundamental principles of morality. The researcher 
considered that Fromm's (85: 160) preliminary finding had been corroborated: that it 
should be possible to establish guidelines for conduct which are based on 
122 Chapter Four, Paragraph 4.0. 
123 Chapter Five, Paragraphs 2.4 and 2.5. 
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the nature of humankind. Consequently, the answer to Barnes' (20:7) question, "Is 
there an ought which underlies the ethical choice itself?" is "Yes there is", but 
it comprises many fundamental oughts. In addition, the researcher considered that the 
fundamental code of ethics answers Alexander's (7:10-12) questions: "Beneath all man's 
activities, as their source and spring, there is ever some dim perception of an end to be 
attained ... Ethics may also be defined as the science of the highest good ... What is 
the supreme good? For what should a person live? What is the ideal of life?" For 
the researcher, the end to be attained, the highest or supreme good - the ideal of life, 
would be total adherence to the code of fundamental ethics. Just what relevance 
the ideal and supreme good might have for being-human was considered laterl24 in the 
research. 
The reader may be concerned about the researcher's use of the word "the" in "~ 
fundamental code of ethics", because it indicates only one code. The researcher realised 
that to lessen misunderstanding, considerable explanation would be required to justify this 
apparent dogmatism and this was done later in the researchl25. However, in the 
meantime, the researcher found that although each of the many specific responses within 
each of the seven criteria for effective agogy would likely be different to meet any 
particular environment where agogy is taking place, the seven broad criteria which make 
up the fundamental code of ethics, would be the same no matter what the setting for the 
agogy. This does not mean that the seven criteria cannot be worded more adequately and 
even added to. The researcher considered that the code showed one of Wilson's (460:165) 
findings to be inadequate: "Since there is no question of proof or logical compulsion in the 
acceptance of ultimate ethical criteria ... ". The research results as reported in this chapter, 
illustrated that if one does not respond according to the code, one experiences 
dignifiedlessness, something people do not want. Fromm ( 116:7) corroborated: " ... their 
[moral norms] violation results in mental and emotional disintegration. The researcher 
hoped that fellow-researchers would contribute further to the fundamental code of ethics. 
It was only at this stage in the research, after extensive fundamental radical reflection, that 
the fundamental reality became evident; that being-human is being-ethical. The 
researcher should not have been surprised at this finding because earlier, he was directed 
to being-human to find out what being-ethical is. The reader might consider the research 
for this chapter to have been an exercise in circular definition. While just what being-
ethical means has been partially answered by the uncovering of the fundamental code of 
ethics, more effort would be required to explain what it means to be fundamentally 
ethical. In addition, one could ask how each of the many ethical responses in the code 
could be carried out. For example, What are the ways of criticising and correcting work 
124 Chapter Eight, Paragraph 3.0. 
125 Chapter Seven Paragraph 2.2.1. 
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which encourage further effort? and What does it mean to prepare lectures, laboratory 
demonstrations, tutorials and other learning events to the highest standards? The 
researcher realised that more consideration would have to be given to what being-ethical 
is, later in the research126. 
Despite more investigation being required, the researcher considered that the uncovering 
of the fundamental code of ethics, was a major finding. There was another major finding: 
the research has revealed that being-ethical is not just something humans do, or do not do: 
being fundamentally ethical is being-human. This finding has far-reaching 
implications for adulthood and education because it means that no matter what other 
criteria are used to define being-human, one cannot omit being-ethical. Although it 
was decided in the remaining chapters of this thesis, to use "being-ethical" to name being 
fundamentally ethical, the phrase "being fundamentally ethical" is also used in some 
instances to emphasise the distinction between particular ethics and fundamental ethics. 
5. 0 BEING-ETHICAL: REVEALING ADULTHOOD AS AN ETHICAL 
PHENOMENON 
Since being-adult is being-human127, and since being-human is being-ethical, it follows 
that the fundamental code of ethics is also the code of humanhood, and the code of 
adulthood. Consequently, it was found at this stage in the research, that adulthood is 
an ethical phenomenon. Several researchers corroborated this finding. For example, 
Turner and Helms (424:60) referred to " ... that ethical sense which is the mark of the 
adult"; Erikson (98:10) to" ... the ethical rule of adulthood; Oberholzer and Greyling 
(311:38) to " ... traits of adulthood in his personal ethical situation", and Erikson 
(95:226) to the true ethical sense of the young adult, and (95:227) to adult 
ethics. 
The reader will have noticed the frequent references in this chapter to degrees of 
effectiveness of agogy and degrees of ethicalness. For the researcher, "degrees" of 
attainment indicated a continuum. Consequently, in a preliminary way the researcher 
found that humanness and adultness could be attained in degrees and are therefore 
continua. Maslow (269: 170) corroborated this when he found that some people are more 
human than others and good human beings are very human. It is relevant that 
Knowles (222: 15-17) decided that the phrase, "climate of humanness" best described 
the climate of mutual respect, collaborativeness, mutual trust, supportiveness, 
pleasure and openness, that is required to assist adult learners. For the researcher, 
"pleasure" would be more adequately expressed as "experience of dignifiedness". In 
126 Chapter Seven. 
127 The reader is alerted to the danger of "slipping back" into thinking of being-adult as a chronological 
or biological phenomenon. The researcher offers this reminder, because he frequently experienced 
difficulty in this regard. 
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summary, it became evident that ethicalness, humanness and adultness are one 
and the same continuum. It was realised that the synonymity of ethicalness, 
humanness and adultness would have to be examined furtherI28, particularly Maslow's 
finding that some people are more human than others - which, on first reading, 
seemed to diminish dignity. 
Whilst many of the findings reported in this chapter have revealed even more of what 
adulthood is, the researcher found several questions that required answers. Some of these 
are now listed. 
• If it is adultness that is the continuum, what is adulthood? 
• How, when so many humans are unethical at sometime in their lives, can being-
human be being-ethical? 
• Why has the apparently dogmatic "the", in "the fundamental code of ethics", been 
employed rather than "a"? 
• Frequent reference throughout the thesis so far, has been made to the ideal ofbeing-
human. What is this ideal and what relationship has it, if any, to being-ethical? 
• Is it really possible for a human to become more ethical (more human) as stated in this 
chapter? 
• God has been referred to several times in this thesis. What is the relationship, if any, 
between being-ethical and God (however perceived)? 
• Can the preliminary finding that there is a distinction between an ethical code, a moral 
code and a fundamental ethical code, be corroborated? 
In order to find out more about adulthood as being-ethical, and how being fundamentally 
ethical might, if at all, contribute to an understanding of what adulthood is and what 
education should be, the researcher considered it necessary to attempt answers to some of 
the questions just listed. 
128 See Chapter Seven, Paragraph 3.0. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
ADULTHOOD AND HUMANHOOD AS BEING-ETHICAL 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Previously in the research 1 it was found that being-responsible is the most adequate 
description of what adulthood is. It was also found that being-ethical is the most 
adequate description of being-responsible. Consequently, an even more adequate 
description of adulthood is: adulthood as being-ethical. When these findings were 
revealed earlier in the research, a major methodological problem arose: how to describe 
what being-ethical is. 
Remembering that only humankind has the potential to be ethical, the researcher examined 
what it means to be human, to find out what it means to be ethical. As recorded in the 
previous chapter, it was ultimately found that being-ethical, and hence being-human, 
entails, among other things, adhering to the fundamental code of ethics, that is, 
being fundamentally ethical. In the previous chapter, the researcher presented his 
preliminary uncovering of the code of fundamental ethics. It was found that no matter 
how one strives to describe being-human, if a description does not include being 
fundamentally ethical, one is not describing being-human. 
Just as the reader might be, the researcher was initially bewildered by some of the far-
reaching logical consequences of the findings just mentioned. For example: 
• it seems dogmatic and consequently unscientific to refer to "the fundamental code 
of ethics"; 
• the fact that being-ethical involves adhering to the code, implies that the extent of a 
person's being-ethical could be evaluated; 
• if being-human is being-ethical, then it might be claimed that any human who is 
not ethical is not human. Common sense dictates that this is just not so; and 
• the reader may consider that the researcher has indulged in a round-about exploration 
to arrive at a well-known truism: being fundamentally ethical entails adhering to a code 
of ethics. 
Responses to the difficulties of apparent dogmatism of "the" code, and the possibility of 
evaluating a person's ethicalness, are given later in this chapter2. The reader may detect, 
that the third and fourth difficulties arise from not distinguishing between being-ethical 
(the onticity) and being ethical (the particular). The researcher noticed that just as 
1 Chapter Four, Paragraph 5.0. 
2 Paragraph 2.7. and Paragraph 2.2.1, respectively. 
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apparent contradictions such as "the responsible person was not responsible"; "the 
meaning was not meaningful", "the good burglar was bad" and "the adult was not very 
adult", one could say: although humans are ethical beings, they are not always 
ethical. Scientific responsibility demanded that the implications of being-ethical be 
investigated and, in particular, the relationship between being-ethical and being ethical. 
2.0 BEING-ETHICAL AS ETHICALITY AND ETHICALNESS 
The researcher found that being-ethical involves two inseparable existentialia: ethicality 
and ethicalness. Ethicality is the existential fact (no matter one's degree of awareness 
of it) that the experiencing of dignifiedness depends on the extent to which one adheres to 
the fundamental code of ethics. Ethicalness is the degree to which responses accord 
with the fundamental code of ethics, that is, the degree of responding ethically. 
When people say, "She is a very ethical person", they are referring to the degree of 
ethicalness. The statement just made does not deny that responding according other codes 
of ethics (say, professional codes) can also be ethical, and the relationship between the 
fundamental code, and other codes was examined later in this chapter3. The researcher 
realised that further reflection on ethicality and ethicalness would provide further insight 
into being-human and adulthood. 
2.1 ETHICALITY4: THE PRIMORDIAL RELATIONSHIP OF 
DIGNIFIEDNESS AND ETHICALNESS 
Just as all humans, whether they like it or not, cannot escape the demand to question their 
being, the search for dignifiedfulness, and finding an effective agogue, so all humans 
whether they like it or not, cannot escape the demand to search for the requirements of 
ethicalness. As Alexander (7:1)5 found: " ... careful inquiry into the laws of conduct is 
indispensable to the proper interpretation of the meaning and purpose of life." Degenaar 
(81 :266) corroborated, finding that: " ... the exploration of morality is built into the 
concept of morality." 
Ethicality is not affected by unethical acts. No matter how unethical people are, they 
cannot deny their ethicality. Consequently, "ethicality" is another name for 
humankind: being-human would not be being-human without ethicality. Sartre 
corroborated this when he found that (370:628) questions about the human being can be 
3 Paragraph 2.2.1. 
4 For the researcher, relevant dictionary definitions are vague and tend to treat ethicality and ethicalness as 
synonyms. For example, Burchfield (53:979), Gove (133:780) and Klein (216:546) defined ethicality 
as ethical quality, character, aspect, behaviour or principles, for example. Gove (133:780), 
Klein (216:546) and Murray et al (294:312) regarded ethical quality as ethicalness. 
5 Although numerous examples have been taken from the literature of Christian ethics, the researcher 
was not indicating the superiority of one religion over another. 
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answered only on the ethical plane6. It is also safe to find that ethicality is the potential 
to be even more ethical. 
In effect, humans are compelled to search for the requirements of the code, in order to 
meet them because, in doing so they experience dignifiedness. Of course, experiencing 
dignifiedness can be made more difficult by others who intentionally or unintentionally 
diminish dignity; that is, those who do not act according to requirements of the code 
(respond unethically). However, it is reasonable to expect that the more one adheres to the 
requirements of the code (the more ethical one is), the more dignified one's life will be. 
The researcher was startled by the finding that experiencing of dignifiedlessness arises 
from not doing enough to respond according to the code, that is, not being ethical 
enough. 
However, it could be claimed that a bank robber who steals £1 million would be over-
joyed, and would experience considerable dignifiedness. This possibility was explored 
later7 in the research. Such an exploration would first require describing what it means to 
adhere to the code and to become more ethical. It was realised that these questions and 
others could be answered by investigating what ethicalness is. 
2.2 ETHICALNESS: ACTING ACCORDING TO ETHICALS 
For the researcher, ethicalness is acting according to the requirements of the fundamental 
code of ethics. During the researchs, it was found that ethicalness, humanness and 
adultness are one and the same continuum. Before progressing to investigate what meeting 
the requirements of the code implies, and the implications of the synonymity of 
ethicalness, humanness and adultness, it was necessary to examine the apparent 
unscientific and dogmatic use of "the" in "the fundamental code". The researcher's 
used of "ethicals" is explained in the following subparagraph. 
2.2.1 IS "THE", IN "THE FUNDAMENTAL CODE", DOGMATIC AND 
UNSCIENTIFIC? 
Previously in this thesis, the researcher explained in detail, the existential 
phenomenological approach which requires phenomena to be described as they are, and 
not as researchers think they are or want them to be. Views, opinions and beliefs are not 
acceptable as findings. Despite this careful grounding work, it is likely that some fellow-
researchers, particularly those not used to existential phenomenology, will still regard the 
approach as pseudo-science. In particular, those used to researching in a relativistic 
6 As is well-known, Sartre did not complete his planned project of further writing on ethics after Being 
and Nothingness (370:628). 
1 Paragraph 2.6. 
8 Chapter Six, Paragraph 5.0. 
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tradition9 will consider any fundamentality or universality to be impossible. Indeed, Bok 
(39: 1) considered that: "The thought of searching for an ethics capable of cutting across 
cultural boundaries strikes many contemporaries as either offensive or ludicrously naive." 
However, it was anticipated that some fellow-researchers' most serious criticism would 
arise because the researcher has claimed to have found the fundamental code of ethics. 
This finding will be regarded by some as an arrogant and irresponsible way to conduct 
research. Some fellow-researchers deny any fundamental code of ethics. For example, 
Sartre (369:36) found that there is no given ethical scripture and (369:38) "No rule of 
general morality ... ". Naturally, the researcher was concerned about criticism from fellow-
researchers and was initially uneasy with using "the", preferring "a". However, the 
uncovering of the code was not merely the researcher's opinion - it arose from an 
extensive explication of what it means to be human - to be the existent. Heidegger 
( 162:95) indicated the interrelatedness of existence and ethicality when he mentioned 
Being and the ought, as derived from the Greek agathon meaning the good. In 
addition, a fundamental code can only be the fundamental code - the same for all 
humans: the universal code. The researcher realised that using "a" was not being true to 
the results uncovered - to the demands of scientific integrity. 
Consequently, the researcher considered that "the code" was adequate description 
because, while there are personal codes, professional codes, and national codes, it is the 
fundamental code that underlies all of these codes. Adhering to the requirements of 
scientific dialogue, the researcher: 
• invites fellow-researchers to conduct similar research to find out if they arrive at the 
same code; 
• emphasises again that the fundamental code presented in the previous chapter is a 
preliminary uncovering; 
• emphasises that there are different ways of expressing the fundamental code; and 
• expected that he and other researchers would enhance the description of the code in 
further studies. 
The reader might think that there is a contradiction in the researcher's findings. On the one 
hand, it has been stated that the principles in the fundamental code are the same 
everywhere and for everyone. Yet on the other hand, it has also been stated that the 
fundamental code could have different expressions, and that readers as researchers could 
do their own uncovering work. However, there is no contradiction for two main reasons. 
Firstly, as far as it is possible to know, there could be many more than seven principles in 
the fundamental code. The researcher uncovered the code by considering specific 
9 See Downie (87:148), for example. 
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instances of unethicalness only in universities and colleges. It is likely that when specific 
requirements for ethicalness are uncovered for agogues in the legal profession, medicine 
and business, for example, that the seven criteria! headings of the code can be added to. 
However, no matter how many criteria! headings are uncovered, they would all be 
concerned with respecting, maintaining or enhancing dignity. 
Secondly, as already reported, philosophical research can only be a personal quest, in 
which each scientist seeks answers and compares them with answers of fellow-scientists 
to see if there is corroboration. Lack of corroboration would provide an opportunity to 
learn further from differences in findings. Despite protestation about the naivety or 
offensiveness of searching for a fundamental ethic, Bok considered it necessary (39:23). 
Although it will take considerable further research in other studies to confirm it, the 
researcher anticipated that ultimately, after consideration of differences on what is required 
to protect, maintain and enhance dignity, researchers will arrive at the same code. Wilson 
(460:152) arrived at the same finding: "It seems, then, that the evidence for the likelihood 
of eventual unanimity is overwhelming ... proper experience will probably lead to 
unanimity in the acceptance of ultimate ethical criteria." 
The reality of the fundamental code of ethics and the need to find and express it, is 
reported by fellow-researchers. For example, Aristotle (12:7-11) referred to the 
universal, final and self-sufficient good10; Kohlbergll referred to universal 
ethical principles; Weinreich-Haste (449:46-78) found that moral rules and principles 
are universal or universalisable; and Brock ( 46: 10) found that: " ... the striking fact about 
the moral codes of recorded history is the extent to which they resemble each other." He 
explained that C S Lewis in his book The Abolition of Man, compiled a chart to illustrate 
this. Lapidus (236: 107) found that despite the differences in Islamic, Confucian and 
Christian conceptions of adulthood, " ... there are common realizations about man's 
humanity, religious fulfilment and becoming an adult", and Niebuhr (304:85-89) 
presented findings about universal other, cause, community, intent and ideal, for example. 
Kung (232) referred to a "new world ethic" and Braybrooke (44) to a "Global 
Ethic". Kung (232: 138) found: " ... the one world in which we live has a chance of 
survival only if there is no longer any room in it for spheres of differing, contradictory 
and even antagonistic ethics." He referred12 to a "universal ethical criterion". 
Erikson (95:225) referred to the more universal principles of highest human good, 
and Allport (9:13) to universal norms. 
10 The researcher was aware of the difficulty in explicating the concept of "good" as derived from Greek 
agathos: See Macintyre (261 :6-11 ), in this regard. 
11 As reported by Thomson (417:52). 
12 In Braybrooke (44:21). 
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Ulich (426:27) referred to "absolute ethics" and (426:58) "fundamental rules", and 
Baelz (15:2) expressed the same as some underlying pattern or order in the immense 
variety of moral decisions and practices. Konstant 13 found that: "There are certain 
unchanging principles of right and wrong; these are universally or almost universally held . 
. .. Such principles do not depend solely on a particular religious belief, but arise also from 
a consideration of the conditions of human growth and fulfilment." Braybrooke ( 44:5) 
undertook an extensive study of the commonality of values in the statements of numerous 
organisations in the Interfaith Movement14. He found that the search for a new world 
ethic raised many questions and that the many documents of the Interfaith Movement 
might provide raw material for answering such questions. 
The researcher realised that the fundamental code presented in this thesis, is the beginning 
of the global ethic (new world ethic) Kling and Braybrooke were hoping for. For 
example, the requirements (principles) of the code are the "norms of behaviour which 
are universally valid" which Braybrooke (44:24) hoped for. The code explained why 
Braybrooke (44:24)15 found as follows: "It may perhaps not be surprising that at the heart 
of the global ethic will be the Golden Rule - to be found in every religion - 'Do unto 
others as you would have them do unto you'." 16 The researcher found that 
Erikson (98: 10), working from a psychological perspective, also found the golden rule 
and expressed it as follows: " ... the ethical rule of adulthood is to do to others what 
will help them, even as it helps you to grow."17 Erikson's finding just stated, illustrated 
that the code of fundamental ethics arises from the agogic: the mutual existential 
dignifiedness from benevolent independence-in-interdependance with the other. 
Erikson (95:233) corroborated this finding when he explained the golden rule as follows: 
" ... truly worthwhile acts enhance a mutuality between the doer and the other - a mutuality 
which strengthens the doer even as it strengthens the other." 
The researcher also considered that the research made a contribution to answering the 
following questions: What is good for human beings?18 Are there some activities or 
qualities that are good for human beings in general? Is there a recipe for the good life? 
(153:107); What might be the universal values we are looking for? (417:45); and, Is there 
not: " ... some universal tie underlying human nature, one which transcends all diversity. 
13 In Brock (46:11). 
14 For example, The International Association for Religious Freedom, The World Congress of Faiths, 
The Temple of Understanding, The world Conference on Religion and Peace, and The World 
Parliament of Religions ( 44:2-9). 
15 Braybrooke also, in places, used "the" to refer to the Global Ethic. 
16 Brock ( 46: 10) referred to the Law of General Beneficence and showed how it is found in the Analects 
of Confucius (Never do to others what you would not like them to do to you) and the Christian Bible 
at Matthew 7.12 (Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them). 
17 "Grow" is a biologistic term inadequate for explaining human reality. 
18 Kling (231:15) called this question, the fundamental criteriological ethical question. 
243 
... is there not perhaps a criterion which can be implemented by an unbiased moral 
consciousness to evaluate our own actions as well as those of others?" (311 :42). The 
research has shown that having dignity respected, maintained and enhanced, which entails 
being as ethical as possible (adhering to the code), is what is good for humans. 
This is corroborated by the many mentions of dignity in the documents of the Interfaith 
Movement. For example: in the Judaeo-Christian tradition God gave humans their 
inalienable dignity (44:11); the concern for human dignity is evident both in the 
Jewish rabbinic tradition and in the teachings of the Christian church (44:12); In Islam, 
God guarantees the dignity of human life (44:13); it is the duty of men to respect in 
others the right to personal dignity (worth as a person)l9; we share ... the equality20 and 
dignity of all human beings [and] the effective protection of human dignity21; and 
violence is done wherever and whenever the integrity and dignity of the human person 
are damaged22. Just what the possible relationship, if any, between God and being-
human, might be was explored later in the research23. 
Seeking additional corroborative findings acknowledging the fundamental code, was 
beyond the scope of the research. However, Kiing's and Braybrooke's findings gave the 
researcher confidence to find that the code is the fundamental one; which is expressed in 
various ways and in varying degrees, in all particular codes of ethics. It was considered 
relevant that the plural, "ethics", is used in "codes of ethics" and in "the fundamental 
code of ethics". So far in this thesis, "principles", "requirements", "demands", 
"standards", and "rules" have been used to refer to the many instances of ethicalness 
that comprise the fundamental code. It was considered reasonable to call each instance 
of ethicalness, a "demand" because, the agogue has to strive to meet the demand, if 
his or her agogy is to be effective. In addition, it was decided to name the seven general 
criteria! headings underwhich the many demands could be categorised, "ethicals". 
Consequently, in the remainder of this thesis, the researcher is able to refer to either 
"meeting the demands of ethicals" or "acting according to ethicals", to 
describe being-ethical. It is self-explanatory, that to act according to ethicals, one must 
fulfil the demands of ethicals, and in fulfilling the demands of ethicals, one is responding 
according to ethicals. 
l9 Commission No. 2 of the International Conference of Christians and Jews, Oxford, 1946 (44:38). 
20 The reader will be aware that egalitarianism infringes human dignity. 
21 The World Conference on Religion and Peace, Kyoto Declaration, October 1970, Clause 1 (44:42) and 
Clause 4 (44:50), respectively. 
22 The World Conference on Religion and Peace, Louvain, Belgium, 28th August- 3rd September 1974, 
Clause 7 (44:54). The reader will notice the numerous tautologies: "dignity of the human person", for 
example. 
23 Chapter Eight, Paragraph 4.0. 
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Although the word "ethicals" is probably new in the English language, and might be 
unacceptable to some, its use is not strange when it is remembered that "morals" is in 
common use. Previously in the research24, a distinction was found between 
particularised morals which change from time-to-time and place-to-place, and 
universal morals which do not change. At that stage in the research, in a preliminary 
way, "ethics" was used to refer to universal morals and these universal morals 
were regarded as having higher authority than particularised morals. The researcher 
considered that Sartre (369:52) made the distinction between particularistic and universal 
morals when he found that: " ... although the content of morality is variable, a certain 
form of this morality is universal." The researcher considered that Kohlberg25 had 
also uncovered ethicals when he found that: "A moral principle is not only a rule of action 
but a reason for action. As a reason for action, justice is called respect for persons." 
The reader will now be aware that, for the researcher, universal and fundamental 
morals26 are ethicals, that is, an ethical and a fundamental moral are 
synonymous. The researcher was aware that the finding that ethicals have higher 
authority than morals is far-reaching. Das (74: 102) found similarly: " ... the wider 
morality of the man who represents the sentiment of humanity forms a consistent threat 
to the morality of the man who is located in the particularistic structures of caste and 
householdership." Having explained why a fundamental code can only be the 
fundamental code, it was possible to continue the research and provide a more detailed 
description of acting according to ethicals (ethicalness) as opposed to acting according to 
morals (moralness). 
It has already been explained27 how morals are norms or rules for expected behaviour 
which are derived from a religion, a tradition, or the survival needs of a society. It is 
common knowledge that if people ignore morals (break the rules) their acts are called 
"immoral" or "bad", and if they frequently break the rules they could be called "bad 
people". A good act is one in accordance with a moral and a good person frequently 
acts according to morals. The term "morality" is frequently used to indicate someone's 
perception of how moral a society is. It is also common knowledge that attempts are made 
to enforce morals by threats of punishment, either indirectly by ostracising, or directly by 
monetary fines, jailing, beatings or executions, for example. 
24 Chapter Five, Paragraph 2.4. 
25 As reported in Thomson (417:51). 
26 Hanfling (153:175) referred to "fundamental moral values". For the researcher, Glover's (312:87) 
"secular morality" is synonymous with fundamental morality and with ethicality. 
27 Chapter Five, Paragraph 2.4. 
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It has also been shown how morals can change over time and from culture to culture, and 
how some morals are enshrined in laws. It is important to remember that morals are, and 
can only be, designed by humans. Originally, someone, and then some group, decided on 
the basis of personal preference, assessment of survival risks or on the interpretation of 
certain passages in a holy book, those actions which are immoral and should be prevented 
by rules (morals) forbidding them. 
As is expected from their relativity, morals can be created by any group that has the power 
to convince people that the morals are good for them or that God demands that the morals 
be obeyed. Similarly, any powerful group, usually a government, can decide that some 
action that was once deemed immoral, is now moral. A prime example of this was the 
moral in South Africa, not to have sexual intercourse with someone of a different race to 
oneself. At one time this was considered by some to be immoral and now it is not by most 
people. Similarly, until recently in the United Kingdom (and perhaps in other countries) it 
was generally considered immoral for a man and women to live together without being 
married; to have children outwith wedlock; and to be a homosexual. However, a recent 
Church of England report "celebrates" all families - gay, lesbian, single parent and 
cohabitees28, an indication that many people no longer consider these ways of living as 
immoral. 
If one asked what the reason for a moral is, it is likely that people would answer: "because 
it protects the survival of our society" or "because it is the word of God". However, the 
researcher anticipated that if one asked on what evidence people decided that a moral 
protects a society, a satisfactory justification could not be given. Similarly, if people were 
asked why they think God wants a particular act deemed immoral, adequate reasons could 
not be given. It should also be remembered that "God's word" is a person's or a group's 
interpretation. Many moralists would consider "God's word", for example, to be the 
ultimate authority. However, one can still seek for more fundamental reasons by asking, 
Why? Consequently, it is safe to state that many morals29 are not based on fundamental 
authority - fundamental reason. 
Ethicals however, transcend external authority, and require humans to find the 
fundamental reasons for deciding whether something is good or bad. Ethicals, are 
uncovered from the very essence of being-human and, consequently, are based on 
fundamental pathic interdependence of humans. The term "uncovered" has been used 
frequently in this thesis and is most relevant when referring to ethicals. The researcher 
found in a preliminary way that ethicals are there and always have been, whether 
28 The Independent newspaper, Wednesday 7th June 1995, pl9. 
29 One cannot say "all morals" because some morals may qualify as ethicals and consequently will 
have fundamental authority. 
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humankind is aware of them or not. Even a cursory examination of the history of human 
behaviour shows that with time, more and more ethicals are being uncovered and accepted 
as beneficial guides to behaviour. For example, the barbaric practices of the Roman 
amphitheatre, and more recently slavery, are no longer acceptable as decent human 
behaviour. 
It might be claimed that ethicals are created just as morals are by humans: that the 
researcher just "willy-nilly" invented ethicals. However, the explication in this thesis 
should illustrate that uncovering ethicals based on the essences of being-human, is not the 
same as "just making them up" based on some preference, dislike or prejudice. Of 
course, the way they are expressed was the researcher's choice and the extent to which 
one acts according to them is a matter of personal choice. 
The imperative of ethicals has more rational-pathic authority than morals. I should 
adhere to ethicals, not because society or God30 "says" so, but because if I do not, I will 
experience dignifiedlessness. The reason why I must act according to ethicals, has already 
been explained: it protects, maintains and enhances the other's dignity and thereby, my 
dignity. And, it has already been explained in some detail why I should respect, maintain 
and enhance dignity: if I do not, life would not be worth living and I might as 
well die now. This finding answered Williams' ( 455: 17) questions: "Why should I do 
anything?" and "Why is there anything that I should, ought to, do?" 
The fact that ethicals are fundamental rules or requirements and morals are contingent 
ones, raised five important but preliminary findings for the researcher. 
• Firstly, it was suspected that what is of prime importance to humans in deciding what 
the good life is (and synonymously what a good act and a good person are) is the 
extent of adherence to ethicals, not necessarily adherence to morals. 
• Secondly, it is likely that some ethicals may require disobeying some morals and, 
in rare instances, even breaking some laws. Consequently, being immoral does 
not necessarily mean one is unethical and, in rare instances, breaking the law would 
not be unethical. 
• Thirdly, it was realised that some ethicals might contribute to lessening 
dignifiedness, not protecting it. For example, sending a criminal to prison and 
dismissing an incompetent person from his job, would certainly diminish their 
30 The researcher again stresses that he is in no way attempting to show disrespect to religious people or 
any Deity. 
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dignifiedness. A lawyer would find herself in an ethical dilemma if she found out 
something that would help prove the innocence of another but would harm her client. 
If she kept quiet, the dignity of the other is harmed: if she tells, she has broken the 
ethical of confidentiality, and the dignity of the client is diminished. 
• Fourthly, a bank robber could claim to be experiencing dignifiedness by ignoring 
ethicals and successfully stealing and spending £1 million. However, the researcher 
considered initially that the robber's experience might be one of joy, excitement and 
enhanced status among thieves, but that these are not experiences of dignifiedness. 
• Fifthly, "good" and "bad" have been used in this paragraph, and it was considered that 
because different people would adhere to ethicals in different degrees, a person's 
ethicalness could be assessed. 
The researcher considered that to further explicate ethicalness (and hence being-human), it 
was necessary to test these preliminary findings by attempting to find answers to the 
following questions: 
• Can adherence to ethicals more adequately explain "the good life", than adherence to 
morals? 
• Would acting according to some ethicals result in less dignifiedness? 
• Would adhering to some ethicals require immoral acts and even illegal acts? 
• Can benefits from ignoring ethicals lead to experiencing dignifiedness? 
• How can a person's ethicalness be assessed? 
2.3 CAN ADHERENCE TO ETHICALS MORE ADEQUATELY EXPLAIN 
"THE GOOD LIFE", THAN ADHERENCE TO MORALS? 
In asking the question just stated, the researcher anticipated that Murdoch's (291:52) three 
similar questions would be answered: What is a good man like? How can we make 
ourselves morally better? and Can we make ourselves morally better? It was also 
anticipated that Glover's (127: 182) uncertainty about what is moral and what is not, 
would be alleviated. The researcher did not underestimate the "deep philosophical 
controversy" (378:26) in finding out what "the good" is. However, the explication so far 
in this thesis indicated that reflection on ethicals could assist in this regard. 
It is safe to state that using addictive drugs for recreation purposes31, and prostitution are 
regarded as immoral by many people in many cultures. Morals have been developed to try 
and prevent people becoming involved in these activities and some societies have indicated 
how seriously they regard ignoring the morals by turning them into laws and punishing 
people who transgress the laws. The relevant morals would be something like the 
3 l It is necessary to make this distinction because some addictive drugs are used for medicinal purposes. 
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following: "you should not abuse your body and endanger others by using 
addictive drugs" and "you should not earn your living by selling your body 
to someone to use for their sexual gratification." 
It is understandable why many people consider using addictive drugs and prostitution 
(male and female) to be undesirable and immoral, and want them to be made illegal32. 
However, assume that thousands of people are addicted to, and obtain considerable 
pleasure from, talcing some addictive drug in the privacy of their own home. As far as one 
can tell, their health, work performance, family life and relationships with others are not 
harmed. Indeed, they are helpful and polite neighbours. Also, assume that both the clients 
and the prostitutes gain a great deal of satisfaction from the liaison, and that the prostitutes 
in a community supply only non-married clients; do not openly solicit; are very polite, 
kind and helpful neighbours; are treated well by their clients; are not stealing from their 
clients; and are not spreading sexually transmitted disease. 
Even if the reader considers the scenarios just presented to be far-fetched33, the researcher 
considered that they reveal that it is not the drug use itself that people object to, but the 
hurt and suffering experienced by, for example, drug over-users themselves whose 
lives have the lowest quality; those who are robbed to pay for someone's drug addiction; 
the neglected and possibly abused children of drug abusing parents; innocent people hurt 
in drug-caused accidents or drug-gang wars; and parents who may suffer watching their 
drug-addicted children damage their bodies and even die. 
For the researcher, it is not prostitution itself that people object to but the real problem 
of the hurt and suffering experienced by, for example, prostitutes who are beaten 
and verbally abused by pimps and cruel clients; husbands and wives when they find out 
their spouse has been unfaithful; children who might have to witness their prostitute 
parent's activities and live through the break-up of a marriage; people who are infected by 
disease; and property owners when the value of their most important investment is 
devalued because of prostitution in their area. 
Careful examination of the real problems associated with addictive drug over-use and 
prostitution reveals that the hurt and suffering arises from ignoring ethicals. To 
act in such a way as to cause hurt and suffering to others is acting against the protection, 
maintenance and enhancement of dignity. To treat someone as a thing, a tool, or an It 
32 The researcher was not trying to justify any one position with regard to illegal drug use or 
prostitution. More importantly, in this research it was necessary to ask some difficult questions, and 
the reader is reminded that no criticism or insult is intended to any group of people. 
33 Some readers will recognise that they are not far-fetched. For example, alcohol and nicotine are 
harmful and are addictive drugs when over-used, yet their use is not considered immoral by most 
people. 
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(as Buber would say) is to create experiences of dignifiedlessness. It is reasonable to find 
that if addictive drug use and prostitution took place in ways which did not diminish 
dignity, that is, which did not contravene ethicals, there is no reason to call prostitutes and 
drug users "bad" people, and the activities of addictive drug use and prostitution, "bad". It 
is safe to state that adhering to morals does not necessarily make one a good person, but 
adhering to ethicals does necessarily make one a good person. In other 
words, it is possible for prostitutes and addictive drug users to be good people, despite 
being immoral. It is possible for an immoral person to be a good (an ethical) person. 
The researcher considered that another but different example can illustrate how it is 
adherence to ethicals, not necessarily morals, that makes someone a good person. In many 
cultures, homosexual acts are regarded as bad (wrong), that is, immoral. The moral used 
to deter people from homosexual practices would be something like this: "you should 
not have sexual intercourse with someone of the same ·gender." However, 
assume one is not a homosexual and had the choice of living in only one of two 
communities, "A" or "B". Community "A" comprises a majority of homosexual couples, 
but they are genuinely kind, caring, polite and helpful neighbours and make no attempt to 
flirt with non-homosexuals. In other words, they act according to ethicals. Community 
"B" comprises a majority of heterosexual couples, but most people are rude, unfriendly, 
unhelpful, frequently violent and purposefully attempt to initiate sexual relationships with 
other married people. Which community would one choose to live in? 
The researcher realised, even though he is not a homosexual, that he would prefer, and 
suspected that most people would prefer, to live in Community "A". In Community "A", 
one would experience greater dignifiedness. This illustrated that being a homosexual 
(acting against a moral) does not in itself indicate goodness or badness. It is how one 
treats other people that is of ultimate importance in deciding goodness or badness. As long 
as one adheres to ethicals, that is, one attempts to respect, maintain and enhance dignity of 
others, one is being ethical and entitled to be called "a good person". 
The researcher understood why some readers would be disturbed by the finding that 
addictive drug users, prostitutes and homosexuals can be good people despite being 
immoral. Some people will regard these ways of life as shocking and even repugnant, 
and may not want to discuss the matter at all. Finding that some immoral people can also 
be good people does not mean that one has to approve of drug-use or prostitution or want 
those activities for oneself or one's children. However, the finding revealed the 
requirement of having to justify one's judgement of goodness or badness. Why is 
this a requirement? 
250 
It is the prerogative of each person to decide whether or not he or she will think about and 
discuss such matters. However, merely accepting one's parents', religious leaders' or 
political leaders' definition of what is immoral, may lead to instances when one's own 
dignifiedness is diminished because one unknowingly diminishes the dignity of another. 
The researcher considered that despising another merely because someone says they are 
despicable, is diminishing the dignity of the other. The example of apartheid has already 
been mentioned and one can think, as Colbeck (61:24) and Wilson (463:29) did, of the 
way many Nazi Germans treated the Jewish people during the Second World War because 
Hitler decreed they were bad (immoral). 
It cannot be denied that questioning long-standing, accepted beliefs and authority can be 
difficult, and the researcher found that this difficulty contributed to existential dread and 
the yearning for an agogue, as already described34. In questioning accepted beliefs one 
runs the risk of incurring disapproval of parents, children, colleagues and neighbours. 
However, remembering that being-human is being-questioning, if one does not question, 
the potential for further ethicalness, dignifiedness, diminishes. Consequently, as a 
preliminary finding, the researcher found that not being willing to seek justification of 
one's judgement of goodness or badness would prevent one being as ethical as one 
could be, and experiencing less dignifiedness than one could35. 
Because adulthood is an ethical phenomenon, not being as ethical as one could is the same 
as saying one is not being as adult as one could. The finding that one is not as adult 
as one could be, unless one questions social norms and attempts to come to one's own 
realisation of what is good and bad, may seem strange. However, fellow-researchers have 
found similarly. Some of this corroborating evidence is now stated: point form is 
employed to keep this chapter to a manageable length. 
• Hanfling (153:193) found that: "Sometimes the path of duty, and of self-
realization, lies in questioning accepted values." Earlier in the research it was 
found that many psychologists regarded being-self-realised as the epitome of 
adulthood and it was realised that the relationship (if any) between adulthood and self-
realisation (and similar ideals) would have to be investigated36. 
• Wilson (463:30) found that: humans " ... should not subscribe to social values just 
because they are there, or because they are socially or politically powerful. We should 
endorse and value them when, but only when, they reflect or instantiate real or 
34 Chapter Six, Paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4, respectively. 
35 The scientist, whether agogician, philosopher, psychologist or theologian for example, has a double 
obligation: one as a non-scientist and another as responsible scientist. 
36 Chapter Eight, Paragraph 3.0. 
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transcendental values. 11 The researcher anticipated that the research would reveal 
just what these transcendental values might be. 
• May (271:74) showed that being-ethical is not just introjection, adjustment or 
internalisation because of 11 ••• the person's capacity to be aware at the moment that he 
is responding to the social expectation, the one choosing (or not choosing) to guide 
himself according to a certain model." May's finding highlighted the distinction 
between rote social conformity on the one hand and the freedom, originality, 
and creativity of genuine social response on the other. For the researcher, a 
rote social response would be moralness and a genuine social response, ethicalness. 
• Another of May's (271 :45) findings illustrated how ethicalness does not depend on 
external norms but arises from knowledge of what it means to be human: " ... being is 
a category which cannot be reduced to introjection of social and ethical norms ... it 
[being] is precisely not what others have told me I should be, but is the one 
Archimedes point I have to stand on from which to judge what parents and other 
authorities demand. Indeed, compulsive and rigid moralism arises in given persons 
precisely as the result of a lack of a sense of being." For Erikson (95:223-224), 
moralism is the irrational and pre-rational combinations of goodness, doubt and rage 
that re-emerge in the adult in malignant forms of righteousness and prejudice. 
• Rogers (85: 122) found that humans gradually take over the standards or conditions of 
worth imposed by others, and think of them as their own. However, he also found 
that a fully functioning person follows cultural standards because they are 
compatible with his own. This implies that if cultural standards were not compatible 
with a person's own, he would reject them, an implication not always evident in 
everyday life. 
• Kakar (200:125-126) found that the ideal of Hindu adulthood comprises two 
stages: taming and transforming instinctual activity into mature loving and caring 
relationships (individual socialization), and a second stage requiring " ... 
desocialization - an emotional withdrawal and renunciation of libidinalities." The 
researcher considered that Kakar's stage two implies not adhering to social norms if 
they contravene ethicals. In addition, "caring relationship" indicated the role of the 
andragogic in adulthood. 
• Wei-ming found that the Confucian ideal of adulthood (447:112) cannot be attained by 
simply modelling oneself on the proper ways of life and conduct approved by 
society. 
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• Turner and Helms (424:54) indicated that it is desirable for people to question social 
norms. Some "... young people identify with the values and goals of their parents 
without questioning whether or not they are right for them. Thus there are those 
who abandon the painful task of self-growth and the quest for adult maturity for 
the easier alternative of letting oneself be socialized by others. If this is the 
chosen path, the price to be paid for social maturity may be lifelong 
psychological immaturity."37 As the findings already stated in this thesis show, 
psychological immaturity would lead to experiencing dignifiedlessness. 
• Das (74: 102-103) illustrated the desirability of not accepting some Indian societal 
norms, by using phrases attributed to a fictional male character of upper caste who 
marries an untouchable. "But beyond the morality of the caste, there is the 
morality of humanity ... The village may find me guilty, but god38 will not." Das 
(74:103) commented that this character " ... finds true maturity in the 
transcendence of his bounded, closed morality." For the researcher "morality 
of humanity" is ethicality and "true maturity" means responding according to ethicals. 
It is this true adulthood (or the core of adulthood as Erikson (98:18) expressed 
it) which the researcher considered he uncovered in the code of ethicals. 
In summary, ethicals can be used to evaluate which morals are good or bad, 
that is, to answer the question Wilson ( 460: 19) found humankind asks: "How can I be 
certain that my morality is right?" It also stands to reason that ethicals can be used to 
evaluate which laws39 (whether human-made or perceived as God-given) 
are good or bad. The researcher found similarly to Glover (127:186-187) who, by 
asking several questions40, decided that: "There seems no good reason for drawing the 
frontier of morality in one place rather than another." However, the reader will now be 
aware that it is possible to say what is, and what is not, ethical. 
It is safe to state that a good moral or law, is an ethical. In a preliminary way, the 
researcher found that ethicals are used mostly unknowingly, to evaluate morals and 
laws. For example, when a society decides that a moral or law should no longer be a 
37 Ignoring the biologistic connotations of growth and maturity, one can ask: Can self be separated from 
bodiliness? and Is not adult maturity a tautology? "Abandon" implies a conscious decision, but it is 
probably done subconsciously. 
38 In this instance, Das used "god" and not "God". The researcher's results of further reflection on the 
relationship, if any, of gods or God to ethicalness and adulthood, is given in Chapter Eight, Paragraph 
4.0. 
39 Many laws could be regarded as the written down ethicals uncovered by previous generations. Laws, in 
most instances, are guidelines intended for protecting and maintaining dignity. Some laws may not 
achieve what they were intended for. 
40 Glover asked, for example: "Can beliefs based wholly on divine commands, regardless of human 
welfare, be moral? Or beliefs about the desirability of promoting the interests of one race at the 
expense of others?" 
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moral or law, on what basis does it decide so? Similarly, when a new moral or law is 
created, what grounds (principles or fundamentals) are used to justify the creation? The 
researcher found that it is the realisation that ethicals are being contravened that 
motivates people to create new morals or laws. Similarly, it is the realisation that ethicals 
are not being contravened, that motivates people to cancel a moral or law. Assessing the 
"goodness" or "badness" of any act in terms of ethicals forces one to transcend 
external authority, and seek oneself, for the fundamental reasons for deciding whether 
something is good or bad. 
On the basis of the explication reported in this paragraph, the researcher considered it safe 
to find that ethicals are more adequate criteria than morals for deciding what 
is good or bad behaviour. Erikson (95:222) corroborated this when he found that, he 
who knows what is legal or illegal and what is moral or immoral has not necessarily 
learned thereby what is ethical. However, the researcher wondered what would prevent 
the relativistic situation of people selecting as ethicals merely those behaviours they prefer. 
It would, of course, be pointed out to people who attempted to do this, that if their 
behaviour diminishes the dignity of another, it is not acting according to ethicals and that 
such behaviour is not good behaviour. However, it was realised that in some instances it 
might be necessary to be unethical. For example, one may have to become physically 
violent to prevent a thug attacking another person. The results of reflecting on these and 
other contradictions, are now presented. 
2.4 WOULD ADHERING TO SOME ETHICALS RESULT IN LESS 
DIGNIFIEDNESS FOR SOME PEOPLE? 
Since they have been uncovered from existentialia, it cannot be claimed legitimately that 
some ethicals apply in some societies, for some people and in some instances, but not for 
others. Consequently, there could be instances when responding according to some 
ethicals could offend or hurt others and consequently diminish their dignity. If this were 
so, it would be difficult to support the finding that acting according to ethicals leads to 
dignifiedness. Five scenarios are now presented to illustrate having to act against ethicals 
in order to protect the dignity of others. 
If a thug is attacking an elderly person in order to steal her purse, he is acting against 
ethicals (as well as morals and laws). However, as a human, in order to protect the dignity 
of the elderly person (and hence my dignity) I must intervene, and if the thug does not run 
away I must physically attack him and act against ethicals. The difficult question of 
whether or not to intervene when there is danger to oneself, was considered later in the 
research41. 
41 Paragraph 2.7 in the current chapter. 
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In the United Kingdom, female circumcision is outlawed on medical advice that it causes 
the child considerable pain, and in later life, considerable mental anguish42. However, the 
parents may genuinely protest that their dignity is being diminished because they cannot 
raise their child according to their religious beliefs. Again, the ethicals applied to protect 
the child's dignity, at the same time infringe the parents' dignity. 
A teacher is giving special attention to a very clever and troublesome thirteen year-old 
pupil. The pupil lets it be known in confidence that he loves his mother but hates his father 
and is initiating a "dirty tricks" campaign to make the mother believe that the father is 
having an affair. He is succeeding, and over a number of weeks, having placed blond 
hairs and lipstick on his father's jackets and shirt collars, the mother is about to start 
divorce proceedings. If the teacher does not act against the ethical of confidentiality and 
diminish the pupil's dignity, the parents are sure to have their dignity severely diminished 
by an unnecessary divorce43. 
After an amnio-sythesis test a foetus is found to have spina bifida. The medical evidence is 
that if born, the baby girl will live for only a few months and have a miserable and 
painful, short life. The doctors and parents agree to act against ethicals and abort the child 
with the total diminishment of her dignity. 
Trading Standards officers in a particular city have been receiving hundreds of complaints 
from householders about the poor quality workmanship of washing machine and 
refrigerator repair engineers and the high prices they charge. There is some evidence that 
engineers have been pretending to find faults and replacing perfectly good parts, and that 
they have been charging for work not done. Trading Standards officers establish a bogus 
household with officers acting as husband and wife. They deliberately disable their 
household appliances and invite various firms to fix them. Those engineers who act 
fraudulently are charged and fined. In effect, the Trading Standards officers acted against 
ethicals (lied and deceived others) in order to prevent unethical engineers diminishing the 
dignity of many other householders. 
Readers who study and teach in the discipline of ethics will be familiar with scenarios 
similar to those just given. It was realised that many more could have been offered and 
that many variations of the five scenarios, were possible. The scope of the research did 
not permit extensive examination of each scenario with regard to the implications of 
42 This is a sensitive and complex issue. Some people might claim that the Orthodox Jewish 
requirement to circumcise all boys, and the neck, ear and lip stretching and face and body scaring by 
some African tribal people, are also forms of mutilation. However, the key issue here is the physical 
pain and mental suffering caused. 
43 Adapted from Tennyson and Strom (415:298). 
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conflicting ethicals. However, after reflection on the five scenarios a major principle was 
identified. 
In some instances one must be unethical-to-be-ethical. In certain circumstances one 
has to accept the fact that one must be unethical in order to be ethical: to protect the dignity 
of one person, one may need to infringe the dignity of another. In this light, being 
unethical-to-be-ethical is acceptable and indeed required behaviour, if one wishes 
to experience dignifiedness oneself. The researcher had not previously encountered the 
principle of being unethical-to-be-ethical and decided to investigate it further by 
applying the principle to the five scenarios already given, and to some others. 
If I do not physically hurt a thug who is attacking another person, the other person will 
experience considerable dignifiedlessness; if a manager does not dismiss the incompetent 
worker, the department or company may collapse losing many more jobs and the owner's 
capital; if the judge does not send the persistent burglar to jail, many more people will 
experience diminishment of dignity when their houses are burgled; and if the teacher does 
not tell the parents' who are about to divorce over the "dirty tricks" campaign by their son, 
the parents' dignity will be diminished. The researcher detected that one can only claim to 
be being unethical-to-be-ethical if the unethical act is done to protect the dignity 
of another who is being, or is about to be, harmed. 
The distinction between being unethical and being unethical-to-be-ethical is a fine 
one, and the researcher considered that it could be illustrated by the following examples. 
• If a thug attacking an elderly person is challenged and runs away, to give chase and 
physically beat him would be unethical. In addition, if one beat the thug more than 
was necessary to stop him infringing the dignity of the victim, that would also be 
unethical. 
• If a religious group conducts certain practices that one does not like and one outlaws 
them merely because one did not like them, this would be unethical. However, any act 
which diminishes the dignity of another, even if it is done in the name of God, is 
unethical. Any religion which required its followers to diminish their own and others' 
dignity would be a bad religion. The fundamentality of ethicals is revealed by the 
fact that in some instances, when ethicals are contravened, societies do not allow the 
defence "God told me to do it", or "it is my religious faith." For example, female 
circumcision, as well as slaughtering live animals in public, are illegal acts in the 
United Kingdom. At the time of writing this chapter, Yszhak Rabin (the Prime 
Minister of Israel) had been assassinated and the assassin claimed that God told him to 
do it. However, the assassin is still charged with murder.· 
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• Even if one has agreed to confidentiality with a pupil, if the dignity of others will be 
diminished by the pupil's actions, the teacher has a duty to be unethical-to-be-
ethical and renege on the promise of confidentiality. The dilemma this poses for 
some professionals is a serious one: some may lose their license to practise for 
breaking confidentiality. However, the responsibility cannot be escaped. Uthe teacher 
does not tell the parents in this instance, she is protecting her own interests at the 
cost of diminishment of others' dignity. It is safe to state that to renege on a 
confidence for the joy of tittle-tattle or for financial gain by selling another's private 
details to a newspaper, for example, is not being unethical-to-be-ethical, and is not 
acceptable behaviour. 
• H an abortion is conducted on the sole grounds that if the child is born its life would 
be so horrible as to diminish its dignity, then that is acting unethically-to-be-ethical, 
and is being-responsible. However, if a mother decided on an abortion merely because 
a child would be inconvenient, or if born with some handicap would inconvenience 
(even considerably) the parents, this would not be unethical-to-be-ethical and would 
be wrong. A difficult situation would be where an abortion was recommended by 
doctors to save the life of a mother. However, humankind cannot escape ethicality and 
ethicalness. It would be unethical for a mother to abort a child (totally diminish the 
child's dignity) for the sole reason of saving her own life. This example raised many 
questions for the researcher and it was anticipated that it would have to be returned to 
as the research progressed44. 
• The researcher realised that just what does protect the dignity of another can 
sometimes be uncertain, and those faced with making such an assessment have a very 
difficult task. For example, a man enters hospital for removal of a stomach tumour. 
The doctors find that the cancer is so widespread that there is no chance of recovery 
and the man has only a month to live. The surgeon and wife agree not to tell the man 
and sedate him heavily for the time he has left because, on medical evidence, it is 
considered that the man would suffer so badly that his dignity would be diminished. 
In other words the doctors and spouse claim to have been unethical-to-be-ethical45. 
However, it could be that the man would have wanted a month more of conscious life 
to settle his affairs and say goodbye to friends and family. It is safe to state that the 
burden of being unethical-to-be-ethical is a heavy one. 
44 Paragraph 2. 7 in the current chapter. 
45 However, if the decision was made to hasten death, or to spare the spouse the agony of living with a 
husband who knows he is going to die, the action is unethical and unacceptable. 
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• Trading standards officers who lie to catch criminals robbing householders (indirectly 
through fraud) are being unethical-to-be-ethical, and this behaviour is acceptable. 
However, if journalists attempt the same or similar exercises they are acting not so 
much to protect dignity but to obtain a story which will aggrandise themselves, and 
raise readership and sales of their newspapers. Journalists are neither Trading 
Standards officers nor police officers, and if they did find any criminal activity, should 
report it to the police. Some journalists might claim that they do report their findings to 
the police. However, it is well known that they do this after the newspaper story or 
television programme has appeared and they feel they have gained the status and 
financial rewards46. 
In summary, being unethical in some instances may be necessary to experience 
dignifiedness. However, being unethical is only acceptable, that is, will only lead to 
dignifiedness if one is unethical-to-be-ethical. The scope of the research did not 
permit further explication of being unethical-to-be-ethical. However, it is likely that 
fellow-researchers will uncover more about it in additional studies. For example, being 
unethical-to-be-ethical must be limited to an initial instance. Once a criminal is sent to jail, 
every attempt should be made to reduce further diminishment of dignity. Similarly, once 
the parents of the thirteen year-old are told about his plot, there should be no further 
diminishment of dignity such as a thrashing or sarcasm. 
Another serious difficulty arose to confront the researcher: the possibility of being 
immoral, but being ethical. If some morals and laws are found to be bad, that is, 
diminish dignity, is one obliged to disobey them? Most people would regard this as a most 
serious question, because acting against social norms usually incurs the disapproval of 
parents, chilclien, colleagues and neighbours, and even the possibility of being jailed or in 
extreme cases executed. It was decided to investigate whether adhering to some ethicals 
would require immoral and even illegal (anti-social) acts. 
2.5 WOULD ADHERING TO SOME ETHICALS REQUIRE IMMORAL 
AND EVEN ILLEGAL ACTS? 
It is not unusual today to hear people referring to "bad laws" or to state that they are 
willing to break a law47 because it is an immoral law. One could always question the 
motives of people making such statements. They could be using immorality as an excuse 
(a rationalisation) for doing what they want to do. In the previous paragraph it was 
explained how ethicals can assist in judging whether or not a law is a good law or not. 
Ulich (426:38) corroborated this when he found that there are laws of right which are 
46 The researcher (344:198-258) has dealt with the ethics of journalism in a previous study. 
47 For the researcher, "law" included rules (ethics) of various professional bodies and the orders of a 
military commander or one's employer. 
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higher than laws of the land. Gustafson and Laney (145:6) found similarly, 
referring to "higher laws", and Bonhoeffer ( 41 :238) to: "the ineluctable necessities of 
the lives of men." For the researcher "laws of right", "higher laws" and "necessities", are 
ethicals. 
Consequently, it is safe to state that if a moral is also an ethical, and if a law is introduced 
to support an ethical, then being immoral or breaking a law would be bad (unethical): it 
would lead to diminishing the dignity of others. However, this does not mean that because 
a moral is not an ethical, or because a law does not support an ethical, that one should 
ignore them and undertake immoral or illegal acts. The reasoning for this finding can be 
best presented in three steps. 
a) If a moral or law requires some completely innocent people to be physically hurt48, 
one is obliged to disobey the moral and law because they diminish others' and one's 
own dignity. For example, if a norm in a head-hunter society requires young men to 
decapitate others to prove their manhood: if a society requires the sacrifice of a 
human at sunrise to appease the Gods and ensure a good harvest; these should be 
disobeyed. If a law required the identification of people of a particular religion or of 
homosexuals or prostitutes, and their delivery for death in a gas chamber, one 
should act illegally and hide the innocents. The researcher considered that Jung 
(85:42) found similarly when he indicated that one may have to reject society's 
values when the cost of adhering to them would be a personality that is one-sided 
and incomplete. For the researcher, Jung's "personality that is one-sided and 
incomplete", is experiencing of dignifiedness. 
As anticipated, the researcher found some complications with the finding just given. 
For example, does this mean that if a society employs the death penalty, that one 
should act illegally and free the prisoners on death row? In some societies 
disobeying the law may result in one's own death which means that to be ethical, 
one may in some instances require risking death. These two problems are 
discussed later in this chapter49. 
b) If a moral is not an ethical, then it is based on prejudice and preference and does not 
need to be obeyed. Examples regarding homosexuality and prostitution have already 
been given. However, the way one chooses to disobey (contravene) would 
48 This research could not deal with everything to do with being-human. The researcher has not been able 
to consider the role of the body in dignity and being-human. In existential phenomenology this is 
know as bodiliness. The reader is referred to Levin (245) and Oberholzer and Greyling (311:165-
175). Frankl (108:22 and 47) provided a terrible description of how dignity is diminished when the 
body is abused. 
49 Paragraphs 2.5 and 2.7, respectively. 
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affect others' and one's own dignifiedness. For example, a homosexual couple 
living in a predominantly heterosexual community might decide to exercise their 
rights and freedoms by publicly showing affection for each other "as any other 
couple would do." Such action would show lack of care for others, knowing that 
most neighbours will be shocked, upset and angry. 
The couple may state that the shock and upset is the neighbours' problem and that 
homosexual couples should not have to give up their rights and pleasures because of 
others' prejudices. However, no matter how misguided one thinks one's neighbours 
are, to knowingly upset them diminishes dignity. The neighbours' responses 
( ostracisation, oral taunts and even physical violence) will also diminish the couple's 
dignity. It could be claimed that someone who considers themselves to be right 
(being-ethical) would not worry about neighbours' (society's) responses, and 
consequently their dignity would not be diminished. For the researcher the phrase 
"knowing one is right" raises the phenomenon of conscience, and findings on the 
relationship (if any) between dignity, social pressure, ethicalness and conscience are 
presented later in this chapter50. 
c) If a law does not require someone to be physically hurt but merely prevents a group 
of people (even a large one) doing or getting what it wants, then one should not 
break the law. No doubt many groups could claim that some law is unfair, biased 
and prevents them enjoying life. However, by living in a society and voting (or 
having the right to vote), every person is under an obligation to every other person. 
There is an implicit agreement (promise) to act according to the majority decision, 
and breaking a law of the kind mentioned here, is breaking a promise. Of course this 
would change if a tyrant (despot or dictator) imposed laws. 
If some people consider a law to be unfair, they could attempt to change it by 
contravening ethicals (killing others, terrorising, and burning and looting). 
However, this would lead to diminishment of their and others' dignity. Some 
groups might claim that the powers that instituted the unfair law are so powerful, 
and the democratic process so slow, that they cannot take the time to be ethical, or 
that they would never achieve a change in the law without violence. However, the 
results of the research showed, that in situations where people wish to change a law 
to gain some benefit currently prevented, no matter what excuse is given for violence 
against others, the perpetrators will themselves, ultimately, experience 
dignifiedlessness. 
50 Paragraph 2.5.1. 
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In summary, adhering to some ethicals does in rare instances require immoral and illegal 
acts. Scheffler (378:25) explained the same finding indirectly when he shows how once 
(if) one becomes self-aware, social norms lose their ultimate authority and become objects 
of a choice to be made reflectively on independent grounds. For the researcher, these 
"independent grounds" are ethicals. 
In this paragraph, considerable mention has been made of the diminishment of dignity of 
others, and very little mention has been made of the dignifiedness of the person being 
immoral or illegal. It could be claimed that immoral and illegal acts, even when they are 
undertaken to be ethical, bring diminishment of dignity upon the perpetrators. The 
researcher further explored the implications of this. 
2.5.1 IS NOT IGNORING SOCIAL NORMS (MORALS AND LAWS) 
BRINGING DIGNIFIEDLESSNESS UPON ONESELF? 
At this stage in the research, the researcher found that finding answers to some of the 
questions raised, required increasingly complex and multi-layered thinking. It was decided 
to begin this paragraph by summarising the distinction between an ethical act, an immoral 
act and an illegal act. 
An ethical act is one in accordance with ethicals which are based on the essences ofbeing-
human, expressed ultimately as the perennial search for dignifiedness. Some ethicals in 
some societies are already expressed in social norms, morals and laws, and in these 
instances the researcher regarded these morals or laws as ethicals. However, some 
norms, morals and laws are not based on protecting dignity and may in some instances 
directly diminish dignity. Consequently, there are some instances when to be ethical one 
must disobey morals and, in rare instances, some laws. 
If to be ethical, one must be immoral or undertake an illegal act, one expects to be 
shunned, ostracised, ridiculed and even physically attacked. Ulich (425:156) arrived at the 
same finding: " ... the truly moral man is ready for sacrifice. This is different from 
throwing himself away as we find in the mentally sick or the desperado. In the moral 
decision a person may disregard immediate profit and the superficial approval of his 
fellow men, not because he has lost the desire to be happy and respected, but because the 
totality of his value system rebels against an isolated temptation. If obeyed, this 
temptation, rather than adding to his inner peace and self-respect would destroy both; 
for it would make him lose his better self and sense of dignity." In other words, unless 
one responds fundamentally ethically, one experiences dignifiedlessness. 
Allport (9:305) gave the example of a head-hunter society. In a society in which the norm 
is to decapitate another to prove one's adulthood, people who express disapproval of it 
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and try to prevent.it, are made to feel bad, wrong and less adult. Scheffler (378:31) found 
similarly: "Action on principle requires a certain courage, the ability to withstand natural 
fears of unpleasant consequences following such actions." 
It has already been explained how being immoral (as long as a moral is not also an 
ethical), does not make one a bad person. Even so, if a person ignores a moral, it i~ likely 
that neighbours will despise and shun him. The degree of despising and shunning will 
depend on how strongly neighbours feel about the moral concerned. Consequently, it 
could be claimed that even when one is ethical, but this requires acting against some 
morals and laws, the adverse reaction of neighbours (shunning, ostracising, ridiculing and 
even physically attacking) would ultimately lead to dignifiedlessness. In addition, it is safe 
to state that even if no physical violence was involved, an experience of dignifiedlessness 
would arise if prostitutes' customers treated them like things (objects), to be used and 
discarded. 
In the light of diminishment of dignity from social stigma, how is it possible that some 
people risk dignifiedlessness to be ethical? Three main findings resulted from reflection on 
this question. 
Firstly, if one had to be immoral to be ethical or unethical-to-be-ethical or, if one 
ignored a moral because in doing so no ethicals were contravened, the 
dignifiedlessness experienced would depend on the degree of social stigma associated 
with the "immoral" activity. For example, at one time in the United Kingdom, having a-
baby out of wedlock was a serious moral offence, whereas today there is hardly any social 
stigma. During the 1930s in the United States of America, to manufacture, distribute and 
sell alcohol (a drug) was a criminal offence, but today drinking alcohol is widely accepted 
and expected. In a similar way, if some currently illegal activities were decriminalised and 
demoralised, the social stigma would disappear and instances of dignifiedlessness from 
these activities (as long as there was no misuse) would be minimised. 
Secondly, the instances of dignifiedlessness because of social sigma could be counter 
balanced by other instances of dignifiedness. For example, a drug addict who is a good 
father and husband may achieve so many instances of dignifiedness from his wife and 
children, that the instances of dignifiedlessness from social stigma associated from drug-
taking, are insignificant. Similarly, a prostitute whose customers showed gratitude and 
caring, and whose parents showed love and understanding may experience sufficient 
dignifiedness to counteract the dignifiedlessness arising from social stigma. In addition, 
people who decided to be immoral or to break a law to be ethical, would experience 
dignifiedness from other people (however small the number) who considered them to be 
ethical, and supported them. However, it could be claimed that bank robbers could gain 
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dignifiedness from other robbers, and even from poor people to whom they distribute the 
stolen goods or money. 
The possibility of robbers experiencing dignifiedness from robbing others was reflected 
upon and the results are presented in the following paragraph. However, reflecting on the 
differences between the possible dignifiedness of a robber and the dignifiedness of an 
ethical person, gave rise to a third finding about why ethical people are able to risk social 
stigma. 
The researcher found that ethical people are able to resist social stigma or pressure because 
of an ethical conscience. The researcher was aware of the considerable literature on 
what conscience is5 l, but the scope of the research permitted only a preliminary 
explication. The researcher found conscience to be the knowledge of what is right 
and what is wrong through awareness of the pain caused by 
dignifiedlessness, through one's own experiencing of what is required for 
dignifiedness. This finding can be expressed more concisely: conscience is 
knowledge of right and wrong based on understanding of being-human. 
The researcher considered that May (271:45) found similarly: that being is not what others 
have told me I should be, but is an Archimedes point for judging what parents and other 
authorities demand. 
It is only with this sound knowledge, that one can act against accepted norms, knowing 
that others will despise and try to diminish one's dignity. Indeed, it is this knowledge 
which gives some people the courage to be ethical even when so being, could 
result in death. Indeed, for those people who have a high degree of awareness of pain 
caused by dignifiedlessness , that is, a high degree of conscience, it is an imperative to be 
ethical even in the face of death, because not being-ethical would make life 
dignifiedlessness - not worth living. 
For the researcher, Frankl (108:92-93) described a practical example of this dilemma. As a 
doctor he was responsible for very ill typhus patients in a concentration camp, but he was 
determined to escape. He described the unpleasant feeling of thinking of letting others die 
because he wanted to save himself. In the end he could not leave his patients and 
described, what the researcher would call an experience of dignifiedness: " ... As soon as I 
had told him with finality that I had made up my mind to stay with my patients, the 
unhappy feeling left me .... I had gained an inward peace that I had never experienced 
before." 
51 See, for example, Fromm (116:141-172). 
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Consequently, ethical conscience for the researcher is not an internalisation of norms 
dictated by external authority (moral conscience). The researcher reflected in more 
detail on what ethical conscience is, later in the research52. May (271:45) corroborated 
this finding, showing that morality cannot be wholly reduced to social influences: " ... the 
sense of being gives the person a basis for self-esteem which is not merely the 
reflection of other's views about him. For if your self-esteem must rest in the long run on 
social validation, you have, not self-esteem, but a more sophisticated form of social 
conformity .... the sense of one's own existence, though interwoven with all kinds of 
social relatedness, is in basis not the product of social forces ... ". 
The reader will be aware that May's finding is adequate, only if by "morality" he means 
ethicalness. As already described, self-esteem for the researcher is the experiencing of 
dignifiedness. Allport (9: 136) gave a different example of conscience at work. If someone 
has chosen a career and knows he should study for it; if he fails to do so, he violates 
his own chosen style of being. Three additional findings arose from the finding just 
stated and it was decided to mention them only in point form to prepare for further 
investigation later in the research. 
• Since ethical conscience involves awareness of the pain caused by dignifiedlessness 
through one's own experiencing of what is required for dignifiedness, it is an integral 
part of ethicality. Consequently, being conscience-led is synonymous with 
being-ethical (acting according to ethicals). 
• The idea of degrees was once again uncovered. For various reasons, different people 
will have different degrees of conscience. This finding is in line with other findings 
expressed so far, that people have differing awareness of being-human, being-
questioning and being-dignity seeking, for example. 
• A high degree of ethical conscience is no guarantee that someone will act accordingly: 
one might sometimes, for a variety of reasons, choose to ignore conscience. 
However, no matter what the reasons are, one would know one was being unethical 
and that dignifiedlessness would be the penalty. In a preliminary way, the researcher 
found that much of the work undertaken by psychologists in moral development is 
seeking for ways to assess the degree of ethical conscience. In addition, in a 
preliminary way the researcher found that it is the enhancing of conscience that is the 
main aim of educators when they devised moral education, religious education, values 
52 Chapter Eight, Paragraph 7 .0. 
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education and citizenship education, for example. These preliminary findings were 
further considered later53 in the research. 
In summary, if one is faced with being immoral or breaking a law, in order to be ethical, it 
is ethical conscience which protects one from dignifiedlessness when others despise or 
otherwise harm one. In addition, it is conscience that prevents one diminishing the dignity 
of others when choosing how to exercising one's rights in the face of a moral that has no 
ethical grounding. Ethical conscience is not the fear of punishment, but it does include an 
awareness that the penalty of diminishing the dignity of others, is one's own 
dignifiedlessness. The researcher considered that it is for this reason that many moralists, 
most likely unknowingly, aim to achieve experiences of dignifiedlessness ( ostracisation, 
shunning and ridicule) in others as punishment and as a potential deterrent. However, it 
could be claimed, as already pointed out in this chapter, that people, such as bank robbers, 
can experience dignifiedness even when they contravene ethicals. The researcher was 
obliged to investigate whether these claims are adequate. 
2.6 CAN BENEFITS FROM IGNORING ETHICALS LEAD TO 
EXPERIENCING DIGNIFIEDNESS? 
It cannot be denied that most robbers who steal money or goods; most prostitutes who 
tempt married people to be unfaithful; most married customers of prostitutes who are 
unfaithful; and most thugs who physically harm others, experience some pleasure, 
happiness, joy or satisfaction from being unethical. Similarly, most mothers who abort 
children for their own convenience and most54 people who lie to avoid difficult situations 
for themselves, will experience some kind of relief in being unethical. An etymological 
study shows that "pleasure", "happiness", "joy", "gladness" and "satisfaction" express 
very similar phenomena, and the researcher decided to use "happiness" as an umbrella 
term (including relief) in this thesis. 
It cannot be denied that, in addition to all the disadvantages, happiness is one of the results 
of being unethical. This finding posed a considerable problem for the researcher. It is 
obvious that happiness can arise from doing bad deeds (being unethical) as well 
as good deeds (being ethical), and of course, from deeds that are aethical such as 
studying or walking in the country55. Despite Frankl's (110:52) finding that "an ethical act 
carries pleasure on its back", one can safely state: so does an unethical act. However, the 
researcher was intuitively aware that the happiness achieved by robbing someone and 
53 Chapter Eight, Paragraph 7 .0. 
54 The word "most" is necessary because some people might be unethical because of some illness and 
may feel compelled to act against their will, for example. 
55 As the reader will be aware, the scope of the research at this stage, was becoming unmanageable. It 
was solely for this reason that it was decided to omit consideration of happiness arising from aethical 
activities. 
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spending the money, is not the same happiness experienced when one helps another. 
Considerable frustration was experienced in the attempt to find an explanation for this 
intuition. 
For example, one could claim that the happiness from a bad deed is temporary but 
happiness from a good deed has a more lasting effect. However, it is self evident that no 
one can be permanently happy and that the experience, however achieved does not last. 
Since searching to overcome dignifiedlessness is a perennial activity, once happiness 
wears off, one is again confronted by existentiality. Consequently, it was realised that 
there had to be a more adequate explanation of how humans know that happiness from a 
bad deed cannot lead to dignifiedness, whereas happiness from a good deed can. As 
Fromm ( 116:27) found, happiness is not an end in itself but is what accompanies the 
experience of an increase in potency ... "56. 
After considerable reflection, the researcher had to return to the mystery of innate 
dignity inherent in being-human. Although it cannot be adequately explained, all 
humans, unless unfortunately affected by severe mental disability, are aware, even if 
subconsciously, of their innate human worth. All humans know how they want to be 
treated by others and know, and pathically experience, when they are not being 
treated well. People may not be able to verbalise it, but they know when their dignity is 
being diminished, that is, when they experience dignifiedlessness. 
Consequently, when robbers experience happiness from robbing and from spending the 
ill-gotten gains, they know they are diminishing the dignity of those they have robbed. 
They may not care at the time and for some time after the robbery. They know stealing is 
wrong because if someone robbed them, they would feel their dignity being diminished. 
They would feel their dignity diminished even if the stolen items were things they 
themselves had originally stolen. Even if they do not care, or even hate the people they 
have robbed, they cannot escape the knowledge of primordial guilt: of knowing that 
they have contravened a fundamental law of being-human. When Aristotle referred to the 
good man being self-loving, and Hanfling (153: 185) to a cheat feeling no affection 
for himself, this, for the researcher, is evidence of the dignifying effect of ethical 
behaviour and the dignifiedlessness experienced from unethical acts. 
It could be claimed that some robbers are being unethical-to-be-ethical, because they rob 
the rich to help the poor (the Robin Hood syndrome). However, even if robbers genuinely 
wanted to help the poor, they could not escape knowing that they diminish the dignity of 
56 The scope of the research did not permit a more extensive investigation of what happiness is. The 
reader is directed to Fromm (116: 172-197) and Russell (539) in this regard. 
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those robbed. They would know that their "good deed" had an ulterior motive. It is 
reasonable to find that if the poor found out that they were being benefitted by thefts, 
some would experience dignifiedlessness too, because they would know they had taken 
part in diminishing the dignity of others. Even if a person furnished her whole house by 
purchasing stolen goods, she would know that the material items and the pleasure they 
give are not obtained from her own efforts and that their theft caused pain to others. 
It could be claimed that many unethical people do not need the recognition of others to 
experience dignifiedness. However, as Adler (2:12-13) found, a murderer holding a bottle 
of poison is confirming his importance only to himself. A private meaning is no 
meaning at all. Our aims and actions have meaning only in their meaning for others. It 
has already been explained how dignifiedness arises from the recognition of others. 
Consequently, it could be claimed that a particularly daring robber gains the adulation and 
respect of fellow-robbers, and that dignifiedness follows. However, dignifiedness would 
not arise from the recognition of fellow-unethical people, for the following reason. 
Although there might be respect among thieves, they know that this is the only respect 
they have. Recognition of fellow-unethical people is not sufficient because they know that 
the rest of society and their victims despise them. As Hanfling (153:185) found: "The 
crooked politician may be heaped with honours and high offices; the cheating student may 
be warmly congratulated on his or her exam results; but they cannot avoid the knowledge 
that their achievements are a sham ... ". Hanfling (153:185) corroborated this: many 
criminals often go to great lengths to justify their actions in their memoirs trying to prove · 
to themselves and others that they have done nothing to be ashamed of. Adler (2: 144-
147) gave additional corroboration, and further corroboration came from examples of 
criminals attempting to rationally justify their acts. For example, a shoplifter might claim 
that it is wrong to steal from individuals, but it is alright to steal from large department 
stores because the owners are very wealthy. 
In the light of this evidence, the researcher found that any achievement obtained by deceit 
or force (except when one must be unethical-to-be-ethical) is likely to be experienced as a 
hollow achievement. The unethical person knows that what they have achieved is 
worthless and their dignity has not been enhanced by it. Although, in the short-term, 
acting unethically might lead to happiness, in the long-term it will not. As Frankl (110:53-
54) found, the will to pleasure cannot be the moral maxim. In other words, 
happiness is not the same as experiencing dignifiedness. Similarly, Allport 
(9: 118) found that happiness and maturity are not the same, and Dicaprio (85:40) 
found that happiness can only be attained when seltbood is attained. For the researcher, 
Cupitt (71 :7) expressed the distinction between happiness and experiencing dignifiedness 
when he referred to eduaimonia as: " ... religious blessedness, a kind of happiness that 
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does not desert us but remains with us even in the most extreme conditions we can 
experience ... eternal happiness57." Tillich ( 420:25) expressed the experience of 
dignifiedness as joy: "Joy accompanies the self-affirmation of our essential being in spite 
of the inhibitions coming from the accidental elements in us." 
Consequently, happiness experienced at the expense of another's dignity is a superficial 
gaiety which is quickly diminished by primordial guilt, fundamental knowledge that one 
has diminished others' and one's own dignity, fear of being caught and imprisoned, and 
shame of being despised. This kind of happiness cannot lead to experiencing 
dignifiedness. Corroboration of this is given in practice when criminals express the wish 
to quit crime and admit that it is ultimately a non-rewarding activity- a "mug's game". 
On the other hand, happiness that arises from ethical acts does lead to experiencing 
dignifiedness. Indeed, the researcher found that ethical happiness is experiencing 
dignifiedness. Experiencing dignifiedness is the inner satisfaction one 
experiences from assisting another human. Of course, one must perennially seek the 
experience of inner satisfaction by continuing to do ethical acts. However, unethical 
people's frequent attempts to experience happiness are attempts at escaping the 
dignifiedlessness of their lives. As Frankl (110:55) found, joy and happiness cannot be 
direct goals in themselves. Frankl's finding assisted the researcher to find that if one did 
make happiness a direct goal, it would not result in dignifiedness. In a similar way, 
directly seeking some honour, say a knighthood (in the United Kingdom) or a Nobel 
Peace Prize, would not lead to dignifiedness, because even if one achieved it, the seeker 
would know it was obtained under false pretences. 
The findings reported in this paragraph reveal that experiencing dignifiedness cannot be 
achieved except by protecting, maintaining and enhancing the dignity of others. The 
researcher considered that this finding corroborated Kant's rejection of the idea that the 
moral motive could be reduced to the desire for happiness. For the researcher, the ethical 
motive is the desire for dignifiedness. There is another way in which happiness can 
be shown not to be the same as dignifiedness. 
To protect the dignity of another I might have to do things which I do not want to do or 
which disadvantage me in the short term. For example, if a person dropped a £10 note and 
did not notice, by handing it back I appear to be disadvantaged to the sum of £10. 
However, even if I was not aware of it, I would experience dignifiedlessness if I did not 
hand it back - even if the person was a millionaire. Something that appears to be against 
57 Since no human can be continuously or totally happy, the researcher is not sure what Cupitt meant 
by "eternal happiness". 
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my best interest (happiness) in the short term, is not in the long term (dignifiedness). The 
example just given reminded the researcher of all the instances of degrees of 
ethicalness mentioned summarily in this paragraph so far. For example, to be ethical, 
one might have to risk being ostracised, dismissed from one's job, physically attacked and 
even killed. At the time of writing this chapter, a school headteacher in London was 
stabbed and killed attempting to defend one of his pupils who was being attacked by a 
gang of youths58. It is understandable that different people would be prepared to bear 
these risks in differing degrees. 
The research so far had shown that there are degrees of ethicalness: the researcher 
wondered if, and how, the code of ethicals could be applied to assess a person's 
ethicalness. This investigation was necessary because degrees of ethicalness are degrees 
of adulthood, and an assessment of someone's ethicalness is also an assessment of their 
adulthood. 
2.7 HOW CAN ETHICALNESS BE ASSESSED? 
The researcher noticed, as did Ryff (368:80) and Wilson (462:103), that to many 
educationists and educators, the idea of assessing a person's ethicalness59 is anathema. 
Many would regard such assessment as a diminishing of dignity. However, for the 
researcher, assessing dignity is an everyday, commonplace way of humans protecting and 
enhancing their dignity. It is a truism that almost all people want to be with ethical people. 
With ethical people, one is reasonably sure (even though this may be subconscious) that 
one's dignity will not be diminished. The fact that some unethical people will work with . 
other unethical people, such as in purchasing stolen goods, does not deny the fact that 
given the choice, most people would want dealings with people who will treat them 
ethically (in a dignified way). 
The reader will notice that the researcher has made some kind of assessment by stating 
"unethical people" and "ethical people". It is safe to state that most people, whether 
they are aware of it or not, are making ethical assessments of others almost everyday. The 
Media provide a constant supply of stories giving examples of human behaviour and much 
of the public's discussion about these stories involves assessing whether the behaviour 
was right or wrong. Similarly, at work and at home, one hears comments such as "that 
wasn't fair", "what a horrible thing to do", "he's a nasty person", and "what a nice 
person." In addition, the fact that societies have rules and laws is an indication of 
assessments of rightness or wrongness. For the researcher, these and similar statements 
are a manifestation of assessing someone's behaviour for ethicalness. 
58 See the Aberdeen based newspaper, The Press and Journal, Saturday 9th December 1995, p9. 
59 Most educators would not call it "ethicalness" but "moralness'', "religiosity" and "spirituality". 
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In light of this evidence, the researcher realised that at this stage in the research, he was 
attempting to find out if the code of ethicals could assist in making everyday and largely 
implicit assessments, more explicit. It was anticipated that, as with all things human, 
using a code in a simplistic way would not provide adequate description. It could be 
claimed that some psychologists' research on moral development already provides a way 
of assessing a person's ethicalness. However, it has already been explained why much of 
psychologists' research on moral development was not employed in this research. Many 
of the psychological experiments did not assess ethicalness, but ethical (moral) reasoning. 
Consequently, as Greenfield (138:33) found, participating in ethics workshops, reading 
an article on ethics or knowing what is right and wrong, does not make one ethical: "One 
must genuinely ... be committed to securing the welfare and serving the interests of others 
... intentions are not enough ... One must continually and consistently pursue those 
ends." The researcher did not find as Alexander (7:13) did (after Kant) that: "It is the inner 
aim, the good will which alone gives moral worth to any endeavour. It is not what I do 
but the reason why I do it which is chiefly of ethical value. The essence of virtue resides 
in the will, not in the achievement; in the intention or motive, not in the result." For the 
researcher, the test of ethicalness is in what one ultimately does. A mother might kill 
her child because she genuinely wanted to spare him the agony of living in what she 
perceives as a terrible world. In doing so she acts against ethicals and is unethical. Having 
ethical motives is insufficient to be ethical. 
How then could the code of ethicals assist in assessing ethicalness? The researcher found· 
that three part-assessments would be required. It is reasonable to state that since each 
demand within each ethical is a standard (requirement) of ethicalness, the more standards 
people act by, the more ethical they would be. However, even if a person fulfilled all the 
demands within all seven ethicals in the code, she may do this only once. Consequently, it 
is not only the number of demands adhered to that is relevant, but also the 
frequency of adherence to each. 
Another more complex difficulty was identified. It is likely that ignoring some demands of 
ethicals would result in greater diminishment of dignity than ignoring some others. 
Correspondingly, fulfilling some demands will protect and enhance dignity more than 
fulfilling some others. For the researcher this indicated a hierarchy of demands of ethicals 
and that it would be possible to weight each demand according to how much adhering to 
it, enhances dignifiedness. A few examples of a hierarchy of demands, even in a 
preliminary way, would contribute further understanding of what it means to be ethical 
and how to assess ethicalness. 
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For example, risking one's life to save a person of a persecuted religious group, or diving 
into a shark infested harbour to rescue a drowning person60, is more ethical than 
intervening to help someone being robbed by a person half one's size and weight, or 
giving back a £10 note dropped by a person in the street. If a manager risks his job in 
protecting employees from a bullying senior manager, this would be more ethical than 
resisting taking the afternoon off on the pretence of "working at home" and then playing 
golf instead. 
It was realised that there could be situations where the most ethical acts of all would 
require, what some people would call, saintliness. To illustrate this, the reader is invited 
to imagine being in the following scenario. After an aeroplane crash in a desert only four 
people survive: you and another parent, each of you with a six-month old baby. The 
babies are about to die from dehydration, but the other parent, through sheer effort, has 
found a cup of water - just enough to keep her baby alive. Despite strenuous searching 
you cannot find water, and the other parent will not share. You are physically stronger 
than the other parent. 
If you were the parent without the water would you steal the water and allow the other 
child to die, to save your child? If you were the parent with the water would you share it 
knowing that your child might also die? The researcher hoped that no human is ever faced 
with such terrible choices. However, one can ask which of the two actions, sharing or 
resisting stealing, would be the more ethical? It was realised that attempting to answer 
this question would have entailed a diversion from the main research question. The. 
researcher was dissatisfied by the summary treatment of a hierarchy of demands of 
ethicals, but as the reader will be aware, a thorough investigation of this would have 
involved an additional substantial research project. 
However, if after research on a hierarchy of ethicals, and if it were possible to observe 
almost every action of a person in a given time period, it would be possible to calculate a 
person's ethicalness using the formula: I. [(Ex W) x F], where Lis the sum of; Eis the 
number of ethicals adhered to; W is the weight awarded to each ethical and F the 
frequency of adherence to each ethical. It is possible to imagine that a certain score could 
be designated by a society as the level of ethicalness to be obtained before one could be 
called "an ethical person". This score would be the same for assessing whether someone 
was being-adult or not. Such scores could be used instead of chronological age when 
determining whether or not a person is sufficiently responsible to vote, drink alcohol and 
drive a car, for example. 
60 Perhaps the feeling of guilt and cowardice arises from intuitively knowing that one has not done what 
being-human requires one to do. The guilt and cowardice are the manifestations of dignifiedlessness. 
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However, the impracticality and unworkability of such calculations and scores was 
immediately apparent for four main reasons. 
• It would not be possible to observe all the ethical actions of any person, even in a 
short time span. Very few people would allow the intrusion into their private lives that 
this would entail. In addition, one would not be able to detect adherence to ethicals 
where no action took place. For example, say a non-married university lecturer "fell in 
love" with one of her students, but being ethical, decided not to act on the desire. This 
instance of being ethical, and similar ones, would not be readily observable. 
• Any ethicalness score would be so general as to be unhelpful. If an individual obtained 
a high score (was generally very ethical), but drove his motor car very irresponsibly, 
would the high ethicalness (adultness) score mean that his licence should not be 
revoked? 
• It is very likely that different societies would arrive at different threshold scores for the 
definition of "an ethical person" (an adult person). Consequently, an ethicalness score 
would be no more helpful in identifying adulthood, than chronological age61. 
• If ethicalness scores were calculated, it is likely that they could be used to directly 
compare individual's ethicalness, which would lead to diminishment of dignity. 
In summary, it was anticipated that using the code of ethicals to produce some kind of 
reliable, mechanistic scoring system to assess ethicalness would be an impossibility. The 
researcher wondered how the code of ethicals could have any role in assessment. After 
further reflection it was found that the code of ethicals is still helpful in six main ways, 
namely: 
• enabling people who read it, to become more aware of the actions required to enhance 
the dignity of others and also what behaviours towards others and others' behaviours 
towards them, diminishes their dignity. The code enables individuals to self-assess 
their own ethicalness: 
• enabling educators and other agogues to be more aware of how they should be 
educating and supporting others on how to behave, so that educands and other 
agogees can experience dignifiedness; 
61 Chronological age was shown to be an inadequate description of adulthood in Chapter Two. 
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• acting as a rough guide to how ethical or unethical a person is. It is impossible to state 
absolutely that any person is ethical or unethical. One could find that on most days, in 
most responses, that a person is ethical or unethical. It is this that people mean when 
they say that someone is an ethical or unethical person; 
• making evident that there are circumstances in which it is more difficult to be ethical 
(adhere to ethicals) than in others. The difficulty arises from the amount of suffering 
one must bear, or the potential suffering that would result, from adhering to an ethical 
demand. In a general way, it is more difficult and, consequently more ethical, to 
adhere to ethicals when that may mean danger to one's life, family or 
livelihood, than adhering to ethicals which involve refraining from acts which would 
give one pleasure at the expense of another. 
Initially, the researcher was disturbed by Frankl's (108:75) finding and warning: 
"Who can throw a stone at a man who favors his friends under circumstances when, 
sooner or later, it is a question of life and death? No man should judge unless he asks 
himself in absolute honesty whether in a similar situation he might not have done the 
same." On the one hand, the researcher did not want to judge others in such horrifying 
circumstances as Frankl experienced in the concentration camps. Yet on the other 
hand, the research revealed that it is possible to judge rationally, and that one is 
judging anyway, whether one is aware of it or not. The researcher found that judging 
was not objectional as along as the dignity of the one being judged is protected as far 
as is possible. As Frankl (108:178) found, it is in very difficult times that the test of 
ethicalness is strongest. Difficult times give " ... a last chance to actualize the highest 
value, to fulfil the deepest meaning ... ". Another way to express this would be that a 
more ethical person would be prepared to accept more apparent harm or 
inconvenience to himself, to do what was necessary to be ethical and experience 
dignifiedness; 
• making evident that one can become more ethical and experience even more 
dignifiedness, by adhering to more ethicals and adhering to them more frequently; 
• making evident again, the impossibility of any person being totally 
(completely or fully) ethical. This is so because there are so many demands of 
ethicals that it would not be possible to adhere to all of them, all of the time. In 
addition, one might, by and large, be ethical in the many roles one fulfils (father, 
spouse and chairman of the horticultural society) yet unethical in other roles (politician 
and businessman)62. In addition, a person might be generally ethical for some time 
62 The researcher is not implying that all politicians and businessmen are unethical. 
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and then, for some reason, do something unethical, and then continue to be generally 
ethical, before again doing something unethical. At this stage, it became evident to the 
researcher that an intuition at the beginning of the research had been expressed: that 
ethicalness is a continuum. 
During the research for this chapter, the researcher had to frequently remind himself that 
he was attempting to describe ethicalness in order to describe adulthood as adequately as 
possible. As the reader will be aware, ethicalness is adultness (and humanness). This 
finding corroborated the finding stated several times in this, and the previous chapter, that 
adulthood is an ethical phenomenon. However, earlier in the research63 when it was 
found that ethicalness, humanness and adultness are the same continuum, it became 
evident that adultness was the continuum, not adulthood. Consequently, the 
researcher was required to find out the extent to which fellow-researchers' findings 
corroborated adultness as an ethical continuum and to continue seeking a more adequate 
description of what adulthood is. 
3.0 ADULTNESS AS AN EXISTENTIAL-ETHICAL CONTINUUM AND 
ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR ADULTHOOD 
It has already been explained that the word "existential" in "existential-ethical" is 
superfluous because being-ethical can only be, being-existential. In other words, 
ethicality and existentiality are inseparable, and their separation in this research is 
for study purposes only. However, the researcher considered that the term "existential-
ethical" was necessary to remind the reader that being ethical (ethicalness) is not just a 
demand based on the researcher's whims and views, but one arising from being-human. 
It has already been shown64 how adulthood and adultness are ethical phenomena. 
However, despite the many summary references to degrees of ethicalness and 
extents of ethicalness, throughout this, and the previous chapter, the researcher 
wanted to test his preliminary finding that adultness is a continuum. Although there is 
considerable evidence that fellow-researchers have found adultness to be a continuum, 
much of this evidence is expressed in terms of adulthood. It was realised that some 
fellow-researchers did (as did the researcher at the beginning of the research) not 
distinguish between adulthood and adultness. Consequently, when fellow-researchers 
referred to adulthood as a continuum, this was taken to be adultness as a 
continuum. The main ways in which adultness as a continuum was expressed in the 
literature consulted are shown in point-form to keep this chapter to a manageable length. 
63 Chapter Six, Paragraph 5.0. 
64 Chapter Six, Paragraph 5.0. 
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• Loevinger65 regarded "... progressions of ego development as gradations along a 
qualitative continuum ... ". Roelofse et al (7:84) indicated a progression of: child, 
pre-adulthood, early-adulthood, prime adulthood and late adulthood. 
Many psychological and sociological researchers provided additional evidence. 
Erikson found (94:268) that for individuals to become mature adults they must 
develop all the ego qualities to a sufficient degree66. 
• It has already been shown67 that socialisation is regarded by many researchers as 
continuing throughout life, and for the researcher, this indicated that adultness is a 
continuum. Since socialisation could best be described by being-responsible; since 
being-responsible is best described by being-ethical, and since being-ethical is being-
adult, socialisation is, by and large68, synonymous with adulthoodisation. 
Becoming more socialised means becoming more adult. Turner and Helms 
( 424: 17) expressed the same finding when they referred to maturity as socialization 
and continuous models69 of development. 
• Bischof (37:34) and Vaillant (429:29) used the word "continuum" to refer to 
progress during life and to maturity, and Wei-ming (447:112) found that an 
adult is not only a mature person, but a person capable of further maturing. Terms 
such as "highly mature" or "more mature" and "maturity scale" (380:68) (despite 
their unsuitability for describing human phenomena) indicated a continuum. For the 
researcher, another indication of adultness as a continuum was the frequent use of the 
metaphor of adulthood as a journey. Thorat (418:65-81) referred to "Passage to-
adulthood ... ", and Kett (206:286) mentioned that in the middle ages, life was 
regarded as a highway. However, since, as already explained, adultness cannot be 
achieved absolutely or totally, any mention of a journey or passage with an achievable 
goal, end point, completion or destination, is inadequate description. 
• In addition to words such as "progress", "journey", "scale", and "continuous", there 
were other terms indicating degrees of achievement of adulthood, which indicated a 
continuum. For example, Stegner (404:40 referred to "higher adulthood" and 
"limited adulthood", and Wei-ming (447:112) found that the Confucian ideal of 
adulthood entails continuous effort towards self-realisation - a way of becoming a 
person. Similarly, Bischof (37:37) referred to full selfhood and full self-
realisation. Again, the reader will realise that full adultness (fulfilling all ethicals 
65 According to Weathersby (446:52). 
66 As previously described in Chapter Three, Paragraph 3.0. 
67 Chapter Four, Paragraph 4.0. 
68 The qualification, "by and large", is necessary because some socialisation may involve internalisation 
of morals which are not ethicals. 
69 Bold type is in the original. 
275 
totally all the time) is impossible. However, the mention of an ultimate goal (even if 
unachievable) indicated a continuum. Although psycho logistic descriptions of 
adulthood have been shown to be inadequate, it was suspected earlier in the research 70 
that some psychological ideals may be expressing a fundamental ideal of adulthood. 
The researcher considered that findings such as full selfhood and full self-realisation, 
indicated that some psychologists also recognised adultness as a continuum. 
At this stage, with the evidence just presented and the cumulative results of the research in 
mind, the researcher considered that there was sufficient evidence to find that adultness 
is a continuum, and to confirm the continuum as an ethical one. It was found that the 
more one fulfils the demands of ethicals, the further along the continuum one is, and that 
one can move both forward and backward along the continuum. It was found that 
adultness as a continuum helped in understanding, and to express more adequately, some 
of the findings and expressions of psychological and sociological researchers of 
adulthood, presented earlier in this thesis. Again, point-form presentation is employed to 
keep this chapter to a manageable length. 
• It has already been explained71 why biologistic terms such as "mature", "grow" and 
"develop" are inadequate descriptors for humans and adulthood. Consequently, when 
terms such as "maturity", "a mature person", "further maturing", "highly mature", 
"more mature" and "maturity scale", are used, they are being employed inadequately to 
express adultness, an adult person, becoming more adult, highly adult, 
more adult and the continuum of adultness, respectively. 
However, one could still ask: What term more adequately describes the dynamic of 
progress along the continuum of adultness, than "growth", "maturing" and 
"developing"? With the explication given so far in this chapter, the researcher 
considered it safe to state that humans do not grow, develop or unfold, but become. 
Movement forward (progress) along the continuum of adultness can adequately be 
expressed by "becoming more adult" and movement backwards (regression) can 
be referred to as an "interruption to becoming more adult". 
Similarly, when psychological researchers referred to a "journey and its 
destination", it is possible to state that they were referring to becoming more 
adult. Additional evidence of movement along the continuum of adultness being 
called "becoming" is given by: the Japanese ideal of adulthood (362: 128) being one 
of becoming not being; fellow-researchers referring to "becoming adult" 
(63:vii); and Oberholzer and Greyling (310:54) finding that adulthood is not so much a 
70 Chapter Three, Paragraph 4.3. 
71 Chapter Two, Paragraph 3.4. 
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state as an opportunity - the degree of progress on the way to becoming 
someone. As this research has already shown, being as adult as possible, means 
fulfilling as many demands of ethicals as frequently as possible. 
• Just as no human can obtain absolute answers to existential questions; just as one 
cannot experience dignifiedness once-and-for-all, and just as no person can be totally 
ethical, no human can be totally, completely adult. Many researchers have 
found similarly: the ultimate task of adulthood cannot be fully achieved (63: l); 
adulthood is incompletable (362: 127), and total, full, ultimate or ideal 
adulthood is unattainable. Bouwsma ( 42:80) found that no person, whatever their age, 
can claim to be fully an adult, and (42:81) that it is impossible to achieve perfect 
maturity. Malia (264: 182) found, and Friedenberg ( 112:248) corroborated, that " ... 
adulthood cannot be considered as a fixed and finite goal, but that it can only 
be seen as an ever receding approximation to the fullness of human potential." 
Bischof (37:37) implied that this fullness can never be achieved, and Ten Have 
(414:2) found that agogy is guidance" ... towards complete adulthood ... ". These 
findings indicated for the researcher that the continuum of adultness has no ending. 
• The findings just listed re-emphasised a finding already expressed several times in 
this, and the previous, chapter: that being-human means to be perennially seeking. 
Being-adult means to be perennially striving for complete or full adultness, 
even whilst knowing it cannot be achieved. The word "ideal", used several times in 
this and the previous chapter, indicated the possibility of some perceived image of 
what being totally, completely, fully, or perfectly adult would be like. Again, it is 
possible to state that for the researcher, the ideal adult would be one who acted 
according to all ethicals all of the time - an impossibility. As Lapidus 
(236: 106) found, the ideal of Muslim adulthood, although it may never be 
attained, defines the direction in which a Muslim life proceeds. It has already been 
explained why "the code" is not dogmatic and unscientific, and the researcher 
considered that the same findings apply to "the ideal of adulthood". 
Consequently, the researcher anticipated that the ideals already mentioned (Muslim, 
Japanese and Confucian), and any other particular ideals, are expressions of the 
fundamental (universal) ideal, whatever that may be 
Even after having thoroughly grounded adultness as an existential-ethical continuum, the 
researcher realised that there were at least two important questions about the continuum 
that needed answering. Firstly, although the continuum has no achievable end, is it 
possible to state where the continuum begins? The opposite of total ethicalness 
would be total unethicalness, that is, not fulfilling any of the ethicals at all, at any 
time. The researcher wondered if any human could be totally unethical, and in a very 
preliminary way considered that at birth, a human would be very near to be being totally 
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aethical - neither ethical nor unethical. If this were so, humans would be at, or very near, 
the beginning of the continuum at birth. However, this description, as preliminary as it is, 
still may not be adequate, as the following second question illustrates. 
Does the continuum of adultness incorporate the extreme unethicalness of criminal 
acts such as murder, rape and torture, or is there a separate continuum of evilness? The 
reader may realise that attempting to find adequate answers to these two questions would 
have required a considerable deviation from the research topic. Consequently, the 
questions of where the continuum begins and whether there is another continuum of 
evilness, or a negative extension of the continuum of adultness called "evilness", were 
not considered further. Delimiting the research as just mentioned made it explicit that the 
researcher was considering the continuum in terms of the agogic, that is, the degree to 
which one fulfils the code of effective agogy, that is, the code of ethicals, as presented in 
Chapter Six. 
There was a further question that did require answering in order to progress the research; a 
question already asked in Chapter Six, namely: If it is adultness that is the 
continuum, what is adulthood? Bearing in mind that ethicalness, adultness and 
humanness are one and the same continuum, and that humanhood is the mode of being of 
humans, the researcher considered it safe to describe adulthood as follows: 
Adulthood is that part-mode of humanhood (independent of chronological 
age and biological maturity) of those people who have progressed so far. 
along the continuum of ethicalness, that is, who are so sufficiently aware 
of the interrelatedness of ethicality and dignity, and of the inseparability 
of their own and other's dignification, that they can, without guidance in 
most circumstances, be trusted to usually respond in ways which protect 
and enhance the dignity of others. 
The researcher has presented the description just given in large type, because it contributes 
to answering the main research question asked at the beginning of the research: What is 
adulthood? The description of adulthood just given is a contribution to the more 
adequate description of adulthood that was being sought. Although adulthood is an 
existential-ethical part-mode of being-human, it is not a continuum. Adulthood is not 
pre-determined by the arbitrary selection of chronological age, biological 
or psychological development or social conditioning, but by a person's 
progress along the continuum of ethicalness (adultness), that is, how 
ethical one is. In light of adulthood being found to be an existential-ethical part-mode of 
humanhood, the researcher wondered what childhood could be. 
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3.1 ADULTHOOD, CHILDHOOD AND HUMANHOOD 
Based on the explication in this thesis of adulthood as an existential-ethical onticity and the 
description of adulthood just given, the researcher found childhood to be: 
that part-mode of humanhood (independent of chronological age and 
biological maturity) of those people who have not progressed sufficiently 
far along the continuum of ethicalness, that is, who are so insufficiently 
aware of the interrelatedness of ethicality and dignity, and of the 
inseparability of their own and other's dignification, that they cannot be 
trusted to usually respond in ways which protect and enhance the dignity 
of others, and usually do not so respond, without guidance in most 
circumstances. 
While the researcher readily understood the distinction between adulthood and childhood 
as part-modes of being-ethical, he was unsure about the meaning of childness. Since 
adultness is the ethical continuum, what use could there be for the term "childness"? 
However, during the research72 it was found that ethicalness, humanness and adultness 
are one and the same continuum. If "humanness" is used to refer to the ethical 
continuum then childness and adultness are part-continua relevant to the part-modes of 
humanhood, that is, childhood and adulthood. For example, say a person had become 
sufficiently ethical to have moved forward along the continuum of humanness, so that he 
was on the part-continuum of adultness (that is, in the part-mode of being called 
"adulthood"). If this person then did something so unethical that he moved backwards 
along the continuum of humanness, at what point would he move off the part-continuum 
of adultness and onto the part-continuum of childness? If such a distinction could be made 
what use would it have for educators? 
It was realised that finding answers to the questions just posed, was a task outwith the 
scope of the current research. However, the possibility of using "humanness" to name the 
continuum of ethicalness indicated a way of overcoming a major two-part difficulty with 
the finding that "adultness" and "adulthood" are existential-ethical onticities independent of 
chronological age and biological attainment. 
The first part of the difficulty can be explained as follows. As already explained73, the 
researcher encountered considerable difficulty because many fellow-researchers used 
"adulthood" (frequently unknowingly) to name both the biological and the human. In 
other words, without knowing it, when many fellow-researchers used "adultness" they 
72 Chapter Six, Paragraph 5.0. 
73 Chapter Two, Paragraph 3.4. 
279 
referred to both the automatic process of biological growth and the agogic-
dialogic of ethical becoming. However, it was found that almost all fellow-
researchers consulted, implied that ethicalness was the fundamental phenomenon 
they were referring to when they used "adultness". 
The second part of the difficulty was that in the current literature and in everyday life, it is 
assumed that people who are older or biologically mature, are automatically further along 
the continuum of adultness (ethicalness) and consequently, are assumed to be in the part-
mode of being-ethical called "adulthood". Similarly, young people are generally assumed 
to be less far along the continuum of ethicalness and are assumed to be in the part-mode of 
being-ethical called "childhood". 
The reader will now be aware that these generalised assumptions are inadequate. 
Matureness and adultness are not the same phenomena: matureness is a biological 
continuum and adultness an ethical continuum. In many instances children will be 
further along the continuum of adultness (ethicalness) than many adults. In other words 
some children will be in the part-mode of being-ethical called "adulthood", while some 
adults will not. In summary, the difficulty for the researcher at this point in the research, 
was that although the research had shown that "adultness" and "adulthood" are adequate 
terms to name the ethical continuum and that part-mode of being-human which is more 
ethical, the long tradition of associating ethicalness (adultness) with biological matureness, 
would mean that using "adultness" and "adulthood" to name ethicalness and ethicalhood, 
would lead to misunderstanding. 
Consequently, since childhood and adulthood are part-modes of humanhood; since 
childness and adultness are part-continua of humanness, and since ethicalness and 
ethicalhood are humanness and humanhood, it was realised that using "humanhood" and 
"humanness" would be more adequate description. It was hoped that this approach would 
again illustrate the equality of ontological worth of biologically immature (children) and 
biologically mature (adults) humans. Some fellow-researchers (89: 161) ( 439: 199) have 
found similarly: being-a-child is a mode of being-human and is not a deficient, 
incomplete or defective way of being nor a sickness (439:138). Dicaprio (85:195) found 
similarly. 
The adequacy of employing "humanhood" to express adulthood (ethicalhood) is shown by 
Beyers Nel (27:7) who equated an image of manhood and an image of adulthood. In 
addition, the findings just presented contributed to solving the need expressed by 
Graubard (135:v): to relate adulthood and childhood, and the need expressed by Murphy 
and Gilligan (293:102): " ... integrating childhood and adult development into a single 
life span developmental perspective." The reader will now be aware that Murphy 
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and Gilligan's finding could be more adequately expressed as "a single continuum of 
becoming more human." 
Consequently, for the remainder of the research, the researcher was required to think in 
terms of humanhood and humanness, realising that an explication of humanhood is also 
an explication of what many researchers perceived as adulthood and adultness. The reader 
will be aware that humanhood is ethicalhood, and humanness is ethicalness. Any 
description claiming to be a description of humanness, which does not include ethicalness, 
is not an adequate description. 
Previously in the research74, it was found that adulthood is the aim of education. This 
finding can be expressed more adequately by stating that the aim of education is 
humanhood. The researcher found considerable corroboration for the findings just 
stated. For example, the Chinese word for adulthood, ch'eng-jen means one who has 
become a person or one who has gone far towards a fully developed humanity 
(447:112). The ideal of Japanese adulthood involves becoming more human during all 
of one's life (362:127), and Friedenberg (112:248) found that adulthood," ... can only be 
seen as an ever receding approximation to the fullness of human potential." Wei-
ming (447:121) found similarly: humanity is synonymous with realising adulthood . 
. 
With the explanation of adulthood as humanhood, it is understandable that Knudson (224: 
261-264) in objecting to the terminological difficulties regarding agogy, coined the 
tautologous term "humanagogy". 
The relationship between becoming more human, agogy and education is shown directly 
when agogicians explained that agogy is frequently found to: enable people to fulfil their 
human task (414:2); to make a person competent to act humanly (90:53); be 
assistance towards fully becoming human (81:255), full humanity75 genuine 
humanness (89: 139); being a full-fledged human being (89: 198); and the 
realisation of humanity (89:97). 
In addition, Warren ( 444:22) paraphrased Maslow to find that the general question about 
self-actualisation is: " 'To what degree has this person actualized his 
humanity?'." Maslow (270:29) explicitly referred to: " ... the continuum of greater to 
lesser degree of humanness." He continued that: "degree of humanness" is more 
useful than concepts such as social competence and human effectiveness. Friedenberg 
(112:248) referred to degree of maturity, and Maslow (270:28) indicated a humanness 
continuum when he found it possible to state that one person is nearer full humanness 
74 Chapter One, Paragraph 1.0. 
75 Comenius, quoted by Degenaar (81:270). 
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than others and that this person is more human76. He (270:34-35) further indicated that 
becoming more adult (more human) is a continuum when he referred to the impulse to 
improve ourselves, to become the best that you are capable of becoming and the best 
that one is capable of being. Erikson (98:19) corroborated Maslow's findings in this 
regard by referring to "becoming more inclusively human." 
The researcher detected an inadequacy in the finding that the aim of education is 
humanhood. All humans are already human and in the mode of being called 
"humanhood", and on the continuum of humanness, to some extent. Consequently, it was 
realised that the aim of education could be more adequately described as further 
humanhood. However, what is further humanhood? Once again, the reader may 
consider that the researcher is involved in circular description. Previously in the research77 
it was found that to find out what it means to be ethical, one must search for answers to 
what it means to be human. An exploration of what it means to be human led to the 
researcher having to find out what it means to be fundamentally ethical. Now, at this 
stage in the research, after considerable reflection on ethicality and ethicalness, the 
researcher is required to find out what humanhood and humanness are. 
While it might appear that the researcher is "going round in circles", this is not the case. 
The cumulative nature of an existential phenomenological approach has already been 
explained, and the reader will notice that although the phenomenon being studied is still 
being-human, the level of complexity has been increasing as the research progressed. In 
other words, at this stage in the research, the researcher was required to uncover even · 
further, the meaning of being-human. It was realised that this could be achieved by 
examining being-human as progression along the humanness continuum. 
76 Although Maslow (270:28) did not make it explicit, he was working phenomenologically at this 
stage, because he stated that the fusion word "more" (a fusion of fact and value):" ... has nothing to do 
with my wishes and tastes, my personality, my neuroses ... my unconscious wishes or fears or 
anxieties or hopes are far more easily excluded from the conception of full humanness than they are 
from the conception of psychological health." 
77 Chapter Five, Paragraph 3.0. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
BEING-HUMAN AS STRIVING 
TO BECOME PERFECTLY HUMAN 
The greatest task for humans is to come to understand that humanness requires them 
to perennially become more human, because the degree to which they experience life 
as worthwhile, depends on the degree to which they meet the requirements of perfect 
humanness l. 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Having found degrees of ethicalness and the possibility of ideal ethicalness, the researcher 
was not surprised to find that fellow-researchers recognised degrees of humanness 
and recorded expressions indicating ideal humanness. For example, Oberholzer and 
Greyling referred to true humanness (311:13), pure humanness (311:12), fuller 
humanness (311:25), truly human (311:16) and becoming more human (311:16). 
Gunter (144:109) referred to fully human adulthood. Dicaprio referred (85:60) to full 
humanness as did Maslow (269: 156-157) (270:27). Maslow also referred to fullest 
development of human potential, fullest degree of humanness, fullest 
humanness (270:24) and full development of humanness (270:25). Geering 
(121:13) referred to becoming truly human, and (122:2) full humanisation, and 
Frankl (109:134) to genuinely human. 
It could be claimed that recognition of degrees of humanness implies that some people are 
more human than others and that this implication diminishes dignity. However, the 
existential of equality-in-inequality reminded the researcher that this is not so. Every 
person from the moment of conception is a human of equal ontic worth to every other 
human. As already explained2, being a young person or being unethical does not mean 
one is of less ontic worth: every human should have his or her dignity respected. This 
does not deny the fact that every person can become more ethical and so become 
more human, and so experience more dignifiedness. Oberholzer and Greyling 
(311:25) corroborated this: every person is already fully human at birth but (311:16) 
can become a better human. In the light of the research so far, it is safe to state that 
humans must become more human if they are to continue to experience dignifiedness. As 
1 An adaption of Kant's finding as translated by Du Plooy and Kilian (90: 131 ): "The greatest task of man 
is to come to know how to occupy his place in the whole of creation and that is to know correctly 
what has to be done to be considered a human being." 
2 Chapter One, Paragraph 2.6 and Chapter Seven, Paragraph 3.1. 
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mentioned in Chapter Seven3, the researcher realised the need to undertake further 
reflection on the phenomenon of becoming, and now presents the results of this seeking. 
2.0 BEING-HUMAN AS PERENNIAL BECOMING 
May (271 :41) found that the word "being" is, " ... a participle, a verb form implying that 
someone is in the process of being something ... ", and that being should be regarded as 
potentia, the source of potentiality. May continued: "Perhaps therefore, becoming 
connotes more accurately the meaning of the term [being] ... We can understand another 
human being only as we see what he is moving toward, what he is becoming; ... and we 
can know ourselves only as we project our potentia in action. The significant tense for 
human beings is thus the future - that is to say, the critical question is what I am pointing 
toward, becoming, what I will be in the immediate future." 
Foulauie (106:49) found similarly: "Existence is not a state, but an act, the actual 
transition from possibility into reality; as the etymology of the word indicates, to exist is to 
take leave of what one is (ex) in order to establish oneself (sistere) on the level of that 
which formerly was only possible." Foulauie (106:51) also found that existence is a 
perpetual transcendence and that we only exist in the progress towards a farther 
stage of being. Du Plooy et al (89:222) found similarly: "He [humankind] exists, he 
comes to a standstill (stere) out of (ex) himself, he goes out from the self, he never is 
but is always in the event of becoming." Bergevin (26:5) referred to: becoming "the 
mature persons it is possible for us to become", and Oberholzer and Greyling (311:25) 
found that being-human means constantly becoming someone. Kidd (207:6-7) used· 
the phrase "being, becoming, belonging" to indicate that being-human in being-
becoming. 
For humankind, the becoming and potential just referred to, can only be becoming 
more human (89:97) (311:17), becoming a better human being (90:31), and 
increasing humanisation (209:221). Consequently, when Scheffler (378:11) found 
that: "The idea of a fixed potential is a myth", he was not considering the potential to 
become more human. May (271:96) found that: " ... the person is always becoming ... 
The human being, so long as he possesses self-awareness and is not incapacitated by 
anxiety or neurotic rigidities, is always in a dynamic self-actualizing process4, always 
exploring, molding himself ... ". As Sartre found (369:56): " ... by seeking, beyond 
himself, ... man can realise himself as truly human." Since, for the researcher and many 
fellow-researchers, being-human begins at conception or birth, the becoming is becoming 
more human, not becoming human. Jenkins (192:100-101) referred to:" ... the glory of 
3 Paragraph 3.0. 
4 
"Process" names an automatic, stimulus-response mechanism and is inadequate for describing human 
reality. 
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becoming human ... to act fully humanly to all men and thus become fully 
human together." Consequently, the following findings are inadequate description: "Step 
by step I progressed, until I again became a human being." (108:142); " ... education is the 
most effective way, or the only way of ... converting them [the young] ... into human 
beings" (285:7-8); most adults can be described as crippled because they are less than 
fully human (444:177). 
The question, How does one become more human? has already been answered implicitly 
in the previous chapter. In summary, a human becomes more human by adhering 
to more and more demands of ethicals, more of the time. This unending 
(except in death)5 task can only be successfully faced with the agogic assistance of the 
fellow-human. Since it has been uncovered from existentialia (the fundimenti) of being-
human, the fundamental code of ethics is also a code of humanness. The 
fundamental relationship between ethicalness, humanness and becoming is shown by the 
fact that the words "worthwhile" and "worth", once meant to become and come to be 
(something)6. 
For the researcher, each ethical is a requirement - a demand of humanness. Statements 
such as: "He is a very human person", or "She is a very humane person", recognise a 
person's fulfilling many ethicals consistently. The researcher considered that the code of 
humanness makes explicit the subconscious reasoning behind such statements. Indeed, 
the code of humanness, illustrates that becoming more ethical and becoming more 
human are one and the same. Consequently, it is safe to find that humanisation is · 
identical to ethicalisation. In addition, since the more ethical one becomes the more 
dignifiedness one experiences, humanisation is synonymous with dignification. 
The terms "socialisation" and "enculturation" have been mentioned several times in 
this thesis and it would seem reasonable to state that these two phenomena are identical to 
humanisation. However, this is not the case because, they include conditioning to 
accept morals (moralisation), some of which will not be ethicals. It is safe to state, 
though, that some aspects of socialisation and enculturation will be humanisation because, 
some social/cultural norms will also be ethicals. Allport (8:29) corroborated this finding 
and related it to adulthood and becoming when he stated: " ... the primary problem in 
the psychology of becoming is to account for the transformation by which the unsocialised 
infant becomes an adult ... capable of taking his place in a complex ordered society." 
5 It was beyond the scope of this research to examine the claim that becoming continues after death, as 
Kubler-Ross (229) suggested. 
6 See, for example, Gove (134:2637), Macdonald (259:1573), Onions (317:1013), and Simpson and 
Weiner (394:585). 
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There is considerable corroboration of the interrelatedness of adulthood and humanisation. 
For example, Du Plooy, Griessel and Oberholzer (89:14) found that agogy in its education 
setting is accompaniment towards human adulthood; Gunter found (144:12) that 
adulthood in the true sense, is adulthood which is worthy of a human being, and Du 
Plooy and Kilian (90:98) found adulthood to be the practising of an occupation in a way 
worthy of a human i>eing. The fact that achievement of adulthood is also achievement of 
humanhood is shown in that even particular concepts of adulthood are expressed in terms 
of being-human. For example, Viljoen and Pienaar ( 439:68) and Kilian and Viljoen 
(209:221) found self-realisation to be humanisation. The Confucian concept of 
adulthood (447:109) is not so much that of attainment but of a process of becoming. 
To assist the reader's understanding of the synonymity of the terms "humanisation", 
"ethicalisation" and "dignification" the researcher decided to present Table Eight. 
TABLE EIGHT 
AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE EQUIVALENCE OF TERMINOLOGY 
RELATING TO BEING-HUMAN 
The inescapable Degree of Mode of Dynamic of 
reality becoming being becoming 
existentiality existentialness existent existentialisation 
ethicality ethicalness ethical ethicalisation 
dignity dignifiedness dignified dignification 
humanhood humanness human humanisation 7 
As already expressed in this thesis, humanhood and personhood are synonymous. In 
addition, the researcher considered that when Allport (408:19) referred to personality, he 
was expressing humanhood. Just as ideal ethicalness and ideal adulthood are recognised 
by some researchers, so is ideal humanhood (total humanness). For example, 
Oberholzer and Grey ling (311: 16) referred to the demands of pure humanness; Maslow 
to ideal humanness, and Viljoen and Pienaar (439:74) found that adults need an image 
to keep striving towards8. Plato found this image to be moral perfection9. In addition, 
earlier in this chapter, terms implying full humanness and true humanness have been 
reported. 
7 Since adult, adultness, adulthood, adulthoodisation are synonymous with human, humanness, 
humanhood and humanisation, they are not included in the table. 
8 Oberholzer and Greyling spell "pure humanness" with capital letters "P" and "H". 
9 In Passmore (320: 13). The researcher interpreted moral perfection as ethical perfection. 
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Based on the results of the research, the ideal human for the researcher is one who 
fulfils all ethicalslO totally at all times. However, as the reader now knows, it is 
impossible to achieve ideal humanness, just as it is impossible to totally alleviate 
existential dread and just as it is impossible to finally answer the quest for dignifiedness. 
As Kakar (200: 119) found, the human goals of psychological maturity are to be strived 
for rather than achieved. Sutherland (410:23) found similarly: "Our imperfections 
include falling short of our ideals as human beings ... ". In addition, when the 
Japanese compliment ningen ga dekita means: "for him, the process of becoming 
human is complete" (362: 127), it is understood that completeness is impossible. As 
one progresses towards the ideal, its demands increase: one becomes aware of how far 
from the ideal one is. Consequently, Geering's (122:18) statement, "Whether we 
become fully human or not" is not adequate, because no human can become fully 
human, although he corrected this (122:19) by finding that" ... at no point in life have we 
completed the process of becoming human." 
The researcher considered it safe to find that a total fulfilment of all ethicals would be 
perfection and such an attainment could be called perfect humanness. This finding 
was corroborated by Allport (8:6) when he found that many psychologists " ... see the 
human person as both a striving and rational being approaching toward, or departing from 
an ideal of perfection according to his exercise of freedom", and when he (8:48) 
referred to humans developing a " ... self-image with visions of self-perfection ... ". · 
The reader may recognise that "according to his exercise of freedom", is the researcher's 
degree of adhering to ethicals. Kant 11 referred to the metaphysical ideal of perfection. 
Despite never being able to be a perfect human, it is understandable that to become more 
human, humans must have an ideal of perfect humanness which enables them to 
decide what is more human and what is less human. Since the code of ethicals is 
uncovered from existentialia and since perfect humanness is total adherence to all ethicals, 
perfect humanness is not merely some theory of the researcher's. None the less, scientific 
integrity demanded that corroboration from fellow-researchers be sought. In addition, the 
researcher wondered how the many ideals described by some fellow-researchers (as 
reported earlier in this thesisl2) related, if at all, to perfect humanness. 
10 The researcher could have used the term "humanicals" but was concerned that yet another new term 
was being introduced in this thesis. 
11 In Passmore (320:22). 
12 Chapter Three, Paragraphs 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3. 
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3.0 BEING-HUMAN AS STRIVING FOR THE IDEAL OF PERFECT 
HUMANNESS 
The reader may consider that to think in terms of human perfection is absurd. However, 
some fellow-researchers have also found that the ideal of perfection is integral to being-
human. For example, Passmore (320) devoted a thorough study to the historical debate on 
whether or not humankind is perfectible. Ulich (425: 145) reported that the ancient Greek 
ideal of perfection was the man of beauty and virtue, and the Roman ideal was the 
steadfast and brave man. Aristotlel3 referred to perfection of human nature and14 a 
perfecting process; Maimonidesl5 referred to true human perfection; Alexander 
(7:5) to personal perfection, and Erikson (95:222) found that ethical rules are based on 
a definition of perfection. The Senators of the University of Glasgow ask their 
graduates to strive for perfection: "Eternal God ... We beg ... that your servants who are 
about to graduate may from these beginnings aspire to the goal of perfection ... "16. 
Braybrooke (44:14) found that the four stages oflife in the Hindu tradition are intended to 
lead a person progressively to perfection. 
Montessori (283:30) found that: " ... the whole life of the child is an advance towards 
perfection, towards a greater completeness ... ". For the researcher, the whole life of 
a human is a striving towards perfection - whether one is aware of it or not. 
Consequently, being-human entails striving to actualise more of the ideal of perfect 
humanness, which means striving to adhere to more and more ethicals, more and more 
frequently, and more and more fully 17. It is safe to state that if one did not strive to 
become more human, one would not experience dignifiedness. 
Since perfect humanness is grounded in the code of ethicals, it is undeniable that the ideal 
is an ethical one. As Ulich (426:27) found: "We should recognise that there is an absolute 
ethics, the rules and conduct which would apply to the perfectly good man in the perfectly 
good society ... ". Fellow-researchers corroborated this. For example, Du Plooy, et al 
(89:135) referred to leading to what ought to be (88:14), and Ten Have (414:11) 
indicated that agogues must know the ideal situation, that is, what ought to be. 
Frankl (110:69) found that: " ... a man's moral self-condemnation assumes an ideal of 
personality, his private ought-to-be." Oberholzer and Greyling (311:12) corroborated 
that perfect humanness is related to dignifiedness: "Pure humanness demands that we 
acknowledge the dignity of others ... pure humanness transcends ... all violations of 
human dignity." 
13 In Hanfling (153:189). 
14 In Hanfling (153:132). 
15 In Yalom (468:424). 
16 The University of Glasgow Graduation Day Programme, December 1993. Prayer of Thanksgiving. 
17 The reader will recognise that the perfection described, is perfection of a human as human, not 
technical perfection of a human as a doctor or bank robber. Passmore (320:11-18) gave a more detailed 
account of different kinds of perfection. 
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The researcher considered it necessary to state again that perfect humanness is 
unattainable. As Frankl (110:79) found: "If all men were perfect, then every individual 
would be replaceable by anyone else. From the very imperfection of men follows the 
indispensability and inexchangeability of each individual; for each is imperfect in his own 
fashion." As Kakar ( 199:5) found, there are no final answers regarding human 
existence, and as Hanfling explained (153:26), achievement is part of a purposeful and 
meaningful life, yet achievement is destructive of meaning. As we travel to meet the goal 
we are inspired, but the sense of purpose is eliminated by the achievement of purpose. It 
is safe to state that the ideal is not achievable because it keeps receding. Oberholzer and 
Grey ling (311: 16) expressed the same finding: pure humanness explains why being-
human is being-open (uncompletable, unfinishable). The more one complies with the 
demands, the more one realised one's shortcomings. 
Consequently, the research can contribute to the debate, as recorded by Passmore (320), 
on whether or not humans are perfectible, and whether perfectibilists or anti-perfectibilists 
are right or wrong. Humans can never be perfect, because the ideal of perfection keeps 
receding. However, humans, can become more perfect and must strive to become so, in 
order to experience dignifiedness. 
During the research for previous chapters, the researcher was perplexed by the numerous 
and apparently different lists of requirements given by some researchers for considering a 
person as an adult, a responsible adult or a true adult. There were three ways in · 
which requirements for humanhood (adulthood) were presented in the literature consulted. 
Firstly, some researchers such as Birren et al (36:22-25), Knowles (221 :29-30), 
Oberholzer and Grey ling (311 :54-60) and Oberholzer (310:55-60), gave explicit and 
extensive lists of requirements. The implication in providing the lists was that the more of 
the requirements fulfilled, the more adult a person is. 
Secondly, some psychologists provided ultimate goals for human becoming such as 
Roger's (85:123) fully functioning person; Maslow's (270:24) self-actualisation; 
Erikson's self-realisation and integrity (94:277); Coleman's (63:5) identity and 
self-esteem, and (63: 110) healthy adulthood; Dicaprio's ideal personality 
(85:37), selfhood (85:60) and (85:37) healthy personality; Kakar's (200:119) 
healthy adult; Jung'sl8 individuated personality; Freud's (85:36-37) self-
merging; and Homey's (85:88) true lover of mankind. Many agogicians expressed 
ideals in this way. For example, self-realization (439:95) (414:11) (Kriekmans)19, 
l8 In Dicaprio (85:60). 
19 Researchers whose names appear in brackets are quoted or paraphrased in Du Plooy and Kilian (90:98-
101 ). 
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self-becoming ( 439:202)20; self-responsible self-determination (Langveld); 
self-reliance (144:14) and self-education (144:16). Many other ideals could have 
been listed, but this would have duplicated Dicaprio's (85)21 extensive work. 
Thirdly, when some psychologists provided stages of human "growth" (becoming) they 
arrived at an ultimate stage or task. For example, Erikson's (94:247-274) ultimate stage 
was integrity verses despair, and Kohlberg's was commitment to universal 
moral principles22. The scope of the research permitted neither examining in detail each 
ideal encountered, nor the individual relationship between each ideal and perfect 
humanness. However, the researcher found that the ideals presented by psychologists, 
support some of the previous findings of the researcher and of other existential 
philosophers. Consequently, some of these general findings are now briefly presented. 
• The researcher found that many of the ultimate goals and ultimate stages were in fact 
stated ideals. Some researchers realised they were presenting ideals. For example, 
Dicaprio (85:60) set out to study the highest ideals of humanness23. Frankl 
(110:70) referred to " ... the eternally great ideals of humanity [of] imperishable 
power ... binding upon everyone." However, it was detected that some researchers 
were not aware that what they had found were ideals. That the research had uncovered 
the relevance of ideals in being-human was not surprising to ~he researcher, because 
the research was a study in ontology, and as Sartre (370:626) found, ontology reveals 
" ... to us the ideal meaning of all human attitudes." 
• The researcher, recognised the ideals presented by fellow-researchers as expressions 
of the fundamental ideal of perfect humanness, and noticed that many of the 
requirements of the ideals, were identical or similar to, ethicals in the fundamental 
code of ethics presented in Chapter Six. Adler24 also found that although people have 
many goals, one is the most basic: everyone has a guiding goal. Dicaprio (85:xii) 
did not find similarly: he found that no model is sufficient to encompass all people. 
Dicaprio's finding is adequate if one is merely referring to models and theories. 
However, as the research has shown, it is possible to penetrate to the roots of being-
human and find that although the lifestyles of the nuclear physicist, a young wife 
looking after children, an airline pilot, a child, an adult, a poor uneducated person and 
20 Also offered by Sonnekus as quoted in Morrow (288: 159). 
21 Dicaprio examined the ideals offered by, for example, Sigmund Freud, Carl Gustav Jung, Erik 
Erikson, Alfred Adler, Karen Horney, Gordon Allport, Carl Rogers, Abraham Maslow, and Erich 
Fromm. 
22 In Thomson (417:52). 
23 He also referred to the highest levels of growth and functioning that are possible for 
humankind which, for the researcher, is the same as the highest levels of humanness possible for 
humankind. 
24 In Dicaprio (85:74). 
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a wealthy university student, are very different, they are all humans with the 
fundamental need to experience dignifiedness. Dicaprio acknowledged this when he 
found (85:5) that: "If we knew enough about man, it would seem that there should be 
only one all-encompassing model. But such a possibility is still quite remote." 
The researcher hoped that the uncovering of the code of humanness is a small 
contribution towards the "all-encompassing" understanding of being-human. 
• Most of the researchers who stated that they had uncovered ideals, also found that the 
ideals were unachievable. For example, Erikson (94:268) indicated that winning at 
the ultimate task is an ideal that can never be totally achieved. Stegner 
(404:47) found the ideal to be an impossible dream, and asked if it is more adult to 
aspire to the impossible or to accept imperfection. However, it is safe to state that 
Stemer's two options are not mutually exclusive. One can accept one's imperfections 
yet still aspire to the ideal. Frankl (110:73) found similarly: "That he [a person] must 
aim at the best is imperative; otherwise his efforts would come to nought. But at the 
same time he must be able to content himself with nothing more than approaching 
nearer and nearer, without ever quite attaining his goal." 
It is for the reasons just stated, that the researcher did not find as Morton (289: 120)25 
did: "It's worse than useless to draw a perfect picture of the ideal man ... A blue-print 
of the perfect man is of no use to us. Such pictures are figments of our own 
imaginations." The researcher's findings in this research contradict Morton's finding 
because they show that humankind is guided by ideals. Scheffler (378: 14-25) found 
similarly: "Human beings formulate rules or laws for themselves by which they 
monitor their own conduct, and create ideals to which they try to conform .... What 
emerges here is implicit self-reference, awareness of how one is acting, whether one 
has in fact performed properly." 
• The relationship between striving for the ideal and experiencing dignifiedness is 
frequently mentioned. However, this is usually expressed as experiencing 
meaningfulness or self-esteem, or experiencing guilt or shame. For example, Scheffler 
(378:31) found that living up to ideals is a source of well-being, while violations and 
lapses occasion remorse or shame. When Coleman (63:5) found identity to be the 
foundation on which an adult life is built, he related it (63:7) to gaining the" ... self-
esteem and self-fulfilment all persons need." 
25 Morton is writing from a Christian perspective and the researcher, with respect, did not find as he did, 
that Jesus of Nazareth is the only man who is a possible ideal for humankind. 
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• Some of the researchers who stated ideals also made explicit that the only way to 
progress towards the ideals (and thereby experience dignifiedness ), is to assist fellow-
humans. For example, Freud (85:29) found that humans experience the higher self 
when they help someone and experience pride, and as already stated, Homey 
(85:88) referred to being the true lover of mankind, the humane and (85:90) 
considerate person. Alexander (7:5) described the relationship between 11 ••• 
personal perfection and the service of mankind - the culture of self and the 
care of others. 11 He also indicated that a person cannot realise his own life except as 
he seeks the good of another. Erikson (94:268) corroborated these findings by 
finding that substantial progress towards the ideal could be achieved only 11 ••• in him 
who in some way has taken care of things and people. 11 
It has been explained26 how experiencing dignifiedness depends on assisting others to 
experience dignifiedness and that this being-independent-in-dependence, and mutual 
involvement, is the mutual existential corrective. This relationship is drawn, 
perhaps unwittingly, by Katz (203:4-6) who related self-actualisation and andragogy, 
indicating that the andragogic is essential to self-actualisation. 
• Since even particularistic ideals cannot be totally achieved, many psychologists find 
that striving for ideals involves continual becoming. Rogers (85: 123) (85: 129) 
described his fully functioning person as a continual process of becoming, and 
Allport (8:19) wrote of a psychology of becoming. 
In summary, many researchers working from psychologistic and sociologistic 
perspectives, despite using terminology which is inadequate for describing human reality, 
corroborated the researcher's and others' findings uncovered using an existential 
phenomenological approach. In all likelihood, researchers working from psychologistic 
and sociologistic perspectives would not be aware of this corroboration. Fellow-
researchers' findings just presented in this paragraph have been relevant to the research 
not only because they offer corroboration, but also because they answer many of the 
researcher's questions raised when he examined psychologistic and sociologistic findings 
earlier27 in the research. 
The researcher was concerned that some readers might consider the results of reflection on 
the ideal of perfect humanness and the various particularist expressions of it, to be too 
abstract and of little practical value to people in their own reflecting about being-human. 
However, since the researcher undertook the current research with the hope of obtaining 
26 Chapter Six, Paragraph 2.6. 
27 Chapter Three and Chapter Four, respectively. 
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insights to improve practice, it was envisaged that any such recommendations arising from 
the research would be offered in the final chapter of this thesis. In addition, however, it 
was considered necessary to find out how the ideal of perfect humanness (perfect 
ethicalness) is made visible (actualised) in everyday life. 
In one way, just how the ideal of perfect humanness is actualised in everyday life, has 
already been explained in this thesis. People who respond to others by frequently adhering 
to the code of ethicals are manifesting the ideal of perfect humanness, albeit in varying 
degrees of imperfection. It is safe to state that those people who so respond, are the 
caring, supportive fellow-humans one can call agogues. Morton (289:72) found 
similarly: "In their search for a meaning to their lives men have looked to their heros for 
help .... This veneration of heros seems to be a universal characteristic of mankind." The 
heros Morton referred to are leaders, heros of old, Gods, or supermen - people who 
achieved great things and exhibited virtues. 
It is the agogue that is taken by the agogee to express, in some degree of imperfection, the 
ideal of perfect humanness, and so guides the agogee in becoming more human, that is, in 
progressing along the continuum of humanness. During the research, several statements 
about principles which can act as guides to live by, were encountered, and it was 
shown how they can be fundamentally expressed in a code of ethicals which are 
humanness. However, it is safe to state that it is only when one experiences the ethicals 
in one's life, through the intervention (however brief) of an agogue (even if the 
dialogue is through the medium of a book, for example), that one pathically knows their· 
essentialness for becoming more human and experiencing dignifiedness. 
The fact that degrees of humanness are experienced through a fellow-human is shown by 
Kakar ( 199:5) who found that a person on the way to becoming an adult is enjoined to 
base his actions on the lives of people who have attained self-realisation, and by 
Warren (444:85) who found that the educator should serve as a model of the self-
actualised person. It has already been alluded to in the previous chapter28 that people who 
have progressed far along the continuum of humanness (people who adhere to ethicals 
despite danger to their lives, for example) may be regarded as saints. As Coan found, 
one ideal of adulthood is saintliness29, and Stegner (404:39) corroborated this finding 
that adulthood is expressed in the characteristics of saints, sages and culture heros30. 
At this stage in the research, having uncovered the relationship of adulthood and 
perfection and adulthood and saintliness, the researcher gained insight into why the 
term "God" had been frequently mentioned in this and previous chapters of this thesis. 
28 Chapter Seven, Paragraph 2. 7. 
29 Coan in Ryff (368:70). 
30 He still however, retains a relativistic view, finding that saints and sages are of many kinds. 
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Since perfect humanness is an impossible achievement for humans, the only way to 
envisage it is to imagine an all-knowing and all-powerful person capable of 
fulfilling all ethicals totally. Barnes (20:95) stated this finding another way: "If 
these ideals [perfection] could be achieved, the human being as we know him would not 
exist, and there would be no need for an ethics. As de Beauvoir has said, one does not 
offer ethics to a God." Passmore (320:326) found similarly: "To achieve perfection ... it 
would first be necessary to cease to be human, to become godlike ... ". Maslow 
(269: 174) also referred to: " ... our godlike qualities." For the researcher, the only word in 
the English language capable of expressing this perfectly good (totally good) person 
is, "God". Consequently, it is safe to state that striving for perfect humanness is also 
striving to be God-like (Godly), which in effect, entails striving for a degree (however 
small) of Godliness. 
This finding is corroborated by, for example: Geeting ( 122: 19) finding: humans becoming 
god-like; Alexander (7:1) finding that:" ... its [theology's] theme must be the systematic 
of the ideals and forces which are alone adequate to shape character and fit man for 
... fellowship with, and likeness to, the Divine Being .... ";Niebuhr (304:66) finding 
that: " ... the ideal has been described as that of the vision of God"; Sartre (370:626) 
finding that: "Man makes himself man in order to be God", and that " ... to be man 
means to reach towards being God"31; Bonhoeffer (40:31) finding that: God is 
potentiality; Bultmann finding32 that: in order validly to speak of God, one must also and 
of necessity speak of Man; and Aquinas33 finding that: the perfection of humankind lives -
in the vision of God - the Divine Essence. Passmore (320:24) corroborated this, 
finding that for many fellow-researchers, human perfection is defined in terms of likeness 
to God - deiform perfection. Cupitt (71:102) found similarly and expressed God the ideal 
as: " ... ideal realism, a humanly fictioned realism ... ". 
Since perfect humanness can also be described as God, the continuum of humanness, just 
as it is the continuum of ethicalness, is also the continuum of Godliness34. The 
researcher considered that Marcel (267:85) had identified this when he referred to: " ... a 
code of ethics centred on fidelity [as] the very mark of the Absolute in us." It is relevant 
that Cupitt (71: 115) found that: "Heaven, Paradise, the City of God and the Kingdom of 
God are all symbols of a world fully humanized." Consequently, it is safe to find that 
31 In Passmore (320:327). 
32 As summarised by Schepers in McDonald (275:Vol 5:729-730). 
33 In Passmore (320: 17). 
34 No human can ever be in the mode of being called Godhood because no human can ever attain 
perfect humanness. 
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human becoming is perennially becoming more Godly, which is achieved by 
fulfilling more and more ethicals, which are also criteria of Godliness. 
Striving for Godliness and a continuum of Godliness, do not deny the fact that many 
humans at some time or other will behave so irresponsibly, so unethically, that they are 
called "inhuman" or even "devilish". The research so far has revealed why and how 
humans strive for Godliness and not for devilishness (122:19). It has already been 
explained that just what evilness and consequently, devilishness is, and what their 
implications may have for a continuum of humanness (Godliness), were matters outwith 
the scope of the current research35. 
The findings just stated revealed that ethicalness, humanness and Godliness are one 
and the same. However, there are two main reasons why some researchers may not find 
similarly. Firstly, it is common knowledge that many people claim not to have (to be 
guided by) any God. Since the research is a fundamental study, if it is found that some 
people are not guided by God, then the finding that humanness is Godliness is inadequate. 
If humanness as Godliness is an inadequate finding, the ideal of perfect humanness 
cannot be expressed in any more fundamental way. 
Secondly, for most people, the word "God" is associated with religion and 
consequently, use of "God" implies education as a religious activity. Again it is common 
knowledge that many people claim not to belong to any religion, and in the researcher's 
experience, many educators and educationists would strongly deny that they are involved 
in any religious activity and would not want to be involved in education if it was a 
religious activity. 
The researcher considered that because the finding being-human as striving to be 
Godly could be questioned, and because it was so radical, especially in the context of 
education, it would have been scientifically irresponsible to have ended the study at this 
stage. Consequently, it was decided to investigate further what it means to be striving to 
be Godly and its implications, if any, for being-human and for education. 
4. 0 BEING-HUMAN AS PERENNIALLY STRIVING FOR GODLINESS 
The reader is likely to be aware that humanness as Godliness raises numerous 
difficult philosophical and theological problems, and that identifying and attempting to 
answer them would entail a major study in philosophical theology36. For example, 
35 Chapter Seven, Paragraph 3.0. 
36 An idea of the complexity of such an investigation is given by Bonhoeffer (399) who in examining 
the relationship between act and being considered the interrelationship of philosophy, transcendental 
philosophy, theology, anthropology, and ontology. 
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Passmore (320) presented a study of 327 pages (excluding notes), much of which 
investigated fellow-researchers' findings on humankind striving to be Godlike. Since the 
research was not conducted under the auspices of theology37, and since the purpose of the 
research was not to attempt to describe God or prove the existence of a God or Gods, only 
a few problems most relevant to adulthood and education were considered during the 
research. It was realised that any findings would be only very preliminary on~s. With 
this background the researcher considered the major implications for being-human, 
education and adulthood, of using the word "God" to name the ideal of perfect 
humanness. 
4.1 GOD AS AN IMAGINED PERSON AND AS A REAL PERSON 
It is understandable that some of both non-religious and religious people would be upset 
with the finding: humanness as Godliness, but for different reasons. On the one 
hand, people who do not belong to any religion and who claim not to be guided by any 
God, may be upset by the finding that all humans are guided by God in their becoming 
more human. They may think that the researcher is promoting his own religious 
convictions. However, as the findings documented so far in this thesis illustrate, God as 
the image of perfect humanness, has been scientifically uncovered and is not the 
personal wish of the researcher. As Van Rensburg et al (435:375) found: the 
anthropological question theologians have to answer is what humankind's God· 
images reveal about humankind. It is the privilege and duty of those readers who are 
scientists and still consider that they have no God, to strive to show the findings just 
recorded, to be inadequate. 
On the other hand, it seems sensible to expect religious people who accept they are guided 
by a God and acknowledge they are striving to be like their God, to be comforted with the 
finding, humanness as Godliness, because it provides a rationale for their conviction. 
However, in the researcher's experience, some religious people are upset by the finding 
because they regard their God as a real living God - a person who can comfort them, 
save them from a terrible fate (however that may be defined), and punish them when they 
behave badly. To speak of God merely as an image is offensive to many38. 
In summary, it was recognised that the main difficulty in understanding and accepting 
humanness as Godliness arises from the association of the word "God" with the God 
or Gods of religions. The researcher wanted to find out just what the relationship might be 
between God as an image of perfect humanness (imagined person) and the God 
of a religion (real person). 
37 Nor was the research conducted under the auspices of existential theology, philosophy of 
religion (philosophical theology) (52:646), science of religion or religious studies. 
38 The researcher apologises again to any reader who interprets any finding as disrespectful (irreverent). 
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Describing what a religion is, was beyond the scope of the research39, However, Bullock 
and Trombley (52:738) found religion to be, among other things, an attitude of awe 
towards God or Gods, accompanied by beliefs and affecting basic patterns of individual 
and group behaviour. It is safe to state that many religions require their adherents to 
believe that God is a particular omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent real person who 
is worth strivin;: to be like. 
The teachings of many religions are contained in what are often referred to as "Holy 
Books" and also in the doctrines (dogma) devised by religions' leaders. These teachings 
and dogma describe what God is, how one should behave towards God and the benefits 
of living according to God's rules. For religious people, "good" and "bad" are determined 
by the rules of the religion as devised by the religion's leaders, who usually claim the 
rules to be given to them by God. It has already been explained in this thesis, and by 
fellow-researchers, how a society's morals are frequently derived from religious rules. 
Many religions have rituals and ceremonies designed to assist people to communicate with 
God, to experience God's goodness and to encourage worshippers to become more like 
God. As Frankl (110:71) found: the ideal for Christians " ... becomes ultimately and 
essentially a freely chosen imitation of Christ ... ". It is also well-know that some religious 
people openly compete with other religious people, trying, sometimes in the most 
derogatory terms, to show that their God is better than the Gods of other religions. For 
many religious people, God is all important for human life and they would claim that 
education and adulthood are religious phenomena, and that being-human is being-· 
religious. 
Many researchers report finding that humanness is religiousness, and consequently, 
that adulthood is a religious mode of being, and that education is a religious 
activity. For example, relationships have been found between: 
• Adulthood and being-religious (89:155) (311:107) (90:123) (435:358). Du 
Plooy and Kilian (90: 117-123) referred to religious aspects of adulthood. Kakar 
(199: 10) found that the traditional Hindu view of the life cycle is a religious or 
ideal one. 
• Education and religion. Du Plooy and Kilian (90:24) found that education is 
especially religious advancement, and Moore (285:90) found that generally there 
is a close connection between education and religion. 
• Ethics and religion, such as in the extensive discussion in the literature of 
philosophy of religion on morality and religion, as shown by Davies (79:92-
39 For example, Flew (105:304) found that: " ... a satisfactory answer to the question 'What is a 
religion?' would be more like an encyclopedia than a one-sentence definition." 
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105), for example. Baelz (15:14) found that it may not be possible to isolate ethics 
from other studies such as religion (15:5). Murdoch (291:52) found similarly: moral 
philosophy has shared some aims with religion. 
• Being-human and being-religious. Geering (122:21) found that as soon as 
humankind began to ask questions about life and death, and as soon as they engaged 
in the quest for meaning, they were laying the foundations of religion. Feuerbach 
(102:1-2) found that: "RELIGION40 has as its basis the essential difference between 
man and brute [non-human] - the brutes have no religion ... ", and Van Rensberg 
et al (435:375) found that the importance of religion to humankind cannot be 
denied. Oberholzer and Grey ling (311: 108) found religiousness to be a ground 
structure of existence: " ... in man's innermost being he lives by trust, which 
gives him peace of mind. The latter can only be found in religion." 
With the evidence just presented, it would seem reasonable to find that religiosity is an 
existential fact and that religiousness (degree of adherence to religious doctrine and 
ceremony) is essential to humanness. However, bearing in mind that just what a religion 
is has not been adequately explicated in this thesis, and using the relatively inadequate 
description of religion already provided in this paragraph, the researcher did not find that 
being-human is being-religious. For some people, all talk of God and the 
accompanying dogma, is at best harmless folly and at worst, a serious form of 
conditioning which enslaves people to the ideas and wills of religious leaders and prevents 
their becoming more human. For some non-religious people, an attempt to support 
educands to become more Godly, is religious conditioning designed to promote a· 
particular religion and a particular description of God. For some people, attempts to 
persuade others that one description of God is the only "right" description, is unethical41. 
Consequently, for some people, religion holds no importance at all and may be regarded 
as a hindrance to becoming even more human (to dignifiedness), and consequently to 
education. 
At this stage in the research an important finding was uncovered. It was realised that God 
as the image of perfect humanness is not limited to Gods of religions. It was also 
realised that God as the image of perfect humanness is an onticity. Although an image of 
perfect humanness (total goodness) is essential to being-human, such an image (God) 
requires neither a particularistic religious description nor adherence to any religious 
doctrine. Consequently, the researcher found it possible to distinguish between the 
fundamental God (God as image of perfect humanness) and religious Gods 
(particularistic Gods of different religions - expressions of the fundamental God). Frankl 
40 Emphasis was in the original. 
41 One could ask what criteria are used to judge this unethicalness, and the researcher considered this later 
in the research. See Paragraph 7.0 in the current chapter. 
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(108: 159-163) found similarly: " ... 'spiritual' does not have a primarily religious 
connotation but refers to the specifically human dimension." 
The word "fundamental" has just been used to name the fundamental God· the God 
essential for human-being which transcends the particularistics, rituals and 
dogma of religion. Tillich ( 420: 180) referred to the fundamental God as "God above 
God" and "God above the God of theism." However, "spiritual" is already employed in 
the English language to name being guided by the God which is not dependent on a 
particular religion42. Consequently, "fundamental God" and "spiritual God" are 
synonymous. The researcher considered that Cupitt43 gave an adequate description of 
spiritual God: " God is the mythical embodiment of all that one is concerned with, in 
aspiring to become a whole and fulfilled human being. God is a myth we humans need to 
help us become more human." 
It was considered safe to state that there is the spiritual God and also religious 
Gods. Since being-human is perennially striving to become more Godly, it is safe to find 
that all humans, whether they are aware of it or not, are guided by the 
spiritual God. They may or may not believe in any religious God, but they will have 
some ideal of perfect humanness which guides their responses. In addition, although 
further research will be required to corroborate it, it is safe to state that many of the 
particularistic religious Gods are expressions of the spiritual God. 
As Frankl (108:206-207) found, humankind: " ... always decides what his existence will· 
be, what he will become in the next moment .... man ultimately transcends himself; a 
human being is a self-transcending being." It is not possible to become more Godly 
(human) if one does not have an image of what God (perfect humanness/the transcendent) 
is like. This means that no person can, from a fundamental (on tic) perspective, be an 
atheist. Macdonald (260: 111) found similarly. All humans, whether they are aware of it 
or not, are guided by some glimpse of spiritual God - the ideal of a person who 
fulfils all ethicals totally, all of the time. Marcel (267:76) indicated that a person's 
ideal could be identified by asking: "Whom or what do you serve?" Passmore (320:25) 
reported how theologians have struggled to describe the ideal that is God. The researcher 
anticipated that God as total adherence to all ethicals, all of the time, would 
assist in this struggle. 
42 Frankl (109:61) showed the distinction between German "geistig" and "geistlich", the former 
indicating the human [spiritual] dimension and the latter the religious, whereas in English, there is 
only the one word "spiritual" with its religious connotation. 
43 In Geering (122:24-25). 
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On further reflection it was considered safe to find, in a preliminary way44, that it is 
spiritual God which is at the root of, and gives rise to, almost all religions and all Gods 
perceived as real beings. Some preliminary evidence for this finding was as follows. 
• The researcher considered that Frankl's ( 110: 18) finding is similar to many fellow-
researchers who corroborated the spiritual God. He found that humans are often 
much more religious than they suspect: "These days people see more in man's 
morality than an introjected father-image, and more in religion than a projected 
father-image." 
• In the researcher's experience, some fellow-researchers (without making it explicit) 
are using the word "religion" in discussions about the spiritual God. 
• In discussions about God, one frequently encounters the statement that there is only 
one God and that Gods of religions are expressions or manifestations of that God. 
• It has already been explained45 how the Golden Rule is common to many religions. 
Again it must be stated, that in uncovering the spiritual God, the researcher did not intend 
belittling any religious God. Indeed, spiritual God and religious God (personification of 
the image), are not necessarily mutually exclusive. However, it was beyond the scope of 
the current research to assess the evidence for or against any particularistic God as a real 
person, and consequently, for God being male or female, for example. 
In summary, since every human is guided by the spiritual God, being-human is 
being-spiritual. The reader will be aware that in using the phrases, "humanness as 
Godliness", "continuum of Godliness", and "striving to become more Godly", the· 
researcher has been ref erring to the spiritual God. In a preliminary way, the researcher 
considered that the phrases just listed could be synonymously stated as "humanness as 
spiritualness", "continuum of spiritualness", and "striving to become more spiritual". The 
implications for education are considerable. Since human becoming is perennially 
becoming more Godly, the purpose of education is to assist and guide 
educands to progress along the continuum of Godliness - spiritualness. 
Any activity not having guiding educands to become more spiritual (or Godly) as its main 
purpose, is not education. To many people, the finding that spiritualness (Godliness) is 
the ultimate goal of education will be surprising, and to others, anathema. However, 
fellow-researchers have found similarly. 
There was considerable corroboration of being-human as being-spiritual, and of the goal 
of education being a spiritual one. This corroboration was given directly by some 
educationists. For example, some referred to ennobling (311:25) (89:135) (90:24), one 
44 The researcher stresses again his awareness of the inadequacy of his description of the spiritual God. 
The reader is directed to White ( 452) who provided considerable evidence in this regard. 
45 Chapter Seven, Paragraph 2.2.1. 
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meaning of which is spiritually elevating. Du Plooy and Kilian (90:5) referred to 
spiritual ennoblement and Gunter (144:16) and Pistorius46 to adulthood as a 
spiritual goal. Erasmus and Van Wageningen (93:43) referred to spiritual maturity 
as the ultimate goal of all education. Tanabe (412.21) found that: " ... education is 
an effort to guide children to resemble God", and involves " ... raising children to 
resemble God's heart and so to love all people and all things in the same way that God 
does." Buber (50: 130) found that: "Nothing but the image of God. That is the 
indefinable, only factual, direction of the responsible educator." Kastenbaum (201 :28) 
referred to adulthood as flowering into deity. 
Corroboration was also given directly by some psychologists and psychotherapists such 
as Frankl (108:114) who wrote of man growing spiritually beyond himself. Ulich 
( 425: 142) showed the interrelationship of spirituality and dignity: "From his 
[humankind's] spirituality spring his dignity ... ".Despite psychologistic descriptions of 
adulthood being inadequate, some psychologists recognised being-human as being-
spiritual in an indirect way. For example, Erikson found (96:265) that adulthood begins 
with the ability to receive and give love and care and that (95: 115) the central virtues of 
adulthood are love, care and wisdom. For the researcher, the love referred to is 
spiritual love or, as already described, agape (love of humankind - of one's fellow-
human)47. Murdoch48 showed the relationship between love and striving for 
perfection: "The idea of perfection moves and possibly changes us because it inspires 
love in the part of us that is most worthy." 
In addition, the relationship between the disciplines of ethics and theology49 is well 
recorded. For example, Alexander (7: 11) found that a study of ethics cannot avoid the 
study of theology, and (7:2-3) that ethics is really the crown of theology. Regan 
(336:3-5) showed that theology was originally divided into dogmatics and ethics. The 
discipline of moral theology (also called theological ethics) discusses the 
relevance of religious, especially Christian, belief to ethical problems (52:547). In 
addition, some textbook titles indicated the relationship explicitly: The Ethical Approach 
To Theism (19) and Moral Values And The Idea Of God (401). 
46 Quoted by Gluckman (128: 120). Since the current research is a search for fundamentals, essences or 
universals, the researcher was required to research in terms of all religions and not limit spirituality to 
one religion. 
47 Chapter Six, Paragraph 2.5. 
48 Quoted by Reeves (335:44-45). 
49 Theology, from Greek theos meaning God (52:855) (435:375), is a study of the nature of God, 
which entails, as Bullock and Trombley (52:856) found, an attempt to talk rationally about the 
Divine. 
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The reader will know that "spirit" is used in the English language to name things as 
diverse as a ghost, an alcoholic distilled drink, an attitude (team spirit), a real meaning or 
intention (the spirit of the law), a person's state of mind (she is in good spirit), and the 
tendency prevailing at a certain time (the spirit of the age). In this thesis, the use of 
"spiritual" has no relation to the things just listed nor with spiritualism - the belief (and 
doctrines assockted with it) that dead people can communicate with the living. 
As was expected, it was found that many researchers writing from a religious or 
theological perspective referred to "spirit" and the "spiritual nature of humankind". 
However, Erasmus and Van Wageningen (93:43) asked what spiritual maturity 
means. Similarly, the researcher wanted to find out what being-spiritual is in order to 
uncover implications for being-human, adulthood and education. 
5.0 BEING-HUMAN AS BEING-SPIRITUAL 
At this stage in the research it was realised that sufficient findings had been uncovered to 
describe what being-spiritual is. However, it was necessary to synthesis them into a 
concise description. Just as being-ethical was found50 to involve two inseparable 
existentialia, ethicality and ethicalness, so being-spiritual was found to involve 
spirituality and spiritualness. 
The researcher found spirituality to be: the existential fact (no matter the extent of one's 
awareness or acceptance of it and whether one is religious or not) of being guided by 
spiritual God (the image of unattainable perfect humanness - perfect ethicalness) and· 
being perennially striving to seek (become more conscious of) Godliness and ways 
of becoming more Godly, in order to perennially experience dignifiedness. 
The researcher considered that Morton (289:22), had he given a definition of spirituality, 
would have found similarly: "This spiritual enquiry of the sage, the mystic and the 
saint is a facet of man's universal urge to ask and to seek ... the inner meaning of his 
life." Morton (289:51) corroborated the researcher's finding that, because of spirituality, 
no human can be an atheist. He found that because all humans ask questions about (are 
seeking) purpose, destiny, hope and God, this " ... is the reason why the agnostic and the 
atheist cannot get away from discussing God, even when they refuse to mention his 
name." Consequently, whatever Nietzsche51 meant by "God is dead", it cannot have the 
meaning that spiritual God is dead. 
50 Chapter Seven, Paragraph 2.0. 
51 In Ulich (425:183). 
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Frankl (108:159 -163) provided additional corroboration for the researcher's definition of 
spirituality: he pointed out that the Greek word "logos" means "meaning" as well as 
"spirit". He found that a human's aspiration for a meaningful existence is a 
spiritual issue, and also found that ( 108: 164) fulfilling meaning and actualizing values 
(ethicals, for the researcher) are inseparable. Frankl found (109:66) that: "Man is spirit. 
By the very act of his own self-transcendence he leaves the plane of the merely 
biopsychological and enters the sphere of the specifically human, the noological52 
dimension. Human existence is, in its essence, noetic." He (108:156) also found that 
belittling a person for seeking meaning is " ... to depreciate the spiritual aspirations of 
another." The findings of Frankl just stated, illustrated the inseparability of 
spirituality, existentiality and ethicality53. The researcher found that De Chardin 
expressed humankind's spirituality and spiritualness when he coined the terms 
"Noogenesis" (80:201) and "Noosphere" (80:200). 
Spiritualness (being spiritual - without the hyphen) is the manifestation of spirituality: 
the degree to which an individual has progressed along the continuum of Godliness, as 
shown by the extent to which he or she adheres to ethicals. Consequently, when one 
says: "She is a very spiritual person", or "His spirituality was evident to all", one is 
recognising a person who adheres to ethicals more (is more Godly) than many others 
do54. One's degree of spiritualness would be evidence of the extent of one's striving 
to find spiritual God and respond accordingly. The reader will realise that the extent of 
one's striving to find God is, necessarily, the extent of one's striving to find out what 
being-human is. Woodbridge ( 466:36) related spirituality to spiritualness, ethicalness, 
agogy and education: "Spirituality in relationships can be defined as the mutual intimacy 
of individuals, characterised by openness, trust and fulfilment." 
Since being-human is being-spiritual, any recommendations about effectively educating 
(guiding to becoming more spiritual), would require a more adequate description ofbeing-
spiritual. The researcher's difficulty at this stage of the research was how to do this 
without extensive research in theology. 
52 Frankl's word for spiritual (109:66). 
53 For some fellow-researchers, the researcher's findings will appear simplistic. For example, Hull 
(174:33-44) described the many meanings (some conflicting) of "spirituality" in the United Kingdom. 
Sutherland (409:16) illustrated the uncertainty about the meaning of "spiritual development". 
However, the researcher considered that the findings so far uncovered (using an existential 
phenomenological approach) can contribute to alleviating some of the misunderstandings arising from 
inadequately referring to "spiritualities", for example. 
54 The reader may notice that the phrase "in relationship with others" is unnecessary because 
ethicalness is only a possibility in relationship with other humans. It is safe to state that ethicals 
could also be called "spirituals", although using "spirituals" to name ethicals would not be helpful 
because of its connotation with religious songs. 
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It is reasonable to expect that spiritual God (God as an image of unattainable perfect 
humanness, without any particularistic religious connotation) could be the basis for 
considerable theological reflection. Despite the fact that, as already explained, the research 
was not conducted under the auspices of theology, the researcher considered that the 
findings now to be presented are very preliminary results of reflection in existential 
theology. The requirement at this stage in the research for reflection from an existential 
theological perspective, confirmed the researcher's intuition at the beginning of the 
research55, that philosophical anthropology, ontology, and theology were 
inseparably interrelated. The consequences of the inseparability of the disciplines just 
listed for being-human and for the study of being-human, are explained later56. 
In the light of this disciplinary interrelatedness and the subtle distinction between religious 
Gods and the spiritual God, the researcher was perplexed on how to reflect further on 
what being-spiritual is. However, it was recognised that using the dogmatic phrase "tb.t 
spiritual God" would be controversial, and further explanation of why the researcher 
used "the", would assist in explicating being-spiritual. 
5.1 WHAT IS THE SPIRITUAL GOD? 
Just as using "the" in "the fundamental code of ethics", is scientifically responsible57, the 
researcher found "the spiritual God" to be adequate description. How the researcher 
arrived at this finding and its implications, are now presented in a four-part explanation58. 
5.1.1 GOD IS NOT SELECTED OR CHOSEN 
The reader may have detected from the preliminary description of the spiritual God, that 
God is not selected or chosen. The onticity of spiritual God is not a matter of having a 
range of gods and then selecting one which, in non-scientific terms, satisfies one's current 
needs or is most believable. Having a spiritual God is not a matter (in scientific terms) of 
selecting that God which most fully enables one to experience dignifiedness. Spiritual 
God is uncovered, not selected. By seeking for the requirements of perfect 
humanness (ethicals) and from experiences in applying, or not applying them, one begins 
to understand (find out) what perfect humanness (spiritual God) is. One also begins to 
learn and experience the benefits (dignifiedness) of striving to become more Godly. 
In this light, it would be inadequate description to refer to "different or many 
spiritual Gods". A more adequate description would be "different extents of 
55 Chapter One, Paragraph 3.3. 
56 Paragraph 7.0 in the current chapter. 
57 As explained in Chapter Seven, Paragraph 2.2.1. 
58 The explanation is limited to four main themes because the research was not research in theology; the 
length of the thesis had to be kept to manageable proportions and sufficient findings could be tested to 
give the preliminary grounding necessary to offer recommendations. 
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having uncovered (perceiving) God". Consequently, the researcher found one of 
Sartre's findings (369:47) inadequate. Sartre found that: " ... there is a human 
universality, but it is not something given; it is being perpetually made." For the 
researcher, the ideal of perfect humanness is given (and this is the mystery of being-
human) but the givenness is uncovered in different extents and at different times for 
different individuals. 
The researcher considered that the explanation just given explains the non-relevance for 
this research of using the word "God" in phrases such as: "Money is his god" or "Robin 
Hood is my god." The revelation of God through seeking what is required to experience 
dignifiedness, and then deciding to act according to Godliness (ethicals) is not the same as 
short term selection of a particular cultural or mythical hero which encourages people to 
hurt others. It has already been explained how, even if some people choose to become 
more like a wealthy drug dealer or a Robin Hood, they would ultimately experience 
dignifiedlessness: they would know that they are not adhering to ethicals - the requirement 
and proof of becoming more human. 
5.1.2 HUMANS DO NOT MAKE GOD 
Since spiritual God is not chosen or selected, but uncovered, it might be claimed that each 
human makes God. Feuerbach59 found that humankind has made God in his own image, 
and Morris (287:35) found that humans anthropomorphised a God as man-father - as an 
ultimate being who loves us without conditions. The researcher found these to be 
inadequate descriptions. Ethicals, and the requirement to act according to them in order to · 
experience dignifiedness, are always there and always will be there, as long as there are 
humans. Again, the researcher returned to the mystery of being human. Just why 
humans need to experience life as worthwhile ( dignifiedful) and just when the need for 
dignifiedness was first perceived, are questions which are likely to remain a mystery. It is 
safe to state that spiritual God is always there, and almost all humans are capable of 
uncovering (discovering) spiritual God. 
The researcher considered that Friedenberg (112:250) found similarly: "What we respect 
in ourselves, if we are to be capable of genuine response to other persons ... must be a 
humanity which existed before it was molded and embossed by our particular lives ... ". 
Some people will require more accompaniment (agogic support) than others, but it is safe 
to state that the more one's involvement in effective agogy, the more of spiritual God one 
will uncover. Consequently, it is not adequate to state that humans make God. However, 
it is possible to find that God makes humans what they are. 
59 In Geering (122:25). 
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5.1.3 ALL HUMANS ARE MADE AND SUSTAINED BY GOD 
As already explained, spiritual God is a perception in degree, of perfect humanness. How 
then is it possible that an image - a perception - can make a human? In the history of 
humankind it is well known that ideals influence actions. For example, many people are 
aware of wise sayings such as: "As you think so you are"; "As a person thinks in his 
heart, that he becomes"; and "Everything comes first from a dream". In addition, there are 
many books on the theme of positive thinking and using mental imagery (visualisation) to 
improve perfom1ance in sport, business and personal life60. 
Consequently, it is safe to find that a person will, with time, come to think and behave 
(become) more and more like the degree of God uncovered. Fellow-researchers have 
found similarly, although they wrote from a religious perspective. For example, Jaspers61 
found that: "What man is, he becomes through that cause which he has made his own." 
For the researcher, "cause" in Jasper's finding, is synonymous with "ideal". 
Similarly, Morton (289:73) found that: "The divine hero [God] thus sets his stamp upon 
those who acknowledge him", and Eliade62 found that by behaving" ... as the God or 
civilising Hero, man repeats their gestures and, in some sort, participates in their 
presence." For the researcher, participating in the presence of God means becoming more 
like God. Jenkins expressed this onticity adequately when he found that: God offers 
humankind the divine image so that humans can be truly human (192:122); " ... man is 
to be defined and fulfilled only in God" (192:114), and man is the image of God, the 
reflection and reflector of God and the emerging image of God ( 192: 106). 
The findings just stated corroborated the findings already presented in this chapter. It is 
only through uncovering more and more of spiritual God, and acting according to this 
ideal that one can become more human and experience dignifiedness. As Bonhoeffer 
( 40:21) found: " ... man understands himself in the last resort not from the transcendental 
but from himself, from reason, or from the bounds which reason has prescribed to itself 
... ". Consequently, it is safe to find that God provides dignifiedness and in so doing 
sustains humans. Some researchers state explicitly that answers to the meaning of life 
can be found by a belief in God (45:21-50) (45:192-215). Jenkins (192:104) found 
humankind to be: " ... an emergent migrant who is on his way to building and receiving 
his identity ... in response to a God who is love." 
60 See for example: Hill (169), Nichols (302), Maltz (266), Murphy (292), and Sherman (391), to list 
only a few. The researcher does not necessarily approve of the techniques suggested by these authors, 
and also acknowledges the non-scientific status of the texts. However, it is of some interest that some 
of these authors and others, refer to God, suggest people set short-term ideals or goals and illustrate 
that one cannot ultimately achieve success in life, if you hurt others. 
61 In Frankl (109:83). 
62 In Morton (289:73). 
306 
There is other indirect evidence of the inseparability of Godliness and experiencing 
dignifiedness. For example, in Judaeo-Christian tradition God gave humans their 
inalienable dignity (44:11); the concern for human dignity is evident both in the 
Jewish rabbinic tradition and in the teachings of the Church (44:12); and In Islam, God 
guarantees the dignity of human life. Again, findings stated earlier in this chapter are 
corroborated: humans cannot experience dignifiedness (meaningfulness) unless they act 
according to the requirements of God' (the degree to which they perceive the ideal of 
perfect humanness as given by ethicals). 
The reader will have noticed that, although in this paragraph the researcher has reported 
findings about the spiritual God, he has used findings of fellow-researchers writing from 
a religious perspective. This is a valid approach because as already explained, many 
statements about religious Gods have their grounding in findings about spiritual God. 
Because of this, some statements about God from a religious perspective that are 
unacceptable to some, could be acceptable from a spiritual perspective. 
A religious statement such as, "Seek the will of God and experience peace", can be 
translated into the spiritual statement: Perennially strive to uncover and act more and more 
according to God's (perfect humanness's) requirements and experience dignifiedness. The 
religious statements, "Only God saves" and "God alone is humankind's salvation" 
express the existential fact that if one wishes to be saved from dignifiedlessness, one must 
seek ethicals and act accordingly. Spiritual God enabled the researcher to find as 
Macdonald (260:57) did: "There is an indissoluble kinship between God and man. It is a· 
contradiction in terms to talk of 'godless man' for his very humanity implies that he stands 
in a unique relationship with the divine." The findings about spiritual God stated so far 
helped the researcher to understand Kant's finding63 that the ethical is the only means by 
which God communicates with man. 
Synthesising the findings that God is not selected or chosen, that humans do not make 
God, and that a human is made and sustained by God, uncovered another finding. 
Namely, that each human makes him or herself. 
5.1.4 EACH HUMAN MAKES64 HIMSELF OR HERSELF 
Again, the researcher was aware how unacceptable and irreverent such a finding would be 
to many people. However, during the research an adequate objection to the finding could 
not be found. It is safe to find that to become more human (and thereby experience 
dignifiedness) each person has to make an effort to uncover God and then act accordingly. 
63 Quoted in Buber (50:77). 
64 The critical reader will know that there is no biological connotation in this statement. 
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The extent of a person's experiencing of dignifiedness will be in proportion to the effort 
so expended. 
The researcher considered that fellow-researchers have found similarly. Sartre (369:34-
50) found that: " ... every man ... is condemned at every instant to invent man ... Man 
makes himself; . . . he makes himself by the choice of his morality, and he cannot but 
choose a morality65 ... ". Sartre (and according to Sartre, most existentialists) (369:26) 
found that: "existence comes before essence" and he (369:28) stated directly: "he [man] is 
what he wills ... Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself." Morris 
(287: 13) found that: "Man is therefore in the odd position of being his own designer or 
essence-giver." Barnes (20: 18) found that man realises himself as Being which he makes, 
and (20:68) "Each person will make himself ... ". Yalom (468:128) referred to "being 
one's own father or as Spinoza put it, 'one's own god' ... ". 
Ulich ( 425:70) showed humankind as the spiritual being: "Man is the creature which is not 
only formed, but which also forms himself." Geering (122:16) corroborated, finding that 
humans are self-made with respect to their humanity. Frankl (109:108) found that man 
is the being who continuously decides what he is, and Barth and Feuerbach66 found: " ... 
that to believe in religion is to believe in man, that to hope that religion will save 
man is to hope that man will save himself ... ". The word "save" has religious 
connotations. However, as already alluded to, the researcher considered that "save" names 
the fact of humans, through their own efforts and with the accompaniment of agogues, 
finding God and saving themselves from experiencing dignifiedlessness. The researcher 
also found that spiritual God explains the religious saying: " ... we in God's heart and he 
(sic) in ours ... 11 67. 
It has been explained68 how the current research is a part of the researcher's attempt to 
escape dignifiedlessness. Consequently, it is also his effort to become more human 
(become more Godlike). Critical readers will know from their own research and from the 
complexity of findings stated in this thesis, that uncovering God is not an easy task. 
Jenkins (192:86) expressed this: " ... man is seen as having the opportunity to respond to, 
search for, and work with God. This is an opportunity and a destiny which as we have 
seen, he fights against and again and again rejects, supposedly 'in his own interests'." 
65 The researcher takes morality, in this instance, to mean ethicality. 
66 Reported by Niebuhr in Feuerbach (102:vii). The researcher wondered what phenomenon was being 
named by "save", and expected that a preliminary answer would be uncovered later in the research. 
67 Cupitt (71:124). 
68 Chapter Six, Paragraph 2.3.2. 
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Jenkins (192:87) provided additional findings about God which corroborated the 
relationship between God and being-human as already explicated: "But this work of God, 
which continues steadily whether man goes with or against the grain of it, at no 
point derives man of his opportunities and responsibilities for searching, 
responding and collaborating. Hence man's situation is never closed, his searching is 
never completed, his responses are never finally sufficient, the work which may be 
creative or destructive is never done." Jenkins corroborated what the researcher had found 
earlier: that being-human means being-open, never being complete and accepting the 
impossibility of perfection. In short, It is safe to state that humans are responsible for 
their own becoming; perennially experiencing dignifiedness; becoming more human; and 
becoming more Godly. 
Bonhoeffer (40:33-34) detailed findings of fellow-researchers which are very similar to 
those just stated, that: " ... self-understanding existence must be able to think of itself as 
entire creator of itself, and even as a creator of its own existence ... ". However, as 
Bonhoeffer pointed out: "In this case, of course, no real understanding of existence is 
signified, for the self-understanding involved merely characterises the final position 
attainable by human thought and self-possession. This line of thought can do no more 
than unfold a new problem of act and being." The researcher's finding is not finalising 
human thought or making human thought the foundation of being. It does what 
Bonhoeffer says - begins to unfold the interrelationship of act and being - humans come to 
know God through reflection and experiencing responding ethically. 
The researcher's wonderment at this stage in the study was heightened. Previously in the 
research, answers to the question: What does it mean to be responsible? (What is 
being-responsible?)69 were offered. The critical reader will remember that being-
ethical was found to be the most adequate (fundamental) description of being-
responsible. Now, at this stage in the research, after detailed consideration of being-ethical 
and being-spiritual, the phenomenon of being-responsible had again been uncovered. It is 
for this reason that the researcher emphasised Jenkin's use of "responses", 
"responsibilities", "responding" and "responsible". 
The researcher was excited about this return to being-responsible for two main reasons. 
Firstly, the reader may remember the researcher's earlier description of the existential 
phenomenological approach70. It was explained how the approach relies on cumulative 
explication and frequently requires the researcher to re-examine a phenomenon when 
initial reflection had to be suspended while awaiting further related facts. The researcher 
69 Chapter Five. 
70 Chapter One, Paragraph 3.1. 
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considered that the return to being-responsible at this stage, was an example of the 
existential phenomenological approach in action. 
Secondly, as the critical reader may remember, it was previously found that being· 
responsible as being-ethical is the most adequate description of what adulthood is. 
However, as the results reported in this chapter show, it was realised that being-spiritual 
could provide an even more fundamental description of what it means to be responsible 
and hence what it means to be adult. Consequently, it was decided to investigate what it 
means to be spiritually responsible. 
6.0 BEING-SPIRITUAL AS BEING SPIRITUALLY RESPONSIBLE71 
It was found that being spiritually responsible involved spiritual responsibility and 
spiritual responsibleness. The researcher was concerned that investigating being 
spiritually responsible would duplicate findings already expressed when being-spiritual 
and being-responsible were investigated. It was decided that even if there was some 
duplication, arriving at similar findings but from a different perspective would be 
corroboration and add to the cumulative description. However, as will now become 
evident, there was only minor duplication and the additional findings provided more 
extensive insights into what it means to be spiritual, responsible and human. 
How though, is being spiritually responsible different from being-responsible as 
previously72 described? The reader will remember that "being-responsible" named: 
• being the cause of something (as in, "The man was responsible for the accident"); 
• accepting the consequences of some event or act (as in, "I accept responsibility for the 
failure"); 
• wanting to be held accountable (as in, "I want a job with more responsibility"); and 
• being blamed or praised for a particular outcome ( as in , "We hold you responsible for 
the accident"). 
It was also found previously that none of these phenomena named by "being-responsible" 
is the radical phenomenon people have in mind when they think of adulthood. This was 
illustrated by apparently contradictory or nonsense statements such as: "We cannot give 
any more responsibility to Mr Smith because he sometimes lacks responsibility"; "He took 
responsibility for his irresponsibility", and "The man was responsible because he was not 
responsible". The researcher realised after finding being-responsible to be more 
adequately described as being-moral, then as being-ethical, then as being-Godly and then 
71 A hyphen is not required in "being-spiritually responsible", because it is already identifiable as a 
fundamental phenomenon: there are no possibilities for particular instances of it as there are in being-
responsible. 
72 Chapter Five. 
310 
as being-spiritual, that spiritual responsibility and spiritual responsibleness could also be 
called "fundamental responsibility" and "fundamental responsibleness", 
respectively. The researcher considered that Niebuhr (304:87) had found fundamental 
responsibility when he referred to "universal responsibility", and that Buber (50:34) 
had found it when he referred to "genuine responsibility". Since it is fundamental to 
humanhood and adulthood, the researcher wanted to gain an even greater understanding of 
what being spiritually responsible is. 
6.1 WHAT IS SPIRITUAL RESPONSIBILITY? 
Spiritual responsibility is an onticity just as existentiality, ethicality and spirituality are, 
and humans cannot escape it 73. Frankl ( 110: 16) recognised the relationship between 
spirituality and responsibility when he found that: " ... responsibility and freedom 
comprise the spiritual domain of man." A person may, or may not be responsible for a car 
accident; may or may not accept consequences; and may or may not be held accountable 
by others for particular outcomes. However, a person is always and individually 
spiritually responsible. The onticity, being always and individually 
spiritually responsible, revealed five further part-onticities that assisted in 
understanding what being spiritually responsible is. 
6.1.1 BEING SPIRITUALLY RESPONSIBLE IS INESCAPABLE 
The researcher found similarly to Bonhoeffer ( 41 :225) that spiritual responsibility is 
inescapable except in death. Humans have no choice in becoming, and as Sartre (369:48) 
found: " ... what is not possible is not to choose. I can always choose, but I must know 
that if I do not choose, that is still a choice." As Frankl ( 110:59) found: " As long as he 
[man] has consciousness he has responsibleness. This responsibility remains with him to 
the last moment of his existence." Sartre found similarly (369:34): humankind is without 
excuses: " ... there is no determinism 74 - man is free, man is freedom." As Morris 
(287:40) found, humankind cannot escape being the originator, inventor and creator of 
values. The researcher considered it unnecessary to report details of the "determinism 
versus freedom" debate. However, it is evident from the findings in this thesis that the 
researcher found humankind to be the biological exception, not determined by instinct, but 
able (free) to choose how human to become. 
73 Glover (127: 1) referred to moral responsibility. However, as should be now evident, moral 
responsibility is not necessarily spiritual responsibility and in some instances being morally 
responsible may be being-unethical, and lead to experiencing dignifiedlessness. 
74 Determinism: the doctrine that all human behaviour is go~'emed by causal laws (Glover (127:21). 
Both Lillie (249:4) and Alexander (7:12) found that it is volitional actions which makes humankind 
self-determining and responsible for intentions, dispositions and actions. As Lillie (249:4) 
found: in ethics, "We deal with human actions and not with the actions of lower animals." To 
highlight the distinction between humans and animals, Lillie could have referred to human responses 
(volitional) and animal reactions (pre-determined or instinctual). 
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6.1.2 BEING SPIRITUALLY RESPONSIBLE IS ALWAYS BEING 
RESPONSIBLE FOR (THE CAUSE OF) ONE'S OWN BECOMING 
It has already been described75 how being-human is perennially becoming more human. 
Spiritual responsibility gives more insight into this becoming. Each human is the cause of 
(can be blamed or praised for) his or her own degree of experiencing dignifiedness. As 
Morris (287:47) found, people are personally responsible for the way they are living their 
lives, and explaining their conduct in terms of values not of their own making, is living 
unauthentically - not aware of actualising their freedom. No person can experience 
dignifiedness for another and synonymously, no person can become more Godly for 
another. 
To experience dignifiedness requires personal effort in uncovering God for oneself and 
responding as God would. Merely being told, "These are the ethicals (requirements of 
pure humanness) you must abide by if you want to experience dignifiedness and find life 
worthwhile", would not be uncovering God and would not result in becoming and 
experiencing dignifiedness. The researcher considered that Sartre (369:56) found similarly 
when he stated that not even a valid proof of the existence of God could save 
man. Becoming and experiences of dignifiedness cannot be given: they have to be 
uncovered. 
Each human can choose, with every act, whether he or she becomes more Godly or less 
Godly: every response has the potential to move one up or down the continuum of 
Godliness (ethicalness). Moving up the continuum gives experiences of dignifiedness, 
moving down, ones of dignifiedlessness. As Sartre (369:29) found: "... man is 
responsible for what he is. . .. [existence before essence] places the entire 
responsibility for his existence squarely upon his own shoulders." Frankl (108:191) 
found similarly: " ... everything hinges upon our realizing the essentially transitory 
possibilities. Man constantly makes his choice concerning the mass of present 
potentialities; which of those will be condemned to nonbeing and which will be actualized? 
Which choice will be made an actuality once and forever, an immortal 'footprint in the 
sands of time'? At any moment man must decide, for better or for worse, what will be the 
monument of his existence." 
Humans cannot abdicate their becoming by taking orders from another or from a perceived 
supernatural force, and still expect to experience dignifiedness. If a person claims that a 
voice (the voice of a God of a religion, for example) speaks to him, the person must 
decide whether the command or action requested is ethical. Sartre (369:34) stated a similar 
finding: "Any man who takes refuge behind the excuse of his passions by inventing some 
deterministic doctrine, is a self-deceiver ... ". It is safe to state that since each person is 
75 Paragraph 2.0 in the current chapter. 
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what he or she chooses to be and experiences the chosen degree of dignifiedness, each 
person ultimately, makes his or her own quality of life (degree of well-being). As Aristotle 
found76, humans are responsible for their own characters. The implications of this 
finding for educators are discussed later in this thesis 77. 
The reader will be aware that one's own becoming more human cannot be separated from 
the becoming more human of others. Bonhoeffer ( 41 :225) expressed this adequately: 
"Responsibility for oneself is in truth responsibility with respect to the man, and that 
means responsibility with respect to mankind." 
6.1.3 BEING SPIRITUALLY RESPONSIBLE IS BEING PART-
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BECOMING OF OTHERS 
Each human can only experience dignifiedness if he or she contributes to others' 
becoming more Godly and experiencing dignifiedness. This is so, because as already 
explained, any response which diminishes the dignity of another, is a response not in 
accordance with ethicals. Such responses lead the responder ( agogue) and respondee 
(agogee) to experience dignifiedlessness. The degree of dignifiedness experienced 
depends on one's degree of ethicalness - the extent to which one responds to others 
according to ethicals. Consequently, it is understandable that Bonhoeffer (41:224-225) 
found that responsibility is, fundamentally, a matter of deputyship. 
Consequently, spiritual responsibility requires one to be the cause of (and take partial 
blame or praise for) others' experiencing dignifiedness (becoming more Godly). For 
example, a finding of Frankl's (110:59) expressed the inseparability of experiencing one's 
own dignifiedness, protecting the dignity of others and becoming more human (Godly): 
" ... what dignity he displays in doom and disaster, is the measure of his human 
fulfilment." As Barnes (20:68) found: "Every man is responsible for the future, and 
(20: 117) " ... in choosing for ourselves, we are indeed choosing for mankind." 
Consequently, it is safe to find that spiritual responsibility is neither the internalisation 
of external compunction as suggested by Freud nor the instinctual conditioning 
through pain, fear or pleasure, as suggested by Eysenck 78. It is spiritual responsibility 
that enables and requires one to ignore external compunction and to bear the 
displeasure of others and the accompanying pain and fear, when ignoring commands 
or laws that diminish the dignifiedness of others. It is also spiritual responsibility that 
enables and requires one to adhere to laws and morals when these are also ethicals. 
76 As reported by Glover (127: 11). 
77 Chapter Nine, Paragraph 4.15. 
78 As described in Glover (127:89). 
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It has just been stated that spiritual responsibility is not instinctual conditioning through 
pain, fear or pleasure. However, if one considers existential (spiritual) pain and fear 
(dread) it is safe to state that humans strive to be spiritually responsible, 
because they cannot live without dignifiedness and seek to alleviate the 
existential (spiritual) pain (dread) of dignifiedlessness. As already mentioned 
in a preliminary way, the researcher was aware that this finding had considerable 
implications for altruism 79 since every act of kindness is not for its own sake, but for the 
contribution it makes to alleviating existential dread. 
6 .1. 4 BEING SPIRITUALLY RESPONSIBLE IS BEING SPIRITUALLY 
ANSWERIBLE 
Earlier in the research when being-responsible was investigated, the researcher did not 
highlight sufficiently that responsibility entailed accountibility. For example, as 
BradleyBO found " ... for practical reasons we need make no distinction between 
responsibility or accountability." It is safe to state that only humans (unless unfortunately 
mentally injured) are accountable, that is, have the ability to account for their responses 
and are capable of being held to account and to give an account. The researcher 
considered that just as one can distinguish between responsability and responsibility, it 
it possible to distinguish between accountability and accountibility. Being-human 
involves not giving just any account, but giving an adequate account. Viljoen and 
Pienaar (439:31) made clear that being-human means being " ... accountable for his 
doings and knows himself to be so. Unlike any other being, he may be called to account 
... ". Similarly, Oberholzer and Greyling (311 :4) related adulthood and accountibility: "In 
other words, he has become adult, especially in a moral sense. This means that he can be 
allowed to choose for himself and can be held accountable for what he does." 
For the researcher, "being held" and "being called" implied someone to whom one is 
accountible. Who is it that judges whether or not an account is adequate? Who does the 
calling and who is it that holds one to account? Consequently, a more fundamental 
description of being accountible is being answerible. This finding was corroborated by 
some fellow-researchers. Being-responsible means: answering to another or something, 
being answerable (394:Vol VIII:542), being called upon to answer (133:1935), and 
being able to answer (133: 1935). It is relevant that after describing several phenomenon 
named by "responsibility", Haydon (161:55) showed that they all relate to answering. 
The reader may, by now, be aware that being answerible in the everyday sense, is not 
the fundamental phenomenon named by being spiritually answerible, and this 
distinction is now explained. Most people are aware of the requirement of answering to 
79 See Chapter Six, Paragraph 2.6. 
80 In Glover (127:11). 
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some person during the course of everyday life. Indeed, it is likely that because most 
people fulfil many roles, they are answerible to several people. For example, a person 
may be answerible to a "boss", a spouse and, if accused of a crime, to a judge. It cannot 
be denied that every human (unless he or she is a hermit living completely alone) is 
answerible to some other person. For example, in a manufacturing company, an 
apprentice will be answerible to the qualified tradesperson, the tradesperson to the 
foreman, the foreman to a manager; the manager will be answerible to the managing 
director, the managing director to the chairman of the board and the chairman to the other 
directors because they are representatives of the shareholders. 
Similarly, in a school, a chemistry teacher will be answerible to the head of chemistry, the 
head of chemistry to the head of science, the head of science to the headteacher, the 
headteacher to the chairperson of the board of governors and the chairperson to the other 
board members as representatives of the parents. Many other examples could have been 
presented but they would have been repetitive. 
It might be claimed that one is not always answerible to another person. For example, it is 
often stated that a teacher is answerible to society for preparing the next generation of 
literate citizens; that a manager of a chemical factory is answerible to a community for 
maintaining the quality of the local environment; and that an accountant is answerible to 
her professional body for maintaining high accountancy standards. However, for the 
researcher, even such seemingly impersonal requirements to answer, are ultimately 
manifest in answering to someone. For example, a teacher whose teaching was sub- · 
standard would have to answer to a government inspector; a manager whose factory 
polluted a river would have to answer to a judge; and an accountant who was found to be 
engaged in unprofessional practice, to the chairperson of a disciplinary committee. 
For the researcher, the instances of everyday requirements to answer, just stated, do not 
describe fundamental or spiritual answeribility. This can be shown in at least two 
ways. 
Firstly, all the examples of the need to answer just stated, involve a subordinate81 
answering to another person in authority - a "boss" - someone who has a right to demand 
an answer. Not only must the subordinate answer, probably face-to-face, but must explain 
why any goals (responsibilities) set for and/or accepted by, him have not been achieved. 
In those instances where a goal has not been achieved, that is, where a responsibility has 
not been fulfilled, it may be that there is an acceptable answer. In these instances both the 
subordinate and the "boss" would re-assess the responsibilities for the next year. 
81 "Subordinate" is not meant in any derogatory way. 
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If responsibilities are not fulfilled and the answer (explanation why) is deemed 
unacceptable, the subordinate is likely to be punished in some way. This punishment 
may involve a verbal "telling-off', a monetary fine, demotion, a requirement for additional 
training and, in extreme cases, dismissal. In these instances, to be answerible means to be 
subject to punishment. Say, for example, that a subordinate did not fulfil a 
responsibility but then, in order to avoid punishment, either falsified records to show that 
it had been achieved or alternatively, made up spurious but plausible excuses to "justify" 
why the responsibility was not fulfilled. In this unethical instance, the subordinate has 
answered and, to the unsuspecting "boss", has answered adequately. 
However, the subordinate has diminished his and the other's dignity, and has hindered 
his and the other's becoming more human. To whom does the subordinate answer 
for this? To what punishment, if any is the subordinate subject? Before 
recording an answer to these questions, the researcher considered that the second example 
would add to the explanation of the difference between everyday answeribility and 
spiritual answeribility. 
Secondly, a production worker, lacks interest in her job, works carelessly, and produces a 
defective product which injures a customer. The production manager does not detect the 
defective product, the customer cannot demand an answer and does not complain, and in 
the end, the worker does not have to answer. Or does she? Similarly, because a lecturer 
wishes to concentrate on her research, she is ineffective, and her students are ill-prepared· 
for the examination and the workplace. The students are unlikely to want to, or be able to, 
demand an answer; they do not complain and the lecturer does not have to answer. Or 
does she? To what punishment, are the worker and lecturer subject? 
For the researcher, the three unethical acts just described, reveal that everyday 
responsibility is concerned with meeting particular obligations, and spiritual responsibility 
is concerned with meeting the fundamental obligation: being responsible for 
one's own and the other's becoming more human (more ethical and Godly) 
and one's own and the other's perennial experiencing of dignifiedness. In 
the three instances just given, the "boss", the customer and the students experience 
dignifiedlessness as a result of unethical acts. The subordinate, worker and lecturer have 
not contributed to the becoming more human, of others. 
However, as the reader will know, by diminishing the dignity of others, one experiences 
dignifiedlessness oneself. Consequently, for the subordinate, worker and lecturer, 
whether they know it or not, their "punishment" is experiences of 
dignifiedlessness. They may be able to mislead or avoid facing others, but they cannot 
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mislead or avoid facing themselves. When they diminish the dignity of another, humans 
are pathically aware of this because they experience, however slight, the experience of 
dignifiedlessness and the damage they have done to their own becoming more human: in 
everyday language they experience a "pang of conscience". For the researcher, no 
matter what external person one is answerible to, this everyday answeribility is an 
expression of spiritual answeribility: humans are ultimately (spiritually) 
answerible to their consciences. However, What is a conscience? or as Glover 
(127:87) asked: "How do I come to have a conscience at all?" 
Before recording findings resulting from an investigation of what conscience is, the 
researcher considered it necessary to summarise what being spiritually responsible is. The 
research revealed that the distinction between being responsible for and being 
responsible to82 is, fundamentally, inadequate description. Being responsible to 
someone is also being part-responsible for them experiencing 
dignifiedness and becoming more human. No matter what other criteria are used to 
describe being-responsible, if contributing to the other experiencing dignifiedness 
and becoming more human, is not included, then the phenomenon being 
described is not being-responsible. 
The scope of the research did not permit an investigation of what obligations and duties 
are, whether they are different phenomena, and what their relationship (if anything) might 
be to responsibility. However, the research revealed in a preliminary way, that 
responsibilities are obligations and duties, and that the fundamental obligation or . 
duty is to become more human (spiritual) by assisting others to become more human. The 
researcher considered that Alexander (7:2) expressed the interrelationship of spiritual 
responsibility and ethicality when he found that: "There is no truth which has not its 
corresponding obligation, and no obligation which has not its corresponding truth. And 
not until every truth is rounded into its duty, and every duty is referred back to its truth 
shall we attain to that clearness of vision and consistency of moral life ... ". In addition, 
Frankl (110:44) showed the interrelationship of spiritual responsibility and dignifiedness: 
"Responsibility implies a sense of obligation. A man's obligation, can however, only be 
understood in terms of a 'meaning' ... ". 
Whether one refers to a responsibility, an obligation or a duty, each person in each instant 
cannot escape knowing whether or not he or she has fulfilled the responsibility, to assist 
another to become more human. In addition, humans cannot ultimately escape, 
experiencing of dignifiedlessness (worthlessness) in some degree, when the responsibility 
82 As described by Haydon (161), for example. 
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is not fulfilled. Consequently, the researcher, wanted to find out if it was adequate to 
describe conscience as experiencing of dignifiedlessness. 
7. 0 SPIRITUAL CONSCIENCE: AWARENESS AND EXPERIENCE OF 
THE INSEPARABILITY OF GODLINESS83 AND DIGNIFIEDNESS 
In everyday language, being conscious is taken to mean being awake, that is, not 
unconscious, asleep or in a coma, for example. It is well known that both humankind and 
animal.kind are capable of being conscious. One can speak of a dog being unconscious. It 
has previously been explained how only humans exist84, that is, that only humans are 
capable of questioning their own being. This explanation could have also been expressed 
as humankind being capable of self-consciousness85. For the researcher, Oberholzer 
and Greyling's (311:162) finding that "man is consciousness" can be expressed as "man 
is self-consciousness." 
For the researcher, Feuerbach (102:1-2) described spiritual conscience when he found 
that: "Religion being identical with the distinctive characteristic of man, is then identical 
with self-consciousness - with the consciousness which man has of his nature. But 
religion, expressed generally, is consciousness of the infinite; thus it is and can be 
nothing else than the consciousness which man has of his own - not finite and 
limited, but infinite nature." However, in light of the cumulative research results 
expressed in this chapter, it is safe to state that self-consciousness is manifest as 
conscience. Consequently, humankind is consciousness-as-conscience. But just 
what is consciousness-as-conscience? 
For many people, conscience is something within themselves, an "inner voice" 
(425: 156) or "the voice of God" (127:86-87) that tells them when a response is right or 
wrong. Earlier in this thesis, it was explained how religious and social rules can become 
moral rules and socialisation involves inculcating (internalising) these rules as conscience. 
In other words, conscience is frequently explained as the internalisation of rules, chidings 
of our parents and the inbuilt fear of losing love, friendship and being hurt, either 
physically or mentally, through words. It is this fear of pain and rejection which makes 
humans want to answer adequately. Hoffman86 expressed this phenomenon as follows: 
83 The researcher was aware that the synonymity of existentialness, ethicalness, Godliness and spiritual 
responsibleness might lead to difficulties in understanding. However, what else is one to do? The 
reader will now know that being-human cannot be explained in a step-wise hierarchical fashion. To 
alleviate possible misunderstandings the researcher has, frequently attempted to show the 
interrelatedness of the part-perspectives of being-human. 
84 Chapter Six, Paragraph 2.0. 
85 The scope of the research did not permit a study of the extensive literature on what the self is. Whilst 
there is debate on whether or not animals are capable of self-consciousness, the researcher found that, 
as far as it is possible to know, they are not. The basis for this finding is explained in Chapter Six, 
Paragraph 2.0. 
86 Quoted by Thomson (417:48). 
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"People often assume that their acts are under surveillance. This fear of ubiquitous 
authority may lead them to behave morally even when alone. The socialisation experiences 
leading to this orientation, may include frequent power-assertive and perhaps love 
withdrawing discipline, which results in painful anxiety states becoming associated 
with deviant behaviour." Fromm (116:141-158) provided a similar description of how 
conscience comes about. 
However, acting according to this parental, social or religious conscience cannot ensure 
that one's answer will be spiritually responsible and will save one from experiencing 
dignifiedlessness. For example, if many morals which are not ethicals, have been 
internalised, it is possible that the "inner voice" will encourage or permit unethical acts. 
Similarly, the "voice of God" may urge one to hurt people of other religious faiths, or 
sacrifice one's child. Consequently, there must be another, fundamental conscience, 
which lets people know that it is right to disobey those social and religious norms (morals) 
which are not also ethicals. Fromm ( 116: 158) called this fundamental conscience, 
"humanistic conscience"87. Fundamental conscience explains why there are 
many instances, currently and throughout history, of people knowing that answering 
according to conscience will bring ridicule, rejection, pain and even death. Ulich 
(425:152) corroborated with several examples, and (425:153) used the term "genuine 
moral impulse", which for the researcher, is fundamental conscience. 
This finding corroborated the researcher's earlier finding88 that being:-ethical requires 
acting against some morals and laws, and bearing the adverse reaction of neighbours 
(shunning, ostracising, ridiculing and even physically attacking). It is the distinction 
between moral conscience and fundamental (ethical) conscience that Allport 
(9:135) found when he differentiated between a "must conscience" and an "adult 
conscience"; that the early stage of conscience is due to the internalisation of tribal and 
parental rules and that eventually musts [morals] give way to oughts [ethicals]. 
Allport (8:71) gave further corroboration: "If conscience were merely a matter of self-
punishment for breaking an established habit taught with authority, then we could not 
account for the fact that we do often discard codes imposed by parents and by culture, and 
devise codes of our own." Adler89 found similarly, distinguishing between the must 
conscience of the child and the ought conscience of the mature adult. 
The reader will be aware by now, that the must conscience is not limited to children, and 
children are not necessarily excluded from ought conscience. In addition, the findings just 
8? Mentioning Fromm's finding is not an indication that the researcher "supports" or is promoting the 
doctrine of humanism. 
88 Chapter Seven, Paragraph 2.5. 
89 In Dicaprio (85:109). 
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stated have explicated further, the finding that humans cannot escape spiritual 
responsibility. As Bonhoeffer ( 41 :239) found: "There is now no law to hide behind 
... there is, therefore, also no law which can compel the responsible man to take any 
particular decision in the face of such necessities." 
In the light of findings about ethical conscience in Chapter Seven and spiritual 
responsibility in the current chapter, the researcher found that fundamental or 
spiritual conscience is: the pathic and gnostic awareness that one will 
experience dignifiedlessness if one does not contribute to the other's 
dignifiedness by responding according to the ideal of perfect humanness 
as expressed in the code of humanness, together with the experiencing of 
dignifiedlessness, when one does not respond according to the ideal. 
The reader will remember that spiritual responsibility was uncovered from an investigation 
of being-human and being-ethical. Consequently, spiritual responsibility can also be 
defined as: the pathic and gnostic awareness that one will experience 
dignifiedlessness if one does not contribute to the other's dignifiedness by 
responding according to the ideal of total ethicalness as expressed in the 
code of ethicals, together with the experiencing of dignifiedlessness, when 
one does not respond according to ethicals. In this light, ethicals (fundamental 
ethics) can also be called "spiritual ethics". 
The researcher realised that fellow-researchers' findings on what spiritual conscience 
is, would have to be examined in a separate study, to see if they corroborate this 
description. However, it was found that the description, even in preliminary form, added 
insights about what being-human is. These are presented in point form to keep this chapter 
to a manageable length. 
• Spiritual conscience involves both the potential to prevent one diminishing dignity 
before one responds, and the experiencing of existential pain (dignifiedlessness) once 
one has responded unethically. It is safe to state that experiencing dignifiedlessness 
can be expressed as "having a bad conscience" or as "shame" or "remorse" 
(378:31), "guilt" or "sin"90. As Bonhoeffer (41:242) found: "A responsibility which 
would oblige a man to act against his conscience would carry within it its own 
condemnation." 
90 Again, the scope of the study did not permit an investigation of what guilt is, but Barnes (20:69-97) 
gave a comprehensive account of guilt from an existential perspective, and Ulich (425:153-154) gave 
additional insights. 
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It could be claimed that the researcher's description of spiritual conscience is 
inadequate because it does not include the possibility of "having a good 
conscience" - of experiencing dignifiedness when one does respond according to 
ethicals. However, it was found initially that spiritual conscience is an awareness that 
prevents unethical responses, not an awareness that directly promotes ethical ones. It 
is true that one experiences dignifiedness by responding ethically, but this comes 
indirectly from not responding unethically. For example, in everyday experiences one 
frequently hears the phrase "to have a clear conscience" but rarely hears "to have a 
good conscience". 
Consequently, Allport's (9:136) finding that: "The 'feel' of conscience in maturity is 
rarely tied to the fear of punishment, whether external or self-administered. It is 
rather a feeling of obligation", is not as adequate as it could be. Spiritual conscience 
is being aware that one will be punished by experiencing existential dread, 
and sometimes, experiencing that punishment. Allport (9:136) expressed this when he 
found that: "Mature conscience, then, is a sense of duty to keep one's self-image 
in an acceptable shape ... ". Morrison (287:50-51) expressed the same finding: that a 
lie is a lie against oneself and that in doing so one wipes out one's precious 
humanness, one's freedom. For the researcher, Fromm (116:159) described spiritual 
conscience adequately: "Conscience is thus a re-action of ourselves to ourselves ... It 
... summons us back to ourselves, to live productively, to develop fully. It is the 
guardian of our integrity ... [it] is the voice of our loving care for ourselves." 
• It is reasonable to state that spiritual conscienceness is a continuum. The degree 
of uncovering the ideal; the degree of the awareness that one's own dignifiedness 
depends on contributing to the other's dignification; the degree of abiding by 
conscience; and the degree of experiencing dignifiedlessness when one does not 
respond according to ethicals; will vary from person to person, and for the same 
person, depending on the situations he or she encounters. 
• In the light of previous explication of humanness as Godliness in this chapter, the 
reader will realise that the description of spiritual conscience can be expressed in a 
third way: the pathic and gnostic awareness that one's own becoming 
more Godly will be hindered unless one contributes to the other's 
becoming more Godly by answering according to the ideal of Godliness 
as expressed in the code of Godliness, together with the experiencing 
of dignfiedlessness, when one responds in an unGod-like way. 
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Consequently, regarding God as spiritual God, the researcher regarded as adequate 
description Bonhoeffer's (40:31) finding that: " ... in whatever direction man may 
tum, God is always at his back"; Scheler's91 finding that human conscience92 
" ... by virtue of its vision of the highest values, bears within itself, as a person, 
something which permits it to understand God and itself'; Glover's (127:86-87) 
finding that: " ... a man's conscience can naturally be seen as a means of 
communication between God and himself ... Conscience is ... the invisible eye 
of God that watches each move I make"; and Frankl's (108:174) finding that the 
majority of his patients found themselves to be accountable before God. Niebuhr 
(304:74-75) showed how Kant came to the same finding and explained how 
responding to conscience was as if one was before a tribunal. 
Spiritual conscience corroborated two earlier findings93, namely: that the code of 
ethicals can assist in identifying bad morals, bad laws, bad codes of ethics and bad 
religions; and that in some instances one must be unethical-to-be-ethical. 
Colbeck (61:16-17) gave an example of a "bad" religion. The reader will realise that 
the list just stated can be extended to include bad particular Gods. As Passmore 
(320: 15) found: " ... what guarantee is there that submission to God's will cannot lead 
men into imperfection?" The research has revealed that "God's will" is that humans 
be spiritually responsible, that is, adhere more and more, to more and more ethicals. A 
person guided by spiritual conscience will know that a response is unethical and 
dignity-diminishing, even when particular morals, laws, leaders or Gods allow or 
require such a response. 
The researcher considered that Bonhoeffer ( 41 :245) described spiritual conscience and 
the requirement to (in rare instances) be unethical-to-be-ethical. He did not find 
as Kant did that one should be honest when a murderer, who is seeking your friend 
(who is hiding in your house) to kill him, asks if you know where your friend is. 
Bonhoeffer found, as did the researcher, that in this instance one should be dishonest: 
"If I refuse to incur guilt against the principle of truthfulness for the sake of my 
friend, if I refuse to tell a robust lie for the sake of my friend ... then my action is in 
contradiction to my responsibility ... ". The finding just stated reminded the researcher 
that spiritual responsibility reveals the inseparability of serving God and my 
neighbour, a finding Bonhoeffer (41:245) stressed. 
91 In Bonhoeffer (40:57). 
92 The reader will notice the tautology: conscience is unique to humans. 
93 Chapter Seven, Paragraph 2.4. 
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The researcher considered that Kant94 corroborated this finding when he found that 
the way we identify God is by our own conception of moral perfection: "Even the 
Holy One of the gospel must first be compared with our ideal of moral perfection 
before we can recognize him to be such." The researcher considered that Passmore 
(320:23) had also identified spiritual conscience when he found that -"We [humans] 
adjudge Jesus and Socrates perfect by comparing them with our ideal of moral 
perfection; in calling them perfect we mean that they perfectly exemplify that ideal." 
Macdonald (260:75) corroborated similarly: "Indeed the worth of any religion can be 
fairly adequately assessed by the depth and range of its ethical imperatives." 
The reader will remember that spiritual God is an ideal (the ideal of perfect 
humanness) pathically held by every human, and one's Godliness (and spiritualness) 
is the degree to which one has uncovered the ideal and responds 
according to it. Consequently, it is safe to state that each human is answerible to the 
extent of Godliness he or she has uncovered and holds as the ideal. Consequently, it is 
difficult to escape the conclusion that each human is spiritually (ultimately) 
answerible to himself or herself. The experiencing of dignifiedlessness is one's 
own response to one's own knowledge of not adhering to the ideal. As Marcel 
(267:80-81) found: to be faithful to myself is to respond to a particular inner call and 
only the person knows whether or not one has responded. This finding corroborated 
the researcher's earlier finding that each human makes himself or herself95. 
This means that no matter who else judges a person's degree of humanness, the. 
spiritual judgement is passed by the person himself or herself. Barnes (20:27) 
recognised this when she stated: "Man is a creature of such a sort that if he once asks 
himself, 'What have I made of myself and how do I appraise what I have become?' 
then he must answer." The "voice of God" or the "voice" of any other person, is 
one's own personification of one's own judgement of one's humanness. Barnes 
(20:78) came to a similar finding: "I am always before the Bench. The eye of 
Judgement is ever there .... The uneasy awareness that the Other is always there 
looking on is literally true. It is myself who am constantly watching and 
passing sentence." This meant for the researcher, that when Glover (127:86-87) 
referred to man becoming aware of the divine approval or disapproval of his 
actions, this can be adequately expressed as his own approval or disapproval. It is also 
safe to state that fundamentally (spiritually}, the one that does the punishing is oneself: 
it is only oneself that compares one's responses to the code of ethicals (Godliness) and 
decides on the extent of fulfilment. 
94 Quoted in Hanfling (153:49). 
95 Paragraph 5 .1.4 in the current chapter. 
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• Whether they are aware of their requirement and striving to achieve the ideal of perfect 
humanness, and whether or not they perceive their spiritual conscience as another real 
person, it is safe to state that the spiritual ideal demands or calls humans to strive to 
achieve the ideal. As Oberholzer and Grey ling (311: 17) found: " ... in his involvement 
with becoming more human, man must listen very carefully to the authority of the 
idea which addresses him and demands his obedience." They (311: 16) continued: 
"Life summons us, commands us in terms of the idea of man which co-ordinates 
and directs the totality of human life." Frankl ( 110: 109) found similarly: "The 
requirement that values be actualized ... becomes a concrete demand for every single 
hour and a personal summons to every single person." He (108:156) continued: 
existence calls a human forth or summons him. 
Britton (45:30-31) offered a relevant finding: "Each is called by God to some task: he 
must find out and pursue his calling ... Whatever else life may offer, nothing can 
really profit a man who neglects to discover his calling." For the researcher, "lack of 
profit" is experienced as dignifiedlessness. Simpson and Weiner (394:Vol II:792) 
regarded "calling" as the summons, invitation, or impulse of service; the strong 
impulse to any course of action as the right thing to do. Similarly "calling" 
(14:318) is a strong inner impulse toward a particular course of action, a 
profession or career, especially one which involves helping other people or a 
strong feeling that one must do a particular job which involves helping others 
(395:197). Vocation was found to involve service to others, serving the divine. 
purposes, obligations and responsibilities (as to others) (14:2561); a calling 
by God to his service (233:1652), and a particular role in life, especially one which 
involves serving other people (395:1629). As Marcel (267:75) found: " ... all life 
is a service." 
The scope of the research did not permit investigation into the possible interrelatedness 
of being-human, professionality and ethicality96. However, the limited explication of 
"calling" just presented, illustrated again for the researcher, the interrelatedness of 
ethicalness, agogy and Godliness. The researcher considered that Howe ( 173: 83) 
expressed this interrelatedness: "In speaking the word of dialogue, a person puts 
himself on the threshold of truth and becomes the servant of God. Faithfulness, 
therefore, to the call of God is to be measured not in terms of propositions of belief, 
but in terms of willingness to give ourselves to one another." Consequently, 
spiritual calling, (the ultimate or fundamental calling) for the researcher, is one's 
96 The researcher (347:191-202) has previously sought some answers in this regard. Findings about 
vocation are used in this subparagraph because the lexicographers consulted, treated "calling" and 
"vocation" as synonymous. 
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own call to one's own humanness to become even more human by striving to uncover 
more and more of the ideal of perfect humanness, and then respond accordingly. 
It is reasonable to find that because humankind is called, required and summoned to 
answer, that humankind is also questioned. Frankl (108:172) found similarly, that 
man is questioned by life and must answer by answering for his own life. Adler 
(2:1) also referred to humankind as being questioned, and Frankl (109:27) described 
the interrelationship of spiritual responsibility and spiritual conscience as follows: " ... 
responsibleness derives from the existential fact that life is a chain of questions 
which man has to answer by answering for life, to which he has to respond by 
being responsible ... ".However, although one might say that life, the ideal or God, 
questions, it is more adequate description to state that it is oneself who questions the 
extent to which one has achieved Godliness. Consequently, it is safe to s~ate that 
being-human is being-questioned. Luijpen (257:260) expressed this when he 
found that the fundamental question for humans is What do I have to be? 
Earlier in this thesis97 the dreadfulness of existential dread was described. The 
researcher considered that Frankl ( 110: 51) related dread to spiritual responsibility 
when he referred to responsibility as resembling an abyss ("its awful depths") and 
when he reported shuddering when considering it: " ... there is something fearful about 
man's responsibility .... It is fearful to know that at this moment we bear the 
responsibility for the next ... every moment holds thousands of possibilities, but we 
can choose only a single one of these ... ". 
The researcher was enthralled by the finding that being-human is being-
questioned. Earlier in the research, it was found98 that being-human is being-
questioning of one's own being, Consequently, it is safe to state that being-
questioned and being-questioning are inseparable. Barnes (20:28) found 
similarly: the questions What do I want to be? and What have I become? " ... 
are forever repeated and inextricably bound together." For the researcher, Barnes' 
questions could also be expressed as How human can I become? and How 
human have I become? The researcher's wonderment continued because the 
finding being-questioning:being questioned (and synonymously, How human 
can I become:How human have I become) indicated that the research had come full 
circle, and that it was possible to summarise the many findings of the research on what 
being-human is. 
97 Chapter Six, Paragraph 2.3. 
98 Chapter Six, Paragraph 2.1. 
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Being-human is perennially being-questioning of what it means to be 
human, and uncovering with the help of a person who has already 
become more human than oneself, what perfect humanness is, so that 
one can contribute to others' becoming more human by responding 
ethically, which enables one, when self-questioned by one's awareness 
of the ideal and deviation from it, to pathically answer questions about 
being-human with experiences of dignifiedness, or dignifiedlessness 
thereby enabling one's own becoming more human. 
At the beginning of the research, the researcher doubted the possibility of providing a 
summary description of what it means to be human. It may be claimed that by reducing the 
meaning of being-human to a nine-line subparagraph, that the researcher has diminished 
the dignity of humankind. The researcher considered this not to be the case for three main 
reasons. Firstly, by summarising as concisely as possible, the extensive description of 
what it means to be human as reported in this thesis, it is hoped that fellow-humans will 
be assisted in their own questioning and so be assisted in their own becoming more 
human. 
Secondly, the definition cannot, and does not, and no definition ever will, penetrate to the 
ultimate mystery that is being-human. The definition (no definition) can explain why 
humans want to strive to experience dignifiedness rather than die99. Thirdly, unlike~· 
code of ethicals and the ideal of perfect humanness, the researcher is well aware that his 
description is only i! description - a small contribution. The provided definition could not, 
and does not, close dialogue with fellow-researchers, who may arrive at further findings 
which will considerably enhance the adequacy of the definition just given. 
It could also be claimed that providing a definition of what it means to be human, is a 
gross over-simplification of what being-human is. However, whilst the expression is 
concise and appears simplistic, after reading the findings reported in this thesis, the reader 
will know that the act of defining is not irresponsible science, for two main reasons. 
Firstly, most of the words in the definition represent existentialia of considerable 
complexity. Secondly, the definition just given would not have been possible without the 
extensive investigation, as reported in this thesis. 
99 Although some people commit suicide, this happens when dignifiedlessness has reached such a degree, 
that life is not worth living. 
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Since the definition had been possible only by uncovering existentialia, the researcher 
realised that the definition could be expressed in an even more concise and broader way: 
Being-human is existentiality, agogicality, ethicality, and 
spirituality. 
The adequacy of this expression is authenticated by the research results reported in this 
thesis and can be shown using the definition provided a few paragraphs ago, annotated as 
follows: 
Being-human is perennially being-questioning of what it means to be human, 
(existentiality) and uncovering with the help of a person who has already become 
more human than oneself, (agogicality) what perfect humanness is, so that one can 
contribute to others' becoming more human by responding ethically, (ethicality) 
which enables one, when self-questioned by one's awareness of the ideal and 
deviation from it (spirituality), to pathically answer the questions about being-
human with experiences of dignifiedness, thereby enabling becoming more human. 
The reader is reminded that the highlighting of four existentialia, should not be interpreted 
as any one of them being sufficient to, or more important for, adequately describing what 
it means to be human. One could refer to part-existentialia of dignity, and if the English 
language allowed it, dialogicality and GodicalitylOO. All existentialia and part-
existentialia are interrelated and a description of one of them alone, provides insight to · 
only a limited dimension of being-human. The researcher highlighted the four existentialia 
in the definition of being-human because they were sufficiently broad to include other 
part-existentialia such as dignity and dialogicality. 
The researcher noticed that the four existentialia employed to define being-human are 
indicated by the suffix "-ity". This fact brought back to the researcher his wonderment 
throughout the research with the word "humanity". For example, phrases such as 
"essence or humanity of humankind"lOI, "continuous effort to realise one's 
humanity"102, "wider morality of humanityl03, morality of humanity104, and 
"essential humanity of human relationships" 105, were encountered. Although it 
was not made explicit, it seemed as if "humanity" wa.s being used at times to name 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
The scope of the research did not permit further study of possible groupings of existentialia and 
whether the term "part-existentialia" is adequate. 
Chapter One, Paragraph 3.3.2. 
Chapter Two, Paragraph 3.4. 
Chapter Four, Paragraph 4.0g. 
Chapter Five, Paragraph 3.0. 
Chapter Six, Paragraph 2.5. 
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humankind and at other times, humane behaviour. At this point in the research, it was 
realised that humankind and humane behaviour (behaving according to ethicals) were one 
and the same and that "being-human" could be expressed as "humanity". 
Consequently, for the researcher, "humanity" names the inescapable reality that 
humankind is. Gove ( 134: 1100-1101) found similarly: that humanity is " ... the totality of 
attributes which distinguish man from other beings: the condition of being human ... ". 
Ginsberg (126:229 236) used "humanity" similarly: "This humanity is not an essence 
defined for us ... but an existence we give and create ... humanity is what we give to life. 
Ginsberg ( 126:238) also recognised humanity as the universal it is: "Human beings die; 
humanity endures". Geering (122: 1) found similarly. Frankl (110:55) illustrated the 
interrelationship of humanity and responsibility: "Can anything be given to us more 
directly than our own personal experience, our own deep feeling of our humanity as 
responsibility?" It was also realised (and this corroborated a finding uncovered several 
times during the research), that "humanness" is an adequate term to name the 
inseparability of the continua of existentialness, ethicalness, agogicalness and 
spiritualness. 
The researcher expected that the reader would, by now, be used to the necessity of the 
considerable synonymity required to describe what being-human is. However, it was 
considered that the interrelatedness of the existentialia and the inseparability of the 
continua could be illustrated in a helpful way in Table Nine, a revised version of Table 
Eight, already presented in this thesis106. 
TABLE NINE 
AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE INTERRELATEDNESS OF MODES OF 
BEING-HUMAN AND THE DISCIPLINES THAT STUDY THESE 
MODES 
Mode Continua of Inescapable Dynamic of Scientific 
of being becoming reality becoming discipline 
humanhood humanness humanity humanisation humanology 
existent existentialness existentiality existentialisation ontology 
ethical ethicalness ethicality ethicalisation ethicology 
agogical agogicalness agogicality agogicalisation ago logy 
dignified dignifiedness dignity dignification logosology 
spiritual spiritualness spirituality spiritualisation theology 
106 Paragraph 2.0 in the current chapter. 
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Despite the presentation of Table Nine being only a preliminary one, the researcher 
considered that it shows the complexity and inseparability of the main part-modes of 
being-human. Whilst awaiting further research, the researcher considered that 
"humanology" is equivalent to "philosophical anthropology"; that "ethicology" rather 
than "ethics" is a more adequate description for the study of being-ethical and that 
"logosology" adequately names the study of how humans seek experiences of 
meaningfulness ( dignifiedness ). 
The reader will be aware that throughout this thesis, the researcher has been using 
hyphenated terms to name the part-modes of being within humanhood. Consequently, in 
Table Nine "existent" and "ethical" for example could be expressed as being-existent 
and being-ethical or existenthood and ethicalhood. Further examination of the use 
of the suffix "-hood" to name modes of being was beyond the scope of the current 
research. Table Nine also shows, without doubt, that a study of God (theology) is a study 
of humankind (humanology). The researcher wondered if, and how, Godhood, 
Godliness, and Divinity could be included in Table Nine, but realised that consideration of 
this would require a separate study. 
Although not explicitly aware of why at the beginning of the research, the researcher 
intuitively suspected that a number of disciplines were interrelated and ultimately were 
studying the same phenomenon 107. It was only during writing this chapter some five 
years after beginning the research, that the reason for this inseparability became evident. 
The reader will remember the researcher's intuition at the beginning of the researchl08, · 
that philosophical anthropology, ontology, and theology were inseparably 
interrelated. It was considered that the findings just presented corroborated this initial 
finding. Ultimately, theology, ontology, ethicology, philosophical anthropology and 
ago logy are all ways of investigating and reporting on the same reality - humanity. 
Consequently, the researcher found as adequate, Tillich'sl09 finding that there is no 
distinction between philosophical anthropology and theological anthropology. 
The scope of the research did not permit further study of the adequacy of the structure or 
expression of, Table Nine, and it was hoped that fellow-researchers would provide more 
comprehensive versions of it. The scope of the research required the researcher to relate 
the findings about humanity to education. The researcher realised that with concise 
definitions of spiritual conscience and being-human, now available, an even more 
adequate description of adulthood than that given earlier in this thesisl 10, was possible. 
107 Chapter One, Paragraph 3.3. 
108 Chapter One, Paragraph 3.3. 
l09 In Bonhoeffer (40:73). The researcher did not find as Bonhoeffer did, that there is a distinction. 
110 Chapter Seven, Paragraph 3.0. 
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Adulthood is that part-mode of humanhood (independent of chronological 
age and biological maturity) of those people who have progressed so far 
along the continuum of humanness, that is, who are so sufficiently aware 
of humanity (ethicality, agogicality, spirituality and dignity), that they can, 
without guidance in most circumstances, be trusted to respond in ways 
which protect and enhance their own and others' dignity, and usually do 
so. 
At this point in the research, the researcher experienced some reluctance in attempting to 
explain the implications of this definition for education. Although it was realised that the 
interrelatedness that is humanity, and the inseparability that is humanness, 
had been adequately explained in this paragraph, the inseparability of a number of 
existentialia and part-existentialia had only been explained in a fragmentary fashion 111 
throughout this thesis. The researcher, realised that it was necessary to relate the complex 
and wide-ranging findings about being-human to adulthood and education. Such an 
explication would be necessary further grounding work for offering recommendations for 
educators. Consequently, it was decided to show more explicitly the inseparability of 
some existentialia and part-existentialia. 
8.0 AGEIN AS AGAPE: SHOWING HUMANITY AS THE 
INTERRELATEDNESS OF EXISTENTIALITY, AGOGICALITY, 
ETHICALITY AND SPIRITUALITY 
Initially, it was considered that in order to show humanity as the interrelatedness that it is, · 
it would be necessary to take each mode of human reality and show its interrelatedness to 
the others. This approach would have involved six separate descriptions and the 
researcher was concerned about giving a repetitive and fragmented account of the research 
findings. 
However, as the reader may remember, the phenomenon of spiritual love (agape) was 
encountered frequently during the research. Phrases such as the following were recorded: 
" ... adulthood begins with the ability to receive and give love and care"112; "Love is 
the only way to grasp another human being in the inner most core"; "love enables man 
to intuitively understand his personal relationship to the other and reveals him as a 
unique personal being"; "One must have at least a readiness to love the other 
person, broadly speaking, if one is to be able to understand him"; "Love, then, is an 
entering into direct relationship with the personality of the beloved"; "l~ve enables 
1 l l As the reader will know, this fragmentation was inevitable, bearing in mind the impossibility of a 
hierarchical description of being-human, the wide-ranging, interdisciplinary nature of the research and 
the necessary cumulative explication. 
112 Chapter Three, Paragraph 3. lc. 
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man to intuitively understand his personal relationship to the other113; "dialogical 
love"; "For the loved one wants to be worthier of the lover"l 14; "true lover of 
mankind"115; "adulthood begins with the ability to receive and give love ... the central 
virtues of adulthood are love, care and wisdom"116; "God who is love"ll7; and 
"inbuilt fear of losing love ... love withdrawing discipline" .1 18 
The researcher also remembered his earlier finding that: "one term adequately describes the 
agogue's combined attitudes of benevolence, sympathy, compassion and firm guidance, 
namely 'love as agape'." 119 On further reflection it was realised that agein as agape 
would be a straightforward way of showing the interrelatedness of the part·realities of the 
reality of humanity. 
8.1 AGEIN AS AGAPE: SPIRITUAL LOVE 
The research has revealed that, whether they are aware of it or not, humans perennially 
strive to alleviate the existential dread of nothingness, meaninglessness and 
worthlessness ( dignifiedlessness) by perennially seeking experiences of purposefulness, 
meaningfulness and worthiness (dignifiedness). It has also been shown that 
experiences of dignifiedness are possible only when one responds to others 
fundamentally ethically, that is, according to the code of ethicals. Humans, in varying 
degrees, know this is how they ought to respond in order to be dignified, because they are 
pathically aware when they are not being treated well; when their dignity is being 
diminished, that is, when they experience dignifiedlessness. Ulich (425:151) found 
similarly. Moreover, humans, to the extent that they have uncovered it, are aware of the· 
call or demand to respond ethically from the ideal of perfect humanness, and are 
pathically aware that if they do not strive to become more like the ideal, they will 
experience dignifiedlessnessl20. 
It cannot be denied that being an existent, as all humans and only humans are, can be 
frightening. One knows that questions about one's worth and the meaning of life can 
never be finally answered, yet one is required to seek answers. One knows that the ideal 
of perfect humanness can never be achieved, but one is required to strive for perfection. In 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
120 
Chapter Six, Paragraph 2.5. 
Chapter Six, Paragraph 2.6. 
Current Chapter, Paragraph 3.0. 
Current Chapter, Paragraph 4.1. 
Current Chapter, Paragraph 5.1.3. 
Current Chapter, Paragraph 7.0. 
Chapter Six, Paragraph 2.5. 
Even though some humans have a limited degree of awareness of humanness; even though some 
have their awareness deadened by being badly treated by parents; and even though some attempt to 
hide from their awareness through drug misuse, for example, the researcher considered that the 
summary description applies to humankind. 
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addition, one perennially questions (assesses) oneself, for one's progress along the 
continuum of humanness towards the ideal. Humans are faced with a stark choice: either 
struggle with the complex, frustrating and incompletable task that is their becoming more 
human, and fulfil it adequately, or experience dignifiedlessness and a life not worth living. 
Even if one succeeds in perennially becoming more human and experiencing 
dignifiedness, one still has to face the ultimate boundary - death. 
Faced with this existential dilemma, humans turn for help to the only ones who can help -
fellow-humans. No other beings but human beings, can assist humans to become more 
human. The only way one can respond ethically is in responses to fellow-humans. As 
Sartre (369:45) found: "He [humankind] recognises that he cannot be anything (in the 
sense in which one says one is spiritual, or that one is wicked or jealous) unless others 
recognise him as such. I cannot obtain any truth whatsoever about myself, except through 
the mediation of another. The other is indispensable to my existence, and equally so to any 
knowledge I can have of myself." Consequently, existence is dialogue. Humans have 
no choice in whether they are dialogical or not, but they can choose the number and 
quality of their relationships. 
However, it is safe to state that some dialogical relationships, rather than others, advance 
becoming more human. When one human, be she a baby, child, student, spouse, patient 
or older person, for example, calls out for assistance in whatever of the many forms this 
could take, and when another human more experienced in humanness, be she a parent, 
teacher, spouse, doctor or nursing home assistant, responds with the motive to do all_ 
possible to protect and enhance the dignity of the less experienced person, even when this 
means hardship even for herself, agogy is underway. As soon as the more experienced 
person acknowledges the call and offers support, and the less experienced person accepts 
the offer, whether implicitly or explicitly, agein is being actualised - the dynamic of 
becoming is intentionally underway. The relationship is an agogical-dialogical one, 
and the person more experienced in humanness is the agogue and the less experienced 
person, the agogee. 
Consequently, the dynamic of perennially becoming more human is only possible when 
one human is more experienced in humanness, than another. It would be inadequate to 
describe the less experienced person as the only one in need, because both agogee and 
agogue experience the ultimate need of dignification and humanisation. Both agogue and 
ago gee are called, albeit in different ways, by the ideal of perfect humanness (as far as 
they have uncovered it), which can also be called "God". Although it may never be made 
explicit, and although both agogue and agogee may never be rationally aware of it, agein 
is the mutual recognition of potential but unattainable Godliness: the agogee 
recognises in the agogue someone further along the continuum of Godliness than himself, 
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and the agogue recognises in the agogee someone struggling to become more Godly. 
Smithl21 found that the understanding of humankind is the only way we have of 
understanding God, and Morton corroborated this in finding that the mystery of God does 
not come to us as doctrine, a dogma or creed (289:52) but by experiencing. 
Both agogue and rgogee love God: one's dignifiedness depends on uncovering God and 
becoming more like God. The ideal is the highest good the agogue and agogee can think 
of, and they wish to be that goodness. The agogue loves the agogee as a fellow-human 
struggling to alleviate existential dread, and shows this by wanting the best for the agogee 
and offering accompaniment - even when this may mean short term discomfort and 
apparent disadvantage to the agoguel22. Robinson (356:184-1196) described in detail 
the relationship between love and social laws, and how agape is always a manifestation of 
the relationship between oneself, God and one's neighbour. It is relevant that Freud 
(85:36-37) found that the mature person should be capable of loving, and that Downie and 
Telfer (86:152) found that agape is the supreme regulative principle for morality. 
The agogee loves and pathically admires the agogue for her achievement of more 
experienced humanness and because she has taken the time to accompany - to show love. 
The agogee strives to become more like the agogue. As Frankl (110:146-147) found, 
through striving to be like the lover, the loved one becomes more and more the image of 
what God conceived and wanted him to be. While this description may seem abstract, an 
example of it in practice is the love many children have for their primary school teachers. 
In many instances, the teacher rather than the parent, is regarded by the child as the one 
who accompanies. Indeed, Wilson (463:31) asked:" ... how schools and other institutions 
can at least make space for, and encourage, the growth of a capacity for love ... ". 
This reminded the researcher of the phrase "God is love" which spiritually, means to 
respond from the ideal of Godliness. To act in love is to enhance dignity and not to 
diminish it. In light of the results just presented, it is understandable that agogues can 
claim to be acting out of love of God. The reader will realise that to persecute and 
torture, for example, for the love of God is not for the love of spiritual God (the ideal of 
perfect humanness). Passmore (320:323-324) referred to the love of God as a "pseudo-
love" because it has resulted in so many atrocities. However, love of spiritual God would 
not permit such atrocities. In addition, when Ulich (425:143) stated that love can be both a 
virtue and a vice, he is not considering spiritual love. 
121 In Morton (289:143). 
122 It has already been explained in Chapter Seven, Paragraph 2.6 why the discomfort is "short term" and 
the disadvantage "apparent". · 
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The researcher found Frankl's (108:58-59) expression to be adequate: " ... love is the 
ultimate and the highest goal to which man can aspire ... The salvation of man is through 
love and in love ... ". Adler (2:183) put it this way: "The most important task imposed 
by religion has always been 'Love thy neighbour'." However, Adler's finding can be 
more adequately stated as, Love the Lord thy God, thy neighbour as thyself. 
Loving the fellow-human and loving God are inseparable. Some fellow-researchers have 
found similarly. For example, two requirements from Hebrew scripture: We are called 
to love God with our whole being, and Love our neighbours as we love 
ourselves123, are found (427:11-15) to be of equal importance and inseparable. "One 
cannot first love God, and then, as a second task love one's neighbor and vice versa ... 
just as we cannot truly love God without loving our neighbor, so too, it is extremely 
difficult to experience the love of God except through others." Passmore (320:324-325) 
found that it is misleading to use the word "love" when speaking of loving one's 
neighbours. However, what he is naming by "love" is not spiritual love. 
For the researcher, the mutual love of agogee and agogue, in their seeking to alleviate 
existential dread in dignifiedness, by striving for Godliness, is the actualisation of 
spiritual love (agape) in a spiritual relationship. Woodbridge (466:34-37) found 
similarly and explained the role of spiritual love in an education setting. Accompanying 
another to further humanness, and accepting accompaniment in doing so, is a spiritual 
activity. Frankl ( 110: 133), found similarly: "Loving represents a coming to relationship 
with another as a spiritual being ... the close connection with spiritual aspects of the 
partner is the ultimate attainable form of partnership." The researcher considered that 
Ulich's (425:160-161) self-transcending love and cosmic love are synonymous 
with spiritual love, as is Maslow's (269:42-43) B-love. Adler (2: 15) used "love" to mean 
interest and concern for all humankind. For the researcher "spiritual partnership" is an 
adequate way of expressing agogy. 
The researcher considered that Frankl (108: 176) had found the spiritual in the agein: "By 
the spiritual act of love ... he sees that which is potential in him, that which is not yet 
actualized but yet ought to be actualized", and (110:146), "Love permits us to see the 
spiritual core of the other person, the reality of the other's essential nature and his value 
potentialities." Feuerbach124 also illustrated agein as agape: "Now, this being of Man 
exists only in community, it is found only in the unity of Man with Man - a unity 
that is supported only by the reality of the difference between I and Thou. Man with 
Man - the unity of I and Thou - is God." Buber (51:131-137) regarded the I-Thou 
relationship as a spiritual one. Some fellow-researchers corroborated this. For example, 
Geering (121:14), when he pointed out that in the German term /ch-Du used by Buber, 
123 Deuteronomy Chapter 6 Verse 5 and Leviticus Chapter 19 Verse 18, respectively. 
124 Quoted by Barth in the introduction to Feuerbach (102:xiii-xiv). 
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Du is particularly used for family relationships and between lovers. The "Thou" in 
Buber's "I-Thou" can reasonably be interpreted as "the beloved" or "loved one". 
The summary of research findings about being-human, in this subparagraph explain why 
many people regard seeking answers to questions about God, the universe, meaning in 
life, and so on, as spiritual questions. Geering (122:21) found similarly. The 
researcher realised that actualising the agein as agape though teaching would 
have extensive implications for what it means to be an educator and these are discussed in 
Chapter Nine125. 
The reader will be aware that all humans, whether they wish it or not, experience 
existential or spiritual need. As already explained, this need is experienced as existential 
dread and expressed in the seeking to alleviate it. For the researcher, Hanfling (153:x) 
expressed existential anxiousness when he found that: when people ask about the meaning 
of life they are expressing a worry that there is something wrong, unsatisfactory 
or inadequate with human life. The reader will be aware why there is this pathic 
awareness. There is something wrong. Even though humans know they are incomplete 
and want to be complete, they also know that they can never be completed. It has already 
been explained how existential tension 126 (being required to seek without the 
possibility of final answers) is essential for human life. Ulich (425:142) found similarly, 
and Frankl (108:165-166) expressed it as follows: " ... mental health is based on a 
certain degree of tension, the tension between what one has already achieved and what one . 
still ought to accomplish, or the gap between what one is and what one should become." 
It was the realisation at this stage in the research that some people are unable to cope with 
existential tension and become mentally ill because of it, that enabled the researcher to 
relate fellow-researchers' associations (as stated in this thesis) of adulthood and being-
human with health and therapy. It became evident that agein is, in varying degrees, 
existential or spiritual therapy. 
8.2 AGEIN AS SPIRITUAL THERAPY 
Earlier in this thesisl27, the findings of fellow-researchers who are psychologists and 
psychotherapists used the phrases "healthy adulthood" and "healthy adult", not so 
much to mean physical health, but responsible, well-adjusted behaviour. Kakar 
(200: 119) found that a healthy adult is moral and an ideal of adulthood, and Dicaprio 
also expressed the ideal as ideal living or ideal personality (85:37). As a result of the 
125 Chapter Nine, Paragraph 4.1.16. 
126 Chapter Six, Paragraph 2.3.2. 
127 Chapter Three, Paragraph 5.0. 
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research, the researcher considered it safe to find that "well-adjusted", "ideal living" 
and "ideal personality", mean responding according to ethicals. 
Consequently, "healthy adulthood" is one way of expressing the behaviour of someone 
who is successfully coping with existential tension and becoming more human. Maslow 
(269: 167-178) and Fromm ( 115) corroborated this in some detail. However, since being-
human is being-agogic-dialogic, it is safe to state that those who cope, do so because they 
have been able to experience dignifiedness through spiritual love. Barronl28 illustrated 
this when he found that health is measured by one's dealings with other people -
succeeding in reaching one's own goals and assisting others to reach theirs. As Fromm 
(I I 6:viii) found: "Neurosis itself is, in the last analysis, a symptom of moral failure ... 
moral conflict ... and the success of the therapeutic effort depends on the understanding 
and solution of the person's moral problem." 
Lowenthal and Haven (255:390) provided further evidence of the interrelationship 
between adulthood, health and agein. They found that those people who have tried to 
establish social relations, but failed, are more likely to experience mental illness 
and hospitalisation in old age. Sinha referred to the behaviour resulting from non-
achievement of psychological ideals of adulthood as disorders, and Kuhlen found that 
unhappiness, negativeness and anxiety arose similarlyl29. The happiest and healthiest 
people tend to be those who were, or had been, involved in one or more close personal 
relationships. The reader will be aware that the happiness and healthiness come about 
through experiencing dignifiedness through spiritual love (agein) in relationships. 
It cannot be denied that effective agogues, assist agogees in coping with the existential 
tension that being-extent is. It also cannot be denied that every human is in need of 
assistance, to some degree, to cope, and it is likely that many people are unaware that they 
are in agogic relationships and are receiving and giving assistance. However, it was only 
on considering the mental illness that arises when some people have not been able to 
establish agogic dialogue (close supportive relationships) and have not experienced 
spiritual love, that the researcher could understand Oberholzer and Greyling's (311 :45) 
finding that: " ... successful dialogue is elevating and therapeutic ... the therapy is 
reciprocal ... ". Since all humans are in existential need, all are in need, to some extent, of 
existential or spiritual therapy. 
The fact that all humans (in all likelihood unknowingly) are in need of some degree of 
spiritual therapy, and are experiencing it through the agein is, for the researcher, 
128 Quoted by Vaillant (429:6). 
129 Chapter Three, Paragraph 5.0. 
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corroborated by Frankl (108:162-163). He found that in dealing with people experiencing 
existential frustration, "Not every conflict [existential frustration] is necessarily neurotic; 
some amount of conflict is normal and healthy .... I would strictly deny that one's search 
for a meaning to his existence, or even doubt of it, in every case is derived from, or 
results in, any disease. Existential frustration is in itself neither pathological nor 
pathogenic. A man's concern, even his despair, over the worthwhileness of life is a 
spiritual distress but by no means a mental disease." Wilson ( 460: 16-17) provided 
similar findings, stating tliat the parallel between psychoanalysis and philosophy is 
remarkably close and that philosophical problems could be regarded as the sophisticated 
man's neurosis. Frankl (109:172) related spiritual therapy to education: " ... treatment of 
existential vacuum should be open to psychologists, social workers, educators and 
pastoral counsellors as well." 
Further corroboration was given by Maslow (270:30): " ... it is better to consider neurosis 
as rather related to spiritual disorders, to loss of meaning, to doubt about the goals 
of life ... these are all fallings away from humanness ... ". The researcher considered 
"falling away from humanness" relevant since an inability to initiate agogic relationships 
would hinder one's becoming more human. According to Frankl (109:155), his whole 
approach to psychotherapy, that is, logotherapy, is to bring light to the spiritual 
struggle of the individual. Elkins (91 :78-98) gave further corroboration of the 
interrelatedness of spirituality and therapy, when he explained that psyche means soul 
and therapist means servant or attendant. Consequently, a psychotherapist is a servant 
or attendant of the soul 130. 
The reader will be aware that spiritual therapy is not something that is applied when 
someone is mentally ill 131. Rather it is that which occurs between two humans when 
agein, or according to Buber, the "in-between" of "I-Thou", comes about through the 
efforts of agogue and agogee. This is why the researcher would not use the term "client" 
for "agogee", as Ten Have (414:8) does. However, the role of the psychotherapist, as 
opposed to the psychiatrist revealed another relevant finding. 
When someone is mentally ill through biological malfunction, the psychiatrist will attempt 
to heal the person with recommended drugs. When someone is physically ill, the doctor 
130 The scope of the research did not permit a study of what people mean when they use the word 
"soul". However, for the researcher, Elkins' preliminary description (134:83) indicated that "soul" is 
used to name the interrelatedness that is humanity. 
131 The reader may be aware that there is a school of existential psychiatry founded on the basis 
that much mental illness is caused by the inability to cope with existential frustration. Just what 
mental illness is; whether all findings of existential psychiatrists are adequately described; and the 
detailed examination of how extreme instances of existential frustration manifest, were questions 
outwith the scope of the current research. Frankl (109), May, Angel and Ellenberger (273) and Yalom 
(468), for example, give extensive insights into existential psychiatry and how its principles are 
derived from existence. 
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will apply the latest medical techniques to fix the broken bone or remove the diseased 
organ. Similarly, when a student is failing a university course, the lecturer will advise 
improved study techniques, say, to improve the student's performance in examinations. 
For the researcher, the instances just listed are not examples of therapy, but of the 
application of techniques to a person. 
The psychotherapist on the other hand is not involved in curing, but in supportively 
accompanying people in distress (414:6) after some crisis, such as death in the family, 
homelessness after a natural disaster and divorce, for example. As Frankl (109:137) 
found, psychotherapy is not so much the method but a relationship between patient and 
doctor. "This relationship between two persons seems to be the most significant aspect of 
the psychotherapeutic process, a more important factor than any method or technique." 
This is, to some extent, corroborated by Gage132 who found that the most effective 
therapists are those who facilitate relationships which are mutually respectful, trusting, 
authentic and empathic. The reader will realise that this is what is expected of agogues. 
Consequently, it is safe to state that when psychiatrists, doctors and educators, for 
example, are going about their technical tasks, they are also, whether they know it or not 
and whether they like it or not, actualising agein as therapy. It is their success as 
agogues that will influence the success of their technical efforts. For the researcher, Hirst 
and Peters ( 170: 19) finding that education has no suggestion of a cure, is inadequate 
description. Whilst existential dread can never be totally cured, it can be alleviated, and 
this is, to some extent, a cure. As Allport (8:33) found: "Love received and love given. 
comprise the best form of therapy." For the researcher, Allport's finding is adequate 
because love received and love given, is spiritual love (agape). Wilson ( 463 :31) illustrated 
the interrelationship of therapy, love and education, when he explained how effective 
psychotherapy consists in re-parenting, that is, concern or love independent of a child's 
merits. For the researcher, Frankl (110: 14) recognised the interrelationship of existence, 
therapy and education when he referred to logotherapy (his therapy based on alleviating 
existential yearning) as " ... education towards responsibility; the patient must push 
forward independently towards the concrete meaning of his own existence." 
With the explication of agein as spiritual love and as spiritual therapy, the researcher was 
able to progress to offering a post-scientific personal view of essentially agogic orientated 
teaching, and to offering recommendations for educators. 
132 Paraphrased in Katz (203:1). 
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CHAPTER NINE 
ADULTHOOD AS A PART MODE OF HUMANHOOD, RECOGNISED BY 
SUFFICIENT PROGRESS ALONG THE EXISTENTIAL-ETHICAL 
CONTINUUM OF HUMANNESS, AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR 
EDUCATION 
"A mystery is, indeed, something that is beyond our understanding but which leads 
us into a deeper understanding of life. It is not a problem to be solved but an 
experience to be entered into." 
Morton (289:55) 
1.0 INTRODUCTION: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The reader will remember that the researcher's wonderment about adulthood arose from 
difficulties he experienced in the philosophy of adult education, caused by lack of, or 
seemingly inadequate, definitions of adulthoodl. For example, if adulthood is the "end 
result", "the goal" or "the aim" of education, as some educationists find, then "adult 
education" is a misnomer. In addition, phrases such as "life-long education" and 
"continuing education"2 would not make sense, because education would end with the 
achievement of adulthood. However, adult education is a well-established discipline and 
practice, and education is widely accepted as a life-long activity. 
It was realised intuitively, that when most people use the word "adulthood", they do not 
mean merely a certain chronological age or biological state. There seems to be something 
else people have in mind when they say, for example, that "Educators lead children to 
adulthood", or "It is our education system that provides the adults of tomorrow." 
Consequently, the researcher decided to seek a description of adulthood, more adequate 
than the descriptions currently being used - one that would explain away the apparent 
contradictions just explained. 
In particular, the researcher wanted to find out whether or not adulthood as an 
existential-ethical continuum would qualify as such a description. The researcher 
realised he was searching for a fundamental and, hence, universal description of adulthood 
that would apply to all humans, in all times and in all cultures (humankind). 
Consequently, any description of adulthood which does not apply to humankind, would 
be inadequate. It was found that a philosophical anthropological approach with an 
1 As explained in Chapter One, Paragraph 1.0. 
2 Quotation marks have been used in two additional ways in this chapter. Terms and phrases that are 
inadequate expression are shown in quotation marks. For example, education does not have goals, only 
people do. In addition, the researcher's findings stated elsewhere in this thesis, are given in quotation 
marks when used in this chapter. 
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existential phenomenological and andragogical perspective was the best way to 
conduct the research. As the research progressed, it was confirmed that a philosophical 
approach was the most appropriate way for investigating adulthood fundamentally. After 
reading the results of the researcher's extensive study of what it means to be human, the 
reader will most likely acknowledge the adequacy of Adler's (3:297) finding: " ... there can 
be no philosophy of education apart from philosophy as a whole." For the researcher, 
Adler's finding could be more adequately expressed as: philosophy of education is 
philosophy of humanity. Beyers Nel (28:69) found similarly, that philosophy is 
humankind's total thought concerning their own existence. 
The reader will have noticed that, in order to seek an answer to the question, What is 
adulthood? the researcher has had to conduct a wide-ranging interdisciplinary study with 
investigation of several interrelated phenomena. In addition, the researcher was aware that 
several of the findings uncovered are radical and may well have surprised the reader. It 
was with these two points in mind that it was decided to summarise in the current chapter, 
the main findings recorded in each of the previous chapters. Whilst this approach would 
result in some repetition, it was hoped that it would assist the reader in gaining an 
overview of how adulthood as an existential-ethical phenomenon was uncovered. The 
summary about to be presented was also considered necessary in order to prepare the way 
for a statement of the researcher's personal views on what essentially agogic oriented 
teaching is, and for offering recommendations to educators. The researcher realised that 
there are no final answers about being-human, and that the results now to be summarised 
are but a small contribution to further research. 
1.1 RESULTS OF EXAMINING FOUR CURRENT DESCRIPTIONS OF 
ADULTHOOD 
To begin the search for a more adequate description of adulthood, four descriptions of 
adulthood were examined for their adequacy. The first description of adulthood examined 
was adulthood as a chronological age. It was found (as reported in Chapter Two) that 
the age at which a person is assumed to become an adult varies over time, from country to 
country, and even within the same historical time and same country. For example, in some 
cultures, a child of seven could be regarded as an adult, whereas in some other cultures, a 
man of forty whose father is still alive, would not be accorded adult status. It cannot be 
denied that the variability in chronological ages selected to define adulthood, makes 
chronological adulthood an inadequate description. Whilst setting a specific chronological 
age as a criterion for deciding who is and who is not an adult may assist any society to 
administer its affairs, it cannot explain what adulthood is, fundamentally. 
Chronological age was found to be used in at least two other main ways in attempts to 
describe adulthood - age span descriptions and life cycle descriptions. In the age 
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span approach, the human life cycle is compartmentalised into phases or stages such as 
early childhood, childhood, early adulthood, adulthood and late adulthood. These phases 
or stages are delineated at their beginnings and endings by chronological ages. All the 
experiences, events, tasks and requirements happening within the age span called 
"adulthood", were then taken to be a description of adulthood. The inadequacy of this 
approach to describing adulthood was illustrated in two ways. 
Firstly, the selection of the age delineations for the time span called "adulthood" was 
arbitrary and there was considerable variability in the range of the age spans fellow-
researchers called "adulthood". Consequently, no age range can qualify as a universal 
description. Secondly, the researcher identified a contradiction regarding the relating of the 
human experiences, events and tasks, to adulthood. Take parenthood, for example: on the 
one hand, parenthood was taken as an indication of adulthood because it usually happened 
during the age span called "adulthood". On the other hand, fellow-researchers implied that 
parenthood itself is a criterion for adulthood. It is self-evident that the two are 
contradictory. Parenthood could happen outwith the age range called "adulthood". 
In the life cycle approach to describing adulthood, it is assumed that all people, at 
roughly the same time of life, meet the same problems, and that these problems, 
challenges, events and tasks happen in a fixed sequence. However, many examples 
illustrated that, not only do events not happen in a pre-determined sequence for every 
person, but lack of sequence is just as likely as a sequence. Consequently, a fundamental 
description of adulthood could not be based on a group of events or challenges that could · 
also happen in the time of the life cycle called "childhood". 
Whilst examining chronological age span and life cycle descriptions of adulthood, it was 
discovered that fellow-researchers were, perhaps unwittingly, also using biological, 
sociological and psychological events or experiences to describe adulthood. One way 
in which this became evident was the application of the word "maturity" to name certain 
biological, sociological and psychological attainments. Consequently, the researcher next 
investigated biological descriptions of adulthood. 
It was found (as reported in Chapter Two) that biological descriptions of adulthood in 
terms of maximum size, maximum physical strength, and capability of 
reproduction, were not adequate descriptions of adulthood. Seven examples were given 
to illustrate this inadequacy and, in addition, five reasons were given as to why adulthood 
as a biological stage or life cycle was inadequate description. A major finding at this stage 
of the research was that human biological events are also psychological and 
sociological experiences. For example, loss of control over urination, hormonal change, 
myocardial infarction and onset of carcinoma are only biological events, whereas 
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incontinence, experiencing menopause, having a heart attack, and being 
affected by cancer, respectively, are human events. 
Another biological description of adulthood - possessing physical skills - was also found 
to be inadequate. It was shown how children may be more physically skilled than adults, 
and that people are not deprived of their adult status if they unfortunately suffer a physical 
disability. Another major finding was that it is not the mere possession of the skills that 
indicates adulthood, but how the skills are used. Even at this early stage in the 
research there was an indication that adulthood involved something to do with 
appropriate behaviour. The researcher discovered why the use of the terms "adult", 
"adulthood" and "being adult" in the current literature, was confusing. It was found 
that each of these three terms was being used by fellow-researchers as synonyms to name 
two different phenomena: the biological and the uniquely human. In many instances 
the distinction between the biological and the uniquely human was not made, with the 
result that behaving appropriately was erroneously related to biological growth. 
Consequently, the researcher decided to use "an adult" to indicate only the biological 
conditions of maximum size, ability to reproduce and having physical abilities, and 
"being adult" to name the uniquely human. It was found self-evident that "being adult" 
(whatever it is) was a better description of adulthood than "being an adult". The researcher 
realised that finding a universal description of adulthood would involve investigating what 
being adult is. This realisation was supported by fellow-researchers' use of terms such as 
"genuine adulthood", "real adulthood", "true adulthood" and "responsible 
adulthood". In summary, adulthood is more than just a biological state. Since initial 
indications were that adulthood as being adult was related to expected or required 
behaviour, the researcher investigated psychological descriptions of adulthood. 
Four main psychological descriptions of adulthood were found, as reported in Chapter 
Three: adulthood as possessing certain mental skills; adulthood as a number of 
psychological stages; adulthood as attainment of a psychological ideal; and 
adulthood as successful (healthy) ageing. Firstly, it was found that it is not the 
possession of mental skills that indicates adulthood, but how these are employed as 
evident in appropriate behaviours. 
Secondly, several methodological difficulties were found with adulthood as a number of 
psychological stages, not least of which was the inconsistent use of terminology in 
describing the stages. In addition, the inadequacy of adulthood as psychological stages 
was shown with six illustrations, namely: variability in type and number of stages; lack 
of evidence for sequentiality, and contradictions about completability of adulthood; 
lack of explanation of concepts important to stage theory; exceptions to how the 
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strengths of love, care and wisdom emerge from task completion; the variability in 
type and number of psychological tasks within each stage, and lack of credibility of 
development theory among psychologists themselves. 
Thirdly, on examining the psychological ideals (ultimate attainments) of integrity and 
self-actualisation, as descriptions of adulthood, it was found that the selection of the 
criteria by which one could tell if someone had attained integrity or self-actualisation, were 
not explained, and could have been added to arbitrarily. In addition, the criteria for each of 
the ideals, required further explanation, because some of them could have been applied to 
people who were intent on hurting others or behaving in some other non-acceptable way. 
Several other ideals were considered and similar inadequacies were found. 
However, at this point in the research, two important findings were made. The lack of 
explanation of the criteria used to assess whether or not any person had attained any ideal 
of adulthood, led the researcher to suspect that there were underlying fundamental 
criteria that, if eventually identified, would provide a more adequate description of 
adulthood. In addition, adulthood as an ideal had been uncovered, and it was realised 
that a universal, fundamental description of adulthood would be an ideal. The researcher 
was unsure at this stage whether identifying such an ideal would be possible, and if one 
was identified, what its implications would be for adulthood and education. 
Fourthly, adulthood as successful ageing was found to be inadequate description 
because many of the terms used in the description needed defining. For example, stating · 
that adulthood is being able to cope, experiencing well-being, healthy and 
satisfactory growth and being well-adjusted, begged the questions as to what 
coping, well-being, satisfactory growth and adjustment are. However, it became evident 
that many fellow-researchers assessed the success of ageing on certain behaviours - the 
things a person must learn if he or she is to be judged and to judge himself or herself to be 
a reasonably happy and successful person. It was found that it is not the fact of being able 
or unable to cope, or experiencing distress, unhappiness, and meaninglessness, for 
example, that indicates adulthood or non-adulthood, but how one responds to events 
or experiences. Although unsure why at this stage in the research, the researcher suspected 
that there was a relationship between mental health, well-being and adulthood, and 
anticipated that more revelations about this would arise during the research. 
During the examination of the four psychological descriptions of adulthood, the researcher 
found sufficient evidence to offer a preliminary finding of three interrelationships, namely: 
adulthood and values (ideals); adulthood and meaning and adulthood and 
responsible behaviour. Again, the researcher was unsure what these relationships 
entailed, and what their implications might be for education. However, the researcher was 
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surprised by the lack of direct references to the role of the fellow-human in a person's 
becoming adult. Whilst there were ample indirect references to the role of society, social 
order, living in a society, the social environment and interaction with others, for example, 
there were few direct acknowledgments that it is fellow-humans who enter into 
relationships in which people experience crucial turning points and challenges, and whose 
responses in relationships, contribute to a person feeling fulfilled, meaningful, self-
actualised and integrated. It was also remembered that every human event and experience 
is a social event. Consequently, the researcher was directed to adulthood as 
sociological attainment as a more adequate description of adulthood. 
It was found (as reported in Chapter Four) that adulthood as sociological attainment was 
expressed in three main ways: as progress through a sociological life cycle; as 
fulfilling certain roles or undergoing certain experiences; and as being 
behaved appropriately. As was expected, the life cycle description had four main 
inadequacies: sequentiality and age grouping of roles and experiences not necessarily 
holding for all individuals; arbitrariness with which events and experiences could be 
added to, or removed from, the life cycle; lack of explicit acknowledgement that 
many of the tasks are not completable tasks and will continue throughout life; and not 
taking unexpected major events into account. 
Adulthood as fulfilling certain roles involved many researchers describing adulthood as 
being employed, being a parent and being married, for example. Apart from the fact that 
many of the roles selected for signifying adulthood are contradictory (earning a wage but · 
yet still living at home, for example), the role description of adulthood was found 
inadequate, because merely starting a job, getting married, and becoming a parent, do not 
automatically mean one is being adult. For example, one could be employed and married 
and behave in ways which are child-like. In other words, it was not the role itself that 
indicated adulthood, but the way one fulfilled the role. 
Similarly, it was found that adulthood as encountering certain experiences such as death of 
a loved one, despair, loneliness or extreme joy, for example, could be encountered by 
anyone, not just adults. It was found that it is the way one responds to the experiences, 
not the experiences themselves, which provides a more adequate description of adulthood. 
Consequently, adulthood as behaving socially appropriately was examined. 
Using appropriate social behaviour as a way of describing adulthood was found 
inadequate because: the list of behaviours taken as indicators of adulthood could be 
compiled arbitrarily; some behaviours are acceptable in some circumstances and not in 
others; some inappropriate behaviours could be appropriate in some instances; 
appropriateness of some behaviours changes with age of people concerned; different 
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societies have different norms which are used to decide what is, and what is not, 
appropriate; and some of a society's norms can differ from an individual's norms or 
conscience. Consequently, adulthood as being socially appropriately behaved 
cannot be a universal description of adulthood. 
It was a major finding of the research, that being adult required, in some instances, 
disobeying a social norm and behaving in ways that many people in a society might 
call "inappropriate". There are some instances when, even if almost all people in a society 
approve of it, certain behaviours - participating in killing others for merely belonging to a 
different religion to oneself, for example - are not appropriate. The researcher realised that 
he would have to search for a fundamental description of what appropriate behaviour 
is, to find a more adequate description of what adulthood is. Considerable evidence was 
presented to show that responsible behaviour was shorthand for fundamentally 
appropriate behaviour. Consequently, it was found that adulthood as sociological 
attainment can be better expressed as adulthood as being responsible, and the 
researcher next examined what it means to be responsible. 
In Chapter Five, before examining what being responsible is, further methodological 
grounding was provided, showing that a philosophical approach is the most appropriate 
way to investigate adulthood. Before progress could be made, a difficulty regarding the 
term "being responsible", had to be overcome. It was found that "being responsible" 
was commonly used to indicate approval of many and varied responses. However, the 
researcher was seeking the phenomenon at the radix (the fundimentum, the essence,· 
the '-ness') in all instances of being responsible. Consequently, it was decided, after 
considerable searching for a more adequate term, to use "being-responsible" (with a 
hyphen) to name the universal phenomenon which makes any instance of being 
responsible, just that. It was realised that in using "being adult" in Chapter Two, the 
researcher had been naming both being adult (used to name the many particular 
expressions) and being-adult (the one universal, the -ness, in all instances of being 
adult). It was found that being-responsible is synonymous with being-adult. 
Of all the many possible responses that might be referred to as "being responsible", the 
researcher found that most could be grouped into at least four main responses: being the 
cause of something, having responsibility, being trustworthy and being 
moral. It was found that being the cause of something and having responsibility were not 
what people had in mind, when they used "being responsible" to mean adulthood. This 
was illustrated by apparently nonsensical sentences such as "The man was responsible 
because he was not responsible", and "We cannot give any more responsibility to Mr 
Jones because he is not responsible enough." 
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It was realised that being trustworthy, which included being reliable and dependable, was 
a more adequate description of being-responsible. People are usually not given 
responsibility unless they are trusted to fulfil it. Initially, it seemed that being trustworthy 
was a fundamental description of being-responsible. However, examples were provided to 
show that being trustworthy alone is not sufficient: the trust (responsibility) one accepts to 
fulfil has to be appropriate (acceptable) as does the way one fulfils the trust. Again the 
researcher was confronted by the problem of what an appropriate response is, and 
considerable evidence was presented to show that ah appropriate response is regarded as 
choosing or accepting moral goals, and fulfilling them morally. 
However, although being moral is a more adequate description of being-responsible and 
hence, being-adult, it was still found to be inadequate. Just as the variability in social 
norms disqualified socially appropriate behaviour as a fundamental description of 
adulthood, so the variability of moral norms (morals), disqualified being moral. The 
researcher realised he was seeking universal or fundamental morals which, if 
identifiable, could assist in assessing whether acting according to any particular moral 
would be being-responsible or not. In other words, the researcher was seeking an answer 
to what being-moral (with the hyphen) is and what fundamental morals are. 
It was another major finding of the research that, in some instances being-moral (being-
responsible and being-adult) would entail being immoral, that is, disobeying some 
particular "bad" morals. Since some particular morals might also be fundamental morals, it 
was found that the distinction between particular morals and universal morals was not 
sufficiently highlighted by using "being moral" and "being-moral". Consequently, it was 
decided to use the term "being-ethical" to name being fundamentally moral. 
The distinction between being ethical and being-ethical was necessary. It was shown how 
a profession's ethical code is likely to be an application of a society's moral code, and that 
in some instances to be fundamentally responsible, people may have to disobey parts of an 
ethical code, that is, be unethical. The researcher realised that being-ethical was being 
fundamentally ethical, that is, responding according to fundamental ethics which can 
assist one to decide whether or not any part of a particular code of ethics, is "good" or 
"bad". The question: What are fundamental ethics? was then asked. 
Evidence was presented to show that some fellow-researchers were also seeking 
fundamental ethics. However, the researcher was unsure as to where to begin seeking for 
answers to what being-ethical (being fundamentally ethical), is. It was remembered that 
only humans are responsable, and the researcher realised that to continue the research - to 
find an even more adequate description of adulthood - would require searching for what 
it means to be human. At this point in the research, the researcher experienced despair 
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because of the potential enormity of such a search, if it was to be undertaken in a 
scientifically responsible way. However, it was realised that it was not necessary to 
examine everything to do with being human: the researcher was seeking being-human, a 
fundamental description capable of including all particularised descriptions of what it 
means to be human (being human). 
1.2 RESULTS OF SEARCHING FOR WHAT IT MEANS TO BE HUMAN 
The researcher began recording his results in Chapter Six, by explaining how he limited 
the scope of the search for what it means to be human. It was decided to begin the search 
by examining being-human as biological exception. It was explained that being-human is 
so radically different from being-animal that it is inadequate description to refer to 
humankind as the "thinking animal" or "the taking animal", for example. It was found that 
the Being of human beings is unique and can adequately be described as "existence". 
Since only humans exist, being-human entails being-questioning about existence. It was 
found that all humans, at all times and in all cultures, at some time or other, in some 
degree, ask existential questions such as: Where did I come from? What am I? 
Why am I here? Where do I go when I die? and What is life all about? Such 
asking is initially, an experiencing, a feeling - a pathic response - which can, in varying 
degrees, become rational questioning. 
It was found that humans ask questions about existence because they are seeking 
experiences of meaningfulness. Humans, faced by the vastness of the universe and the · 
certainty of death, want to know that they do matter; that their lives are worthwhile; that 
they have a purpose on this earth. Experiencing meaningfulness was found to be more 
than just finding or attributing meaning. One can be told one's life is meaningful but still 
not experience it as so. It was found that being-searching for experiences of 
meaningfulness is being-searching for affirmation of one's worth - for the experience of 
worthiness. However one can only experience meaningfulness and worthiness in 
relation with fellow-humans. When humans ask if they matter or are significant, they are 
asking whether or not they matter, are significant or have worth to other humans. 
However, it was shown that the recognition of worth that humans seek is not recognition 
of utilitarian worth, but of their value as humans, and it was found that "dignity", best 
names the fundamental (existential) value or worth of a human. Consequently, it was 
found that being-searching for experiences of meaningfulness is ultimately being-
searching for experiences of dignifiedness. It was decided to employ the term 
"dignifiedness" in the thesis because it more adequately names what many fellow-
researchers name with "meaningfulness" and other related terms. 
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At this point in the research, several possible relationships were revealed. Recognition of 
existential worth and its association with worthwhileness; the essentialness of the fellow-
human; and the co-mentioning of spiritual experiences and meaningfulness, revealed 
possible relationships of: dignifiedness and ethicalness; dignifiedness and the 
andragogic; and dignifiedness and spiritualness. Once again, the reality of an 
ideal was revealed because "dignify" is also used to mean elevate the mind or character, 
make worthy, ennoble, allegiance to what is right or accepted standard of 
conduct; and lofty character - morally elevated. The researcher asked: "What else 
can a human be worthy of but some ideal of being-human?" 
The researcher wondered why humans continue to seek experiences of dignifiedness. It 
was found that humans seek to alleviate the inescapable, experience of existential dread. It 
was explained how existential dread is not just another everyday fear of some thing, but an 
ever-present, non-curable anxiety about being worthless - of nothingness. Humans know 
pathically, in some degree or other, that every choice they make contributes to their 
worthiness or unworthiness, and they want to know what to do to experience worthiness 
(dignifiedness). Without experiences of dignifiedness, life is not worth living. A major 
finding was uncovered by asking: Why, in the face of a vast universe and unanswerible 
questions, do humans not just choose to die? This question presents the mystery that is 
humankind; a mystery that is likely to remain a mystery. 
The research made explicit the role of the fellow-human in experiences of dignifiedness. It 
was found that since it is only another human who can contribute to alleviation of 
existential dread, the striving to alleviate it, is manifest as existential yearning for a 
benevolent fellow-human. If a human is to alleviate existential dread and experience 
dignifiedness, he needs another more experienced, sympathetic and caring person who can 
accompany him as he finds out how to protect and enhance his dignity. The search is 
perennial because existential questions are unanswerable in a final way, and humankind 
will always experience existential dread and the need to alleviate it. 
The person who undertakes the sympathetic and caring accompaniment is adequately 
named by "the agogue" and the one being accompanied, by "the agogee". It was also 
found that the practice of accompaniment, which is both accompanying and being 
accompanied, is adequately named by "agogy". Consequently, being-human entails 
being-relational as being-agogical. Agogical accompaniment is not just any 
accompaniment: it benefits the agogee because it elevates and uplifts, and it benefits the 
agogue because it is in accompanying the agogee to experiencing dignifiedness that the 
agogue also experiences dignifiedness. This mutual experience - this being together in 
support of dignity - is adequately named by "the agein". 
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It was at this point in the research that it was realised that love as agape described both 
the sympathetic caring of the agogue and the agogee's willingness to be accompanied 
through respect for the agogue. Agein is mutual change, interdependence, mutual 
involvement, mutuality of recognition of dignity: - a love that must necessarily 
enrich the lover and the loved. In other words being-human is being-agogical-
dialogical. Dialogue implies fellowship, reciprocal committedness, interdependence and 
co-existence - a mutual sharing of dignifying experiences. 
The research on what it means to be agogical, left no doubt, that in order to respond to an 
agogee's cry for accompaniment in a way that leads to mutual experiences of 
dignifiedness, an agogue must have the best interests of the agogee at heart. The 
researcher found at least twenty responses mentioned by fellow-researchers, which could 
be used to judge an agogue's effectiveness, including: helpfulness, self-sacrifice, 
compassion, fairness and honesty. However, such an arbitrary list with its undefined 
qualities, was unhelpful in describing what being-agogical and, consequently, what being-
human, are. The methodological difficulty at this point in the research was how to go 
about uncovering responses that would protect and enhance the dignity of the agogee. 
The researcher decided to reflect on his own dignity enhancing and dignity diminishing 
experiences as a lecturer and student in the educational setting of a university, and 
compiled a list of as many possible actions of lecturers (agogues) that would result in 
students (agogees) experiencing dignifiedlessness. This list was expanded by 
imagining additional hypothetical instances of behaviour by lecturers that would diminish · 
students' dignity. Forty eight requirements for effective agogy were identified under seven 
criteria! headings. It was explained how this list of andragogic requirements in the 
university setting: could be applied in other settings; was not based on the researcher's 
personal views but on the accumulated research results as recorded in the thesis; and was 
not an artificial, abstract and unrealistic theory. 
At this stage in the research, it was realised that although the code of fundamental ethics 
had been uncovered using instances from the andragogic, that the seven general criteria, 
with some re-wording would apply to all agogic relationships. Consequently, 
although the researcher had intended to limit the research to an andragogic perspective, and 
although the expression of the demands within each of the seven criteria! headings would 
be different for different institutional settings, it was decided to continue the research 
within a broader agogic perspective. 
It was realised that the list of requirements was a code for effective agogy. Since the 
code lists ethical responses (conduct) it is also a code of ethics. However, it is not a 
particular code of ethics such as a profession's code of ethics, but the fundamental 
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code of ethics, which can apply to any profession and any human relationship. This 
finding revealed that since being-adult is being-human and since being-human is being-
ethical, it follows that the fundamental code of ethics is also the code of humanness, 
and the code of adultness. At this stage in the research it was found that adulthood 
and humanhood are existential-ethical phenomena. 
It was realised that the fundamental code of ethics could be a way of judging which social 
behavioural norms and which morals would lead to being-responsible and lead to 
dignifiedness. However, the researcher was required to explain what it means to be 
fundamentally ethical (being-ethical) and to answer several questions arising from the 
uncovering of the fundamental code of ethics. 
After further reflection, it was found (as reported in Chapter Seven) that being-ethical 
involves both the inescapable human onticity of ethicality, and the degree to which one 
adheres to the fundamental code of ethics (ethicalness). It was found that being-human 
is ethicality, because humans are compelled to search for the requirements of the code in 
order to meet them, so that they can act accordingly and experience dignifiedness. It was 
found that the more one adheres to the requirements of the code (the more ethical one is), 
the more dignified one's life will be. 
To explicate "ethicalness" (the degree of being fundamentally ethical) the researcher 
showed that: his use of "the" in "the fundamental code of ethics" was not dogmatic; some 
fellow-researchers are also searching for the universal code of ethics; and that using 
"ethicals" to refer to each of the seven principles in the fundamental code of ethics is 
adequate description. 
Considerable reflection was undertaken on the implications of the code of ethicals for 
being-responsible, being-human and being-adult, and several important findings were 
uncovered. 
• Adherence to ethicals more adequately describes the "good life" than does adherence to 
morals. Five examples were provided showing how it is adherence to ethicals, not 
necessarily morals, that makes someone a good person. Ethicals can be used to 
evaluate which morals and laws (even if perceived as God-given) are 
good or bad. Only laws and morals which serve to protect and enhance experiences 
of dignifiedness are ethicals, and consequently, are good laws and morals. 
• Sometimes it is necessary to be unethical in order to be ethical. The phrase "being-
unethical-to-be-ethical" named the dilemma of having to infringe the dignity of 
one person to protect the dignity of another. Five examples were provided of how 
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being-ethical-to-be-unethical works in practice. In addition, it was also found that only 
in some very rare instances, when a law requires innocent people to be physically hurt, 
that laws and morals must be disobeyed if one is to experience dignifiedness. 
• Being-ethical may mean having to risk being shunned, ostracised, ridiculed and even 
physically attacked. It was also found that the ability to withstand such dignity-
diminishing attacks comes from having uncovered ethical conscience, that is, having 
become knowledgeable of what is right and what is wrong through 
awareness of the pain caused by dignifiedlessness, through one's own 
experiencing of what is required for dignifiedness. It was found that 
happiness is not the same as experiencing dignifiedness, and that happiness at 
the expense of another's dignity, is a superficial gaiety which is quickly overcome by 
primordial guilt, fundamental knowledge that one has diminished others' and one's 
own dignity, fear of being caught, and shame of being despised. 
• Even though it might appear that a person (a bank robber, say) is benefiting from 
ignoring ethicals, in the long term, he or she will experience dignifiedlessness and is 
not benefiting. 
Having thoroughly grounded being-ethical as ethicality and ethicalness, the researcher 
wondered if, and how, the code of ethicals could assist in assessing ethicalness. It was 
found that a mechanistic scoring system would not only be practically impossible, 
but more importantly, would diminish dignity. However, it was realised that the code· 
would be helpful in six main ways, including enabling people to know what is required to 
experience dignifiedness and to assess for themselves, how ethical they are being or have 
been. The code can also assist in enabling educators and other agogues to be more aware 
of how they should be supporting others on how to behave; acting as a rough guide to 
how ethical or unethical a person is; making evident that there are circumstances in which 
it is more difficult to be ethical (adhere to ethicals) than others; making evident that one can 
become more ethical; and making evident the impossibility of any person being 
totally (completely or fully) ethical. 
At this stage in the research a major finding was uncovered that would answer the main 
question of the research. It was found that it was adultness, and not adulthood, that is 
the ethical continuum, and findings from fellow-researchers corroborated this. It was 
found that the continuum had no ending because the perceived ending was an 
unattainable ideal of perfect, ideal or full adultness. It was considered that the question 
of where the adultness continuum begins, and the question of how, if at all, criminal acts 
that severely diminish the dignity of another, could be considered on the continuum, were 
outwith the scope of the current research. Another major finding was that "becoming 
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more adult" was a more adequate phrase to describe what many fellow-researchers, call 
human "growth" and "development". 
It was at this point in the research that the main question posed at the beginning of the 
research, What is adulthood? was answered. In addition, the researcher considered that he 
had uncovered a more adequate description of adulthood. Adulthood was found not 
to be a continuum, but an existential-ethical part-mode of being-human 
(humanhood). Being-adult is being so aware of the interrelatedness of one's own and the 
other's dignifiedness, that one can be trusted to behave, and does behave, ethically, 
without guidance, in most instances. 
With adulthood defined as a part-mode of humanhood, it was found that childhood is also 
a part-mode of humanhood. However, the mention of childhood raised the difficulty of the 
long tradition, and the current practice by many fellow-researchers, of naming both the 
process of maturing and the continuum of ethicalness with "adultness", and the 
assumption that older people are necessarily further along the continuum of ethicalness 
than younger people. Consequently, although the cumulative research findings showed 
that when people use "adultness" and "adulthood", they ultimately mean ethicalness and 
ethicalhood, to use these terms to describe being-human, would lead to misunderstanding. 
It was decided to use the terms "humanness" and "humanhood" to name the continuum 
of ethicalness (and adultness) and ethicalhood (adulthood), respectively. 
At the beginning of the research it was found that the aim of education was adulthood. 
However, towards the end of the research for Chapter Seven, it was found that this initial 
finding could be expressed more adequately: the aim of education is humanhood. 
However, since all humans are already on the continuum of humanness and in the mode of 
being called "humanhood", it was realised that more research was required to find out, 
what humanness and humanhood are. 
At the beginning of Chapter Eight, it was shown how many fellow-researchers have found 
humanness to be a continuum and recognised that humans can become more human. Just 
what it means to become more human was investigated and it was found that being-human 
is perennially becoming: humans do not have a being, but are continually becoming 
someone. It was found that one becomes more human by adhering to more and more 
ethicals, more and more of the time. The word "humanisation" was used to name 
becoming more human, and this term was regarded as synonymous with 
"ethicalisation" and "dignification". It was also explained why socialisation and 
enculturation were neither necessarily the same as, nor contributors to, humanisation. 
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Since references to ideal adulthood had already been encountered, the researcher was not 
surprised to find some fellow-researchers referring to pure humanness and ideal 
humanness. The researcher found that in order to become more human, humans have an 
ideal of perfect humanness, and that this ideal could only be total fulfilment of all 
ethicals, all of the time. In addition, although the ideal is unachievable, it was found that 
being-human involves striving to become more like the ideal. Even though perfect 
humanness had been uncovered from examination of existentialia, and was not just a 
theory of the researcher, it was anticipated that some fellow-researchers would (as the 
researcher probably would have before the research), consider the finding absurd. 
However, several fellow-researchers also reported findings about perfect humanness, the 
goal of perfection and the perfectibility of humankind. In addition, although they did not 
use the word "perfect", the researcher considered it safe to find that the ultimate ideals, 
tasks or achievements of several psychological researchers, were expressions of 
perfection. Since humanness is a continuum, it was found that humans who had 
progressed unusually far along the continuum, were regarded by some as saints or 
sages. In addition, because perfect humanness (total ethicalness) cannot be achieved by 
humans, the only way to envisage it is to imagine an all-knowing, and all-powerful 
person capable of fulfilling all ethicals totally , that is, a God. Consequently, it was 
found that striving for perfect humanness is also striving to be God-like (Godly), 
which, in effect, entails striving for a degree (however small) of Godliness. 
The fact that being-human is being striving to become more God-like, revealed that the 
continuum of humanness is also the continuum of Godliness and that ethicals are 
criteria of Godliness. Although the findings just stated were uncovered from 
existentialia, the researcher was concerned about them for two main reasons. Firstly, it 
was anticipated that the unusualness and radicalness of godliness as humanness 
would shock some readers. Secondly, since the words "God", "God-like" and 
"Godliness" are usually associated with a particular religion, some readers, and 
particularly non-religious readers, might dismiss any further findings reported in the thesis 
as merely the researcher's attempt to promote his own religious views. If any reader was 
discouraged from further reading of the thesis, they would not have the opportunity of 
considering the recommendations for improving practice. Consequently, it was necessary 
to find out what it means to become more Godly, including investigating the preliminary 
finding that Godliness can be independent of religiousness. 
The researcher again considered it necessary to state that the current research was not 
being conducted under the auspices of theology, but that some findings would be very 
preliminary findings in existential theology. In addition, it was stated again that the 
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researcher did not intend to offend any reader, and one way of showing this was to 
maintain the capital "G" in "God". 
It was shown how the word "God" can be used to name the ideal of perfect humanness 
and a real person who personifies that ideal. The scope of the current research did not 
allow consideration of whether or not there is a real person who fulfils all ethicals totally 
all the time. After considering whether or not humanness is religiousness it was 
found that God is not limited to the Gods of religions and the researcher distinguished 
between the fundamental God (God as an image of perfect humanness) and religious 
Gods (particularistic Gods of different religions - expressions of the fundamental God). 
Since "spiritual" is already employed in the English language to name (among other 
phenomena) things to do with the God-not-dependent-on-a-particular-religion, it was 
found that "spiritual God" was more adequate description than "fundamental God". 
Spiritual God was found to be an onticity - humankind exists because of God and no 
human can claim to be an atheist, fundamentally. Findings of fellow-researchers were 
presented as corroboration for the finding that being-human is being-spiritual. 
Consequently, it was found that humanness is spiritualness. It was realised that the 
implications of this finding were extensive, because any activity not having guiding 
educands to become more spiritual (or Godly) as its main purpose, is not education. 
Just as being-ethical was found to be ethicality and ethicalness, so being-spiritual was 
found to be spirituality (the onticity) and spiritualness. It was shown how spirituality, the· 
inescapable seeking for God and the striving to be more Godly, is another way of 
expressing the seeking for dignifiedness, and it was realised that spirituality, 
existentiality and ethicality are different expressions of the same reality. Similarly, 
spiritualness and ethicalness were found to be different expressions of the continuum of 
humanness. Also, at this point in the research, various methodological strands were 
brought together when it was shown that philosophical anthropology, ontology, 
and theology were inseparably interrelated. 
Since being-human is becoming more Godly (spiritual and ethical) it was necessary to find 
out what spiritual God is and what spiritual becoming entails. It was found that 
spiritual God is: 
• not selected or chosen, but uncovered by seeking for the requirements of perfect 
humanness (ethicals) and from experiences in applying, or not applying them; 
• not made by humans, because ethicals, and the requirement to act according to them 
(in order to experience dignifiedness), are always there and always will be there, as 
long as there are humans - this is the mystery of being human; 
• that which makes, sustains and "saves" all humans. Whether they are aware of it or 
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not, all humans are guided by the extent of the ideal of perfect humanness they have 
uncovered, and becoming more like the ideal (God) saves one from experiences of 
dignifiedlessness. 
Again, the cumulative research results uncovered another startling finding: that each 
human makes himself or herself. The amount of effort put into uncovering God and 
responding accordingly, will be experienced as becoming more human as manifest by 
more dignifiedness. The findings of several fellow-researchers corroborated this finding 
and some religious statements about the relationship between God and humankind were 
translated into their spiritual equivalents. 
Being-spiritual as being perennially seeking the spiritual God was found to be more 
adequately expressed as being spiritually responsible. Again, the phenomenological 
approach required the researcher to return to a phenomenon already explicated in a 
preliminary way. It was found that being spiritually responsible is inescapable: a human is 
always responsible for her own becoming and also for the part-becoming of others. It was 
then found that being spiritually responsible is being spiritually answerible, and that, 
ultimately, this entails being answerible to conscience: that being-human is 
consciousness-as-conscience. 
At this stage of the research it was possible to make the distinction between moral 
conscience and spiritual (ethical) conscience. It was regarded as relevant that some 
fellow-researchers found a "must conscience" and an "adult conscience". It was found that· 
spiritual conscience is a continuum, and an explanation was given as to how spiritual 
conscience enables some people to disobey morals when they diminish the dignity of 
others, even when this disobedience may mean death. A definition of spiritual conscience 
was given which showed it to be pathic and gnostic awareness of the potential for 
· dignifiedlessness if one does not contribute to the other's dignifiedness, and the actual 
experiencing of dignifiedness when one does not so contribute. Other similar definitions in 
terms of ethicalness and Godliness, were provided. 
The fact that spiritual conscience is one's own perennial monitoring of one's progress in 
becoming more Godly, enabled the researcher to show that some religious statements 
about the will of God, accountability before God and the the invisible eye of God, 
are onticities from a spiritual perspective. It was also found that each human is 
spiritually (ultimately) answerible to himself or herself. It is spiritual God 
which calls, demands or summons each person to become more Godly (human). The 
interrelationship of agogy, becoming, and the ideal, was again illustrated when "calling" 
was shown to name service to others and serving divine purposes. 
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In reviewing the findings that being-human is being spiritually responsible, being 
spiritually answerible and spiritual conscienceness, it was realised that being-human is 
being-questioned. Humans have no choice but to question their own degree of 
becoming more human, and answer, and face the consequences in terms of 
dignifiedlessness. At this point in the research, the researcher realised that he had been 
returned full-circle to the beginning of his examination of what it means to be human. 
Being-human means perennially seeking answers to questions about one's worth so as to 
alleviate experiences of dignifiedlessness. Consequently, it was found that being-
questioned and being-questioning are inseparable: that the question, What do I 
want to be? is inseparable from the question, What have I become? 
Although it had neither been the researcher's intention nor expectation at the beginning of 
the research, it was possible to provide a definition of being-human: 
Being-human is perennially being-questioning of what it means to be human, and 
uncovering with the help of a person who has already become more human than 
oneself, what the ideal of perfect humanness is, so that by responding ethically, one 
can contribute to others' becoming more human, which enables one, when self-
questioned by one's awareness of the ideal and deviation from it, to pathically answer 
questions about being-human with experiences of dignifiedness or dignifiedlessness, 
thereby enabling one's own becoming more human. 
The researcher explained why the summary description of being-human did not diminish· 
dignity: no definition ever will penetrate to the ultimate mystery of why humans want 
to strive to experience dignifiedness, rather than die. Since the definition just presented 
had been uncovered from existentialia, it was found that it could be stated even more 
concisely: Being-human is existentiality, agogicality, ethicality, and 
spirituality. In addition, reasons were given for realising that "being-human" could be 
expressed as "humanity". Similarly, "humanness" was found to adequately name the 
inseparability of the continua of existentialness, ethicalness, agogicalness and 
spiritualness. Having uncovered that being-human is humanity and humanness, the 
researcher was able to provide an even more adequate description of adulthood as the part-
mode of humanhood of people who are so far along the continuum of humanness that they 
recognise the interrelatedness of their own and others' dignification, that they can usually 
be trusted to respond ethically without guidance in most circumstances. 
Towards the end of the research for Chapter Eight, the researcher recognised that without 
showing the interrelatedness of the many part-existentialia uncovered during the research, 
it would be more difficult to progress to finding out the implications for education, of 
existential-ethical adulthood. It was found that love as agape could be phrased as 
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"agein as agape" and that this adequately expressed the interrelatedness of the part-
realities that are humanity. 
It was found that the mutual love of agogee and agogue, in their seeking to alleviate 
existential dread in dignifiedness, by striving for Godliness, is the actualisation of 
spiritual love (agape) in a spiritual relationship. In addition, accompanying 
another to further humanness, and seeking further humanness, and accepting 
accompaniment in doing so, is a spiritual activity. Since, it was found that agogy and 
agein can be described as "spiritual partnership" and "spiritual outcome", respectively, it 
cannot be denied that accompanying another to further humanness is a spiritual 
activity, and that asking questions about being-human in order to alleviate existential 
dread, is a spiritual quest. 
That humans cannot escape existential dread and the need to seek perfection, even though 
it is unattainable, revealed that all humans are in need of existential (spiritual) 
therapy. It was explained how spiritual therapy differs from the technical help applied by 
a doctor, educator or psychiatrist, and that successful agogues, whatever the setting, are 
involved in both technical help and spiritual therapy. These findings assisted the 
researcher to understand why, in many psychologistic and sociologistic descriptions of 
adulthood, desirable behaviour is described as "healthy adulthood" and "being well 
adjusted". Having provided additional explication of agein as agape and agein as spiritual 
therapy, the researcher was able to summarise the main research findings, on what 
adulthood is. 
2.0 ADULTHOOD AS AN EXISTENTIAL-ETHICAL PHENOMENON 
As a result of considerable cumulative explication in the research, the most adequate 
fundamental and universal description of adulthood found3, was as follows: 
Adulthood is that part-mode of humanhood (independent of chronological age and 
biological maturity) of those people who have progressed so far along the continuum 
of humanness, that is, who are so sufficiently aware of humanity (ethicality, 
agogicality, spirituality and dignity), that they can, without guidance in most 
circumstances, be trusted to respond in ways which protect and enhance their own and 
others' dignity, and usually do so. 
Although the definition of adulthood just given is, for the researcher, the most adequate 
uncovered by the research, because of the interrelatedness that humanity is, and the 
inseparableness that humanness is, the description of adulthood just given could also be 
3 Chapter Eight, Paragraph 7.0. 
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expressed in four other ways. 
• Adulthood is that part-mode of humanhood (independent of chronological age and 
biological maturity) of those people who have progressed so far along the continuum 
of ethicalness, that is, who are so sufficiently aware of ethicality (awareness of 
ethicals and the requirement to respond according to them if one is to experience 
dignifiedness ), that they can, without guidance in most circumstances, be trusted to 
respond ethically, that is, according to ethicals, and usually do so. 
• Adulthood is that part-mode of humanhood (independent of chronological age and 
biological maturity) of those people who have progressed so far along the continuum 
of spiritualness, that is, who are so sufficiently aware of spirituality (awareness 
of the demand of the ideal of perfect humanness and the requirement to become more 
like it, if one is to experience dignifiedness ), that they can, without guidance in most 
circumstances, be trusted to respond spiritually4 , and usually do so. 
• Adulthood is that part-mode of humanhood (independent of chronological age and 
biological maturity) of those people who have progressed so far along the continuum 
of existentialness, that is, who are so sufficiently aware of existentiality 
(awareness that their dignifiedness depends on seeking answers to the worth of their 
lives and on answering in ways that enables others to experience the worth of their 
lives), that they can, without guidance in most circumstances, be trusted to question 
themselves and others in ways which enable becoming more human, and usually· 
do so. 
• Adulthood is that part-mode of humanhood (independent of chronological age and 
biological maturity) of those people who have progressed so far along the continuum 
of agogicalness, that is, who are so sufficiently aware of agogicality (awareness 
that one cannot experience dignifiedness without agogic-dialogic accompaniment), that 
they can without guidance in most circumstances, be trusted to usually be effective 
agogues and agogees, and usually are so. 
For the researcher, the part-definitions of adulthood just presented, when taken together, 
contribute to a detailed fundamental and universal description of what it means to be adult. 
The definition of adulthood explains why Oberholzer and Greyling (311:34) found that: 
" ... adulthood cannot be regarded as a finished product or as a gift bestowed on us on our 
4 The reader will be aware that the continuum of Godliness could also have been applied as an additional 
expression. However, because in this thesis God is the spiritual God, spiritualness is taken to include 
Godliness. 
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way through life. It is a state that must be achieved and, moreover, a state without finality 
or finitude." Similarly, Wei-ming (447:112-113) found that adulthood is not merely a 
culminating point of adolescence nor is..it achieved as a sudden sense of enveloping a 
hitherto incomprehensible mode of existence. 
Since adulthood is a part-mode of humanhood, it was expected that this description would 
be the same (although expressed slightly differently) as the definition of humanhood 
(being-human) uncovered earlier in the research5, and stated again earlier in this chapter. 
Employing the definition of humanhood, it is safe to state that being-adult (adulthood) 
involves a certain degree of awareness of: 
• existential questioning, and the requirement to question oneself and others in ways that 
contribute to dignifiedness; 
• the fact that some people are more experienced humans than oneself, and that seeking, 
and willingly accepting, guidance from them, is required to experience dignifiedness; 
• the demand of the ideal of perfect humanness (God), and the requirement to strive to 
become more like the ideal (God); 
• ethicals, and the requirement to strive to respond according to them in as many 
instances as possible; 
• the fact that as one becomes more human, the requirement to accompany others to 
further humanness, increases, and the requirement to seek to fulfil that requirement in 
relationships; 
• spiritual conscience, and the requirement to frequently self-assess one's progress 
along the continuum of humanness; and 
• the potential for any unethical response to lead to experiences of dignifiedlessness, and 
the requirement to resist responding unethically. 
Again, it was recognised that the description of adulthood just summarised is only a small 
contribution to understanding. The researcher anticipated that he, and fellow-researchers, 
would continue to enhance the adequacy of the description through additional studies. It 
was explained earlier in this thesis6, that one of the researcher's main motives for wanting 
to study adulthood, was the hope of finding a more adequate definition of adult 
education. Having thoroughly grounded adulthood as an existential-ethical part-mode of 
humanhood, and adultness as an existential-ethical part-continuum of humanness, the 
researcher felt able to state the implications of such a description for education. 
5 Chapter Eight, Paragraph 7.0. 
6 Chapter One, Paragraph 1.0. 
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3.0 EDUCATION AND THE GOAL OF EXISTENTIAL-ETHICAL 
ADULTHOOD 
Preliminary explicatory work at the beginning of the research found that "adult education" 
is used to name at least five phenomena 7. It was explained how adult education as a 
relationship between an adult educator and adult educand, was the fundamental 
phenomenon, from which the other phenomena named by "adult education" arose. 
Consequently, it became evident that the researcher's concern about lack of adequate 
definition of adult education, was concern about inadequate descriptions of the relationship 
between educator and educand. It was also found in a preliminary way that many 
educationists find that the aim of educators and educands is adulthood. 
Before examining the implications of adulthood as an existential-ethical phenomenon for 
adult education, the researcher considered it necessary to first examine the implications 
for education in general. Preliminary explication of "education" showed that when 
educationists, educators and others state that adulthood is the worthwhile goal, purpose or 
end of education, they mean neither biological maturity which happens automatically, nor 
only psychological and sociological attainment. Whether they are aware of it or not, they 
imply by adulthood, above all else, a mode of being, recognised by responsible 
behaviour, that is, a person usually and willingly responding ethically to 
others, so that dignity of self and others is protected and enhanced. The 
research revealed adulthood as, fundamentally, an existential-ethical phenomenon. 
As the reader is aware, the research uncovered, in some detail, what it means to usually 
and willingly respond ethically to others so that dignity of self and others is protected and· 
enhanced. In addition, it has been explained how the role of the benevolent fellow-human 
who is more experienced in humanness (the agogue), is essential if the less experienced 
human (the agogee) is to learn to usually and willingly respond ethically to others. 
Consequently, since existential-ethical adulthood is the goal of educators and educands, 
and since this goal can be achieved only by accompaniment of fellow-humans who are 
further along the continuum of humanness, it is safe to find that: 
education is the accompaniment of a person (the agogee) to such a 
degree of awareness of existentiality, ethicality, agogicality and 
spirituality (humanity), that he or she will, without guidance in most 
instances, usually act ethically, that is, in ways that protect and 
enhance others' and hence his or her own, dignity. 
However, such a definition does not take into account those agogees who already usually 
act ethically, that is, who are already in the part-mode of humanhood called "adulthood". It 
also does not account for the further becoming of agogues. In addition, such a definition is 
7 Chapter One, Paragraph 2.5. 
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so concise that it does not provide a basis for explaining the implications for educators, of 
education as an existential-ethical phenomenon. Consequently, a longer, even if 
tautologous, description is necessary: 
Education is the many and perennial agogical relationships a person (the 
agogee) participates in, during which the fellow-humans who are further 
along the continuum of humanness (agogues) provide such effective 
accompaniment (love as agape), that the agogee frequently experiences 
dignifiedness, and either becomes so aware of the interrelatedness of his 
or her own and others' dignifiedness, that he or she eventually moves 
sufficiently far along the continuum of humanness, so that without 
guidance in most instances, he or she will usually respond ethically to 
others, that is, becomes an adult or, if he or she already usually 
responds ethically to others, becomes even more adult; and during 
which, the agogues themselves, in seeing the agogee experiencing 
dignifiedness from their accompaniment, experience dignifiedness, learn 
even more about being effective agogues, and move even further along 
the continuum of humanness. 
This definition of education required the researcher to amend his earlier finding that the 
one phenomenon named by "adult education" being studied in the research, was the 
relationship. It is agogy that is the relationship, and education is a number of such 
relationships. The reader may remember that the researcher hoped that the research 
would reveal a more adequate definition of adult education. Having described adulthood 
and education more adequately, the researcher considered that a more adequate definition 
of adult education would be: 
Adult education is the many and perennial agogical relationships a 
person (andragogee) who (whatever his or her chronological age and 
biological maturity) has progressed so far along the continuum of 
humanness, that he or she can, without guidance in most circumstances, 
be trusted to respond in ways which protect and enhance his or her own 
and others' dignity, and usually do so, participates in, during which the 
fellow-humans who are further along the continuum of humanness 
(agogues) provide such effective accompaniment (love as agape), that 
the agogee frequently experiences dignifiedness, and becomes even more 
adult (human) and during which, the agogues themselves, in seeing the 
agogee experiencing dignifiedness from their accompaniment, experience 
dignifiedness, learn even more about being effective agogues, and move 
even further along the continuum of humanness. 
361 
Throughout the research, there have been instances when the researcher has been worried 
by the radicalness of his findings. Even at this ending stage of the research, yet another 
finding - the existential-ethical definition of education just provided - was 
worrying. The researcher considered it a scientifically legitimate task to briefly explain his 
three main concerns, together with an explanation of what alleviated them. Not to have 
done this may have been to ignore the reader's possible similar concerns, and hinder the 
dialogue taking place through the medium of this thesis. 
Firstly, in his years of studying Anglo-American philosophy of education, the researcher 
had not encountered a definition of education even remotely similar to the one just 
provided. Even when fellow-researchers had regarded education as an existential 
phenomenon, as Kneller (218), Morris (287) and Vandenberg (430) did, the ethical and 
the agogical are not adequately described. However, the researcher realised that he could 
not, and never would be able to, study all researchers' findings in the philosophy of 
education. It is likely that some Anglo-American philosophers of education have arrived at 
similar descriptions, although not using the exact same wording: Burstow (54:193-202) is 
an example in relation to adult education. In addition, the researcher's worries were 
alleviated by the extensive findings of fellow-researchers in the Republic of South Africa 
who have considered education from a Continental European existential philosophical 
perspective. It was expected that some philosophers of education recording their findings 
in French, German and Dutch languages, for example, would have found education to be 
an existential-ethical phenomenon. 
Secondly, even at first glance, the researcher recognised that the existential-ethical 
definition of education would require recommending considerable changes in the way 
many educators perceive education, and in the way terms related to "education", are used. 
As the reader knows, the researcher has already introduced several new terms in this 
thesis, and he was concerned that suggesting even more changes in terminology use, 
especially regarding "education" with its long-established meanings, would discourage 
readers from considering the research findings. However, it was realised, that the 
researcher had the scientific duty to explain findings in the most adequate way possible. If 
it can be shown that current terminology usage hinders understanding, there is an 
obligation to find new ways of expressing findings - even if the new use of terms appears 
unusual. The researcher took considerable care to ensure that new terminology was 
introduced only when no other way could be found to alleviate misunderstanding. 
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Thirdly, it has already been explained8 how a definition is a shorthand description. The 
reader is aware that the existential-ethical definition of adulthood and consequently 
education, have been possible only because of the findings uncovered during the extensive 
research into what it means to be human. The researcher was concerned that some fellow-
educationists and educators may expect to gain an understanding of what education as an 
existential-ethical phenomenon is, from the definition alone. Not gaining that 
understanding from the definition, some may dismiss it as too complex or "nonsensical". 
However, it was realised that many fellow-researchers would recognise the need to 
understand "agogical-dialogical" and "humanness", for example, before being able to 
understand the definition. In addition, the researcher realised that he could not influence 
the way in which fellow-researchers and others would respond to his findings. 
In summary, the researcher realised that to fulfil the requirements of responsible scientist, 
he would have to record the implications of an existential-ethical definition of education -
even though many fellow-researchers would find them radical and the terminology 
unusual. Education as an existential-ethical phenomenon is thoroughly grounded in the 
research findings of what it means to be human, and is not just the wish, "philosophy" or 
whim of the researcher. Beyers Nel (28:70) provided a brief discussion on the role of 
philosophers of education and made a distinction between the philosophy of education, a 
philosophy of education and a philosophy for education. For the researcher, the research 
has been a study in the philosophy of education, but the results of the research are not a 
philosophy of, or for, education. The adequacy of the results can be tested by fellow-
researchers. Towards the end of this chapter, the researcher will give his personal 
reflections on what the research results imply for education. However, the researcher is 
unsure if it is this kind of personal reflection that fellow-researchers mean when they use 
"a philosophy of education". With this background, it was possible to describe further, 
what education as an existential-ethical phenomenon is. 
4. 0 EDUCATION AS AN EXISTENTIAL-ETHICAL PHENOMENON 
Since it is the goal of education, many of the findings about existential-ethical adulthood 
presented in this thesis are also findings about education. Consequently, the more detailed 
description of existential-ethical education to follow has already been grounded, and it was 
decided to employ a concise, point-form approach. 
4 .1 EDUCATION IS NOT AN AUTOMATIC PROCESS 
Education is not driven by some stimulus-response mechanism. As Rich (340: 17) 
explained, and as results reported in this thesis show, humans are not homeostatic 
mechanisms. Consequently, referring to education as a process (49) (77:34) (119:21) 
8 Chapter One, Paragraph 3.2.1. 
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(190:8); a family of processes (119:17) (170:17); pruning a tree (119:12); or planting a 
garden (168:viii), for example, is inadequate description. In addition, referring to humans 
as malleable and a raw material (285:30) and wax to be hardened and then moulded 
(168: 146), and to pupils who can absorb (168:43), is not only dignity-diminishing, but 
inadequate, mechanistic description. Education does not happen by itself, and words such 
as "development" and "growth" used in association with education are inadequate 
description, and should be replaced with "becoming more human". Beyers Nel 
(27:10) found similarly. 
4. 2 EDUCATION IS UNIQUE TO HUMANKIND 
As explained in some detail in this thesis, and corroborated by some fellow-researchers 
(90:4) (119: 18) (170:78) (190:57-58) (209:33) (461:3), only humans are existents. 
Consequently, statements such as "[education being] ... made possible by the capacity, 
common to organic life but reaching its highest level in human beings ... " (119:18), and 
references to animals being educated (136:73) (235:60) (309:14) or the education of an 
animal (136:73), are inadequate description. Highet (168:34) not only equated humans 
with animals, but offered dignity-diminishing advice: teachers should learn about the 
thoughts and emotions of the young " ... just as you would learn to understand horses and 
dogs - or other animals ... the very small ones [children] are often more like birds ... ". 
4.3 EDUCATION IS UNIVERSAL 
The research has revealed that humanness, no matter what the culture or historical time, is 
becoming-more-human, and that assisting people to become more human (education) is a· 
universal phenomenon. This does not mean that every relationship is educative nor that 
people are involved in education at every moment in their lives. It does mean that 
education is, fundamentally, the same phenomenon for all humans, even though the 
technical content of teaching may differ. This is why fellow-researchers (284:97) (308) 
(311) (310) ( 419:vii) are able to refer to "principles of education". Consequently, findings 
such as those of Lester Smith (244:1) that: "Education not only changes with the years; it 
is sensitive to place as it is to time ... ", are inadequate description. 
Nunn (308:9) found that because the ideals of life are eternally at variance, educational 
theories will vary; Bruner (49:8), that because the goals of students change, the goals of 
schools and education change; Niemi (305:4-5), that the motives of adults and children 
differ; Lowe (254:49), that each person has a unique set of needs; and Cross (68:97), that: 
"Motives differ for different groups of learners at different stages of life." However, the 
research has shown that the fundamental need of all humans is the need to alleviate 
existential dread, which in tum manifests as a need for experiences of dignifiedness. 
Fellow-researchers have expressed similar findings, although in different words. For 
example, Monette (282: 117) found that there are ultimate goals which give rise to felt 
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needs, and Benseman (25:13), and Atwood and Ellis9 referred to expressed or felt needs 
as symptomatic needs because, they are symptoms of needs at another level. 
Consequently, while it cannot be denied that particular needs of a number of people are 
different, this does not mean that education changeslO. 
The reader will notice that real needs (25:15), meta-needs (270:43) and primordial needs 
(11:23), are expressions of existential need, which in turn, is the need for a sympathetic, 
more human, fellow-human - an agogue - on the way to further humanness. This is why 
Goldstein and Goldstein ( 131:6-7) found that educationists are seeking "unity in diversity, 
for common patterns in what seem like unlike events ... ", and Brubacher (48:1-2) 
suggested seeking some common denominator or principle which will enable the resolving 
of the conflict between apparently differing needs. 
4. 4 EDUCATION IS INTENTIONAL 
Since only humans are free to choose, only humans are intentionality (84:6) (119:14) 
(285:67), and can take deliberate (170:78) action. Both the agogue and agogee, 
pathically knowing their existential predicament, purposefully seek to accompany and be 
accompanied, respectively, to further humanness, that is, to experience dignifiedness. For 
the researcher, examples of the outward manifestation of this intentionality are: an 
employee registering for a training course even though not required to by her employer; a 
person buying a "self-help" book; a university student asking for a particular lecturer to be 
appointed as his supervisor; and school children wanting to attend school. The fact that 
many employees may not want to participate in training courses, and children truant from · 
school, reveals that they do not, or from past experiences do not expect to, find the 
experiences dignifying 11. 
The reader will be aware by now that education being intentional, arises from the 
intentional initiation of agogic dialogue: the call for assistance from the agogee and the 
accepting response of the agogue. Consequently, while in popular language one could 
state that mass media (76:43) (119:15), the environment (119:15), the street (285:24), 
(119: 15), universities (450: 163), schools (168: 134), films (49:86), books (168:245), and 
machines (49:83), educate or teach, this is scientifically inadequate description. Inanimate 
9 Paraphrased in Benseman (25:15). 
10 Again, the problem of terminology arose. If by "education", the fellow-researchers mean the subjects 
taught in schools, say, then their findings would be adequate. Computer studies would not have 
appeared in a school curriculum in the 1930s. However, the research has shown that the existential-
ethical phenomenon was the fundamental one named by "education", not the technical transmission of 
information. 
11 These are the researcher's preliminary findings from discussions with participants on training courses, 
and children truanting from school. This is a complex matter requiring further research. For example, 
if parents have had dignity-diminishing experiences at school, they may in subtle ways condition their 
children to expect the same. 
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artifacts, machines and buildings cannot "do" anything. It is journalists, neighbours, 
lecturers, teachers and scriptwriters, for example, who have the potential to contribute to 
educationl2. 
The fact that education is intentional, makes it inadequate description to state that animals 
learn (235:60-61) or teach their young. Teaching and learning are intentional activities and 
as far as it is possible to know, animals do not set out to learn how to kill prey or to teach 
their young how to build a nest. Animals, just like humans, are conditioned and can "pick 
up" beneficial behaviours, but only humans are able to teach and learn. 
4. 5 EDUCATION DOES NOT INVOLVE A HIDDEN CURRICULUM 
For the researcher, "the hidden curriculum" is a phrase used, largely in educational 
institutions, to describe all the possible activities, peoples' attitudes, and resources, which 
are not part of the formal taught subject curriculum, and which are deemed to influence, to 
some extent, what pupils think about themselves and regard as appropriate behaviour. For 
example, if teachers say they respect the dignity of all pupils, but take no action to have the 
pupils' toilets kept clean and functioning, the hidden curriculum conveys to pupils that 
they are not valued. Pupils seeing a teacher treat a school janitor with disrespect may pick 
up that it is acceptable to treat people disrespectfully. 
However, since education is intentional, the influence (conditioning effect) of the hidden 
curriculum is not a part of education, and it is inadequate description to use the words 
"teach" and "learn" to name conditioning. For example, it is inadequate description to state -
that education includes indirect and incidental influences (244:8); and to state that a father 
who never says more than 'hello' to his son and goes out to the nearest pub every 
evening, is teaching the boy (168:4-5); that students learn almost unconsciously who are 
the leaders of men (168: 136); and that some doctors, priests and authors do not know they 
are teaching the public (168:vii). However, although education does not involve the 
hidden curriculum, the more the agogue eliminates any negative influences of the hidden 
curriculum, the more effective he or she will be. 
4.6 EDUCATION REQUIRES A BENEVOLENT, SUPPORTIVE 
FELLOW-HUMAN, THAT IS, AN AGOGUE 
The research has made explicit why a person cannot become more human without the 
assistance of an agogue - someone who is rationally aware of the fundamental need to 
alleviate existential yearning and, who being further along the continuum of ethicalness, 
knows what is required to assist the pupil or student in experiencing dignifiedness. 
12 The researcher accepts that when one says "universities educate", one is acknowledging that it is the 
people in the universities that educate. However, the description is still misleading in that, if there 
was no university, the lecturer could still contribute to education. 
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Considerable detail has already been provided on what being an effective agogue entails, 
and later in this chapter13, those findings will be applied in a summary of what 
essentially agogic orientated teaching is. In the meantime, it cannot be denied that 
while fear of sarcasm might well "help" someone to remember technical facts, it will not 
help him to become more human and experience dignifiedness. Fear of a beating may 
"encourage" people to behave for the while they are under threat, but because they have 
not uncovered the interrelationship of their own and others' dignifiedness, their 
responsible behaviour has less chance of being maintained when the threat is removed. 
The more the agogue is aware of non-agogic responses which exacerbate existential dread, 
and takes steps to resist them, the more effective education will be. 
4.7 EDUCATION REQUIRES AT LEAST TWO PEOPLE 
Since both agogue and agogee are required for education, to refer to self-education 
(324:38), a human educating himself (90:21), teaching himself (190:57) and instruction 
without teachers (23:161) is inadequate description. As Degenaar (81:268) found: 
education is " ... becoming through relating." It is self-explanatory that a person cannot 
become more human unless there is a fellow-human, more experienced in humanness, 
who is prepared to accompany her. It could be claimed that one could find out more about 
what it means to be human from a book. However, was it not another human who wrote 
the book, and is not the writing and reading of a book, a dialogic relationship? When one 
reads a book, one is in dialogue with the author and one is not alone. Degenaar (81 :268) 
referred to the agogic-dialogic that is education as "co-investigating dialogue." 
In addition, the more the author is able to show the respect for the reader's dignity and 
encourage the reader to ask existential questions and seek answers, the more effective the 
agogy through the medium of the book, will bel4. It could also be claimed that it is 
possible to become "educated about" animal and plant life by studying without the 
assistance of others. However, the reader will realise that this becoming knowledgeable of 
technical matters is not the same as becoming more human - more educatedl5. 
4.8 EDUCATION DOES NOT REQUIRE THE AGOGUE TO BE 
PHYSICALLY PRESENT 
Agogy can take place through a book, audio tape, and newspaper, and over the telephone, 
radio or television, for example. As Newbyl6 found: "I may read the work of an author 
13 Paragraph 5.1. 
14 The researcher has previously (344) offered recommendations for agogic journalism. However, what it 
means to offer agogic accompaniment through the medium of a book, requires further investigation. 
15 It is even debatable whether one can become knowledgeable on one's own, because the solitary 
naturalist would have had to have some inspiration and rudimentary training in order to arrive at a 
research question and conduct the studies scientifically. In addition, it would be the evaluation of her 
findings by other humans that would assist in progressing the naturalist's learning. 
16 Quoted in Woodbridge (466:36). 
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and discover a unity of thought and depths of understanding that bind me spiritually." 
Buber (50: 125) found similarly: "Not only is the shared silence of two such persons a 
dialogue, but also their dialogue continues, even when they are separated in space, as the 
continual potential presence of the one to the other ... ". It is for this reason that one hears 
phrases such as: "distance education", "newspapers in education" and "using 
the television to educate". For the researcher, the possibility of agogy at a distance 
and its effectiveness, still requires considerable research. However, the reader will be 
aware that if the "distance education" involves merely the transmission of information, it is 
a misnomer• 7. Jonas (194: 11) illustrated that respect for the dignity of others does not 
apply only to people in the present, but also in the future: "Do not compromise the 
conditions for an indefinite continuation of humanity on earth." 
4.9 EDUCATION INVOLVES RELATIONSHIPS THAT ARE PERSONAL 
AND ONE-TO-ONE 
It has already been explained why agogic dialogue is not just two-way communication, but 
a mutual involvement towards becoming more human. That agogic dialogue is essential to 
education is expressed by Buber (50:124): "The relation in education is one of pure 
dialogue." Unless there is a pathic understanding of mutual humanity, recognition of 
dignity and mutual concern for the well-being of the other, agogy and education, are not 
under way. Consequently, merely organising for students to be in a lecture hall with the 
lecturer, and pupils in a classroom with the teacher, is not facilitating agogy and education. 
Unless there is some personal recognition of common humanness between lecturer and 
student, education is not under way. 
It might be claimed that the recent financial pressure on educational institutions in many 
countries, has resulted in such large classes that education is hindered. It cannot be denied 
that achieving agogic dialogue is more difficult when there are large numbers of students 
attending lectures. However, even in a large lecture hall, there will be opportunities for 
appropriate eye contact and question-and-answer sessions, for examplel8. In addition, the 
lecture is only one opportunity for dialogue. Students may be allocated tutors and be 
required to attend tutorials. It would then be the tutor who would have greater possibility 
of being an agogue, undertaking, in addition to personal attention in small-group tutorials, 
comments on written work, and private meetings. Consequently, lecturers and tutors are 
obliged to create circumstances for more personal, one-to-one recognition of humanness, 
if it is to be legitimately claimed that they have contributed to the student's education. 
17 Although it might sound strange, agogic dialogue means that even though a person has died, he or she 
still has the potential to be an agogue through the written or recorded word (344:79). Some fellow-
researchers (90:6) ( 119: 18) find that at least two living people are necessary for education. This issue 
could be one for further research. 
l8 Large class sizes is not a new development. In 1980, in the School of Economics in the University of 
Cape Town, the researcher gave lectures, using a neck microphone, to approximately 600 students at 
one time. 
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4.10 EDUCATION REQUIRES ONE PARTICIPANT TO BE FURTHER 
ALONG THE CONTINUUM OF HUMANNESS 
It has already been explained that all humans are of equal ontic worth and that any 
response which diminishes this human dignity, results in one's own dignity being 
diminished. The reader is reminded that a person's degree of humanness is not related to 
any physical characteristic or to chronological age, but to his or her degree of adherence to 
ethicals. Consequently, to state that one person is less human than another is not 
derogatory, but is an expression of the fact that humans are motivated by an ideal of 
perfect humanness, and that some people behave more like the ideal than others. All 
humans, no matter how far along the continuum of humanness they are, require respect 
for dignity. However, it stands to reason that, unless a person has encountered the 
difficulties involved in becoming more human and overcome them to some extent, and is 
more of an embodiment of the ideal of perfect humanness, his or her capability to 
accompany others to further humanness is diminished. 
4.11 EDUCATION IS MANY AND PERENNIAL INSTANCES OF 
AGOGY 
A major finding of the research was that education is not agogy itself, but a person's 
experiencing of many instances of agogy. Consequently, describing education as a task 
(119:28) (190:xii), a business (190:3), an enterprise (321:31), a situation (119:14), an 
impact (119:18), a series of incidents (184:19), a means (49:1), and an instrument 
( 190: 14 ), for example, is inadequate description. Since it is each instance of agogy that is 
the practice, education is not a practice, nor is it, as some researchers (119:1) (222:6). 
(308:9) state, a science or an art. It could be that many of the names just listed can be 
applied adequately to other phenomena named by "education", but whether or not this is 
so, was beyond the scope of the research19. 
4.12 EDUCATION IS NOT COMPLETABLE 
Since humans cannot escape existential dread and yearning, and since humanness is a 
continuum and the ideal of perfect humanness recedes as one approaches it, no human can 
be completed or perfected. Consequently, phrases such as: a fully developed human being 
(190:8); the function of education is ultimately, becoming fully human (270:162-163); part 
of every complete character (168: 140); many people do not become fully human (340:4); 
adulthood is " ... a life sphere into which the child enters after completion of education 
... " (439:74); and the tutor's business is to make the child into a complete man (168:110); 
are inadequate descriptions. The fact that education is incompletable is shown in terms 
such as "adult education", "lifelong education" and "continuing education" (190:15) 
(450:133), and in findings that education continues throughout life (190:54) (450:131). 
19 For example, if by "science" is meant discipline, then, that would be adequate description of education 
as a subject or discipline. 
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Degenaar (81 :269) found that education can never stop and that to cope " ... with the ever-
present task of fully becoming human, he [humankind] has to be involved in continual 
education." Achieving adulthood is not a sign for education to stop, because as Degenaar 
(81 :269) found, and for the reasons expressed in the results of the research, it is necessary 
for adults to be involved in education. 
It is understandable that "continuing education" and "lifelong education" may be used to 
name many different things. However, as far as education as an existential-ethical 
phenomenon is concerned, there is no guarantee that education will be lifelong or 
continuing: continuing education will depend on initiating agogic relationships. From the 
fundamental definitions of adulthood and adult education presented in this chapter, 
grouping people by chronological age and then referring to "child education", "adult 
education" and "old-people education", is inadequate description20. 
4 .13 EDUCATION IS NOT LIMITED TO ONE INSTITUTION OR ONE 
AGOGUE 
Since education comprises many instances of agogy, it will be many agogues who 
contribute to an agogee becoming more human. In addition, as already explained, agogic 
relationships can be initiated, for example, in the family home, foster home, school, 
hospital, nursing home, prison, workplace, youth club and place of religious worship, or 
through the newspaper or radio, for example21. Coleman (62:435) found that schooling 
remains a small proportion of education. Consequently, as long as they are 
agogues, doctors, teachers, parents, prison officers, religious leaders and journalists, for 
example, are contributing to a person's education and can be called "educators" and their 
accompaniment, "educative". It is for this reason that one hears statements such as, 
"parents are the primary educators". Why then is the term "educational 
institution", reserved for only schools, colleges and universities? 
For the researcher, only schools, colleges and universities, are called "educational 
institutions" for two interrelated reasons. The first reason is a traditional use of 
"education" to name passing on of cultural knowledge in the form of mainly 
historical and technical information, and skills. Just as a medical institution's main 
purpose has come to be regarded as curing diseases and mending broken bodily organs; 
and a penal institution's, as punishing and reforming offenders; so an educational 
institution's main (but not only) task has come to be generally regarded as arranging the 
20 Even using "adult education" for administrative purposes, leads to considerable misunderstanding 
between adulthood as chronological age and adulthood as existential-ethical achievement. Choosing 
suitable terms to assist administration was beyond the scope of the research. 
21 Just why this is so, has been explained in detail in Chapter One, Paragraph 2.6. Newton (301:240-
249) provided an example of what the agogue and agogee should be striving for in a medical setting. 
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teaching and learning necessary to prepare people22 technically so that they 
can adequately cope, and even excel, in societal roles such as employee, 
parent, city councillor and artist, for example23. However, many people, from all walks of 
life, perceive that excelling in academic work (understanding and applying technical 
knowledge) is the main contributor to excelling in societal roles24. This perception is 
reinforced in the United Kingdom by the government requiring the annual production of 
data, ranking schools according to examination pass results. Consequently, the word 
"educators" has come to be used mainly for those people who are active in teaching others 
to learn the technical knowledge and skills perceived by a society to be required to 
successfully fulfil social roles. 
Yet, as the research has revealed, when so-called educators and 
educationists refer to adulthood, they ultimately imply the existential-
ethical phenomenon; not psychological, intellectual or sociological attainment. The 
research results have shown that being an expert in, for example, chemistry, history, 
moral philosophy, accounting or theology, in itself, is not an indication of a person's 
ethicalness. An educated person is not necessarily a knowledgeable person, but is 
essentially an ethical person. To use "education" to name the technical preparation of 
people for success in societal roles, and to use "educator" and "educand" to refer to 
teaching and learning technical information, is inadequate description. 
Consequently, when Macdonald (260:55) found that: " ... the educated man is not 
necessarily a good man.", he is referring to some phenomenon other than education as an . 
existential-ethical phenomenon. For the researcher, those institutions usually called 
"educational institutions", would be more adequately named "teaching and learning 
institutions". In addition, those people working within teaching and learning institutions 
whose main task is to pass on knowledge and skills, are more adequately described as 
"teachers"25, and those studying to gain the knowledge and skills, "learners". 
However, the second reason for only schools, colleges and universities, being called 
"educational institutions", complicates the explanation just given. Despite the fact that 
most people regard academic success as the main requirement for success in life, it is well 
22 
"People" has been used to include pupils and students - irrespective of chronological age. 
23 The researcher accepts that this subparagraph contains several generalised statements. The scope of the 
research did not permit even a concise background to the historical and current ways in which societies 
have organised the passing on of cultural information and skills to the next generation. In addition, to 
have dealt with every possible exception to the statements, would have resulted in this, already 
lengthy thesis, becoming even longer. 
24 However, as the results reported in this thesis have shown, this is a contradiction: when questioned 
fundamentally, most people imply an ethical phenomenon when they say "adulthood" and "education". 
Practical illustrations of this are provided in Paragraph 4.14 of the current chapter. 
25 
"Teachers" includes all kinds of teachers such as lecturers, professors, instructors, trainers and tutors. 
Considering whether or not these terms name exactly the same role, was beyond the scope of the 
research. 
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known that many people expect teaching and learning institutions to assist students to 
become good citizens. In addition, many officials and politicians who make policy 
regarding teaching and learning, and most teachers and those who research teaching and 
learning, consider that teaching and learning institutions are required to "develop" the 
whole person and to assist with moral, religious, and spiritual and personal 
"development". The reason this is so arises from the intuitive and/or rational 
understanding of what the research has made explicit: that when most people refer to 
"developing the whole person morally, religiously, personally and spiritually", they mean, 
in effect, assisting people to become more human. This means that, whether societies 
and teachers are aware of it or not, teachers are expected to support others in becoming 
more human, that is, to be educative teachers (educators). 
Consequently, the terms "teacher" and "educator" are not synonyms, just as "school" and 
"educational institution" are not. For example, a teacher may be highly competent at 
passing on the knowledge and skills of chemistry, yet have little concern for his pupils' 
becoming more human. In addition, a very skilled bank robber could be the teacher of 
several trainee bank robbers: this teacher is not an educator. A government may establish a 
school to pass on knowledge and skills about how to track down and kill people of a 
particular religion: that school is not an educational institution. As already explained, 
doctors, parents and lawyers, for example, although they are not teachers, can also be 
involved in educative healing, educative parenting, and educative advocating, 
that is, be educators26. However, unlike in the case of teachers, the expectation of being 
an educator is not made an explicit requirement. For example, this research has shown that · 
doctors, in addition to treating a physical ailment, have the potential to (and are required to 
if they wish to experience dignifiedness) accompany the patient to becoming more human. 
However, the researcher has not, as yet, seen explicit references to the doctor being 
required to contribute to the moral and spiritual becoming of their patients, that is, to 
doctors as educative doctors27. 
It is only because they are expected to be educative (support people in their becoming 
more human) that teachers, and teaching and learning institutions, are called "educators" 
and "educational institutions", respectively. It might be claimed that teaching and learning 
institutions are also called "educational institutions" because have the greatest potential for 
education: people spend considerable time in them and teachers must usually undergo 
26 A doctor, for example, can also have among her roles, teacher, mother, and chair of the community 
council. If a doctor was required to teach university students for one day per week, she would be, for 
that day, a teacher and would be expected to be an educator. The researcher found that doctor-as· 
teacher is inadequate description, but further consideration of this question was beyond the scope of 
the research. 
27 There are, however, other indications that the doctor is required to be an educative doctor, and these are 
detailed in Paragraph 4.14 in the current chapter. 
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extensive training. However, in a preliminary way, the researcher found this claim 
unjustified for two main reasons. Firstly, other institutions such as families and voluntary 
youth organisations have considerable potential for contributing to education28. Secondly, 
if the training of teachers does not equip them for understanding what humanness is and 
how to be an effective agogue, it is unlikely that they can be educators. 
In addition, even if teachers are trained as agogues, they may not apply the principles. If 
this were so, then some of what is going on in teaching and learning institutions, would 
not be educative. Indeed, recently in the United Kingdom, some schools have been 
closed, or threatened with closure, because the quality of education has been deemed by 
Her Majesty's Inspectors to be of "poor quality", and a few pupils are now suing the 
directors of education of their local authority education departments because "they were 
not given a good education". Reporting the facts just given, is not necessarily a criticism 
of some teachers: the researcher has revealed that agogy is co-responsibility and there are 
likely to be some legitimate reasons why teachers are not able to apply their training. 
However, the researcher considers that those who are critical of schooling, are in effect, 
responding to a lack of educative teaching29. 
In summary, the researcher considers that the existential phenomenological approach used 
for the research, enabled the uncovering of a fundamental definition of education as many 
and perennial agogical relationships leading to adulthood and then further 
humanhood30. Consequently, using "educators" and "educational institutions" to name 
only teachers, and teaching and learning institutions, is inadequate description. Agogues in · 
any institution are contributing to education. Consequently, any organisation which 
contributes to education is an "educational institution". Based on the results of the 
research, the term "educator" can be legitimately reserved for teachers, nurses, parents and 
lawyers, for example, who are agogues, that is, whose work is educative; who contribute 
to agogees becoming more human (ethical). The reader will have noticed that throughout 
this thesis, the researcher has been using the terms "educator" and "adult educator" to 
name only teachers. The findings just stated required the researcher to use these terms to 
name agogues in whatever setting they practice agogy31. 
28 See Robb (535). 
29 See, for example, Illich (180), Postman and Weingartner (327) and Reimer (338). In addition, the 
researcher is aware that some parents are beginning to teach their children at home, and that in the 
United Kingdom, there is an organisation called "Human Scale Education", (96 Carlingcott, Near 
Bath, BA2 SAW, England, United Kingdom) which promotes the benefits of very small schools. 
30 This sentence is somewhat tautologous because, "leading to adulthood and then further humanhood" is 
already taken into account in "agogical relationships". 
3 l The researcher was aware that reserving "education" to name the fundamental phenomenon of the 
many and perennial agogical relationships leading to adulthood and then further 
humanhood, would have extensive implications for the use of other terms, but consideration of 
these was beyond the scope of the current research. 
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4.14 EDUCATION INVOLVES BECOMING MORE ETHICAL • MORE 
HUMAN 
Since, as the research has shown, education is an existential-ethical phenomenon, the 
reader will not be surprised that it involves both the agogee and agogue becoming more 
ethical - more fundamentally moral; more fundamentally responsible. The research has 
revealed that even if something is called "education", if it does not included assisting 
people to become more ethical, it is not education. This onticity is evident in practice in at 
least four ways. 
Firstly, many "educationists" stated directly that they found education to be a moral matter 
(18:100) (285:90-96) (415); that only moral experiences educate (21:14) (183:6); and 
that education is the imparting of worthwhile values as an improving ( 119:21) ( 461 :7) or 
desirable (170:20) phenomenon in a moral or ethical sense. Summarising the findings 
of twenty eight philosophers and educationists, from ancient times to the present, Adler 
(3:279) found that: "ONE OPINION FROM which there is hardly any dissenting voice in 
the great books is that education should aim to make men good as men and as citizens." 
Since ethicalness is humanness, education is agogical relationships which enable a person 
to become more human. As Degenaar (81 :267) found: " ... both educator and pupil should 
continually search for the moral point of view in the never-ending process of fully 
becoming human." This explains why Jarvis (184:7) found that if education does not 
allow the participants the opportunity to realise and develop their humanity, it is not 
education. Similarly, it is because humanness involves responsibleness, that Sharp 
(389:32) found that being-responsible is essential to education. "To deny that there should 
be an education for responsibility would seem to be a denial of the very process of 
education itself." The research justified the researcher anticipating that had fellow-
researchers continued to search more radically for what morality and responsibility mean, 
they would have found being-ethical. In addition, "develop their humanity" would 
have been found to be equivalent to "becoming more human". 
Ethicalness may, in rare instances, involve educators in stating views (and encouraging 
educands to think about them) which do not accord with the traditional norms of a society 
or group. As Degenaar (81:269) found: "To see education not as a critical activity but as a 
mere introduction to the values of the group ... to which one belongs in society is fatal to 
the moral dimension of education." Roebben (415:5-8) found similarly when he found it 
necessary to go beyond a particular societal ethos to reflective ethics, with the aim of 
(415:7) finding "universal-ethical principles". The reader will remember that 
education does not have an ethical dimension: ethicalness is essential to education. 
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Secondly, in his role as an educator of managers in industry and the professions, the 
researcher has noticed a demand for customer care and client care training courses. It 
is well-known that most trainee doctors and lawyers for example, must undertake courses 
in effective communication and are examined on their "bed-side manner" (296:24-28). In 
addition, the researcher has also noticed the increase in managers being advised and 
trained to care for their subordinates and to treat them with respect (1) (56) (139) (152) 
(325). It has already been shown32 that leaders showing respect for their people gain 
better results. 
It cannot be denied that customer care training is initiated for commercial motives, or out 
of self-interest, both short term and long term33. It is being increasingly recognised that 
treating people with respect and politeness builds loyalty, encourages more purchases, and 
increases the chance of existing customers or clients recommending the business or 
service. Since managers in many organisations now issue customer satisfaction 
questionnaires, individuals are becoming more aware that being respectful and polite is 
necessary for promotion and even, in some cases, to keep one's employment. In addition, 
it cannot be denied, that for many managers the main initial motive in caring for and 
respecting employees, is to enhance productivity34. 
However, despite the ulterior motives just stated, the examples illustrate an intuitive 
understanding of what the research has revealed: humans require experiences of 
dignifiedness if they are to feel satisfied with any human relationship - however short. 
Since experiences of dignifiedness arise only from ethicalness, it is safe to state that · 
customer care, client care and effective people-management courses, are courses in 
how to be ethical. No matter how technically competent managers, doctors or teachers 
are, unless they are aware of humanity and respond ethically, they will hinder the 
employee's, patient's and learner's becoming more human, which will manifest as 
dissatisfaction at work, in the hospital or clinic and in the school. In tum, it is safe to state 
that this dissatisfaction will most likely result in under performance, slower healing and 
slower learning. Consequently, the "education" of managers, doctors and teachers, for 
example, is not education unless it includes assisting them to be ethical35. 
32 Chapter Six, Paragraph 3.0. The scope of the research did not permit detailed corroboration of these 
observations. Many quality newspapers also contain evidence: see for example, The listening 
managers, Sunday Times, 12 February 1989, page 18; Job satisfaction equals good work, Scotland on 
Sunday, February 12, 1989; and Leaming from the Japanese, Scotland on Sunday, June 4, 1989. 
33 Even in non-commercial organisations such as universities, charities and non-private hospitals, 
courses on how to communicate better with customers or clients, have a financial motive. If a 
university lecturer, for example, treats his students with disrespect, they will boycott his classes and 
tell others not to attend. The scope of the research did not permit further explication of the possible 
relationship between self-interest and customer/client care. 
34 The researcher (349:45-63) has shown in a separate study how effective management includes ethical 
management. 
35 Further evidence of this, is that the researcher knows of at least two journals devoted to examining 
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Thirdly, the researcher has noticed the demand for more teaching of communication 
skills in teaching and learning institutions, and in industry. Employers are noticing that 
poor communication skills cause difficulties at work and are requiring employees to attend 
a wide range of communication skills courses. Employers are also requesting that 
graduates of teaching and learning institutions be better prepared to communicate 
effectively in the workplace. In addition, teachers are recognising more and more, that 
effective communication skills, not technical expertise, is the main factor in success in 
work, social and family life36. When course contents and books on communication topics 
such as effective presentation skills, effective report writing, effective chairmanship of 
meetings, and assertiveness, for example, are examined, they show that successful 
communication depends on treating others with respect - recognising their dignity37. In 
other words, communication skills being included in the curriculum of teaching and 
learning institutions, is evidence that teachers and policy-makers realise that competence 
in technical skills is insufficient to prepare people for continued 
dignification throughout life, and that education involves becoming more ethical. 
Fourthly, in the United Kingdom, it is widely accepted that teachers, especially in primary 
and secondary schools, are partly responsible for the moral, personal, social, and 
religious becoming ("development") of pupils38. It was outwith the scope of the 
research to examine the many relevant documents produced by the curriculum authorities 
in England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, which provide guidance for teachers 
on how this becoming is to be achieved in schools. However, it is safe to state that almost· 
all state-funded schools and many private schools, are required by law, to teach one or 
more subjects or themes such as moral education, personal and social education, 
and religious education. 
In a separate study, the researcher (354:5-6) found that the main aim of moral education, 
personal and social education, and religious education, was to encourage responsible 
behaviour. In addition, in the same study, it was found that citizenship education, 
management and ethical values: The International Journal of Value-based Management, Institute for 
Business and Management Ethics, Hagan School of Business, Iona College, New Rochelle, New 
York 10801; and The Journal of Human Values, Management Centre for Human Values, Indian 
Institute of Management, Joka, Diamond-Harbour Road, Post Box No 16757, Alipore Post Office, 
Calcutta 700 027. 
36 Again the researcher was dissatisfied that the scope of the research did not permit detailed 
corroboration. However, the researcher has been involved in many communication skills projects and 
courses in universities in Cape Town, Glasgow and Aberdeen, and in a range of industrial 
organisations. 
37 The researcher (351:165-175) has shown this with regard to helping people to improve their report 
writing skills. 
38 In addition, there is evidence (64) (179) (212) (286) (467) that teachers in colleges and universities 
have the same responsibility. 
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environmental education, multicultural education, health education, sex 
education, and alcohol education, all had the same fundamental aim - to encourage 
responsible behaviour. In another study (348:34-53), the same was found for citizenship 
education. Even a summary glance through some of the literature on values education 
(354: 12) (374) (69) (392), character education (247) (454) and responsibility 
education (120) also revealed that these subjects or themes are initiated to teach pupils 
what it means to be responsible. The research has shown that fundamentally, being-
responsible, means being-ethical. Consequently, all the "educations" just listed, 
even if teachers are not aware of it, are initiated and taught to move pupils along 
the continuum of ethicalness. 
The research did not permit investigation of: the misunderstandings that are likely to arise 
from using the word "education" in the name of some school subjects39; the effectiveness 
of the "educations" as a means of facilitating agogic relationships and further ethicalness; 
the variety of ways proposed for undertaking moral education and values education (such 
as school climate and ethos (295:6), (382: 10) and cross-curricularity); and whether 
religious education and moral education assist people to uncover ethicals. For example, if 
in religious education pupils were encouraged to regard others of different faiths as evil 
and to be shunned, "religious education" would be a misnomer as it would not be 
contributing to education. 
However, it is relevant to point out, that despite the research showing that becoming more 
ethical is fundamental to education, and despite many people being intuitively aware of· 
this, there is evidence that in practice, policy-makers and some teachers, treat assisting 
people to become more ethical as a secondary aim. For example, Scottish schools are 
advised40 that only 10% of the curriculum in primary schools and 5% of the curriculum in 
secondary schools, would be a reasonable time allocation to religious and moral education. 
In a separate study (354:6-7), the researcher found that most of the contents of nine 
"educations", which are designed to encourage responsible behaviour, were technical: 
39 For the researcher, terminology in this field is so loosely applied that scientific communication which 
advances understanding, is nearly impossible. Carr (57:159) found similarly. There are hardly any 
definitions of what the various "educations" are, and consequently, whether, for example, values 
education is the same as moral education. "Responsibility education", "education for moral 
maturity" and "education for responsibility" (120) are tautologous because any teaching and 
learning that did not contribute to increased responsibleness or ethicalness, would not be education. 
However, further research is required to find out if other terms using "education" are tautologies. Sharp 
(389: 18) regarded "moral education" to be a generic term covering responsibility education. Some 
fellow-researchers referred to the "educations" as themes and others referred to the "educations" as 
subjects. Some wrote about personal and social development and others about personal and 
social education, without making explicit why this distinction is made. As yet, the researcher has 
not encountered an explanation as to why there is moral education and religious education, but not 
English education and geography education. 
40 By the Scottish Office Education Department (399:16). 
377 
there was limited opportunity to question and seek what it means to be ethical41 . 
4.15 EDUCATION IS A SPIRITUAL PHENOMENON 
Humanness is spiritualness. Spiritualness involves perennially questioning the worth and 
purpose of one's life; seeking the ideal of perfect humanness; seeking ways to become 
more like the ideal; and assessing one's own progress towards the ideal. Ultimately, it is 
one's own assessment of progress along the continuum of spiritualness which permits or 
does not permit experiences of worthiness and meaningfulness, that is, dignifiedness. 
Consequently, any relationship which does not contribute to a person finding out: what it 
means to be human; what ethical perfection is; and how to assess one's spiritualness, is 
not educative. Expressed in other words: any relationship which does not lead to 
experiences of dignifiedness for both agogee and agogue, and which does not contribute 
to the agogee knowing how to continue to experience dignifiedness in any situation, is not 
agogy and is not contributing to education. 
Despite the statement just made being thoroughly grounded in the research findings, it may 
still be so abstract to some readers, as to be impractical. However, some fellow-
educationists state explicitly that education is a spiritual phenomenon. For example, 
Reeves (335:86) found that: "Nothing less than a radical return to fundamentals will meet 
what is essentially a crisis of spirituality among teachers in higher education today." 
Matthews42 found that the academic profession is, profoundly, a spiritual profession. 
Woodbridge (466:34-37) found that: "It is therefore important for educators to teach their 
pupils to understand the spiritual nature of man ... ". Similarly, Ulich (426:ix-x) 
found that all education must be suffused with a spirit of humaneness ... ". In addition, 
there are at least four types of evidence in practice, of education as a spiritual 
phenomenon. 
Firstly, as both Urwin (428:3-4) and Sutherland (409:17-18) explained, there are laws in 
the United Kingdom which require schools to develop pupils spiritually. Consequently, 
some curriculum guidance documents (148) (295) (372) (373) (383) offer guidance on 
what schools could do in this regard. In some of these documents there are statements that 
show an intuitive understanding of education as an existential-ethical-spiritual 
phenomenon. For example, it is claimed (295:3) that spiritual becoming involves beliefs, a 
sense of awe, wonder and mystery, experiencing feelings of transcendence, search for 
meaning and purpose, self-knowledge, relationships, creativity, and feelings and 
emotions. Spiritual development applies to (295:2) " ... something fundamental in the 
human condition which is not necessarily experienced through the physical senses and/or 
41 The researcher provides his personal views on this contradiction later in Paragraph 5 .1 of the current 
chapter. 
42 Quoted in Reeves (335:86). 
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expressed through everyday language. It has to do with relationships with other people 
and, for believers, with God43. It has to do with the universal search for individual 
identity - with our responses to challenging experiences, such as death, suffering, beauty 
and encounters with good and evil. It is to do with the search for meaning and purpose in 
life and for values by which to live." Other policy-makers (383:19) wanted pupils to be 
encouraged to consider questions such as: What does it all mean? Why should I 
bother? and How do I make the most of life? 
Secondly, there is now in the United Kingdom, an increasing literature on spiritual 
education and spiritual "development"44 in teaching and learning institutions. While 
there is considerable uncertainty about what spiritual education, spiritual "development" 
and spirituality is, and looseness in applying terminology45, it cannot be denied that 
spiritual becoming is recognised by many to be integral to education. However, the 
finding by some policy-makers (372:4) that " ... spiritual development is an important 
element of a child's education ... ", is inadequate description. Remembering the 
interrelatedness that humanity is, and the inseparableness that humanness is, spiritual 
becoming is education. This explains why Woodbridge (466:37) found that anti-racist 
and anti-sexist education would be more effective from a spiritual basis46. 
Thirdly, the researcher found that spiritual becoming is considered by many fellow-
researchers to be taking place in religious education and moral education. For example, the 
Scottish Office Education Department (398:2) explained that within religious education " ... 
is also a personal dimension, linked to the individual's search for answers to questions · 
about meaning, value and purpose in life." Some (372:3) (373:5) regarded spiritual 
becoming to take place in all subjects of the curriculum, collective worship and through 
school ethos. Although religious becoming and moral becoming are not necessarily 
spiritual becoming, considering whether or not religious education and moral education as 
described by various curriculum authorities, have the potential to contribute to spiritual 
becoming, was outwith the scope of the research. However, while some fellow-
researchers find a relationship between religion and spirituality, several others (148:8) 
(149:1-3) (300:17) (451:12-15) corroborated what the research revealed: that religiousness 
and spiritualness are different, and that spirituality is not religiosity. 
43 The reader will remember that all humans have some God or god, even if they are not aware of this. 
More research is required to find out if there is a relationship between spiritualness and belief, and 
what this might imply for dignifiedness. 
44 See, for example: Halstead (148) for a list of over fifty papers; SPES, a magazine for the study of 
spiritual, moral and cultural values in education, RIMSCUE Centre, University of Plymouth, 
Exmouth; and Values Education, Vol 3, No 1, St Martin's College, Lancaster. 
45 For example, "human spirituality" and "spiritual education" are tautologies, and "educating the spirit" 
is inadequate description. Spirituality is an onticity applicable to humankind, and only humans can be 
educated. 
46 In a separate study (354:9-12), the researcher found similarly. 
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Fourthly, some fellow-researchers explicitly stated that education is seeking and 
answering questions about what it means to be human, and experiencing meaningfulness 
and dignifiedness. Morris47 found that: "Education is the discovery of what it means to 
be human", and Friedenberg (114:175) found that: " ... the function of liberal education 
for adults is to root dignity and the sense of self firmly in intellectual competence ... help 
them to make sense of their present position in reality, and to chart with some confidence 
their course through a world always uncertain ... ". Friedenberg ( 114: 169) continued: "For 
the way in which liberal education liberates is precisely by examining the meaning of life 
in its particular complexity." Phenix (326:5) found that:" ... the object of general education 
is to lead to the fulfilment of human life through the enlargement and deepening of 
meaning ... ". 
The reader will have noticed that many of Victor Frankl's findings have been stated as 
corroboration in this thesis. This was possible because the research revealed that being-
human means being searching for experiences of meaningfulness (dignifiedness), and 
Frankl's approach to therapy (logotherapy) involved assisting people to cope with spiritual 
distress by experiencing meaningfulness. As Frankl ( 108: 163) stated: "... logotherapy 
makes him [the client - but for the researcher, the agogee] aware of the hidden logos of his 
existence ... to make something conscious again ... cares for spiritual realities such as 
the potential meaning of his existence to be fulfilled, as well as his will to meaning." 
Consequently, the fact that some fellow-researchers48 had investigated logotherapy to find 
out if it could assist in understanding what education is, was further evidence that 
education is a spiritual phenomenon. 
4.16 EDUCATION IS AGAPE WHICH IMPLIES ONLY ONE 
FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE 
The research has revealed that agogic dialogue - the only dialogue that can contribute to 
education - is a manifestation of spiritual love (agape). Essential to agape, is utmost 
concern for the well-being of the agogee, which, in effect, entails doing all possible to 
enhance dignifiedness. As Coleman (62:435) found, education involves learning to take 
care of others and to take responsibility for others. Consequently, the educator's 
fundamental purpose is to ensure that as much as possible is done to assist 
the educand's becoming more human. 
However, the reader will be aware that although the research results have revealed one 
purpose for education, in practice, there is a general perception that there are many and 
conflicting goals. For example: Jeffreys (190:16) questioned," ... whether the purpose of 
47 Reported by Richmond (341:37). 
48 See, for example: Gill (125), Guldbrandsen (143), Meath-lang (278:202-207), and Wirth (465:34-40). 
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education is to encourage the development of the individual, or to satisfy the needs of 
society; Hirst and Peters ( 170:27) found that there is much debate about the ends of 
education; Bruner (49:4) found that there has" ... always been a dualism in our educational 
ideal ... "; and White (450:3) found that relatively few educators will have come to a 
reasoned conclusion about which of the many aims of their educating are fmally acceptable 
II 
The scope of the research did not permit a thorough investigation of the contradiction 
between the research results and the findings of some fellow-researchers. Such an 
investigation would have required comparing and contrasting the perceived differences in 
the goals of education for society and for individuals. In addition, initial reflection revealed 
considerable difficulty caused by the vagueness about what a society is. However, 
in a very preliminary way, it was found that some fellow-researchers find many and 
conflicting goals for education for three interrelated reasons. 
Firstly, it has previously been explained49 how the word "education" is used to name at 
least five different phenomena. When some fellow-researchers find many and conflicting 
goals for education, they, perhaps unknowingly, are describing two different phenomena 
simultaneously as if they were one: education as existential-ethical phenomenon 
and education as the infrastructure - the so-called "educational system" (school 
buildings, curriculum organisations, local government departments, examinations, 
curricula and so on). 
Secondly, when some fellow-researchers refer to "society's needs", they give the 
impression that these needs are different from human needs, as if society is something 
separate from the humans that are the society. In effect, although this is not usually made 
explicit50, fellow-researchers have identified that a certain group of influential people - a 
society's leaders - whether they be politicians, administrators, religious leaders or a 
dictator's family members, for example, decides what teachers must teach. Consequently, 
whether one is aware of it or not, when one says "society's needs", one is saying 
"society's needs as interpreted by the influential group of decision-
makers". In addition, when it is stated that society's needs differ from the individual's, it 
is implied that the influential group is so unaware of humanity and humanness that it 
directs the educational system (and hence teachers) in ways which hinder 
individuals in becoming more human. 
49 Chapter One, Paragraph 2.5. 
50 Hirst and Peters ( 170:27-28) do make it explicit. 
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Again, the scope of the research did not permit providing specific examples of the so-
called "educational system" hindering becoming more human, that is hindering education. 
However, the researcher considered it safe to find that since it is humans that are any 
particular society, the more aware they are of humanity and humanness, and the more they 
are allowed to participate in decisions about how teaching and learning is organised, the 
fewer will be the perceptions of conflict of goals. When a majority of people in a society 
are aware of humanity and humanness, it is reasonable to find that the collective will of the 
people in such a society would be to encourage people to become more human. 
Fundamentally, the purposes of education for individuals and for society are 
the same. What is beneficial for the individual is also beneficial for society, and devoting 
attention to enhancing the humanness of individuals, also enhances the "goodness" of a 
society; making it a more pleasant milieu in which to live. 
Thirdly, because the goal for education is so all-encompassing, the researcher gained the 
impression, that fellow-researchers who found many goals for education, had in effect, 
identified sub-goals. For example, it cannot be denied that preparing people to continue to 
find experiences of dignifiedness, involves teaching them to read and write. To protect and 
enhance dignity an individual must become competent in some skill in order to earn a 
living and experience dignifiedness through others' recognition of his or her achievement. 
Consequently, preparing people for employment is not a hindrance to education but an 
integral part of it. 
Inspectors, headteachers, and parents for example may judge an educator's effectiveness -
in mechanistic ways such as examination results, the number of pupils going to university, 
and the number of school-leavers finding jobs. However, this is not a judgement of 
education. The only judgements fundamentally relevant to education are those of the 
ago gees and agogues, themselves, and these judgements may not be visible. Ultimately, 
only the agogee will know whether or not her dignity has been recognised and enhanced, 
and whether or not she has been assisted to become the best that she can be. Ultimately, 
the agogue, through spiritual conscienceness knows whether or not she has supported the 
agogee to the best of her ability, that is, has, at all times, done the best possible to put the 
agogee's well-being first51. 
Having provided an extensive description of education as an existential-ethical 
phenomenon, the researcher considered this research project to have been completed. 
Having undertaken the extensive and interdisciplinary research on what adulthood is; 
having found it to be, fundamentally, an existential-ethical phenomenon essential to 
education; and having provided an extensive description of education as an existential-
51 Chapter Six, Paragraphs 2.7.l - 2.7.7. 
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ethical phenomenon, he felt able to offer his personal reflections (in post-scientific stance) 
on what educative teaching (educating) should involve. The reader may remember 
that education can take place in institutions other than teaching and learning institutions, 
and the researcher could also have given reflections on what educative healing and 
educative advocating are. However, the reader will remember that the researcher 
initiated this research with education in teaching and learning institutions in mind. 
Consequently, the personal reflections to follow have been limited to what educative 
teaching is. 
5.0 CONCLUSIONS: THE MEANING OF ESSENTIALLY AGOGIC 
ORIENTATED (EDUCATIVE) TEACHING 
It is reasonable to state that the research has uncovered some wide-ranging and radical 
findings. Descriptions of what it means to be ethical, to be spiritual and ultimately, to be 
human, have been provided. Definitions of spiritual conscienceness, adulthood, education 
and adult education, have also been provided. Despite their extent, the researcher 
regards52 his results as only a small contribution to understanding about humanity, 
humanness, adulthood and education. Throughout the research, numerous footnotes have 
been provided indicating some points of departure for further research. To keep this thesis 
to a reasonable length, these are not repeated in this chapter. However, despite the ever-
present need for further seeking, the researcher considers that the explication of what 
education is, as reported in this thesis, assists in explaining some of the problems 
expressed by fellow-researchers. 
For example, Rusk (366:2-3) found that investigations of education " ... raise more 
problems than they solve. To enumerate these problems is impossible, for their name is 
legion ... A coordinating, if not a determining principle is requisite ... ". Garforth 
(119:11) found that statements about education " ... point to different aspects of the 
concept, different features of its geography: one emphasises knowledge, another 
behaviour, another the duties of citizenship, another initiation into social ideals; one 
equates education with the total impact of the environment ... ". White (450:4) found that 
over the past two decades the hopes of several educational philosophers to discover the 
aims of education from an analysis of what the enterprise essentially involves, have 
not been realised. In addition, Bantock (18: 11) found that: "Educational discourse ... is 
marked by a good deal of vagueness . . . Educational writing has for long suffered 
from a distressing lack of precision ... ". 
The researcher also hopes that the research has contributed to: adult education being placed 
on firmer philosophic grounding, one rooted in ontology - a need expressed by Burstow 
(54:193); a comprehensive existentialist philosophy of education - a need identified by 
52 Present tense is now employed in this post-scientific section of the thesis. 
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Barnes (20:289); and to showing that there is a fundamental commonality among 
educators as to what we are educating people for and how we should go about it - a 
concern expressed by Barnes (20:288). The researcher respectfully considers that 
education as an existential-ethical phenomenon is not vague (although not totally free of 
vagueness}, that it names and describes one phenomenon, and that the research has 
uncovered the aims of education from what it essentially involves (becoming more 
human). 
The personal views now to be expressed in the following subparagraphs are based on the 
research results recorded in this thesis, and illustrate how the researcher would personally 
like to see educative teaching conceptualised and practiced. These personal reflections 
should not be interpreted as moralising ( ethicalising) to colleagues on how they should 
conduct themselves. However, it is respectfully pointed out that these reflections give an 
indication of what teaching should be if it is to be called "educative teaching". 
5.1 ESSENTIALLY AGOGIC ORIENTATED (EDUCATIVE) TEACHING, 
THAT IS, EDUCATING 
Educators (educative teachers), in whatever institution they work, love the educands they 
teach. This love arises from a pathic and rational understanding that their fundamental task 
is to contribute to alleviating existential dread and yearning. Educators are aware 
that all educands to some degree, cannot escape experiencing a fear so dreadful that most 
people do not wish to consider it - the potential for dignifiedlessness, that is, nothingness, 
meaninglessness and worthlessness. Educative teachers are aware that all educands are 
striving (unknowingly perhaps} to find out what it is they must do to experience 
dignifiedness: what they have to be like in order to feel wanted, valued and respected. 
Educators, because they have experienced it, are aware of the bewilderment of knowing 
that one must seek answers even when one does not know how to seek, and when one 
knows or suspects that there are no final answers. 
Educators know that they are one of the agogues in the educand's life and that without the 
support, example and encouragement of agogues, agogees cannot experience security. 
Consequently, educators know that their fundamental role is one of therapist. Although 
they recognise the universal motivation of alleviation of existential dread, educators treat 
each educand as a unique individual with a unique potential to express humanness. 
Whatever else they are required to do, educators will do all in their power to protect, 
maintain and enhance the dignity of educands, no matter what their chronological age, 
social status, or how well or badly they may behave. This means that, in some instances, 
educators are prepared to be strict but respectful, in asking for more appropriate conduct. 
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Educative teachers know that their fundamental activity with educands is not the 
transmission of information or training in certain skills, but the facilitation of ethical and 
spiritual awakening and becoming. Educators know that no matter how 
knowledgeable, intelligent, wealthy and skilled people are, unless they understand what is 
required to meet the demands of perfect humanness, and do meet these demands to some 
extent, they will not experience dignifiedness and the spiritual joy of living. Whatever else 
educators are required to do, and no matter how excellent their technical skills, they cannot 
be called "educators" if they do not assist educands to uncover the ideal of perfect 
humanness (God) and help them to move along that continuum. As Morris (287:117) 
found: " ... education must become an act of discovery": Reeves (335:16-17) 
corroborated by finding that education is exploration. For the researcher, the discovery 
and exploration, is spiritual discovery and exploration of what it means to be human. It is 
not surprising that Woodbridge (466:34-35) offers nine spiritual criteria for valuing 
persons, which express many of the researcher's views as stated in this paragraph. As 
Kubie53 found: " ... one ultimate goal of education is to help the person become a human 
being, as fully human as he can possibly be" : for the researcher, it is the ultimate goal. 
Consequently, the educator's task is to accompany agogees to know more and more, that 
they are free; that every deed and word is a choice and an act of value creation; that they 
are creators of their own lives; that they are held personally responsible for their 
responses; and that there is no escape by referring to something or somebody outside 
themselves54. Adler (2:23) recommended similarly, asking teachers and parents to 
encourage children to gain a better feeling for their own capacities and opportunities of 
life. "When they meet problems, they will not stop their efforts, look for an easy way out, 
try to escape or throw the burden on the shoulders of others, make claims for tender 
treatment and special sympathy, feel humiliated and seek to revenge themselves, .... They 
will say We must make our own lives. It is our task and we are capable of meeting it. We 
are masters of our own actions'." As Morris (287: 117) exclaimed: "A world without 
excuses! What an exhilarating possibility." 
Educators strive to adhere to the universal code of ethics, knowing that if they do, they 
will be putting the interests of educands, before their own interests, and will also avoid 
doing anything which will diminish educands' dignity. Educators are ever-vigilant for, 
and take steps to prevent, any inadvertent action of theirs which might diminish dignity. 
They are aware that, for the time they are educators, they are more experienced in 
humanness and consequently, are a personification in some small way, of the ideal of 
perfect humanness which all humans (whether they are aware of it or not) art striving to 
53 Paraphrased in Maslow (270:51). 
54 Adapted from Morris (287:48). 
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become. Educators are so aware of what is required to experience dignifiedness, that they 
do not usually need external laws or rules to ensure their ethical responses. Their spiritual 
conscience "tells" them when they are not adhering to ethicals and have tarnished the ideal 
of perfect humanness, and they know that this hinders the becoming more human of 
educands. When this happens they themselves experience dignifiedness. The educator 
knows that his and the educand's becoming more human (dignification) are inextricably 
interrelated. 
Consequently, in supporting educands, educators go beyond that which is required by, for 
example, their contract of employment, when this is necessary. When, in unfortunate 
situations, the resources made available to them for teaching are deficient (in whatever 
way) they personally and creatively compensate, until their own competence suffers and 
out of duty to educands, they resign. In addition, educators are aware of the distinction 
between morals and ethicals, which means that in very rare occasions, they disobey their 
superior's instructions, religious dictates or laws of the land when such instructions, 
dictates or laws threaten to diminish the dignity of educands. However, undertaking any 
such disobedience to favour the salary or status, for example, of the educator, is unethical. 
Educators are aware that they and their educands are questioning and questioned beings, 
and they continue to strive to find out more about what it means to be human. Although 
they are further along the continuum of humanness than their educands, educators know 
that the mystery that is humanity cannot be finally or completely answered. They know 
that their seeking will not stop as long as they are alive and that they will be perennially . 
called upon to answer adequately. Educators realise that the more they know about 
humanness, the better will be their accompaniment: they know that their effectiveness as 
educators can never be perfect or complete, and that their accompaniment can always be 
. enhanced. As Jarvis (184:130-131) found, the humanity of learners needs to be 
considered in education. The ideal of educator recedes as it is approached. As Buber 
(50: 129) found: "[in educating] ... the educator is led to an even deeper recognition of 
what the human being needs to grow." This means that educators realise their own need to 
be educands and to seek the accompaniment of other educators. 
Educators strive to do all in their power to assist educands towards the part-mode of being 
called "adulthood", and then to further adulthood, that is, they assist educands to become 
more human. They do this because they know that humanisation and dignification are 
simultaneous. As Jarvis indicated (185: 172), educators must know what experiences 
result in meaningfulness and those which result in meaninglessness. By accompanying 
them to further humanness, educators are aware that they are preparing educands' spiritual 
consciences, so that they can know without frequent external guidance, what responses 
will lead to experiencing dignifiedness and those that will not. Consequently, educators 
386 
know that they are enabling educands to become educators themselves, and in so doing, 
opening even greater opportunities for them to experience dignifiedness. 
In addition, educators know that they are contributing indirectly to the alleviation of many 
social problems, because educands who are becoming more human and simultaneously 
becoming more ethical, will be more kind, decent and considerate, and less likely to 
participate in crime. The researcher considers that social problems will be more effectively 
alleviated by having people consider in detail, what humanness and humanity are. Adler 
(2:15) found similarly, indicating that this personal and direct approach would be a more 
effective way of making a better world, than the efforts of religious or political 
movements. 
Educators assist educands to become more human by, for example: 
• being ethical - adhering to ethicals - when dealing with educands and others, and 
explaining explicitly why and how they are being ethical; 
• pointing out as often as possible when responses by an educand, or by any other 
person (whether in the present or in the past) are unethical and why they are so and 
the consequences in terms of diminishment of dignity; 
• directly providing opportunities for reflection on, and discussion of, what it means to 
be human; 
• taking the necessary action to ensure that organisational procedures allow the three 
activities just listed. 
The personal reflection just presented, of what an educator is, is an ideal one which no· 
human can ever achieve totally. However, the researcher's experience is that many 
teachers already fulfil, to some extent, many parts of the ideal. In addition, some fellow-
researchers, such as Kidd (207) have arrived at similar views. It is also possible to state 
that the further along the continuum of humanness educators are, the more effective will be 
their educating. However, every unethical response of a person who is normally regarded 
as an educator, is an instance of that person not living up to the title of "educator". A 
separate study will be required to assess what degree of deviation from the ideal would be 
required to state that a person is not deserving of the title: "educator". 
Having provided personal reflections on what essentially agogic teaching is, the researcher 
is able to offer four main recommendations for practice. 
5.2 SOME RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING EDUCATIVE 
TEACHING 
In the previous subparagraph the researcher listed four ways in which educators assist 
their educands to progress along the continuum of humanness. Consequently, the 
researcher sought ways of increasing the extent, and enhancing the quality, of those 
activities, and based his recommendations on this seeking. 
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5.2.1 EDUCATORS SHOULD COMPILE A CODE OF HUMANNESS AND 
MAKE IT EXPLICIT 
Since no educator can be a perfect educator, all educators require guidance (in differing 
degrees) on what is required to be ethical, and to simultaneously maximise educands' 
well-being from agogic relationships. The researcher considers that the fundamental code 
offered in Chapter Six55, would be a sound starting point for compiling such a code. In 
addition, a school or university mission, ethos or values statement, and an institutional 
code of ethics would also be starting points56, For example, The University of Calgary 
has a "Code of Professional Ethics for Academic Staff', which requires that academic staff 
treat students, support-staff and one another, with fairness and respect. 
However, the reader will remember that a fundamental code of ethics goes beyond a 
school ethos statement or a professional code of ethics. Consequently, even though a 
school or university has a code of ethics for academic staff, this is unlikely to be 
sufficient. A fundamental code of ethics would state in greater detail what is required to be 
a good human - the essentiality in being an effective educator. In addition, the researcher 
considers that the terms "mission statement" and "code of professional ethics" disguise the 
fact that the need for the code arises from the need for both educand and educator to 
become more human. Consequently, the researcher suggests that when an institution has 
compiled its fundamental code of ethics that it be explicitly called the "code of 
humanness", and copies distributed to all staff and all students. 
Unlike a professional code of ethics, the code of humanness should in no way be used for 
disciplinary purposes. The code of humanness is a guide for experiencing dignifiedness, 
and deviations from it are inherently punished by experiences of dignifiedlessness. 
Conduct which breaks school or university rules, should be dealt with separately under 
appropriate policy guidelines. Although in this thesis most attention has been devoted to 
the responses of agogues, it has also been explained that a code of humanness would 
include the required ethical responses of agogees (pupils and students). 
So far, the word "compile" has been used in summary fashion. However, the reader will 
be aware that merely telling teachers and lecturers, and pupils and students, what is 
required, will not be effective in helping people become more human. The code of 
humanness should be compiled by extensive discussion and questioning. By testing their 
own and others' reasoning on each of the clauses of the code, people come to their own 
55 Paragraph 2.7. 
56 As part of a separate study, the researcher wrote on the 21st June 1996, to the Principals or Vice-
Chancellors of 95 universities in the United Kingdom, asking for a copy of mission statements and 
institutional codes of ethics. So far, with 80% of responses received, no university has an 
institutional code of ethics, although some have specific codes to regulate biological and medical 
experimentation. 
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realisation of what it means to be human, and what is required of them to become more 
human. In this way agreement is not forced but achieved, and the likelihood of people 
adhering to the code is increased. Consequently, compiling a code of humanness would 
require institution-wide consultation, and repeating this consultation with new staff and 
students. 
It cannot be denied that compiling the code of humanness will require considerable effort 
and result in some misunderstanding. Some fellow-educators may even take offence at 
having to "spell-out" what many people regard as decent human behaviour. Storch and 
Stalker (407) and Kirby (212) gave some insight into the difficulties they experienced. 
While an explicit code of humanness would be a contribution to enhancing educating, it is 
safe to assume that this contribution would be even more effective if there were procedures 
and structures within which it could be applied. 
5.2.2 EDUCATORS SHOULD DESIGN PROCEDURES FOR BRINGING 
ETHICAL AND UNETHICAL RESPONSES TO EDUCANDS' 
ATTENTION 
It cannot be denied that most of the work in teaching and learning institutions involves 
transmission of information and skills. Although most educators and educationists agree, 
implicitly or explicitly, that education involves becoming more ethical, very little time in 
the procedures and curriculum of teaching and learning institutions is devoted to 
considering what it means to be ethical. The researcher considered six ways in which 
ethical and unethical responses could be brought to the attention of educands, and so assist 
them to understand what is required to experience dignifiedness. 
• In most institutions, new staff are required to undergo an induction programme, and 
new students are usually given some form of orientation. During these events, specific 
attention should be drawn to the institution's code of humanness and credit given for 
essays or other projects completed in this regard. Neuberger (296:24) explained how it 
is now mandatory at Harvard Business School for students to spend the first ten days 
of the course considering ethics. 
• An institutional committee or working party should be established to consider 
suggestions from students, lecturers, visitors and administrators, for example, on how 
the effectiveness of agogic relationships can be enhanced. For example, in many 
universities in the United Kingdom, academic departments are required by government 
funding agencies to off er students the opportunity to comment on improving the 
courses they have undertaken. Care should be taken on the "feedback" questionnaires 
to ask how the lecturer-as-agogue could be more effective57. 
57 The researcher is aware that some students will be cynical about this. However, this is not a reason 
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• Institutions should establish specialised centres to encourage students and staff from 
all disciplines to reflect on ethicals. For example, the University Center for Human 
Values at Princeton University, offers nine programmes and activities designed to" ... 
support and to supplement the growing importance of ethical inquiry for many 
disciplines. "58 In addition to assisting staff and students to understand what it means 
to be human, such centres would be an indication by senior university academics and 
administrators, that the study of ethicals should be taken seriously. 
• An annual, prestigious award should be instituted to reward those individuals in the 
institution who are recognised as paying particular attention to ethicals. 
• Educators should analyse the curriculum of the subject they teach and identify 
instances where ethicals have, and have not, been adhered to, and explicitly, albeit 
briefly, point these out to students. In schools in England this is called the "cross-
curricular" approach and in Scotland, the "permeation" approach, the idea being that 
ethical issues are inherent in all subjects of the curriculum. Tomlinson and Quinton 
(422) provided a comprehensive theoretical overview of this approach in schools, and 
Anderson ( 11) provided specific examples for a variety of subjects. In addition, 
Jenkins (191) made some suggestions for Further Education institutions, and 
Neuberger (296:24) explained how students studying law, divinity, education and 
medicine at Harvard University are required to take a course in ethics. All students 
studying for the Diploma in Legal Practice through Scottish universities, must 
complete a course in professional ethics. At least one question in the examination, or at 
least one essay for continual assessment, for every course should test students' 
understanding of what it means to be ethical. 
• A special column should be reserved in staff and student newspapers to report on 
"enhancing humanness" initiatives within the institution, and to provide specific 
examples of ethical responses adding to the well-being of all, and explaining how 
unethical responses, if any, have been to the detriment of all. In a similar way, 
institution-wide reviews should be held in some cost-effective, non-bureaucratic way, 
asking for suggestions for enhancing working relationships. 
It is safe to assume, that if some of the recommendations just listed are implemented, 
educands and educators would think more about what it means to be ethical and human. 
for not attempting to obtain information which could improve one's agogy. 
58 The quotation is taken from the Centre's promotional booklet for 1991-1992, page 1. The researcher 
knows of at least three similar centres: The Program in Ethics and the Professions in Harvard 
University; the Centre for Professional Ethics in the University of Central Lancaster; and the Centre 
for Applied Ethics in the University of Wales College Cardiff. 
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As shown by Selmes and Robb (384), several fellow-researchers also hold this view. In 
addition, it is expected that discussion resulting from the initiatives, would contribute to 
people realising that their well-being is inextricably related to the well-being of others, and 
this in turn, would contribute to more ethical behaviour. 
However, one of the facts uncovered during the research, is that knowing about ethicals 
and the ideal of perfect humanness, is not sufficient to enable one to become more human, 
and to experience dignifiedness: one must respond according to ethicals. The research has 
also revealed that it is an individual's search for what it means to be human that awakens 
spiritual conscienceness, and reveals, in a personal way, that one's dignifiedness depends 
on the dignifiedness of others. Consequently, the researcher considers that the 
recommendations listed in this subparagraph will contribute in only a small way, unless 
they are supported by a more formal approach requiring students to investigate what it 
means to be human. 
The researcher has three main reasons for this view. Firstly, in the researcher's 
experience, with the traditional requirement to show through some form of assessment, 
that they have gained information and technical skills, it is unlikely that most students will 
willingly participate in a study of ethicals. Secondly, even if lecturers did make 
considerable effort to draw students' attention to ethical issues during lectures, it would be 
impossible to discuss every ethical issue in detail. As the reader will be aware, discussing 
ethical issues adequately takes considerable time, and to do this in a chemistry, history or 
geography lecture or lesson, would require stopping the teaching of the subject that the · 
students' enroled to study. In addition, the lecturer is unlikely to be qualified to lead such 
a discussion, and depriving students of the information and skills they require in order to 
pass their examinations and to obtain employment, would be unethical. 
Thirdly, it is common knowledge that many university students are required to undertake 
courses in business, legal or medical ethics for example, and that most school pupils are 
required to attend subjects such as moral education and personal and social education59. 
However, the researcher's knowledge and experience of these courses and subjects, as 
reported elsewhere (347) (350) (354), is that they do not enable educands to penetrate to 
the essentials of what it means to be human. It is unlikely that the courses and subjects just 
mentioned, and similar ones, will lead people to realise for themselves that an unethical 
response harms their own well-being. In light of these reasons, it is reasonable to 
recommend a specific and formal time in the curriculum for considering what it means to 
be human. 
59 In order to keep the thesis to a manageable length, just what a subject and a course are, was not 
considered. 
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5.2.3 INCLUDE IN THE CURRICULUM, A SUBJECT OR COURSE 
CALLED "HUMANHOOD" 
Since the fundamental aim of education (the many agogic relationships) is to assist people 
to become more human, and since educational systems are designed to facilitate becoming 
more human, it does not seem unreasonable to recommend that pupils and children should 
be directly taught what humanity and humanness are, and what they have to do to become 
more human. Sutherland ( 410: 19-25) found that education requires an understanding of 
what the human condition is, and found (409: 16-22) that: "A search for a full 
understanding of what human beings are, is one foundation of the education of the spirit." 
Oberholzer and Greyling (311:41) found similarly: that to understand education and 
adulthood one must understand human existence. That children in schools should be 
taught to find out what it means to be human is corroborated by Glover (127:196): " ... it 
is also desirable that they [children] be taught to lay bare the deep structure of their own or 
their society's moral and political beliefs ... ". Similarly, Barnes (20:292) suggested direct 
teaching in ethics. 
There should be a university course and a school subject called "humanhood"60 which 
all students and pupils are required to study and pass. Humanhood is the study of 
humanness and humanity. The researcher considers that Sharp (389:31) found similarly 
when he asked, "Should there be a curriculum for responsibility? in schools. The 
researcher does not consider that this recommendation to force people to consider their 
humanity is unethical. Indeed, not requiring people to gain an understanding of what is -
required to become more human, and so deprive them of the greater potential to experience 
dignifiedness throughout life, is unethical. In addition, the recommendation, would 
involve merely an extension of all the other many requirements students have to fulfil in 
order to meet course requirements. 
From their own study and experiences of humanness, and according to the ability of the 
students they are teaching, fellow-educators will have their own thoughts on what the 
content of a subject called "humanhood" should be. However, it is safe to state that in 
some way or other, to some extent, the content of humanness should allow consideration 
of questions such as: "How do humans differ from animals? What does it mean to exist? 
How do humans experience meaningfulness? What fundamentally motivates humans? 
What role does the fellow-human play in my life? What is the distinction between being 
60 "Humanhood" was chosen because, as the reader knows, "humanness" and "humanity" already name 
other phenomena. In addition, "humanity" may have been confused with "humanities". Since 
1991 in separate studies, (348) (351) (354) (535), the researcher has been researching a subject he calls 
"values education". It was only towards the end of the research for this thesis that he realised that a 
better name for "values education" was "humanness" (352:49), and now, for the reasons just given, 
"humanhood". 
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moral and being ethical? What does it mean to be ethical? What does it mean to be 
spiritual? Is it possible to recognise God without religions?" 
An alternative way of approaching these complex questions with school pupils would be 
to have them reflect on and discuss in detail, particular values such as respect, honesty' 
and caring, or values issues such as teenage pregnancy, abortion, drug abuse, euthanasia 
and vandalism. From detailed discussion of these, ethicals would be uncovered and 
people would become more self-aware. As Scheffler (378:25) recognised, with the 
attainment of self-consciousness comes the ability to attend to, and to correct, conduct in 
light of rules and ideals. 
The reader will realise that humanhood will involve pupils and students in philosophy. 
However, from the findings revealed by the research, it is evident that the philosophy will 
not be of the kind usually encountered in a course in philosophy as offered by university 
departments of philosophy, during which students (in lectures, tutorials and private 
reading) study the findings of famous philosophers. Rather, humanhood will involve 
pupils and students undertaking their own personal search - their own philosophical 
investigations, individually through personal reflection, and as a collaborative effort in 
discussion with other educands and educators. 
Humanhood will simultaneously involve students answering questions about their 
humanness and preparing themselves to answer further questions, and so become more 
human. Humanhood would involve a spiritual quest, for as Jenkins61 found, spiritual· 
contemplation is not too sharply distinguished from philosophical contemplation: " ... 
whether one is a believer in God or not, or through whatever religious tradition one 
explores this, is there not a strong case for keeping an awareness of the dimension of 
yearning, wonder and desire for commitment to true and lasting value as a necessary part 
of what it is to be human?" 
The researcher considers that Barnes (20:315) suggested similarly: the habit of self-
analysis (not morbid introspection) is " ... a legitimate aim of teaching ... to instil in the 
individual the realisation that the process of making oneself is never-ending, that the 
interests and rewards it offers are directly commensurate with the psychic labor and 
anguish which one is willing to put into the task .... Learning to comprehend the full 
meaning of one's own growth and to find the process interesting even when painful is one 
of the prime sources of satisfaction ... ". Jonas ( 194:26) found similarly: " ... the business 
of philosophical knowledge, takes precedence before everything else." 
61 Quoted in Reeves (335:80). 
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There is further evidence of the validity of recommending personal philosophical 
investigation (whether through face-to-face dialogue or dialogue through the written 
word). Both Ulich (425:106) and Scheffler (378:25-26) reported Aristotle and his fellow-
Greeks finding that thinking - the pursuit of wisdom and critical self-knowledge - creates a 
meaningful life. Ulich (425: 108) related thinking to dignifiedness in saying that 
thinking is essential for the spiritual side of human existence. Pascal62 found similarly: 
"Thus all our dignity lies in thought. By thought we must raise ourselves ... Let us strive 
to think well - therein is the principle of morality." 
Frankl (109:156) found that: " ... psychotherapy, handled correctly will release a patient's 
religiosity, even if that religiosity was dormant and its release was not at all intended by 
the therapist." Wilson (460: 184) suggested that philosophers should stand out as 
therapists. It has already been explained63 how the role of the educator is, to some extent, 
existential therapist. The researcher considers that once people are initiated into making 
explicit their asking of ultimate questions, they become more interested in these questions 
and consequently, begin to uncover humanity as spirituality. The School Curriculum and 
Assessment Authority in England (373:7) found similarly: "The essential factor in 
cultivating spirituality is reflection and learning from one's experiences." 
Several fellow-researchers record findings which show the interrelationship of 
philosophical investigation, education and becoming more human. For example, 
Socrates64 found that the unexamined life is not worth living. For the researcher, this 
means that by investigating what being human is, which is simultaneously investigating· 
what I am, experiences of dignifiedness are more likely. Cupitt (71:5-6) found that people 
are drawn to philosophy because it strengthens the soul and gives comfort in adversity, 
that philosophy is therapy and that (71:100) philosophy is " ... liberating where it helps 
people to question things that need to be questioned ... ". Phenix (326:5) found similarly: 
"If education is to be regarded as grounded in the search for meaning, the primary goal of 
a philosophy of the curriculum is to analyze the nature of meaning." 
Although he used "moral", Degenaar (81:265-266) illustrated the interrelationship of 
ethicalness and becoming more human: being moral involves " ... the continual 
examination of one's life, becoming involved in and concerned about how one's life 
affects other people, giving valid reasons for one's actions, respecting persons as sources 
of feelings ... ". The researcher considers that some psychologists researching moral 
development65 have identified the role of philosophical investigation in becoming more 
62 Quoted in May (271 :42). 
63 Chapter Eight, Paragraph 8.2. 
64 Quoted by Degenaar (81 :255). 
65 The reader will, by now, be aware that "moral development" is more adequately expressed as "ethical 
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human when they referred to the child as moral philosopher (225:181-186), the 
adolescent as a philosopher (226), and individuals constructing their own sense of 
morality ( 118). As Murdoch (291 :78) found, moral philosophy is the examination of the 
most important of all human activities. 
The researcher considers that Ulich ( 425:226) summarised the researcher's and many 
fellow-researchers' findings: "WHENEVER philosophy becomes its true self ... an 
attempt to help men in the understanding of themselves and in the mastery of their lives, it 
meets education. One could say, it becomes education in its highest form ... those 
rightfully entrusted with educational responsibility not only search for better methods of 
teaching, but also ask fundamental questions such as: What is life's deeper meaning? How 
can man's greatest good, his freedom of transcendence, of thought, and of choice, be 
directed for the good of mankind?" 
So far in this subparagraph, the researcher has shown that many fellow-researchers, think 
as the researcher does, that personal philosophical investigation would assist people in 
becoming more ethical and more human. Fromm ( 116: 160-162) showed why this is so by 
explaining the human requirement to listen to spiritual conscience and why most people 
find this very difficult to do. For the researcher, personal philosophical investigation of 
what it means to be human involves listening to spiritual conscience. 
. 
The scope of the research did not extend to examining the most effective ways of 
conducting classes involving philosophical investigation. However, in a preliminary way,· 
and bearing in mind that becoming more human is dependent on self-discovering of 
ethicals, the researcher considers that during humanhood classes: 
• although educators may offer guidance on topics for discussion, they must be willing 
to examine other options chosen by the class members; 
• a consensus may emerge, but this is not forced by the educators. In addition, the 
consensus view of the class is not forced, explicitly or implicitly, on any person, who 
does not agree; 
• educators' views carry no more authority than the educands'. Any member of the class 
is entitled to state why he or she would not respond in such-and-such a way, and other 
members of the class are entitled to respectfully test the reasoning of classmates; 
• the mode of discussion is one of mutual respect where pre-agreed rules do not permit 
mocking, insulting and shouting, and where listening and giving reasons for one's 
views are required; 
• people are not told what is right or wrong in relation to any ethical issue66. 
becoming". 
66 Of course, people would be asked to abide by the pre-agreed rules of discussion. 
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Sometimes, telling people how to behave and enforcing good behaviour, are necessary 
and desirable. However, during humanhood classes, telling would be ineffective 
because the benefit comes from uncovering for oneself what is required to become 
more human and experience dignifiedness. Consequently, during humanhood classes 
the code of ethicals is not given, and no attempt is made to inculcate or internalise any 
values or to indoctrinate67. 
In summary, personal philosophical investigation as a way of finding out what it means to 
be human, and of experiencing dignifiedness, is expressed by Phenix (326:253-255): 
"The distinctive function of philosophy is the interpretation of meaning . ... The method of 
philosophy is essentially that of dialectic ... a process of conceptual examination by 
raising questions, proposing answers, and developing implications of those answers in 
continuing cycles ... The medium of philosophical inquiry is discursive language ... ". 
Some readers may consider that the philosophical investigation humanhood would 
involve, would be appropriate for university students, but not for school pupils. 
However, since all humans ask existential questions, there appears to be no reason for this 
distinction. To some extent, school pupils are already being asked to think 
philosophically. More significantly, there is considerable evidence that children as young 
as six can take part in extended complex discussion and enjoy it. This was illustrated in a 
BBC 2 television programme in 1991 called "Socrates for six-year-olds"68, and is 
documented by Minnis (281:1). In addition, fellow-researchers have documented the 
philosophical investigation approach for encouraging ethical behaviour, and there are· 
several well-established organisations which research and promote philosophy for 
children, or philosophy in schools69. 
The researcher does not underestimate the considerable obstacles that are likely to be 
encountered when attempts are made to introduce humanhood into the curricula of 
teaching and learning institutions. Introducing any new subject may require the approval 
of curriculum councils, government education departments, and higher and further 
education funding councils. However, there are at least four indications that a new subject 
of humanhood is not just wishful thinking. 
67 Kirby (212) found similarly. 
68 The title of this programme was a misnomer and was misleading: the children were not studying the 
findings of Socrates but were involved in philosophical investigation using the Socratic method. 
69 See for example, Costello (67:5-10), Fisher (103:10-13), Lipman (251:139-147), Sharp (390:3-8) and 
Williams ( 459:5-6). The researcher is aware of: The Society for the Advancement of Philosophical 
Enquiry and Reflection in Education (SAPERE), Maine B, Christ's Hospital, Horsham, West Sussex, 
RH13 7NF; The Centre for Philosophy with Children, Old Acres, Charvil, Berks, RGlO 9QL; Centre 
for Thinking Skills, Brunel University, 300 St Margaret's Road, Twickenham, TWl lPT; and the 
European Philosophical Inquiry Centre, West Quadrangle, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, G12 
8QQ. The researcher also knows of the European Foundation for the Advancement of Philosophy with 
Children, and the International Council for Philosophical Inquiry with Children. 
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Firstly, privately-funded schools would need only the approval of the parents and a Board 
of Governors, say, to introduce humanhood. In addition, it has already been explained 
how in Scotland, schools are required to devote a certain percentage of curriculum time to 
moral education, and personal and social development. Headteachers have discretion as to 
how this statutory requirement is met. It could be met more effectively than it currently is, 
by introducing humanhood. Secondly, as already described, philosophy in schools and 
philosophy for children are becoming respected activities. Several fellow-researchers are 
recommending, as Glover (127:196) does, that " ... the techniques of philosophical 
criticism are made a central part of education ... ". Thirdly, there are, already in the United 
Kingdom, several collections of materials 70 that could be the beginnings of materials for 
discussion in humanhood. These could be used as examples to produce further materials 
for pupils of all ages. Fourthly, the researcher has, in a separate study (352:48-49), 
explained how five objections to introducing the subject "values education" (which is very 
similar to humanhood) can be overcome. 
However, it cannot be denied that if educators are to assist their agogees more directly by 
facilitating the study of humanness, they will themselves require knowledge of humanness 
and skills in conducting classes in humanhood. This led the researcher to consider another 
recommendation. 
5.2.4 "HUMANHOOD" SHOULD BE A SUBJECT IN THE 
CURRICULUM FOR TRAINEE-EDUCATORS 
It is reasonable to suggest that since they are fundamentally involved in accompanying 
people in becoming more human, educators must know to a greater extent than their pupils 
and students do, what humanity and humanness are. Ulich (426:ix-x) found similarly as 
did Phenix (326: 17): "Since education is a means of helping human beings to become 
what they can and should become, the educator needs to understand human nature." In 
addition, educators need to be skilled at facilitating some of the activities already listed in 
the recommendations presented in this paragraph. 
However, the skills learned are not techniques based on humankind as some kind of 
learning machine. Jarvis (185:171) found that:" ... an understanding of human experience 
is vital in order to comprehend learning." As May (271:76) explained: "Our Western 
tendency has been to believe that understanding follows technique; if we get the right 
technique, then we can penetrate the riddle of the patient. ... The existential approach holds 
the exact opposite; namely, that techniques follows understanding." Consequently, to be 
70 Cross (69), Joyce (196) and Rowe and Newton (364), are only three such collections prepared for 
schools. Aitken et al (4) and the Guide Association (142) have produced similar collections for the 
voluntary sector. 
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effective, educators have to understand agogees as expressions of humanness and 
humanity. 
Consequently, the recommendations presented so far, also apply to teacher-training 
institutions. More specifically, just as pupils and students should be required to undertake 
a personal search of what humanness is, so should trainee-educators: humanhood should 
be a subject in the curriculum for trainee-educators 71. This recommendation is expressed 
in different terms by Morris (287:136-137) who explained that Socrates frequently asked 
questions to which no one could know the answer and consequently, is the epitome of the 
seeker after truth, the inquirer or researcher. Morris (287:137) continued: "We 
must renew and reactivate the association of the teacher with the inquirer." 
It could be claimed that during a study of moral education, religious education, personal 
and social education, and philosophy of education, for example, and during training to be 
guidance teachers, trainee-educators are considering what it means to be human. 
However, because the content of these and similar subjects is mainly to do with technical 
transmission of information, and very little to do with relationships (354:6-7), the 
researcher considers that the extent of personal search undertaken, and consequently, the 
extent of trainee-educator understanding of humanness and humanity, is minimal. The 
more trainee-educators find out for themselves, with the accompaniment of an 
andragogue, what it means to be human, the more effective their own accompaniment of 
agogees will be. This, in tum, will result in more experiences of dignifiedness for them 
and their agogees. 
In the previous subparagraph it was explained how teachers of chemistry or geography 
should not neglect the teaching of these subjects by stopping to consider in detail every 
ethical issue arising from the subject content. While all trainee-educators, no matter what 
their subject specialism, should be required to study humanhood so as to be better able to 
assist their agogees become more human, this does not mean that they have to specialise 
in, and teach, the subject called "humanhood". Consequently, it is part of this 
recommendation, that specialist teachers of humanhood be trained. Trainee-
educators who intend teaching humanhood, would have to have an even greater 
understanding of what humanness and humanity are, and of how to facilitate Socratic class 
discussions which contribute to their agogees' becoming more human. The researcher 
considers that Barnes' (20:313-314) arrived at similar findings. She suggested more 
councillors of a philosophical type in schools - not just guidance teachers or psychiatrists -
71 The researcher has not conducted a study of the curricula followed by trainee-educators in teacher 
education institutions in the United Kingdom. However, it is expected that a direct study of what it 
means to be human is currently not in the curriculum for most trainee-educators: further research will 
indicate the adequacy of this expectation. 
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and that their approach should not only involve adjusting children to society, but really 
helping them to understand their existence. It is relevant that Tennyson and Strom 
(415:298) found counselling to be a moral enterprise. 
Again, the researcher does not underestimate the difficulty of introducing humanhood as 
an additional subject in the curriculum for trainee-educators. In addition, the researcher 
understands if some of the recommendations offered in this paragraph seem unrealistic to 
the reader. However, there is considerable and growing evidence that many educators and 
educationists are realising that educating involves accompanying others in their becoming 
more human72. The resear~her considers that the questions asked by Wilson (463:31) 
have been partially answered: " ... how schools and other institutions can at least make 
space for, and encourage, the growth of a capacity for love ... What sort of relationships 
should teachers and pupils have with each other, so as to enable, not just fairness and 
'professionalism', but a sense of belonging? What kind of teachers do we need for this, 
and how can they be educated to do it well?" 
Having offered four recommendations which, if implemented, should enhance experiences 
of dignifiedness for educators and educands, and consequently, which should over time, 
enhance the well-being of all people in a society with an education system which does 
implement them, the researcher is able to conclude this thesis. 
5.3 ADULTHOOD, EDUCATION, GOD AND THE MYSTERY THAT IS 
HUMANITY 
Little did the researcher realise, when he started out on the search for a more adequate 
definition of adulthood, that he would have ended up revealing the interrelatedness of 
adulthood, education and God. As Buber corroborated: "Nothing but the image of 
God. That is the indefinable, only factual, direction of the responsible 
modern educator." Although he had suspicions that education was an ethical 
phenomenon, little did he guess that he would reveal education as a spiritual phenomenon, 
and spiritual love (agein) as the essential in effective accompaniment to becoming more 
human. Little did the researcher realise that he would end up confirming the spiritual 
(human) fact documented in the books of many religions over the centuries: put God 
first; strive to be like God and all else will be right. Employing an existential 
phenomenological approach, the researcher has uncovered what it means to be human, 
fundamentally. 
72 For example, Selmes and Robb (385) (386) present the findings of fifteen fellow-researchers on the 
implications of values education for teacher training institutions. In addition, many references have 
been made in this thesis to journals and centres associated with research into "human values", "values" 
or "values education". In the United Kingdom a Values Education Council was established to co-
ordinate the efforts of about fifteen institutions promoting values education. In the United States of 
America, the researcher knows of, The American Society for Value Inquiry, The Society for Values in 
Higher Education, and the Institute of Global Ethics, for example. 
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Consequently, the researcher has been able to uncover fundamental descriptions of 
adulthood, education, spiritual conscienceness and God, descriptions, which are universal 
- applicable to all cultures. Fundamental descriptions, by definition, cannot be expressed 
in any more radical way. The fundamental description of adulthood, is the description 
from which all other descriptions of adulthood arise. The fundamental description of 
education, is the description from which all other descriptions of education arise. 
Fundamental descriptions are those descriptions which fellow-researchers, employing the 
same approach as the researcher, should also uncover. However, as stated many times in 
this thesis, finding fundamental descriptions, is not the end of the search. It is likely that 
fellow-researchers will find even better ways of expressing the fundamental descriptions. 
The reader will also know that although the researcher has tried to penetrate to the very 
essence (radix) of being-human, and to verbalise what he has found, he has not succeeded 
totally and never will, as no other researcher will. It is for this reason that Morton's 
finding is stated underneath the title of this chapter. As Ginsberg (126:234) found: "Our 
humanity remains an adventure in discovery. Such a discovery is not gathering of 
information; it is revealing of who we are and thereby self-transformation." The 
interrelatedness of existentiality, agogicality, ethicality, and spirituality, and the 
inseparableness of existentialness, agogicalness, ethicalness and spiritualness, will remain 
a mystery. The question still remains: Why do humans strive to become more and more 
human when they know they cannot become perfect? Accompanying others on their 
frustrating and frightening way to discovering what it means to be human, is· 
accompanying them to perennially experiencing, in ever greater degrees, the awe and 
wonder of the mystery that is humankind. As Marcel (536:83) found: " ... the mystery of 
what I am in myself is the very thing about me which is only revealed in love." What 
greater gift can one give others and oneself, than oneself as agogue. 
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